

NORAD

Review

Norwegian Church Aid – Darfur Programme

Final report

May 20, 2011

Nordic Consulting Group

Fr. Nansenspl. 4, 0160 Oslo

www.ncg.no

Review Team: Christian Balslev-Olesen, team leader and Agyedho Bwogo, national consultant

Quality-assurance: Nora Ingdal

The views and opinions expressed in this Report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Norad.

Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS	3
ACRONYMS	4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	5
1. INTRODUCTION	8
2. REVIEW APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY	9
2.1 PURPOSE	9
2.2 REVIEW CRITERIA.....	9
2.3 METHODOLOGY	10
2.4 LIMITATIONS	11
3. CONTEXT	12
3.1 COUNTRY CONTEXT.....	12
3.2 INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS	14
3.3 NCA DARFUR PROGRAMME	15
4. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS	18
4.1 ASSESSMENT MATRIX	18
4.2 FINDINGS	20
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	27
ANNEXES	30
A1 - TERMS OF REFERENCE.....	30
A2 - DOCUMENTS	37
A3 - HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES.....	39
A4 - PEOPLE MET	42
A5 - COMBINED SECTOR ASSESSMENT MATRIX.....	45
A6 – RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE JOINT REVIEW 2009	65
A7 - VISION 2015	68

Acronyms

ACT	Action by Churches Together
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AUHIP	AU High-level Implementation Panel
AUPD	AU High Level Panel on Darfur
CAFOD	Catholic Aid for Overseas Development
CBO	Community Based Organization
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSA	Compliance, Support and Advisory Group
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DERO	Darfur Emergency Response Operation
EPR	Emergency Preparedness and Response
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission (Government of Sudan)
HR	Human Resources
HUM	Section for Humanitarian Affairs
IDP	Internal Displaced Persons
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JMAC	AU Joint Mission Analysis Centre
MFA	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NFI	Noon Food Items
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
OCHA	Office of Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
SCC	Sudan Council of Churches
SLA	Sudanese Liberation Army
SUDO	Sudan Development Organization
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNAMID	UN and AU Mission in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	UN World Food Programme

Executive summary

Norway has provided bilateral support to UN and humanitarian agencies in Darfur since 2004. Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) has for the last two years been the only Norwegian organisation present in Darfur. The NCA Darfur Programme is a joint response by the ACT Alliance and Caritas Internationalis implemented in partnership with SudanAid and the Sudan Council of Churches in South and West Darfur.

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has funded NCA's Darfur programme since 2006 with an annual amount of NOK 10.5 million, which accounted for 10-14% of the total budget. The Programme has provided support to more than 300,000 beneficiaries since 2004, and since 2009 it has been one of the biggest programmes in the area with an outreach to the most vulnerable people in West and South Darfur. In early 2011, MFA asked Norad to conduct an external Review of NCA's Darfur programme, and a team of consultants from Nordic Consulting Group was commissioned to do the Review.

The main purpose of the Review was to analyse the relevance of the programme objectives based on an assessment of the overall conflict context in Darfur. The Review was asked to assess to which extent the context could challenge NCA's adherence to humanitarian principles. A programme assessment matrix - based upon the DAC criteria of relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, results and impact - was developed and became the key instrument in assessing the performance of the programme.

Background

The uprising and protesting against the lack of development in Darfur came to international attention in 2002. By the end of 2005, 1.8 million villagers had been displaced into internal displaced people (IDP) camps where international agencies managed to prevent widespread starvation and epidemics through the provision of basic services. Along the continued armed conflict between the GoS and the rebel movements there has been an increase in banditry and sporadic violence between different groups, often divided along tribal lines.

The protracted crisis in Darfur has left an estimated 4.6 million people reliant on some form of humanitarian aid. The international community's efforts to introduce and support peacekeeping forces in Darfur, initially through the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and since January 2008 through the larger joint UN and AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), have had little effect on the fighting and insecurity, although the efforts have reduced the attacks on the IDPs venturing outside the camps.

In March 2009, following the decision by the International Criminal Court to indict the President of Sudan, the Government responded by expelling 13 international organisations and closing down three national NGOs, including SUDO which was a member of the NCA Darfur Programme. These actions substantially reduced the implementation capacity and coverage of the international humanitarian efforts in Darfur. In early 2010, the security situation in Darfur again deteriorated sharply. Two years after the expulsion, the present humanitarian situation in Darfur is characterised in summary by:

- (1) Restricted access and reduced capacity in the field. Government restrictions have meant that humanitarian information, data and analyses have dried up. OCHA and UN agencies do not/cannot provide updated information and data. As expressed by OCHA: "...we have lost our ears and eyes".
- (2) Increased insecurity for the humanitarian actors: kidnapping, hostage taking, carjacking, and criminal accidents have escalated during the past two years.
- (3) Increased bureaucratic restrictions and expulsion of humanitarian agencies and staff have reduced the presence. The agencies are operating in an environment of uncertainty and fear.

- (4) Programming and documentation/reporting on protection, human rights, Gender-Based Violence (GBV) have been stripped from UN and NGO programmes and information.

Within this extreme politicised security environment, the Review found that the Programme has been able to deliver key lifesaving interventions for a high number of beneficiaries and to produce and document achievements. NCA has even been able to provide evidence of impact of some of the activities.

For the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) and Health and Nutrition sectors, the performance score is high. For all the sections of these programmes performance is high because the strategy, capacity and competence is in place and has been core business for the programme since its very beginning.

For School Support/Education, Peace Building, Organisational Development and Capacity Building and Early Recovery, the scores are medium. These sections has had reduced or weak strategies and has not been able to build and develop the necessary staff capacity and competence to lead and consolidate activities.

For the crosscutting issues performance was found to be medium for Gender, Environment and HIV/AIDS and low for Protection because of Government interference on issues of human rights, Gender-Based Violence GBV and protection.

A number of findings and recommendations addressing the eight main issues in the Terms of Reference (ToR) of the Review are summed up below.

Conclusions and recommendations:

Conclusion 1: The NCA Darfur Programme has evolved since its inception and adapted to new realities. It has been able to fill important lifesaving gaps in 2009 when NGOs were expelled or closed down. However, assessments and analyses of root causes of the conflict are not consistent, and they are not linked to programming with regard to identifying specific connectors and dividers that need to be strengthened and weakened respectively. NCA does consistently perform technical assessment as part of project planning, but none of the assessments include contextual assessment of the conflict. The absence of systematic conflict sensitive assessments has implications for the Programme's understanding and ability to facilitate local peace and reconciliation process. The first recommendation is therefore:

- 1. The Programme would have to develop its analytical and strategic capacity to do conflict sensitive assessments - Do No Harm - and incorporate that consistently into programme planning.**

Conclusion 2: The Programme is constituted and builds on strong partnerships with SudanAid and Sudan Council of Churches. The national partners are essential due to their access and outreach to groups in rural areas, their ability to facilitate local peace process and ensure sustainability of projects, but their potential is not fully developed with regard to capacity building and enabling the local partners to take over the programme. The Review therefore recommends:

- 2. The Programme will have to redefine strategies and speed up capacity building, and focus on activities/sectors with clear strategies and sufficient capacity.**
- 3. NCA needs to speed up the process of making a strategy for focusing, consolidating, and handing over of the Programme to the local partners.**
- 4. The Programme will have to redefine its livelihood section and ensure that the Programme will have the necessary technical competence and capacity.**

Conclusion 3: The Government is basically in control of humanitarian priorities and activities. HAC/ Government controls access for agencies approves project documents (TA) including staffing level and profile of staff and controls release of humanitarian data and information. Since 2009 programming and documentation of violation of human rights, protection and GBV issues and advocacy has been dropped by agencies in Darfur.

- 5. Having understood the extreme sensitivity concerning protection issues in Darfur, the Programme needs to find innovative ways and means to document and report on critical issues of human rights, protection and GBV to inform programming and stakeholders.**

Conclusion 4: The Programme has during the past years built and developed its M&E capacity, having full-time international M&E staffing. Log frame analysis with impact indicators and gender disaggregated data has been implemented for all sectors. Internal and external reviews and evaluations have been introduced for some sectors, but not yet for all sectors.

- 6. The Programme has to increase its quality assuring systems to secure systematic ongoing reviews/evaluations for all sectors and administrative functions within the Programme and develop tools and instruments for remote management and monitoring. The Programme should develop strategic scenario programme planning for different scenarios.**

Conclusion 5: NCA has been able to stay and expand its activities by keeping a low profile, suspending protection programming and documentation and using its long history in Sudan, its presence and network to negotiate issues of concern with local and national authorities. But the conditions set by Government and basically accepted by NCA, UN and agencies as conditions for being present in Darfur are a violation of humanitarian principles and thereby a concession according to human rights and humanitarian actions¹.

- 7. The Programme will have to review its “red lines” or “threshold levels” according to humanitarian principles and international standards as already outlined in the Vision and Strategy for 2011-2015 and communicate that to key stakeholders.**

Conclusion 6: The present organisational set-up of the Programme seems to be working, having in mind the reality and conditions set by the Government. But the set-up is complex, basically having two parallel set-ups, distinguishing between Governance issues addressed to the Compliance, Support and Advisory Group (CSA) and Management issues addressed to NCA’s Management and Board. Uncertainties and lack of clarity on communication procedures between the two bodies create confusion in communication on sensitive issues for the management in Sudan/Darfur.

- 8. The present complex organisational and management set-up of the Darfur Programme with dual communication lines for Management should be addressed by the CSA as soon as possible.**

Conclusion 7: Because of the scope and coverage of the Programme, NCA is playing a lead role in cooperation and coordination between agencies in South and West Darfur. NCA is an active partner within coordination mechanisms and senior management is co-opted into UN coordination mechanisms representing NGOs. MFA has encouraged NCA to take on more responsibility and take up the role as cluster coordinator for WASH cluster. NCA has not had the capacity nor seen it as its task.

- 9. The Programme should either insist on UNICEF to take up its mandate as cluster lead for WASH or consider attracting funding and having staff to take up the responsibility as cluster lead for WASH.**

¹ Humanitarian Action: Assistance, protection and advocacy actions undertaken on an impartial basis in response to human needs resulting from complex political emergencies and natural hazards.

1. Introduction

Norway has been involved in the protracted crisis of Darfur since its beginning in 2003, mainly through humanitarian funding of UN and NGO programmes. Norwegian humanitarian funding has been partly channelled via the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) of which a high proportion has been disbursed for UN and partly through NGO programmes in Darfur. Norway has provided bilateral support to UN agencies in Darfur, mainly UNHCR and UNICEF as well as the ICRC and Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). The latter being the only Norwegian organisation still present and working in Darfur.

The NCA Darfur Programme (hereafter referred to as “the Programme”) is a joint response by the ACT Alliance and Caritas Internationalis to address the humanitarian needs brought about by conflict, insecurity and population displacements in South and West Darfur. The Programme is implemented by NCA working in partnership with SudanAid and the Sudan Council of Churches. Since its launch as a joint ACT/Caritas programme in July 2004, the Programme has provided support to well over 300,000 beneficiaries across a wide range of sectors: health, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene, education, agriculture, protection, peace-building, psychosocial support and livelihoods. ACT and Caritas members have provided over USD 90 million to the Programme from Government donors, private funds and UN sources.

The Section for Humanitarian Affairs (HUM) at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has funded NCA’s Darfur programme for several years with an annual amount of approximately NOK 10.5 million – totalling around NOK 52.7 million. Funding for the NCA Darfur Programme has been made available based upon yearly appeals. Since 2004 ACT and Caritas have issued appeals for the Darfur Programme – the first and biggest appeal for 18 months in 2004 of USD 35 mill – since 2008 around USD 11 mill. MFA has been funding the appeals since 2006 – and since then with a contribution which represent between 10-14% of the total appeals. The table below shows the contributions of MFA grants from 2006 to 2010.

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total (NOK)
MFA HUM (million NOK)	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.7	52.7

The HUM section asked Norad to conduct a review of NCA’s Darfur programme and its role as a coordinator for ACT, Caritas and national partners within the framework of annual ACT appeals. After an open tender process, a team of consultants from Nordic Consulting Group was commissioned to do the review. The consultants included humanitarian experts from Denmark, Sudan and Norway.

2. Review approach and methodology

2.1 Purpose

The purpose of the Review is outlined in the ToR (Annex A1). Three specific issues for the Review have been highlighted in the ToR:

Relevance and context: Analyse and assess the relevance of the programme goals based on an assessment of the overall context - focus on how the context may challenge adherence to humanitarian principles. *The review should analyse whether NCA has been forced to make any concessions, and, if so, which concessions, to be able to keep up operations in this extremely difficult context.*

Conflict sensitivity and risk assessment: Analyse and assess the extent to which NCA operates in a conflict-sensitive manner (i.e., based on a Do No Harm-approach) in programme planning and implementation.

Outcome and possible impact: Analyse and assess the outcomes and possible impact of the programme according to its goals and objectives. *(1) The review shall assess the effectiveness (relation output-outcome), possible impact, relevance and sustainability of the programme (DAC criteria). (2) The review shall assess NCA's cooperation with its local partners - including capacity building, sustainability and phase-out strategies, and (3) The review shall assess NCA-Darfur's administrative/management capacity - including financial management, planning capacity and quality assurance and control systems*

Each of the three issues has been developed further into a number of specific questions.

2.2 Review criteria

As the funding to the NCA Programme has been channelled via the humanitarian allocation, the review will refer to Norway's Humanitarian Policy 2008² and the MFA strategic document on Sudan from March 2010,³ in addition to OECD-DAC's evaluation criteria.

The Review will be applied against the following humanitarian principles and criteria:

(1) International humanitarian principles including International Humanitarian Law and The Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles (GHD)⁴, (2) The Code of Conduct for International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, (3) The Do No Harm "Analytical Framework", (4) The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response - the Sphere Standards and (5) UN Security Council Resolution 1325 Women Peace and Security (2000) as applied in (6) The IASC Gender Handbook for Humanitarian Action (2006)⁵.

For a presentation of the above mentioned principles and guidelines see Annex A3

The ToR outlines the DAC evaluation criteria to be applied for the Review. The five criteria for this Review include relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, results and impact, leaving out efficiency from the DAC

² http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2243145/PDFS/STM200820090040000EN_PDFS.pdf

³ *Sudangjennomgangen: Retningen videre for Norsk Sudan-engasjement, March 2010*

⁴ <http://www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org/gns/principles-good-practice-ghd/overview.aspx>

⁵ <http://www.humanitarianreform.org/Default.aspx?tabid=656>

criteria. The five DAC criteria are explained and elaborated further according to humanitarian actions and explained how they are used in this Review.

Relevance and Appropriateness	‘Relevance is concerned with assessing whether the project is in line with local needs and priorities (as well as donor policy).’ ‘Appropriateness is the tailoring of humanitarian activities to local needs, increasing ownership, accountability, and cost-effectiveness accordingly.’
Effectiveness	‘Effectiveness measures the extent to which an activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs. Implicit within the criterion of effectiveness is timeliness.’
Sustainability	‘Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. Projects need to be environmentally as well as financially sustainable.’
Results (outputs)	The DAC Glossary of Key Terms defines ‘results’ in broad terms ‘The output, outcome or impact (intended or unintended, positive and/or negative) of a development intervention.’
Impact (outcomes)	‘The positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.’

2.3 Methodology

The Review was divided into three phases with the following deliverables:

- Phase 1: Desk study: Archive research in MFA, study of project documents, interviews in Oslo and development of evaluation tools
Output: Inception Report
- Phase 2: Field work: Interviews, observations, data collection - stakeholders and beneficiaries
Output: Debrief to key stakeholders in Darfur/Khartoum (Programme staff, Management and Norwegian Mission)
- Phase 3: Report: Debrief, analysis, verification and report writing
Output: Debrief key stakeholders in Geneva (CSA) and Oslo (NORAD, MFA and NCA) and Report

The Inception Report, which was based upon desk studies and interviews with NCA, MFA and Norad in Oslo, outlined eight preliminary findings. By approving the Inception Report, Norad agreed that the eight preliminary findings should become focus and key questions for the Review. For the Preliminary Findings including Norad’s comments see chapter 4. The Review team obtained full access to the archives in MFA and was given documents from NCA (list of documents consulted in Annex A2).

During the field mission the team visited Khartoum – Norwegian Mission, donors, UN agencies, INGOs, NCA Sudan office and HAC. During the visit to Darfur – Nyala, Darfur South and Zalingie, Darfur West – the team visited beneficiaries in Deriej and Khamsadagaig camp, UN and UNAMID, INGOs, SCC - SudanAid - and NCA field offices and staff. Interviews and focus group meetings took place in Khartoum and Darfur. The

interviews were semi-structured, guided by questions outlined in an interview guide in the Inception Report and based upon the criteria and questions set out in the ToR

As part of the Debrief, the team visited Geneva and met with members of the CSA – key stakeholders for the Darfur Programme from ACT, Caritas, CAFOD and NCA. The team has consulted and reviewed over 35 documents including appeals, reports, assessment, guidelines, reviews and evaluations. A number of UN documents and reports have provided useful background information for the Review and made it possible to use many sources of information to crosscheck findings.

During the Review the team has interviewed a total of 78 people (see list of people met in Annex A4). Six focus group meetings took place with male and female beneficiaries and programme staff in Darfur.

People interviewed	
NCA staff Oslo and Sudan	31
Sudan Council of Churches staff	7
SudanAid staff	6
CSA – ACT, Caritas, Cafod staff	5
Norad/MFA – Oslo and Sudan	6
Beneficiaries Nyala and Zalingei	9
UN/UNAMID	5
Donors	2
ICRC and INGOs	4
Sudanese Authorities HAC	3
Total	78

A programme assessment matrix was developed and has become a key instrument in assessing programme achievements. The matrix is based upon the five DAC/Norad criteria assessing each sector as well as crosscutting issues in the Darfur programme. The matrix was used as a tool for a ‘self- assessment’ process by programme staff in Darfur. Staff, including head of sections, participated in identifying indicators, assessing performance and ratings for each sector. Input was given by staff and was adjusted and summarised by the Review team. Each indicator of achievement, in relation to relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, results and impact was given a score according to its level of achievement (1: Very Low, 2: Low, 3: Medium, 4: High and 5: Very High). This enabled a rating by indicator of the contribution of the NCA Darfur programme. Subsequently, the assessments made in the matrices were used to inform the findings and recommendations for the eight issues identified as preliminary lines of enquiry in the Inception report. The comprehensive assessment matrix is included as Annex A5.

2.4 Limitations

During the visit to Darfur only the team leader was able to go to Zalingie, due to some missing documentation for the national consultant. This unfortunate incident reduced the ability to perform some interviews and focus group meeting with beneficiaries as planned. Apart from that, the Review team was able to follow work plan and timetable as laid out in the ToR and Inception Report.

3. Context

3.1 Country context

The protracted crisis in Darfur has left an estimated 4.6 million people reliant on some form of humanitarian aid and immediate needs in Darfur continue to be driven chiefly by widespread displacement, insecurity and a lack of infrastructure and services, particularly in remote locations.⁶

The uprising and protesting against the lack of development in Darfur came to international attention in 2002. By the end of 2005, 1.8 million villagers had been displaced into IDP camps where international agencies had managed to prevent widespread starvation and epidemics through the provision of basic services.

Peace negotiations between the Government and rebel movements in Abuja, Nigeria, brought a period of relative stability in the first half of 2006. However, the refusal by the two main rebel movements, a faction of the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) led by rebel leader Abdula Wahid and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement produced internal divisions within the movements. By early 2007 there were more than a dozen rebel factions – a development that has greatly increased the complexity and difficulty of subsequent peace efforts.

In addition to the continued conflict between GoS and rebel movements/factions there has been an increase in banditry and sporadic violence between different groups, often divided along tribal lines.


Efforts by the international community to introduce and support peacekeeping forces in Darfur, initially through the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and since January 2008 through the larger joint UN and AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), have had little effect on the fighting and insecurity, though the efforts have had some beneficial impact in reducing attacks on IDPs venturing outside the camps.

In March 2009, following the decision by the International Criminal Court to indict the President of Sudan, the Government responded by expelling 13 INGOs and closing three national NGOs, including SUDO a member of the NCA Darfur Programme. These actions substantially reduced the implementation capacity and coverage of the international humanitarian efforts in Darfur.

Since early 2010, the security situation in Darfur has deteriorated sharply. As seen in the figure below, a total of 2,300 fatalities during 2010 were reported by UNAMID's Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC).

⁶ Sudan. UN and Partners Work Plan 2011, p 10

Figure 1 Comparison of fatalities in Darfur January 2009 to January 2011



Source: UNAMID's Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC),

The estimated number of IDPs in Darfur range from 1.9 to 2.7 million people.⁷ Thus, more than a quarter and potentially one third of the Darfur population (around 7.5 million) lives in IDP camps. Between January and the end of October 2010 an estimated 268,500 people were displaced in Darfur as a result of armed clashes and inter-tribal fighting. Depending on the assumed total number of IDP's, the numbers displaced during the first ten months of 2010 represent an increase of between 10% or 14%.⁸ 40,000 new IDP have been registered in December 2010 alone and 83,000 in 2011 as a result of fighting between GoS forces and rebels in North and South Darfur.

Just as the IDPs are dependent on external assistance to meet their basic needs, so too is a substantial proportion of the non-IDP population, i.e. 'host' communities, settled agricultural communities and nomadic pastoralist communities. At the beginning of 2010, WFP was providing rations to a total of 3.6 million beneficiaries,⁹ equivalent to 48% of the estimated population of Darfur.

Despite the large coverage of WFP's food distribution programmes, Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates are in several cases above the commonly accepted emergency threshold rate of 15%. Of the seven nutritional survey results conducted in the three Darfur states that were released between October 2009 and January 2010, six reported GAM rates above 15%.

In a summary the present humanitarian situation in Darfur is characterised by:

- Due to restricted access, reduced capacity in the field and Government restrictions, humanitarian information, data and analyses – number of IDPs, nutrition status, food insecurity – have since 2009 dried up. OCHA and UN agencies with a mandate to lead and provide humanitarian information and analyses do not/cannot provide updated information data. As expressed by OCHA: "...we have lost our ears and eyes..!"¹⁰

⁷ UN and IDMC note that in 2010 OCHA and UNHCR have used 1.9 million IDPs for Darfur and not 2.7 million as in 2009. A further 268,000 refugees from Darfur are currently in Chad.

⁸ Emergency Relief Coordinator's Key Messages on Sudan 5 November 2010 Issue # 2

⁹ UNICEF Darfur Nutrition Update

¹⁰ Mark Cutt, Head of OCHA, Khartoum

- There is an increased insecurity for humanitarian actors: kidnapping, hostage taking, carjacking, criminal accidents have escalated during the past two years, which has reduced ability to assess, respond and monitor humanitarian programmes and added both risk and cost for humanitarian agencies and staff in Darfur. “...we are locked up behind wires and security procedures and do not know what is going on..!”¹¹
- The implications of increased bureaucratic restrictions, and expulsion of humanitarian agencies¹² and staff by GoS/HAC is that agencies – UN and INGOs – have a reduced presence and capacity and will have to operate in an environment of uncertainty.
- Since March 2009 humanitarian capacity in Darfur has been reduced by 40% due to expulsion of INGOs and closing of national agencies. Access to beneficiaries outside camps has been reduced and movements for agencies are restricted to areas under Government control with the result that agencies are pulling back from rural areas.¹³
- Programming and documentation/reporting on protection, human rights, GBV has been stripped from UN and NGO information since March 2009. Documentation on GBV does not take place. Normal reporting on GBV to UN bodies like UNFPA and OCHA does not function.
- Reduced humanitarian presence has an effect on capacity to assess, respond and monitor humanitarian programmes. The value of the concept of “protection by presence” is under pressure and accountability towards humanitarian principles, beneficiaries and donors is diminishing.

In a briefing to the Security Council in August 2010, the then Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, John Holmes, stated:

“The background is that the humanitarian situation in Darfur has been steadily deteriorating again this year, in the context of the resumption of armed conflict involving the State armed forces and rebel groups, as well as increased tribal clashes. The level of restrictions imposed on humanitarian operations, and of harassment, threats and violence directed at humanitarian personnel, is once again becoming unacceptable. All this renders the civilians we are trying to help even more vulnerable.”¹⁴

3.2 International frameworks

At the end of 2009, peace negotiations on Darfur were initiated in Doha¹⁵. The negotiation in Doha continues today, but without the direct participation of the two main rebel movements.

Besides the Doha talks, two initiatives were launched in 2010.¹⁶ The first of these was the establishment of the AU UN Consultative Forum for Sudan to provide coordinated international support to the ongoing

¹¹ Howard Bell, Country Director, CARE, Chair NGO Steering Committee

¹² The latest expulsion took place in January. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) was forced to suspend its work in West Darfur after the government told it to leave January 20. CRS has delivered food, health and water services to the nearly 1 million displaced people in West Darfur. No other organisation has taken over that role in the past two months. The Sudanese government has accused CRS of distributing Bibles in Darfur, a charge it denies.

¹³ Yusuf Abdi Salah, Head of OCHA, Zalingie

¹⁴ Briefing to the Security Council on the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur Statement by John Holmes, Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator 23 August 2010

¹⁵ An initiative by the State of Qatar supported by the Arab League, the African Union and the United Nations, led jointly by the Qatari government and the AU-UN Joint Chief Mediator

¹⁶ Based upon the AU High Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD) and the AU High-level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), both headed by President Thabo Mbeki.

processes within Sudan, namely: democratic transformation of the country; the implementation of the remaining provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA); and the search for an inclusive global political agreement to promote lasting peace, justice and reconciliation in Darfur. The Forum specifically mentions the initialisation of the “Darfur-Darfur Conference” to complement Doha efforts and encourages an “internal political process” in Darfur.

The second initiative: frustrated by the lack of progress in Doha, the Government in July 2010 announced a “*new strategy for achieving comprehensive peace, security and development in Darfur*”¹⁷ that stresses ‘domestication’ of the peace process, a reorientation of humanitarian activity towards the resettlement of IDPs and views UNAMID as a primary partner. The dismantling of some of the larger IDP camps and the voluntary resettlement of their inhabitants is now a declared intention of the State authorities.

The Government with support by UN and some donors – specifically at Khartoum level - insists that the relief phase in Darfur is over and agencies should turn its activities into return and resettlement of IDPs and deliver humanitarian assistance in other parts of Sudan. Due to the present situation – increased fighting and new IDPs – NGOs have little confidence for the time being in the Government’s recovery strategy and insist that IDP’s not wanting to voluntarily return or resettle due to insecurity should be allowed to remain in the camps. Some donors are pushing the humanitarian agenda and have been able influence a Government/UN/donor Task Force on Return into a Task Force for Sustainable Solutions and call upon NGOs to speak out and put pressure on the UN to take lead on a humanitarian agenda.

3.3 NCA Darfur Programme

The NCA program came to existence in early 2004 as Darfur Emergency Response Operation (DERO) supported/funded by the ecumenical ACT Alliance and the Catholic Caritas Internationalis, two global church based networks of Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox churches, and related agencies and organisations. It was the first formal emergency cooperation between ACT and Caritas, in response to humanitarian needs in West and South Darfur due to armed conflict, violence and displacement and with the goal to improve quality of life of IDPs and host communities.¹⁸

NCA has since 2004 been lead agency for the Program and registered with HAC as the legal owner of the ACT/Caritas Darfur program. CAFOD, UK is responsible for recruitment of international staff. Programmes are implemented by NCA and three national Sudanese NGOs, i.e. SudanAid (Catholic), Sudan Council of Churches (Ecumenical) and Sudan Development Organization (SUDO). SUDO was closed in 2009 by HAC and the remaining two partners are Sudan Council of Churches and SudanAid.

The national partnerships are important for a number of reasons: (1) national organisations have more/easier access to reach out to wider groups in rural areas of local communities and to remote field locations where expatriates may not be permitted to go; (2) a strategy for national partners to take over programs when NCA phases out¹⁹ and (3) can facilitate local solutions and sustainability for long term peace process.

Programme sectors are WASH, Health and Nutrition, Early Recovery/Livelihood, Emergency Response, School Support and Peace Building and crosscutting interventions in Environment, HIV/AIDS, Gender and Protection. The Programme is implemented in areas around Nyala and El Dain in South Darfur and Zalingei

¹⁷ Towards a New Strategy for Achieving Comprehensive Peace, Security and Development, GoS July 2010

¹⁸ Independent evaluation of DERO 1. 2. 2006 led by Dr. Veronica Scherbaum

¹⁹ Independent evaluation of DERO 1. 2. 2006 led by Dr. Veronica Scherbaum

and Garsilla in West Darfur. The main beneficiaries of these activities are conflict affected communities of IDPs, host communities, nomads and semi sedentary population. These communities are reliant on international aid and the total combined numbers of beneficiaries for 2010 was 1,347,327 – 80% are IDPs and 20% are beneficiaries within host communities. A Summary of the Beneficiaries for 2010 is in Annex A5.

As the humanitarian needs continue and because of expulsion of many NGOs in 2009, NCA and partners have stepped up operations to fill the gaps by taking up new activities especially in West Darfur.

To keep up with the pace of changes in Darfur, a Strategic Vision for the Darfur programme has been developed during 2010 to cover the period 2011-2015 to improve implementation of the programmes in the unstable conditions and context of Darfur.²⁰ In 2011 the programme will continue with activities in WASH, School Support, Livelihood, Health and Nutrition, Peace Building and Emergency Response activities.²¹

The Programme has evolved since its inception in 2004 and has had to adapt to the humanitarian, security and political reality in Darfur and Sudan. A brief overview is outlined in the story line below.

Story line:

Political/Security/Humanitarian	NCA Darfur Programme
2003	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SLA and JEM launch attacks on government targets in Darfur • Estimated number of IDPs end of year: 500,000 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NCA and partner assessment mission in Darfur
2004	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UN: “ethnic cleansing” • US: “genocide” is taking place in Darfur • Estimated number of IDPs at end of year: 1.7 m. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formation of NCA Darfur Emergency Operation supported jointly by ACT and Caritas • ACT/Caritas Appeal of \$25m • “Chaotic” – management and staff - upstart of ambitious programme • NCA and partners supported camps attacked by militia programme on halt
2005	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Four key national staff arrested by National Security • Programme renamed Darfur Emergency Response Operation (DERO) • Head Office relocated from Khartoum to Nyala • SCC in financial crisis - DERO takes over financial management of SCC’s programmes • ACT/Caritas Appeal revised to \$35m • Independent evaluation of the programme
2006	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Darfur Peace Agreement • Insecurity increase • Fractionalisation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DERO Appeal for 2006 \$15m • DERO Strategic Plan 2007-2010
2007	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ICC issues first Darfur indictments against Government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DERO Appeal for 2007 \$12.9m • SCC suspends the SCC Darfur Programme

²⁰ NCA ACT/Caritas Darfur vision 2011-2015

²¹ NCA Darfur Program Appeal for 2011

minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> HAC launches investigation of DERO
2008	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 'Hybrid' UN-AU Mission for Darfur (UNAMID) replaces AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DERO Appeal for 2008 \$13.6m HAC investigation - staff travel and visas restricted HAC complete investigation and demand: A clearly visible NCA ownership of the programme, a halt to any connections between the programme and ACT/Caritas; no advocacy activities; clearer accountability lines for the programme through NCA – new name: NCA Darfur Programme supported by ACT and Caritas Compliance, Support and Advisory (CSA) Group comprising ACT, Caritas, Cafod and NCA established. SudanAid, SCC and SUDO member of National Coordination Group (NCG)
2009	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> March 4th: ICC issues arrest warrant for President Bashir. Same day 13 international NGOs are expelled and three national NGOs (including SUDO) are closed "Sudanization" of programmes UNAMID commander declares that "the war is over" Peace negotiations in Doha 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Appeal for 2009 \$11.8m NCA Programme takes on SUDO's life-saving activities and those of IRC and Mercy Corps International staffing reaches planned levels following the May 2008 departures Joint Review assessment of the programme and the relationship between NCA, SCC and SudanAid
2010	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fighting escalates Security situation deteriorates sharply. Kidnapping of international staff member in South Darfur AU/UN Consultative Forum – Darfur-Darfur Conference Government initiative "domestication" – returns and recovery – away from relief 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Appeal for 2010 \$10.3m Joint ACT/Caritas Monitoring visit questions on orientation and continuation of the programme NCA Head of Operation expelled Strategic Vision approved
2011	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Appeal for 2011 US\$11.7m NCA Field Coordinator expelled

4. Analysis and findings

4.1 Assessment Matrix

A Programme Assessment Matrix was developed and has become a basic tool for assessing and analyzing programme achievements. The Matrix is based upon the five DAC/Norad criteria assessing each sector as well as crosscutting issues. The Matrix has been used as a kind of tool for a 'self-assessment' by programme staff in Darfur. Staff, including head of sections, has participated in identifying the most important 2-3 sector indicators, assessing performance and ratings. Performance input is based upon information from reports and reviews and has finally been adjusted and summarised by the Review Team. Each indicator of achievement is scored according to its level of achievement - 1: Very Low, 2: Low, 3: Medium, 4: High and 5: Very High. This enables a rating by indicator of the contribution of the NCA Darfur programme. Subsequently, the assessments made in the matrixes have been used to inform the findings and recommendations for the issues identified as preliminary findings in the Inception Report.

A summary of the Matrix is included below. The Combined Assessment Matrix is included as Annex A5.

DAC/Norad Evaluation Criteria / Indicators	Relevance (and Appropriateness)	Effectiveness	Sustainability	Results (outputs)	Impact (outcomes)
WASH Rating/ Performance 24/25	5 (coverage - SPHERE)	5 (target access and quality)	4 (handover, training, new technology behaviour changes)	5 (exceeded planed number of beneficiaries)	5 (documented improvements health data)
Emergency Preparedness and Response Sector Rating/ Performance 22/25	4 (delay)	5 (exceed plans)	4 (community committees)	5 (exceed plans)	4 (reduced number emergencies)
Health and Nutrition Sector Rating/ Performance 19/25	4 (coverage)	4 (meeting targets)	3 (performance of handed over)	4 (meeting targets)	4 (mortality decreased and morbidity contained within acceptable levels)
School Support/Education Rating/ Performance 14/25	2 (low coverage)	4 (+plans met)	4 (+hand over)	2 (targets partly met)	2 (education quality a problem)
Organisational Development and Capacity Building Rating/ Performance	4 (coverage)	2 (staffing capacity)	2 (closure SUDO)	3 (targets met)	3 (local ownership)

14/25					
Peace Building Rating/ Performance 14/25	3 (coverage)	3 (plans partly met, access/ security reduced)	3 (handover of centres)	2 (target partly met due to closure of SUDO)	3 (self managed – impact difficult to document)
PPP/Early Recovery/Livelihood Components Rating/ Performance 12/25	3 (coverage)	3 (partly met – staffing)	2 (handover recently)	2 (partly met – insecurity)	2 (limited documentation of impact)
Crosscutting Environment Rating/ Performance 13/25	3 (coverage limited)	2 (closure of SUDO)	3 (awareness)	3 (partly met)	2 (evidence limited)
Crosscutting HIV/AIDS Rating/ Performance 12/25	3 (limited interventions)	2 (culture)	2 (strategy delayed)	3 (culture)	2 (limited evidence)
Crosscutting Gender Rating/ Performance 14/25	3 (aggregated data and gender included in most programmes)	4 (delivery according to plans)	2 (partly met – sustainability not documented)	3 (partly met)	2 (limited documentation)
Crosscutting Protection Rating/ Performance 9/25	2 (protection issues partly identified/ addressed)	2 (protection issues partly identified/ addressed)	2 (protection issues partly identified/ addressed)	2 (protection issues partly identified/ addressed)	1 (documented impact limited)

Rating: Very High: 20 – 25, High: 15 – 19, Medium: 10 – 14, Low: 5 – 9 and Very Low: 1 – 4

The Matrix documents a high score for the WASH, EPR and Health and Nutrition sectors. Performance is high for all evaluation indicators because of coverage, quality/SPHERE (relevance), meeting targets (effectiveness), handover (sustainability), exceed plans (results) and documented improved health data (impact). For all sections performance is high because strategy, capacity and competence is in place and has been core business for the programme since its very beginning in 2004. Data, baseline information and M&E are functioning well. A number of internal and external reviews have taken place, specifically for WASH, and most recommendations have been implemented. It should be noted that WASH and Health and Nutrition have baseline data for areas of operations and thereby being able to document impact – improvements in health data.

For School Support/Education, Peace Building, Organisational Development and Capacity Building and Early Recovery – previous called PPP - the score is medium for different reasons. For most sections coverage has been relatively limited (relevance), targets partly met mainly due to staffing capacity (effectiveness), handover has for most sections only started recently (sustainability), targets are partly met (results) and impact is difficult to document (impact). A number of reasons explain the medium performance for these sections. The sections have not had robust strategies and not been able to build and

develop the necessary staff capacity and competence to lead and consolidate activities. Internal or external reviews have not taken place for any of the sections.

These shortcomings are illustrated within the section named Early Recovery up to end of 2010, previous called PPP and from 2011 renamed Livelihood. The changing of names illustrates the fact that it has been difficult to develop and secure a robust programme strategy addressing local needs and adapting to a changing reality on the ground. Interviews with staff and beneficiaries illustrate that Early Recovery has had difficulties in performing because it does not have a clear vision or a methodology and lacks staff capacity.

For the crosscutting issues performance is medium for Gender, Environment and HIV/AIDS and low for Protection. Coverage is limited (relevance), targets partly met for environment due the closure of SUDO (effectiveness), handing over and sustainability difficult to document, results partly met and limited evidence of impact. Gender as a crosscutting issue seems well integrated into most sections and the fact that all sections do have disaggregated gender data for most activities is a potential for both results and impact in the future.

Protection as a crosscutting issue is scoring low first and foremost because of the sensitivity of the whole issue of protection. It is not possible any longer to implement a full-fledged protection programme in the present situation in Darfur. The programme does identify a number of activities within sections as protection – like access to water, health facilities and for children to have access to education. All of these activities are important programmes activities which can provide some prevention for especially women. But it is not and cannot incorporate all protection issues relevant for the present situation in Darfur.

4.2 Findings

The NCA Darfur Programme has evolved and been able to consolidate its scope of activities since its inception in 2004. There are a number of reasons for the fact that the Programme has been able to sustain and develop: (1) The Programme is unique because of the partnership within ACT and Caritas representing 60 church-based partners. The partnership has been able to secure long term funding for emergency interventions and has had access to a wide range of international expertise and staffing. (2) The programme is very much sustained and has local ownership because of its national partners – SCC, SudanAid and previously SUDO. The national partners are not just local contractors but partners with a national constituency providing SCC and SudanAid important community based support. (3) The Programme has since its inception had a holistic integrated approach which has given the programme both confidence and credibility with beneficiaries, national and international stakeholders and donors and the programme has been able to fill gaps when agencies have been expelled. (4) The programme has because of its national partners and NCA's long history and presence in Sudan a unique ability to read, understand and adapt to the local reality. NCA has a network and has been able to negotiate with local and national authorities specifically HAC²² and has in most cases been able to maintain presence and staffing.

The Programme has been able to deliver key lifesaving interventions for a high number of beneficiaries and to produce and document achievements and for some activities also provide evidence of impact. The Programme has since 2009 been one of the biggest programmes in Darfur with an outreach to some of the most vulnerable people in West and South Darfur. The Programmes has full support from colleagues and

²² The longstanding HAC investigation and negotiations with NCAs leadership in 2008 and NCAs accept of HACs demand: A clearly visible NCA ownership of the programme; no advocacy activities; clearer accountability lines for the programme through NCA – new name: NCA Darfur Programme supported by ACT and Caritas may be the reason for the fact that NCA was not expelled in March 2009.

stakeholders within NGOs and UN agencies. As said by a number of head of agencies in Nyala, Zalingei and Khartoum: "...we do not know what to do without NCA's programme."²³

The NCA Programme has a commitment from key stakeholders, a robust funding base, a scope and an outreach which makes it unique and special. This does not take away that the Programme is under pressure and increasing pressure both because of increased procedural obstacles, insecurity and weakness and threats within the programme itself.

Threats to the Programme are, like for most humanitarian actors such as UNAMID, UN and NGOs, many: (1) Increased procedural obstacles can make it impossible for NCA to maintain capacity and international expertise, necessary for sections like Health and WASH. (2) Insecurity and restrictions because of conflict have reduced access capacity to assess, respond and monitor programmes. The Programme basically has to accept that Government controls access and to who services will be delivered, in conflict with humanitarian principles of impartiality. (3) Humanitarian interventions in Darfur do not have leadership, coordination capacity and updated data and information that UN agencies and institutions should provide. The Programme is thereby very much based upon own capacity to assess and analyse vulnerability and needs. The NCA Programme does have some internal weaknesses as outlined above in the matrix: (1) The Programme does not have sufficient capacity nor strategic understanding in all sections to deliver according own objectives, targets and international standards – Protection and Early Recovery (now Livelihood) to mention the most obvious. (2) The Programme does not have sufficient ability nor the capacity to understand the context of conflict and to analyse dividers, tensions, connectors and local capacities for peace and to turn conflict sensitivity assessments into planning and programming. (3) The Programme cannot and has no way to report or document protection issues or getting involved in advocacy within its areas of operations - location and sector.

Below is a summary of NCA's Darfur Programme presented in a SWOT analysis:

<p>STRENGTHS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coverage • Capacity • Competence • M&E • Strategy • Methodology 	<p>OPPORTUNITIES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presence/history • Confidence national/international stakeholders • Credibility beneficiaries/communities • Holistic/Integrated approach • National partners/ownership/sustainability • Vision/commitment
<p>WEAKNESSES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coverage • Capacity • Competence • M&E • Strategy • Methodology 	<p>TREATHS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insecurity/restrictions access • Ability to asses, respond and monitor – “lost eyes and ears!” • Strategic analysis/coordinated response limited • Humanitarian ‘Roadmap’/leadership missing • Government. controls humanitarian agenda – Human Rights/Protection/GBV

²³ Statements by representatives from UNAMID, ICRC, DRC, UNICEF and OCHA.

Eight issues have been identified in the Inception Report as preliminary findings. Some of the issues have been addressed in the matrix and the findings above. The Review addresses below the issues identified in the Inception Report as findings and recommendations:

1. The Review will have to establish if and how the NCA Programme addresses the more long-standing trends and root causes of the crisis: recovery, return of IDPs, environment, peace and reconciliation. (adjust to the context, - relevance)

The Programme has evolved since its inception and has adapted to new realities. It has been able to fill important lifesaving gaps in 2009 when NGOs were expelled or closed down. EPR, WASH and Health and Nutrition sections have constantly expanded based on professional technical assessments often performed in cooperation with UN and NGO partners. The expansion and new activities have been based upon assessment of needs and vulnerabilities, especially with new IDP caseload and movements. The Programme has been able to address both IDPs in camps, host communities, both urban and rural as well as some isolated nomadic communities. According to information from humanitarian partners, the Programme has been better positioned to address needs outside camps than most NGOs working in Darfur. This indicates that the Programme has been in a position to address needs within different communities and has been able to assist returning IDPs in a few incidences because of its presence, coverage and integrated programme approach.

The Programme includes sections for Peace Building and Early Recovery and Environment as a cross-cutting issue. The Programme has overall a high performance in life-saving programmes – nutrition, health, WASH and emergency preparedness and medium performance in peace, recovery and environment activities. Most interventions address specific local issues concerning peace and mediation, often issues linked to resources - land and water issues in camps. Environmental issues like tree planting activities have been terminated when SUDO was closed down in 2009.

NCA does consistently perform technical assessment as part of project planning. The team has conducted a number of assessments, most of them of high technical quality. But none of the assessments include contextual assessment of the conflict nor identify drivers and dividers of the conflict in the specific location for planned projects. The absence of systematic conflict sensitive assessments has implications for the programme's understanding of and ability to facilitate local peace and reconciliation process. This means that the programme does not use its potential to facilitate necessary political process and solutions in Darfur.

The Programme has not been able to increase its ability to analyse and address root causes to the conflict. As outlined above it has not been able to adopt conflict sensitivity assessments into planning and programming. This has implications for its ability to strategically address issues linked to root causes of the conflict as well as to address issues linked to peace and reconciliation. The fact that Government controls access and activities means that the Programme has limited ability to address issues linked to different parties to the conflict.

Recommendations:

- The Programme would have to develop its analytical and strategic capacity to do conflict sensitive assessments and incorporate that into programme planning – basically implementing the “Do No Harm Seven Steps”.²⁴

²⁴ <http://www.donoharm.info/content/download/level000/Seven%20Steps%20English.pdf>

- The Programme will have to have a strategy for focusing, consolidation, handover and capacity building of partners and sectors. Activities/sectors without necessary capacity will have to redefine strategies and speed up capacity building, hand over or close down activities and focus on activities/sectors with clear strategies and sufficient capacity.
- The Programme should develop strategic scenario programme planning for: (1) recovery (2) status quo (3) reduced programme/life-saving intervention. In the present fluid political and security situation a strategic programme like the NCA Darfur Programme would have to prepare and position itself to address potential scenarios for Darfur.

2. The Review will have to assess the current mechanisms and capacity to monitor the programme and document how the programme is implementing previous recommendations to improve the capacity to monitor. (adjust to and implement lessons learned, documentation of result)

The Programme has during the past years built and developed its M&E capacity, having full-time international M&E staffing. Log frame analysis with impact indicators and gender disaggregated data has been implemented for all sectors. Internal and external reviews and evaluations have been introduced for some sectors – most consistently for WASH. No reviews or evaluations for School Support, Early Recovery, EPR and crosscutting issues have taken place.

Two internal ACT/CARITAS reviews and monitoring mission have taken place during the past two years. In August 2009 a Joint Review of the programme was carried out by ACT/Caritas members²⁵ presenting 20 recommendations. Most of the recommendations have been implemented. The list of recommendations and follow up actions Annex A6

A Joint ACT – Caritas Monitoring Mission took place in beginning of 2010.²⁶ The Mission highlighted a number of principle issues and concerns for the Programme. A process to define a vision and a strategy for the continuation of the NCA Darfur Programme was launched in 2010.²⁷

The organisations supporting the Darfur Programme have committed themselves to a Vision for 2011-2015. See Annex A7.

Recommendations:

- Having understood the extreme sensitivity concerning protection issues in Darfur, the Programme would have to find ways and means to document and report critical issues of human right, protection and GBV to inform programming and stakeholders.
- The Programme would have to have systematic ongoing reviews/evaluations for all sectors and administrative functions within the Programme.
- In the present situation with restricted access, the Programme would have to develop tools and instruments for remote management and monitoring.

²⁵ Joint Review Mission of the NCA Darfur Program funded by the ACT and Caritas Networks, Final Report, October 5th 2009.

²⁶ Joint ACT – Caritas support and monitoring visit to NCA Darfur Programme, Sudan 20th February – 5 March 2010.

²⁷ The Vision for the NCA Darfur Programme. Approved by the CSA 29th November 2010.

3. The Review will assess the kind of *“threshold levels/red lines”* NCA has or will have to set for the Programme to scale down or reduce programme activities. (related to the Humanitarian principles?)

The Programme has adopted a Vision for the coming years, outlining an overall strategy and priorities. The Vision commits itself “to monitor developments in the political, security and humanitarian context, regularly revises its analysis of the overall context, updates its contingency plans accordingly and undertakes the necessary preparedness measures”. The Programme has recently developed and approved a Contingency Plan²⁸ including a Crisis Management Plan. The Contingency Plan outlines five scenarios: (1) Darfur ‘normal’ environment and therefore normal activities, (2) Current situation, (3) Sustained deterioration, (4) Specific abduction/life threats targeting NCA International staff and (5) Specific threat to all NCA staff and Darfur Programme. The Contingency Plan including scenario indicators outlines the five scenarios and its implications for activities and staffing. The Contingency Plan is foreseen to be a living document to be updated continuously and seems to be a good and realistic instrument for Management to secure staff safety and security and critical life-saving activities.

The Plan has introduced the first contingency planning for Programme. The Plan outlines some kind of “red lines” or “threshold levels” for the Programme to scale down or reduce programme activities because of security concern for staff. The Plan does not include considerations concerning humanitarian principles – Neutrality, Impartiality, Independence and Humanitarian Action including Protection and Advocacy actions nor any reference to the Code of Conduct. Neither the Contingency Plan nor policy documents, like the Vision for 2011-2015, include reference to “red lines” or “threshold levels” concerning humanitarian principles. In the Vision 2011-2015 it is said: “...the Programme will review the situation in relation to a set of “threshold levels/red lines” developed at a policy level to determine the points at which the Programme is unable to operate or the scale of the operations should be reduced”. According to interviews with senior staff, the process to define roles and responsibilities for NCA Management and CSA concerning the “threshold levels/red lines” has started.

The Programme is characterised by its commitment to stay and deliver assistance to the most vulnerable people and communities in Darfur. Within that understanding and context it has to be understood that the Programme has not defined a specific cut-off point for reducing or closing down the entire Programme. The Programme has introduced a low profile attitude..

Recommendations:

- The Programme should review “red lines” or “threshold levels” according to humanitarian principles and international standards as outlined in the Vision and Strategy for 2011-2015 and communicate that to key stakeholders.
- The Vision and Strategy 2011-2015 should be developed into an integrated programme strategy including all sectors and crosscutting issues.
- The Programme should speed up the process to handover to national partners, local authorities and civil society organizations.

²⁸ Contingency Planning – Darfur Programme, 03.10.2010.

4. The Review will have to assess how the programme is able to implement and lead in a number of sectors and how the Programme is able to provide leadership within clusters like WASH. (quality, capacity, effectiveness, results)

The NCA Programme profile is special in its holistic integrated approach. The Programme has since its very beginning been a multi-sector programme to meet the different needs of the people concerned. Reviews and evaluations have expressed concern if the programme has sufficient capacity and technical expertise to manage programme in up to eight sectors.

As indicated in the analysis of the Assessment Matrix, some sectors have strategies and capacities in place to deliver high level assistance. Some sectors have a medium performance because of shortages or limited capacity and lack of strategies and methodologies. Strategic initiatives have been taken to address issues of capacity specifically within national partner organisations. A special programme for Organisational Development and Capacity Building has been established. Training capacity and staffing is in place to implement the Training Programme.

Coordination, sharing of information and assistance within and between UN and NGOs is taking place. UNICEF is exercising its global mandate as cluster coordinator for WASH, Nutrition and Education, WFP for Food security and UNJLC for NFI distribution. NCA is an active partner within coordination mechanisms, according to OCHA²⁹, and senior management is co-opted into UN coordination mechanisms representing NGOs. Because of the scope and coverage the Programme is playing a lead role in cooperation and coordination between agencies in South and West Darfur, but according to Management does not for the time being have capacity to take up the role as cluster lead.

The Programme has taken initiatives to address capacity issues concerning administration and finance within national partner organisations. Staff has been appointed as a special “accompanier” to the finance sections within the two agencies. According to staff it is an intervention which has been working well during the past two years and has improved quality of finance procedures and reporting.

Recommendation:

- The Programme should either insist on UNICEF to take up its mandate as cluster lead for WASH or consider attracting funding and specific staff to take up the responsibility as cluster lead for WASH.

5. The Review will assess the Early Recovery – now the Livelihood Sector – and assess how the Programme has been able to address the issues raised in the ACT/Caritas Report. (adjust to context and lessons learned, relevance, effectiveness)

In a report from the ACT/Caritas Support and Monitoring mission in 2010 it is said: Early Recovery is very important in the current situation. Our overall impression of the Early Recovery Component of the programme lacks a vision, methodology and capacity of local staff. The Programme has addressed the findings from the Mission. What is currently termed the Early Recovery Sector in NCA will transfer to a focus on ‘livelihoods’ and the sector have been named the Livelihoods Sector as of January 2011. Staffing and a strategy for livelihoods interventions is at present a priority for the Programme.

For the time being the Livelihood Programme is on the “drawing table” and it is not possible for the team to assess if and how the section will be able to deliver according to the objectives set in the Appeal for 2011.

²⁹ OCHA Head of Office in Nyala and Zalingei

Recommendation:

- The Programme will have to redefine its livelihood section and ensure that the programme will have the necessary technical competence and capacity

6. The review will look into NCAs preparations, measures, risk assessment and adaptability to the security situation – and assess how NCA staff is prepared and protected from security incidents and how risks are mitigated. (risk and conflict sensitivity)

The Programme has security capacity and procedures in place. Own international security staff has been recruited and the Programme is incorporated into the UN security procedures. On-going security and risk assessment and training are taking place.

The Programme has had few serious staff security incidences since its inception in 2004³⁰. The Programme has, as indicated, had a number of incidences of harassment and browbeat of staff which has had both direct and indirect impact on individual staff and the Programme as such. There is an “atmosphere of fear” within staff, national and international, as well as the organisation as a whole because of the ongoing and unpredictable situation.

Recommendations:

- The Programme should have ongoing Reviews or “Internal Audits” of security procedures as well as for administrative functions - finance, HR and logistic.
- The Management should find ways and means to strengthen care and support for staff to counteract “culture of fear” within the Programme.

7. The Review will assess the appropriateness and effectiveness of the present coordination and management mechanisms. (effectiveness)

The organisational set-up and management structure of the programme has been adapted twice: In 2005 and in 2008 when the Programme was formally named NCA Darfur Programme and the CSA was established as an advisory group. The set-up with contribution from some 60 partners, cooperation within and between two global networks, the first ever such formal cooperation between ACT and Caritas and the adaptability to a difficult and sensitive harsh local and national reality has meant both complex structures and management procedures. NCA is the legal owner of the program a crucial role to coordinate all support.

The present complex organisational set-up seems to be working. Having in mind the reality and conditions set by the Government and specifically HAC during the investigations and negotiations in 2008. The present set-up is complex, basically having two parallel set-ups: a formal one according the HAC conditions and with NCA as the formal owner of the Programme – and an informal one based upon a MoU³¹ between key stakeholders ACT, Caritas, CAFOD and NCA. A guidance note distinguishing between “management” and

³⁰ An SCC staff member was shot in the leg during an ambush in 2004 and in 2006 the driver of a car on long term rental to SUDO was shot and killed. NCA national and international staff has been involved in a number of hijackings and robberies, fortunately none has been injured during these incidents.

³¹ The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Caritas Internationalis, ACT Alliance Secretariat, CAFOD and NCA agreed in September 2008, set out the functions of the Compliance, Support and Advisory Group (CSA) Group.

“governance” issues in relation to the NCA Darfur Programme supported by ACT and Caritas has been updated in May 2010 and outlines and distinguishes between Governance issues and Daily Management issues.

The present organisational set up depends very much on NCA ability to provide a transparent leadership role and the commitment of agencies in the CSA to address issues with a potential of conflict of interest. Uncertainties and lack of clarity on communication procedures between the two bodies creates confusions in communication on sensitive issues for the management in Sudan/Darfur. The most obvious is the fact that the NCA Sudan Director and the Darfur Director both have dual communication lines.

There is an expressed appreciation by both national partners – SCC and SudanAid of the cooperation. According to senior staff within both SCC and SudanAid, NCA is facilitating both capacity building, the appeal and fundraising process, reporting and administrative support in a transparent and helpful way. The partners indicate that there is a need to increase and improve technical sectoral cooperation between the three partners. At sector level staff colleagues do not know what sister agencies are doing and thereby do not get the necessary support.

Recommendations:

- The present complex organisational and management set-up of the Darfur Programme with dual management and communication lines and potential conflict of interest for senior management should be addressed by the CSA as soon as possible.
- The Programme should ensure closer technical cooperation and capacity building between sections within the three partners – NCA, SCC and SudanAid.

8. The Review will have to address pending issues of reporting procedures between MFA and NCA.

Communication between MFA and NCA have documented a number of concerns in MFA regarding delays in reporting, meeting deadlines, administrative fees and insufficient reporting concerning women’s rights. MFA grants letters states that reports must be received at latest six months after project is finished, but NCA has requested - annually - that reports be submitted later.

The delays in reporting have caused delay in approving applications. MFA has informed the Review Team and NCA has confirmed that some of the issues are still pending and have been pending for some years.

Recommendation:

- NCA should address pending issues between MFA and NCA concerning reporting delays and administrative fees as soon as possible.

5. Conclusions and recommendations

The NCA Programme has been implementing a number of highly relevant lifesaving projects reaching out to more than 300.000 beneficiaries in West and South Darfur since 2004. The Darfur humanitarian context has since its very beginning been difficult and seems to have become even more unpredictable and extreme recently. March 2009 has been a turning point for humanitarian actors in Darfur – a number of

international agencies were expelled and national organisations closed by the Government. Increased insecurity and harsh conditions set by Government have had a number of both practical and principle implications for agencies still present in Darfur, including NCA.

Government is basically in control of humanitarian priorities and activities. HAC/Government controls access for agencies, approving project documents (TA) including staffing level and profile of staff and controls release of humanitarian data and information. Since 2009 programming and documentation of violation of human right, protection - and GBV issues and advocacy has been dropped by agencies in Darfur. The conditions laid out for Darfur humanitarian operations for UN and NGOs need to be brought in line with the humanitarian principle.³²

NCA has been able to stay and expand its activities by keeping a low profile, stopped protection programming and documentation and used its long history in Sudan, its presence and network to negotiate issues of concern with local and national authorities.

The Review Team does not take this as an argument for NCA to close down activities or programmes in Darfur, but an argument for NCA to find ways and means to be informed and report on protection issues in areas of operations in Darfur. At the same time NCA will have to be open and transparent with partners and stakeholders on protection issues which can/will and which one cannot will not be addressed by the Programme.

NCA and the Programme have a commitment to work in a conflict sensitive manner and implement the Do No Harm principles, but have not until now been able to implement the approach. The Do No Harm-approach is a tool for mapping the interactions of assistance and conflict and should be used to plan, monitor and evaluate humanitarian assistance in a conflict setting.

For the NCA Programme with a huge scope and a complexity programme environment it is a necessary and important tool to understand and to be better informed of the context and dynamics in which it is working. NCA should with immediate effect take action to implement the Do No Harm's "Seven Steps" into all programme activities and build capacity and train staff to use this approach.

The Review has been able to work closely with staff and local stakeholders to assess the programme performance according to the DAC/Norad criteria for the Review. As outlined the Programme is scoring high in humanitarian priority activities – WASH, Nutrition, Health and Emergency Preparedness interventions and medium in activities and cross sector activities like School Support, Peace Building, Early Recovery and cross sectors like HIV/AIDS, Environment and Gender and low in Protection.

NCA and the national partner organisations will have to find a way to define programme focus for sections and crosscutting interventions, assess capacity and consolidation or phase out of programme components lacking the necessary capacity.

The Programme would have to increase its quality assuring systems to secure systematic ongoing reviews/evaluations for all sectors and administrative functions within the Programme and develop tools and instruments for remote management and monitoring. The Programme should develop strategic scenario programme planning for different scenarios.

The administrative and management capacity of the Programme have been increased during the past years and the Programme has now a functioning security capacity and procedures in place.

³² Humanitarian Action: Assistance, protection and advocacy actions undertaken on an impartial basis in response to human needs resulting from complex political emergencies and natural hazards.

NCA is lead of the Darfur Programme in partnership with two national partners and in close cooperation with a number of global partners in a complex organisational set up adapted to the specific Sudanese reality. NCA has been able to facilitate cooperation and build capacity with national partners.

For NCA to perform its leadership role it is necessary to have sufficient strategic capacity, to work in an open and transparent way and address issues with a potential for conflict of interest.

The NCA Programme in Darfur is a big and important humanitarian actor in Darfur and will hopeful be able to stay and address complex issues better in the future.

Annexes

A1 - Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference – Norwegian Church Aid – Darfur Programme

Final version per 2 February 2011.

Background

Darfur general

For years Norway has had a presence in the protracted crises of Darfur, mainly through humanitarian funding of UN- and NGO programmes. Previously Norway had a more active political role in the Darfur peace negotiations; however after the signing of CPA in 2005 the priority has been towards the CPA obligations between North and South Sudan, including development aid to the south. This is also the fundament for the future Norwegian approach, stated in the MFA strategic document signed by the Minister in March 2010.

The chronic humanitarian situation in Darfur continues to be of grave concern. Though the humanitarian indicators remain fairly stable, problems of access to the populations, the unsolved situation for millions of internally displaced persons (IDP) and ongoing fighting between rebel groups and the Government are some of the hindrances for sustainable peace and development. In spite of this, new strategies and programmes for recovery are ongoing, however in a highly problematic political and security context. The modality for humanitarian and development aid need to be viewed in this context.

Since last year the deteriorating humanitarian situation in southern Sudan has become a priority. In order to respond MFA has reallocated funds from Darfur to Southern Sudan. As a consequence the Ministry needs to clarify what should be the future role of Norway in Darfur. This will be highly interlinked with the outcome and consequences of the referendum in Southern Sudan and humanitarian consequences of a possible secession between north and south. The MFA discussions on future involvement in Darfur will be conducted in parallel to the review of NCA's programme. Findings from this review could be important inputs to the process.

Norwegian humanitarian funding has been partly channelled via the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) administrated by OCHA/UNDP, of which a high proportion has been disbursed for UN and NGO programmes in Darfur. In addition, Norway has supported bilaterally some UN agencies in Darfur (mainly UNHCR and UNICEF), the ICRC and the only Norwegian organisation still left in Darfur – Norwegian Church Aid (NCA).

The partnership with the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)

The Section for Humanitarian Affairs at the MFA has funded NCA's Darfur programme for several years. The modality has been one-year grants to earmarked project components of the ACT-appeal (Action by Churches Together). The budget figures have varied, however; the ongoing grant for 2010 amounts to NOK 10.5 mill.

Based on several years of support from MFA's humanitarian budget the Ministry has asked Norad to conduct a review of NCA's Darfur programme and its role as a coordinator for ACT, Caritas and other national partners within the framework of annual ACT appeals. This will be a traditional review which has to include humanitarian principles as this is purely humanitarian funding. Also the context will be important in order to understand the role of NCA in a highly complex political and security situation. Included here will be NCA's role as part of the overall humanitarian cluster coordination and cooperation both with the UN, the government and local stakeholders. Finally, the review needs to take into account the ongoing discussion regarding the possible future role for MFA support to Darfur, and to consider the latest development and their impact on future humanitarian support.

Short description of the programme

Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) together with partners have run relief work in Darfur since the unrest began in 2003 and since July 2004 has led a major operation supported by two large international church networks; Action by Churches Together (ACT) and CARITAS. Over this period, the programme has provided life-supporting assistance to approximately 340 000 people in South and West Darfur. The programme is now one of the largest emergency relief operations in Darfur. NCA's component has developed a close cooperation with the Sudanese members of ACT and Caritas - the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) and SudanAid. Together, the programme works with different communities (Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), host communities, sedentary and nomadic tribes) affected by the conflict. The activities are focused in both rural and urban areas that stretch from Garsilla in West Darfur to Ed Daein in South Darfur.

Goal

The goal of the programme is to relieve human suffering and mitigate the effects of armed conflict and displacement and to support IDPs and local communities in South and West Darfur that are among the worst affected by the violence and unrest, and contribute to developing the capacity of NCA's partner organisations in the area.

Target group

The programme serves conflict-affected communities, regardless of religious or ethnic affiliation, from South and West Darfur, mainly, but not exclusively from the areas around Nyala and Ed Daein in South Darfur and Zalingei and Garsilla in West Darfur. Until 2008/09 the programme also had activities in the Kubum corridor to the South West of Nyala.

The programme focuses in particular on vulnerable displaced persons primarily located in densely populated IDP camps in South and West Darfur. Support is also provided to host communities in areas around the camps and in rural areas affected by the conflict in order to achieve development parity and foster peaceful co-existence.

The programme provides services within several sectors (which are components within the Darfur Humanitarian programme): water and sanitation, health and nutrition, Emergency Response (Foremost the distribution of non-food items), education, (also termed school support) and Early Recovery. (The Early Recovery sector encompasses peace-building /livelihoods/Psycho social activities)

Beneficiary Overview 2004-2010 (Extracted from Reports)						
Sector	2004-2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010 (Projected)
PPP (2010 became Early Recovery)	23,383 (Protection) 8000 (Psychosocial)	Not aggregated	Not aggregated	45,074	35 490	92,000
Health and Nutrition	297915	265,017	263716	242349	264584	236476
Water, sanitation and health (WASH)	Not aggregated	Not aggregated	279,161	257 976	347 382	344,449
Education/School Support	27200	32,062	8,160	19,343	18 381	14,000
Agriculture	12,500hh	15,583hh	15,035hh	12567hh	-	-
Non-food items (NFI) (currently Emergency)	65,000hh	25,993hh	20,302hh	41249hh	331 506	138,000

Response)						
-----------	--	--	--	--	--	--

Activities

Peace-Building/early recovery – This sector has evolved throughout the life of the programme: In the period 2004 -2005 what were initially three separate activities (Psychosocial/ Peace-building-Protection) were brought together into one sector known internally as “PPP”. By 2010 these have developed quite distinct characteristics, under one umbrella called “Early Recovery”.

The Peace Building/Early Recovery sector aims to establish and strengthen structures that may contribute to local conflict resolution through training and capacity building.. One component, particularly with regard to Sudanaid, relates to protection and psychosocial interventions, which directly aim to build the capacity of community structures to safeguard the protection of IDPs. The NCA component has taken on an "Early Recovery" profile with more emphasis on peace-building and livelihood than on psychosocial support or protection. During the course of 2010 NCA has sought to hand over community centres which it has earlier run to communities themselves.

The SCC component has particularly focused on peace building activities carried out with the support of the Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund - DCPSF.

The sector aimed to target approximately 92,000 people in 2010, including support to persons that suffer from conflict-related trauma, notably abused women and girls. Activities include group therapy, education and income-generating measures.

School Support/Education – The programme aims to ensure basic education for children through support to local structures, construction / rehabilitation of schools, training and capacity-building of teachers and peace education. The total target of beneficiaries for the School Support sector in 2010 is 14,356 students, 7,794 male and 6,562 females. The sector seeks to increase the attendance of girls in schools by 15%.

Water and Sanitation - NCA is the only partner in the programme that implements activities within the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sector. From 4 March 2009, NCA has been the main actor in this sector in Zalingei in Hamedia, Hassa Hissa and Khamsadagaig IDP camps . In 2010 NCA is implementing WASH activities in Bilel camp, South Darfur and some areas around Bilel and Nyala. In 2010 the sector aim is to target 344,449 people, of whom 107,188 live in rural areas.

Health & Nutrition – The programme aims to ensure the existing primary health care services, clinics and health posts, which are essential to secure basic health services for both IDPs and the local population in the area, including providing nutritional support to malnourished children. Furthermore, mobile health teams cover peripherally located, conflict-affected communities and provide training in health and nutrition for IDPs and the local population. The overall goal is to provide curative services to 226,362 people in 2010. An additional 10,114 people will be reached with the implementation of HIV & aids awareness-raising activities.

Emergency Response Programme Unit - Through the programme, NCA hopes to become the main implementing partner for UNJLC in Zalingei IDP camps. The programme addresses emergency needs as they arise, primarily through water provision. The programme component is expected to encompass 138,000 persons in 2010, including IDPs and host community households living in camps and villages in Nyala, Zalingei, Garsilla and Ed Daein. The unit will be prepared to address voluntary return problems if they arise.

Crosscutting issues

HIV and aids: Focus on HIV & aids forms an integral part of all activities, notably within health education and psychosocial support. Particular weight is placed on preventive measures and awareness-raising, in close cooperation with local authorities.

Gender: Large portions of the affected population are women and children. The programme is geared towards involving both women and men, with a particular emphasis on vulnerable groups. The programme

accommodates integrated psychosocial interventions, including groups where women who have been maltreated can be helped to process their trauma.

Local basis: The programme co-operates closely with local partners (SCC and Sudanaid). Previously the programme had a third partner, SUDO, however the government withdrew their licence and closed them together with 2 other national NGOs and 13 international NGOs in March 2009. In some situations and particularly in the health sector, NCA also works with the local authorities. But first and foremost the work is carried out in close cooperation with the local population. All projects within the Darfur programme have to enter into a Technical Agreement (TA) with the Humanitarian Aid Commission of Sudan (HAC).

Purpose of the review

The purpose of the review is the following:

1. Analyse and assess the relevance of the programme goals based on an assessment of the overall context within which NCA operates in Darfur, including adjustment to changes in that context and with a special focus on how the context may challenge adherence to humanitarian principles.
2. Analyse and assess the extent to which NCA operates in a conflict-sensitive manner (i.e., based on a Do No Harm-approach) in programme planning and implementation. This should include an assessment of NCA's risk assessment procedures and measures of risk mitigation.
3. Analyse and assess the outcomes and possible impact of the programme according to its goals and objectives.

The review shall assess the effectiveness (relation output-outcome) and possible impact of the programme. It will also analyse the relevance and sustainability of the above mentioned programme components. The review shall take into account the OECD-DAC's evaluation criteria and separate between different levels of results according to the results chain. Further, the review shall consider risk management in the programmes, as well as look at the conflict sensitivity in planning, implementation, monitoring and reporting of the programmes.

Scope of work

1. Relevance and context

The review should analyse whether NCA has been forced to make any concessions, and, if so, which concessions, to be able to keep up operations in this extremely difficult context. What characterises the approach and methodology that has allowed NCA to remain operative in an area from which many other I/NGOs have been expelled? This should be explored in particular with regard to humanitarian principles, security arrangements and adherence to human rights and international humanitarian law.

The following context factors are to be assessed in relation to how they inform NCA's humanitarian aid programme in Darfur, notably in the formulation of programme goals:

- An overview of the overall political and security situation in the area of implementation including any restrictions in freedom of movement or access to programme areas
- An overview of the humanitarian situation/situation for IDPs;
- Political considerations, including the government's attitude towards local civil society organisations and INGOs

Based on the consideration of the overall context, the team should assess the relevance of existing programme goals, including whether these goals have been adjusted to changes in the context over time.

2. Conflict sensitivity and risk assessment

The review should assess whether NCA has adopted a conflict sensitive approach during planning and implementation of its Darfur programme, notably whether it routinely adopts an assessment of actors and factors (dividers and connectors) that may influence how the programme itself may impact on the dynamics of the conflict situation in the context in a positive or negative manner, and vice versa.

Furthermore, the review should assess NCA's risk assessment procedures and incorporation of risk-mitigating measures in planning and implementation of its Darfur programme, including adjustment of those risk factors based on an on-going risk analysis and the continuous incorporation of lessons learned.

3. Outcome and possible impact

First, the review shall assess the effectiveness (relation output-outcome), possible impact, relevance and sustainability of the below mentioned programmes:

- peace building/early recovery
- preventive health and the environment, (incl. water and sanitation)
- emergency response programme unit

Second, the review shall assess NCA's cooperation with its local partners, incl. selection criteria, support modality and agreement form, capacity building, partners' ownership, formalised dialogue, planning and reporting procedures, quality of indicators to measure success, procedures for monitoring and evaluation, transparency in the partnership, sustainability and phase-out strategies, anti-corruption measures, and financial audit regime. In addition, the team should examine any other matter they find relevant to support the purpose of the review.

Third, the review shall assess NCA-Darfurs administrative/management capacity, including financial management, hereunder i.a.:

- Planning capacity and risk assessments and management
- Quality assurance and control systems
- Personnel resources
- Clarity and transparency of financial management systems
- Systems for disclosing and reporting corruption and financial irregularity (within own organisation and partner organisations)
- Oversight/monitoring of money flows

Implementation of the review

Review of relevant documents

The review shall be based on the following reference material: relevant MFA policy documents, such as on humanitarian policy; relevant NCA strategic plans and documents; NCA programme plans and reports (200?-2010) to the MFA-HUM; MFA's appropriation documents; the agreement; NCA's reviews and evaluations of the programme; documents with reference to good practice; any other relevant documents.

Interviews and field visit

Interviews shall be conducted with relevant NCA staff in Oslo and at country level (Khartoum and Darfur level), selected NCA partners (government and non-government), relevant MFA-HUM staff, target group/beneficiaries, and other relevant informants.

The review shall include a field visit to be agreed upon between NCA, MFA-HUM, the Embassy in Khartoum and the team. Prior to the field visit, the team should present its preliminary findings in an inception report, based on document reviews and interviews in Norway. The inception report should outline key questions for the field visit.

The review shall be conducted in a transparent and conflict-sensitive manner (cf., *inter alia*, OECD-DAC's 2008 Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities)

The review shall be carried out tentatively in week 5-16 and the final report shall be presented to the MFA-HUM by week 15 of 2011. A debrief shall be held with MFA-HUM and NCA after the field visit, before completing the draft report.

- Draft report by 25 March 2011
- Final report by 15 April 2011
- Workshop to discuss final findings within 1. May

However, due to the situation in Sudan and Darfur, the assignment may be delayed, however it is a precondition for this assignment that it is completed by 1.july at the latest. If not, the assignment may have to be terminated.

Team

The team shall consist of two to three persons; one external consultant and one Norad employee and/or one local consultant.

The team shall, among them, have competence on humanitarian assistance issues in general, and on Sudan and Darfur in particular. Competence regarding gender perspectives is also of great importance. Relevant experience of conducting reviews and/or evaluations of humanitarian assistance programmes, preferably including knowledge of assistance programmes in conflict-affected areas, will be an advantage.

The external consultant shall be the team leader and main responsible for the content and writing of the report.

Reporting

A draft report shall be presented to the MFA-HUM no later than three weeks after the completion of the field visit. Following two weeks for comments by MFA-HUM and NCA, a final report shall be submitted no later than two weeks after receipt of those comments.

The report shall be based on the following tentative structure:

- i) Executive summary
- ii) Introduction and purpose of the review
- iii) Review approach and methodology
- iv) Analysis and findings
- v) Conclusions and recommendations

The final report shall be written in English. It shall contain an executive summary including a list of recommendations. It shall be maximum 25 pages long, incl. the executive summary. Appendices may be added. The final report shall be sent to the Embassy in electronic format.

The review shall provide the MFA-HUM with a prioritized set of recommendations for further involvement in Darfur, and as a basis for the consideration of a possible continued partnership between the MFA-HUM and NCA to be negotiated in early 2011. The recommendations shall be structured with this in mind.

To the extent that the team finds it relevant, the recommendations may include advice on possible adjustments of and/or improvements to NCA's systems and procedures (administrative and programmatic). Otherwise, the team is free to include other recommendations that are deemed relevant to furthering the purpose of the review.

The report will be made publicly available. NCA may on its own or on its partners' behalf request that information that is considered particularly sensitive with respect to the life and safety of staff be included in separate appendices with restricted access.

At the request of HUM or NCA, the team leader shall be available for discussions about recommendations and follow-up points.

Budget

The budget should not exceed NOK 325 800 including travel cost and local consultant.

A2 - Documents

Documents, minutes and literature:

1. ACT Caritas Darfur Emergency Response: DERO Water and Sanitation Sector Assessment, September 2007
2. ACT Caritas Strategic plan for NCA-ACT/Caritas and national partners in Darfur 2007-10: A strategy for the transformation of the Darfur Emergency Response Operation (DERO) 10th August 2006
3. Beyond Emergency Relief Long-term trends and priorities and for UN agencies in Darfur 2010
4. Darfur Emergency Response Organisation, Water and Sanitation Crisis Response Darfur Internal, Project Evaluation Final Report. 1 November 2005 – 31 July 2006
5. Draft Record of the Donor Partners Meeting of the NCA Darfur Programme supported by ACT and Caritas. 2nd and 3rd December 2010
6. DRAFT Record of the International Reference Group Teleconference discussing the 'Vision for the NCA Darfur Programme' document 18th November 2010
7. The Government of Sudan Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs Humanitarian Aid Commission Humanitarian Assistance Strategy in Darfur Final Draft, 28th Nov 2010
8. The Government of Sudan: Proposed Interim Security Plan for Darfur, 2010
9. Joint ACT – Caritas support and monitoring visit to the NCA Darfur Programme, Sudan 20th February – 5th March 2010
10. Joint Review Mission of the NCA Darfur Program funded by the ACT and Caritas Networks Final Report October 5th 2009
11. Independent Evaluation of the ACT/Caritas Operation. Caritas Internationalis. Final Evaluation Report. Health Focus GMBH 15.11.2005
12. Independent Evaluation of the ACT/Caritas Operation. Caritas Internationalis. Final Evaluation Report. Health Focus GMBH 1.2.2006
13. Letter from NCA to the Humanitarian Aid Commission, Khartoum, 25th August 2008
14. MFA-grant-letter 2004 – 2011.

2006-NCA-application-to-MFA

2006 grant letter

2006-update-of events

2006-MFA-comments-to-NCAapplication

2007-NCA-and-UN statement

2006-MFA-approval-final-report (sent-2008)

- Rapport godkjent, prosjektet avsluttet
- 2006-NCA-update-SCC
- 2007-NCA-Application-to-MFA
- 2007-NCA-update-SCC
- 2007-MFA-grant letter
- 2008-MFA-extension-of-report-deadline (but-no-approval-local-audit)
- 2008-MFA-grants-letter
- 2009-Embassy-assessment-NCA-taking-over-SUDO
- 2009-NCA application
- 2009-Embassy supporting NCA-application
- 2009-Grants-Letter (document missing from email)
- 2010-MFA-grants-letter
- 2010-incidence-reporting (confidential)
15. MFA Sudangjennomgangen: Retningen videre for Norks Sudan-engasjement. March 2010
16. NCA-application-letter to MFA 2004 - 2011
17. NCA Darfur Programme Appeals 2004 – 2011
18. NCA Darfur Programme Proposed Appeal Budget Revision – 2010 Nyala, October 4, 2010
19. NCA Darfur Programme Financial Report 3rd Quarter - 2010 Nyala, October 28, 2010
20. NCA Darfur Programme Narrative Report Quarter Three 2010, Nyala, October 2010
21. NCA letter to MFA Support to Darfur Appeal 2010, March 4 2010
22. NCA Darfur Programme Appeal 2010 Overall Programme Logical Framework
23. NCA Darfur Programme Summary Darfur Appeal 2010
24. NCA Darfur Programme Detailed Budget NCA Darfur Programme Appeal 2010
25. NCA Mission Report Sudan/Khartoum 10/06/08 – 22/06/08
26. Norway's Humanitarian Policy. Report No. 40 (2008-2009) to the Storting
27. Norwegian Church Aid/ACT Alliance. Global Strategy 2011-2015
28. Report of African Union, High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUDP), AU Peace and Security Council, 29th October 2009
29. Sudan 2011 UN and Partners Work Plan
30. Terms of Reference NCA – ACT/Caritas Darfur Emergency Response (DERO) National Coordination Group (NCG) Draft 3 11.4.2007
31. The Vision for the NCA Darfur Programme, Final Version as approved by the CSA 29th November 2010
32. www.ochaonline.un.org/sudan
33. www.unsudanig.org/docs

A3 - Humanitarian Principles

The Review will be applied against the following humanitarian principles and core criteria:

International humanitarian principles including International Humanitarian Law and The Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles (GHD)³³,¹ the Code of Conduct for International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, The DO NO HARM “Analytical Framework”, The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response - the Sphere Standards and the Compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 Women Peace and Security (2000) as applied in the IASC Gender Handbook for Humanitarian Action (2006)³⁴.

a. International humanitarian principles

International humanitarian principles including International Humanitarian Law and The Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles (GHD)³⁵ based upon:

Humanity: Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention (paid) to the most vulnerable in the population. The dignity of all victims must be respected and protected.

Neutrality: Humanitarian aid must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute.

Impartiality: Humanitarian aid must be provided solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations. Impartiality also implies making choices to favor those most likely to benefit from lifesaving aid.

Independence: The autonomy of humanitarian objectives from political, economic, military or other objectives must be observed, thus serving to ensure that the sole purpose of humanitarian aid remains to relieve and prevent the suffering of victims of humanitarian crises

Impartiality: An approach to the provision of humanitarian

Humanitarian Action: Assistance, protection and advocacy actions undertaken on an impartial basis in response to human needs resulting from complex political emergencies and natural hazards.

b. Code of Conduct³⁶

1. The humanitarian imperative comes first;
2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone;
3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint;
4. We shall endeavor not to be used as an instrument of government foreign policy;
5. We shall respect culture and custom;
6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities;

³³ <http://www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org/gns/principles-good-practice-ghd/overview.aspx>

³⁴ <http://www.humanitarianreform.org/Default.aspx?tabid=656>

³⁵ <http://www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org/gns/principles-good-practice-ghd/overview.aspx>

³⁶ The Code of Conduct for International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief was drawn up in 1992 by the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response to set ethical standards for organizations involved in humanitarian work.

7. Ways shall be found to involve program beneficiaries in the management of relief aid;
8. Relief aid must strive to reduce vulnerabilities to future disaster as well as meeting basic needs;
9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources;
10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognize disaster victims as dignified human beings, not hopeless objects.

c. Do no Harm Framework

The DO NO HARM “Analytical Framework” was developed from the programming experience of many assistance workers. It provides a tool for mapping the interactions of assistance and conflict and can be used to plan, monitor and evaluate both humanitarian and development assistance programmes. It is a descriptive tool that: 1) identifies the categories of information that have been found through experience to be important for understanding how assistance affects conflict; 2) organizes these categories in a visual lay-out that highlights their actual and potential relationships; and 3) helps us predict the impacts of different programming decisions.

A Brief Description of Seven Steps³⁷ in the Do No Harm Framework:

Step 1: Understanding the Context of Conflict

Step 2: Analyzing DIVIDERS and TENSIONS

Step 3: Analyzing CONNECTORS and LOCAL CAPACITIES FOR PEACE

Step 4: Analyzing the Assistance Programme

Step 5: Analyzing the Assistance Programme's Impact on DIVIDERS and CONNECTORS

Step 6: Considering (and Generating) Programming Options

Step 7: Test Programming Options and Redesign Project

d. Sphere Standards

Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response - commonly referred to as the Sphere Standards, setting standards for quality and accountability. The Sphere Project is an initiative to define and uphold the standards by which the global community responds to the plight of people affected by disasters, principally through a set of guidelines that are set out in Sphere Standards. Sphere is based on two core beliefs: (1) that those affected by disaster or conflict have a right to life with dignity and therefore a right to protection and assistance, and (2) that all possible steps should be taken to alleviate human suffering arising out of disaster and conflict.

e. Women Peace and Security

Compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 *Women Peace and Security (2000)* as applied in the IASC Gender Handbook for Humanitarian Action (2006)³⁸. Security Council resolution 1325 reiterated that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those negatively affected by conflict and called for measures to ensure that women are more equally represented in all stages of peace processes. It furthermore called on all parties to armed conflict to fully respect international law applicable to the rights and protection of civilian women and girls, in particular the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and two Additional Protocols of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and Protocol of 1967, the human

³⁷ <http://www.donoharm.info/content/download/level000/Seven%20Steps%20English.pdf>

³⁸ <http://www.humanitarianreform.org/Default.aspx?tabid=656>

rights instruments, including CEDAW and its Optional Protocol of 1999, and the CRC and its two Optional Protocols of 2000. The Council cautioned all parties to armed conflict to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute. The crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC, which can hold individuals criminally responsible and punishable for committing acts amounting to these crimes.

The IASC Gender Handbook for Humanitarian Action outlines the following actions to ensure gender equality in emergencies:

Analyse gender differences.

Design services to meet needs of all.

Access for women, girls, boys and men.

Participate equally.

Train women and men equally.

And:

Address GBV in sector programmes.

Collect, analyse and report sex- and age-disaggregated data.

Target actions based on a gender analysis.

Coordinate actions with all partners.

ADAPT and ACT Collectively to ensure gender equality

A4 - People met

1. Adam Abdalla	Hygiene Promotion Officer	NCA, Zalingei
2. Samira Abdalla	Community Mobiliser	NCA, Zalingei
3. Marim Abdalmula	Chair Women Committee	Khamsadagaig, Zalingei
4. Ahmed Mohammad Adam	Director General	Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs(HAC) Khartoum
5. Al Sadig Adam	Community Mobiliser	NCA, Zalingei
6. Hassan Ismael Adam	Community Worker	NCA, Khamsadagaig Camp, Zalingei
7. Dauod Mohamed Adam	Health Data Entry Assistant	NCA, Zalingei
8. Yacou Ishaq Adam	PTA Chairman	Direj Primary School, Nyala
9. Innih Akpan	Humanitarian Coordinator	UNAMID, Zalingei
10. Yahia Mohammed Ali	EPR Officer	NCA, Nyala
11. Dominic Atem	Education Manager	SudanAid, Nyala
12. Howard Bell	Country Director, Chair NGO Steering Committee	CARE, Khartoum
13. Jennifer Binns	Humanitarian HR Officer	CAFOD, London
14. John Birchenough	Country Funding Manager	NCA, Khartoum
15. John Borton	Learning and Support Adviser	London
16. Knut Christiansen	Special Advisor	NCA, Oslo
17. Sophie Cleve	First Secretary	Norwegian Embassy, Khartoum
18. Fergus Conmee	Head Humanitarian Programme, Africa, CSA	CAFOD, London
19. Mark Cutts	Head of office	OCHA, Khartoum
20. Mohammed Dauod	Medical Assistance	NCA, Khamsadagaig Camp, Zalingei
21. Kur Mayak Deng	Relief and Development Coordinator	SudanAid, Nyala
22. Zachariah Abdallah Nasr El Din	Logistic Officer	SCC, Nyala
23. Pio Ding	Sudan Program Coordinator	NCA, Oslo
24. Alistair Dutton	Humanitarian Director, CSA	Caritas, Rome
25. Merete Dyrud	Senior Advisor, Section for Humanitarian Affairs	MFA, Oslo
26. Gro Eikeland	Head of Operations	NCA, Nyala
27. Kirsten Engebak	Head of Division, CSA	NCA, Oslo
28. Yacoub Francis	Justice and Peace Manager	SudanAid, Nyala
29. Katherine Gicuku-Ireri	Programme Officer Africa	ACT, Geneva
30. Gareth Gleed	Field Delegate	ICRC, Zalingei
31. Gamal Ahned Gumaa	Humanitarian Financing Officer	OCHA, Nyala
32. Francoise Hadley	Acting CSA Secretary	CAFOD, London
33. Vigdis Halvorsen	Senior Adviser Civil Society Department	Norad, Oslo
34. Philimon Hamed	Program Support officer	SCC, Nyala
35. Fatima Abdulaziz Hamid	Nutrition	NCA, Khamsadagaig Camp, Zalingei
36. Ezaldeen Haron	Nutrition	NCA, Khamsadagaig Camp, Zalingei
37. Ismael Abdalla Ibrahim	Chair WASH Committee	Khamsadagaig Camp, Zalingei
38. Dr. Daud Ibrahim	Health Manager	SudanAid, Nyala
39. Mukhtar Idris	WASH Officer	NCA, Zalingei
40. Ismail Abass Ismail	HIV/AIDS officer	SCC, Nyala
41. Mohammed Ismael	Nutrition Officer	NCA, Zalingei

42. Omda Abdallah Ali Ismail	PTA and Camp Coordinator	Direj Primary School, Nyala
43. Hanne-Marie Kaarstad	Senior Advisor, Sudan Team	MFA, Oslo
44. Blaise Kabongo	Humanitarian Affaris Officer	OCHA, Zalingei
45. Fatima Abaker Abdel Karim	Head Mistress	Deriej Primary School for Girls, Nyala
46. Nils Kastberg	Representative	UNICEF
47. Rebecca Larson Geneva	Deputy General Secretary, CSA co-chair	ACT, Geneva
48. Andrew Lokong	WASH Programme Officer	NCA, Zalingei
49. Dave McEntee	Security Officer	NCA, Khartoum
50. Vasca Sabit Michael	Program Officer - Head of SCC	SCC, Nyala
51. Bjørg Mide	Senior Advisor	NCA, Oslo
52. Wayne Mitchell	Director, NCA Darfur Programme	NCA, Nyala
53. David Gathiri Njoroge	WASH Coordinator	NCA, Nyala
54. Arve Ofstad	Minister Counsellor/ Deputy Head of Mission	Norwegian Embassy, Khartoum
55. El Omda	Head Master	Direj Primary School for Boys, Nyala
56. Adam Mohammed Omer	Nutrition	NCA, Khamsadagaig Camp, Zalingei
57. Marim Omer	Nutrition Assistant	NCA, Zalingei
58. Farahat Abaker Osman	EPR Assistant	NCA, Zalingei
59. Elisha Owiti	Finance Manager	NCA, Nyala
60. Alisha Owiti	Head of Finance	NCA, Nyala
61. Ismael Musa	Community Mobiliser	NCA, Zalingei
62. Juliette Prodron	Humanitarian Adviser	DFID, Khartoum
63. Afaf Osman Abdel Rahman	Senior Peace Building officer	SCC, Nyala
64. Mukhtar Abdel Rahman	Education Officer	SCC, Nyala
65. Bruno Rotival	Head of Office	ECHO, Kharoum
66. Yusuf Abdi Salah	Head of Office	OCHA, Nyala
67. Leif B Sauvik	Senior Adviser, Civil Society Department	Norad, Oslo
68. Vebjørn Sannes	Deputy director, Humanitarian Dept	MFA, Oslo
69. El Fadil Abdallah Ahmed Tambur	Senior EPR Officer	NCA, Nyala
70. James Salestino	Head of Logistics	SudanAid, Nyala
71. Liv Snisrud	Afghanistan Coordinator – previous HR for Darfur	NCA, Oslo
72. Ashaa Sareed Al Tahir	Nutrition	NCA, Khamsadagaig Camp, Zalingei
73. Adam Abdallah El Tahir	PTA	Direj Primary School, Nyala
74. El Fadhil Mohamed Suliaman Zachariah	PTA Treasurer	Direj Primary School, Nyala
75. Muzamil Al Zubir	EPR Officier	NCA, Zalingei
76. Gabriel Yai	Programme Manager	SudanAid, Nyala
77. Suzan ??	Head of Programs	NCA, Nyala
78. Fatima ??	Head of Women Committee	Income Generation Project in Direj camp, Nyala

A5 - Combined Sector Assessment Matrix

NCA DARFUR PROGRAMME

Combined Sector Assessment Matrix prepared for the Norad Review of the NCA Darfur Programme

Note: The matrix for each of the sectors is structured according to the five DAC evaluation criteria. Each indicator of achievement, in relation to relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, results and impact is scored according to its level of achievement (1: Very Low, 2: Low, 3: Medium, 4: High and 5: Very High). This enables a rating by indicator of the contribution of the NCA Darfur programme. Subsequently, the assessment made in the matrices will also be used to inform the synthesis of findings.

DAC/Norad Evaluation Criteria / Indicators	Relevance (and Appropriateness)	Effectiveness	Sustainability	Results (outputs)	Impact (outcomes)
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Sector (WASH) Rating/ Performance 24/25	5 (coverage - SPHERE)	5 (target access and quality)	4 (handover, training, new technology behaviour changes)	5 (exceeded plan of number of beneficiaries)	5 (documented health improvements data)
Emergency Preparedness and Response Sector Rating/ Performance 22/25	4 (delay)	5 (exceed plans)	4 (community committees)	5 (exceed plans)	4 (reduced number emergencies)
Health and Nutrition Sector Rating/ Performance 19/25	4 (coverage)	4 (meeting targets)	3 (performance of handed over)	4 (meeting targets)	4 (mortality decreased and morbidity contained within acceptable levels)
School Support/Education Rating/ Performance 14/25	2 (low coverage)	4 (+plans met)	4 (+hand over)	2 (targets partly met)	2 (education quality a problem)
Organisational					

Development and Capacity Building Rating/ Performance 14/25	4 (coverage)	2 (staffing capacity)	2 (closure SUDO)	3 (targets met)	(local ownership)
Peace Building Rating/ Performance 14/25	3 (coverage)	3 (plans partly met, access/security reduced)	3 (handover of centres)	2 (target partly met due to closure of SUDO)	3(self managed – impact difficult to document)
PPP/Early Recovery/Livelihood Components Rating/ Performance 12/25	3 (coverage)	3 (partly met – staffing)	2 (handover recently)	2 (partly met – insecurity)	2 (limited documentation of impact)
Crosscutting Environment Rating/ Performance 13/25	3 (coverage limited)	2(closure of SUDO)	3 (awareness)	3 (partly met)	2 (evidence limited)
Crosscutting HIV/AIDS Rating/ Performance 12/25	3 (limited interventions)	2 (culture)	2 (strategy delayed)	3 (culture)	2 (limited evidence)
Crosscutting Gender Rating/ Performance 14/25	3 (aggregated data and gender included in most programmes)	4 (delivery according to plans)	2(partly met – sustainability not documented)	3 (partly met)	2(limited documentation)
Crosscutting Protection Rating/ Performance 9/25	2 (protection issues partly identified/ addressed)	2 (protection issues partly identified/ addressed)	2 (protection issues partly identified/ addressed)	2 (protection issues partly identified/ addressed)	1 (documented impact limited)

SUMMARY – SWOT

<p>STRENGTHS</p> <p>Coverage Capacity Competence M&E Strategy Methodology</p>	<p>OPPORTUNITIES</p> <p>Presence/history Confidence national/international stakeholders Credibility beneficiaries/communities Holistic/Integrated approach National partners/ownership/sustainability Vision/commitment</p>
<p>WEAKNESSES</p> <p>Coverage Capacity Competence M&E Strategy Methodology</p>	<p>TREATHS</p> <p>Insecurity/restrictions access Ability to asses, respond and monitor – “lost eyes and ears!” Strategic analysis/coordinated response limited Humanitarian ‘Roadmap’/leadership missing Government. controls humanitarian agenda – Human Rights/Protection/GBV</p>

NCA DARFUR PORGRAMME

Combined Sector Assessment Matrix prepared for the Norad Review of the NCA Darfur Programme

Note: The matrix for each of the sectors is structured according to the five DAC evaluation criteria. Each indicator of achievement, in relation to relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, results and impact is scored according to its level of achievement (1: Very Low, 2: Low, 3: Medium, 4: High and 5:Very High). This enables a rating by indicator of the contribution of the NCA Darfur programme. Subsequently, the assessment made in the matrices will also be used to inform the synthesis of findings.

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Sector (WASH)

DAC/Norad Evaluation Criteria / Indicators	Relevance (and Appropriateness)	Effectiveness	Sustainability	Results (outputs)	Impact (outcomes)
<p>Water Access:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Coverage per-capita (lpppd) 2. Water quality 3. Walking distance and waiting time 	<p>Providing access to water for IDPs and host communities</p> <p>At least 15lpppd in IDP camps and 7.5lppd in rural targeted areas</p> <p>Meeting SPHERE standards, and zero faecal contamination</p> <p>Reduce walking distance to within 100 metres radius</p> <p>Reduce waiting time to less than 30 minutes, gives IDPs more time to engage in other productive ventures</p>	<p>Delivered as planned and exceeded plan expectations</p>	<p>Sustainable new technology (solar energy) introduced for powering water systems as opposed to running diesel generators</p> <p>Of the 8 solar systems installed by 2010, 7 of them have been successfully handed over to the communities to manage.</p> <p>Local community technicians trained on maintenance of new solar systems, hand pumps, and hand dug wells</p> <p>Most activities implemented in conjunction with relevant line ministries to ensure that there is technical support in case NCA pulls out.</p>	<p>Access to water in camps improved from 10.7lpppd (2006) to 23.4lpppd (2010) for over 237,000 IDPs in camps.</p> <p>Turbidity and faecal contamination reduced to zero</p> <p>Walking distances to water point for targeted rural communities reduced to less than 500 metres from highs of 30 km.</p>	<p>Reduced incidences of diarrhea and cholera in program areas since 2006</p>

DAC/Norad Evaluation Criteria / Indicators	Relevance (and Appropriateness)	Effectiveness	Sustainability	Results (outputs)	Impact (outcomes)
<p>Hygiene and sanitation improvement:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Latrine coverage in IDP camps 2. Personal and environmental hygiene 	<p>Providing faecal disposal possibilities for IDPs and host populations</p> <p>At least every household has access to latrine for disposal of human excreta</p> <p>Awareness on personal and environmental hygiene to assist in reduction of communicable diseases</p>	<p>Delivered as planned and exceeded expectations by more than 5% annually</p>	<p>NCA has reduced direct involvement in latrine construction to providing material for slabs; labor is provided by community; NCA's current strategy is to empower communities to use local available materials for super structure construction.</p> <p>Involvement of community members in awareness on hygiene</p>	<p>Sanitation coverage in IDP camps improved from 45% in 2006 to 95% in the same period. (NCA KAP report 2010)</p>	<p>Behavior change on hygiene and sanitation practices high (NCA KAP reports from 2007-2010)</p>
<p>Capacity building:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Staff capacity 2. Community capacity 	<p>Build national staff capacity on WASH programming</p> <p>Empowering community to independently manage water and sanitation activities</p>	<p>All capacity building activities implemented as planned in 2010</p>	<p>Peer learning taking place amongst national staff</p> <p>Water, sanitation and hygiene committees established ; and exchange learning taking place within different communities and encouraged through competitions</p>	<p>A combination of internal mentoring, coaching and staff attending structured courses has been taking place. In 2010 at least 15 in Q4 alone benefited from structured training</p> <p>All new and rehabilitated water infrastructure has a functional water committee</p>	<p>Communities are able to allocate more time in other livelihood activities that was wasted searching for water when community water infrastructure was dysfunctional</p>
<p>Rating/ Performance 24/25</p>	<p>5 (coverage - SPHERE)</p>	<p>5 (target access and quality)</p>	<p>4 (handover, training, new technology behaviour changes)</p>	<p>5 (exceeded planed number of beneficiaries)</p>	<p>5 (documented improvements health data)</p>
<p>Strength / Weakness</p>					

Health and Nutrition Sector

DAC/Norad Evaluation Criteria / Indicators	Relevance (and Appropriateness)	Effectiveness	Sustainability	Results (outputs)	Impact (outcomes)
Improved access to health services addressing the main causes of mortality and morbidity	Access to quality health care and nutrition services is a right of all beneficiaries.	Delivered according to targets and plans for health services and nutritional interventions Nutrition achievement slightly above annual target	Strategies, plans and timeline for hand-over of health and nutrition services to partners Durable and permanent Infrastructure.	27 health facilities and 11 nutrition centres facilities established since 2004. Morbidity trend maintained below alarming levels. Outbreaks witnessed last in 2007.	A decrease in mortality for children >5 documented in some locations between 2009/2010 (would be great if a few percentages were mentioned)
Enhanced capacity of health staff, community health committees and MOH.	Capacity building of staff and community is vital to equip them with the necessary information and knowledge to improve their performance.	Sustained and expanded capacity building for health staff, community health committees and MOH conducted according to MOH and UNICEF guidelines. Capacity building and training tailored to meet the actual needs.	Training and capacity building for health staff, community committees and MOH. Capacity building undertaken focusing on the national staff members, beneficiaries (IDPs and Host community members) and SMOH.	100% of staff, 66% community committee members have been trained. 80% of staff recruited from the local communities and camps.	Improved quality of health care in all supported health facilities
Coverage of all components of primary health care	Provision of all components of PHC under one roof ensures that the beneficiaries receive the necessary services in each supported health facility.	95% primary health care coverage according to targets and plans. Health and Nutrition services provided in accordance to the MOH guidelines.	10 health facilities (45%) handed over to the MOH. However, out of those handed over, not all are 100% operational.	Since 2004, 22 permanent health facilities established and up running 56% increase in antenatal and postnatal uptake for 2007 compared with 2010 (21,526 ante / postnatal checks carried out in 2007 compared to 33,672 ante / postnatal checks undertaken in 2010). Supported facilities fully	From a very high level of malnutrition (GAM and MAM), the rate decreased in some locations Gradual drop of beneficiaries fed in the supported nutrition centres from 2007-2010 i.e. 19% drop in the caseload from 2001 to 2010 in all nutrition centres supported in West Darfur. Disease outbreaks curtailed and contained in all areas of operations.

DAC/Norad Evaluation Criteria / Indicators	Relevance (and Appropriateness)	Effectiveness	Sustainability	Results (outputs)	Impact (outcomes)
				equipped and stocked to respond effectively to outbreaks and unexpected surge in beneficiary numbers.	
Rating / Performance 19/25	4 (coverage)	4 (meeting targets)	3 (sub optimal performance of facilities that have already been handed over)	4 (meeting targets)	4 (mortality decreased and morbidity contained within acceptable levels)
Strength / Weakness	Programme tailored in line with Sudan Primary Health Care structure.	Minimal community participation in project activities.	Minimal community ownership of the Project.	Effective M & E system in place.	

School Support/Education Sector

DAC/Norad Evaluation Criteria / Indicators	Relevance (and Appropriateness)	Effectiveness	Sustainability	Results (outputs)	Impact (outcomes)
Permanent basic schools for friendly and safe learning environment.	Basic education for children affected by conflict and host communities	Education plans were adequately implemented according to plans with minimal deviations	All school support activities implemented in close cooperation with local communities, authorities and handed over to SMOE. No support for running cost or incentives have been provided - dependency on donor support minimal	As of 2010, school support partners managed to benefit 14,879; 9,896 of these beneficiaries were from IDPs, and 4,983 of beneficiaries were from host communities within program areas; 8 permanent schools were build and 14 rehabilitated by both education sector partners	Considerable number of children mostly from IDP camps have access to basic education
School staff, communities and Ministry of Education with enhanced capacity to support, manage and promote quality education services.	Creating enabling and supportive environment for school infrastructure in targeted program areas Improve understanding of stakeholders on the value of education in children in rural and camp environment	All activity plans implemented according to plans with involvement of state ministries of education	All established structures were formed in collaboration with state ministry of education (SMoE) The local structures i.e. PTA have been trained in school management issues and equipped with skills on school running.; 60 persons (45 male, 15 female) were trained on the value of education using curriculum provided by SMOE. Scholastic material e.g. desks, books and other distributed to targeted schools	By end of 2010, at least 60 persons (45 male, 15 female) from both PTAs and teaching staff were trained on the value of education using curriculum provided by SMOE.	Observed increased understanding on the value of education among decision makers and communities where the program operates.
Youth and adults with access to vocational training improve their	Providing alternative IGAs for young people and life skills	Delivered as planned although there were delays in funds releases	Skills imparted to youth are invariably self-sustaining for those who	In 2010, Q4; at least 44 trainees completed training in different life	Personal skills development among those who benefitted

livelihoods and life skills.	development for the youth in program areas Vocational Infrastructure important for skills development for young people	to some partners	benefited. Provision of start-up kits has enabled the youth to open up their own workshops where they produce and sell different items	skills out of which 15 were women trained in tailoring while the rest were male youth. Other courses graduated include; 14 of trained in welding and 15 in masonry.	Self-employment opportunity creation for targeted youth in program areas Improvement in income among households that benefited from vocational training
Rating/ Performance 14/25	2 (low coverage)	4 (+plans met)	4 (+hand over)	2 (targets partly met)	2 (education quality a problem)
Strength / Weakness		Same	Same		Same

Peace Building Sector

DAC/Norad Evaluation Criteria / Indicators	Relevance (and Appropriateness)	Effectiveness	Sustainability	Results (outputs)	Impact (outcomes)
Community centres are sustainable safe havens for educational, recreational, psychosocial and productive activities.	<p>Providing psychosocial support for conflict and post conflict affected persons</p> <p>Technical skills training for (vulnerable group) women, children and youth</p> <p>Adult education</p> <p>Peace building training to community committees and community base organization</p>	<p>Adult education classes for women and youth were conducted in community centers according to time</p> <p>Peace building training for the IDPs and community leaders</p> <p>Exchange visits between host communities and IDPs</p>	<p>Handing over of the centres to local community</p> <p>Community capacity to manage centres</p>	<p>2010: 9,669 people involved in community centres</p> <p>453 persons trained in peace building and community leadership</p>	<p>Improved relations within different communities through support to CBOs documented</p>
Livelihoods alternatives for IDPs in camps and host communities	<p>Availing alternative means of livelihood for target communities in IDP camps and host communities</p> <p>Enabling households earn a living within camp environment and host community</p>	<p>Planned activities and targeted beneficiaries were partly met</p> <p>High community participation in trainings</p> <p>Peace building mainstreamed in WatSan, Health and Nutrition, School Support and Livelihood</p>	<p>Local community able to take over the community centres</p> <p>Centres are community managed</p> <p>Reconciling at water points and in using shared latrines</p>	<p>2010: training of 235 mainly women, 150 people in group counseling</p>	<p>Reduced conflict among IDPs, nomadic tribes and host communities</p> <p>Some community becoming more self sufficient</p> <p>Communities seems able to resolve and manage conflict among themselves</p>
Rating / Performance 14/25	3 (coverage)	3 (plans partly met, access/security reduced)	3 (hand-over of centres)	2 (target partly met due to closure of SUDO)	3 (self-managed – impact difficult to document)
Strength / Weakness					

PPP/Early Recovery/Livelihoods Components

NB. During 2011 livelihoods activities currently undertaken by PPP/Early Recovery will be developed into a full Livelihoods Sector. The activities reported on are therefore a subset of PPP/Early Recovery and a rating of those activities is included in the PPP/Early Recovery table.

DAC/Norad Evaluation Criteria / Indicators	Relevance (and Appropriateness)	Effectiveness	Sustainability	Results (outputs)	Impact (outcomes)
Enhanced recovery activities and empowerment of communities affected by conflict and displacement to contribute to sustainable peace	Provide technical skills for youth and women Provide vocational training as a means of skills development	Vocational training in traditional and new capacities delivered according to community interests	Community initiative towards self-reliance	Beneficiaries in 2010: 126,170	Limited useful data
Improved knowledge in management of microfinance	Enables IDPs and host communities to become self-reliant	Training in microfinance, management of IGAs, food processing, sewing, computer and language. Training carpentry and butchery for boys Counseling of traumatized persons	Small business start up	237 persons trained in management of IGAs 26 persons reached in vocational training 878 trained in sewing and 150 in food processing 188 in computer training 56 in language training 386 in hairdressing 34 boys in butchery 31 boys in carpentry 35 in mechanics	Limited useful data
Rating / Performance 12/25	3 (coverage)	3 (partly met – staffing)	2 (handover recently)	2 (partly met – insecurity)	2 (limited documentation of impact)

Emergency Preparedness and Response Sector

DAC/Norad Evaluation Criteria / Indicators	Relevance (and Appropriateness)	Effectiveness	Sustainability	Results (outputs)	Impact (outcomes)
Quick assessments to provide data for emergency response	Enables identification of needs for response Conflict affected households receive basic items according to sphere standards.	All assessments conducted within 24hrs of emergency occurrence if security situation allows	Involvement of local authorities and other humanitarian agencies Community involvement in data collection and distributions	Records show that in 2008 37,414 households were assessed; in 2009 60,134 households; in 2010, 67,268 households were assessed for NFI distributions	Limited useful data
Emergency response and distributions	To provide basic needs to enable IDPs survive with dignity.	Delivered according to plans – numbers exceed annual plan	Community committees established for emergency preparedness	Beneficiaries: 36,582 households reached in 2008; 55,252 households in 2009 and 55,724 households in 2010	Reduced number of flood and fire incidents
Capacity building	Enhanced capacity to deliver relevant and quality responses and assess impact among staff and community members	Deliver capacity building on emergency prevention and preparedness according to plans	Emergency committee formed to contribute in helping to implement the activities involving; UN UNJLC and INGOs, sharing and coordinated emergency response	328 persons (men, women and youth) trained by community leaders to provide assistance in the activities	
Rating / Performance 22/25	4 (delay)	5 (exceed plans)	4 (community committees)	5 (exceed plans)	4 (reduced number emergencies)
Strength / Weakness	The sector implanted in the areas of assignment and expanded to new areas according to the new emergencies. Weakness: there was a delay from IOM the transporter because of lack of funding which effected the ability to start distribution at the	According to the good and faithful coordination with UNJLC, the sector performed/worked at the new areas according to the new emergencies like fire cases and new displacements and floods / Weakness: The delay of funds from IOM	In order to delegate activities to community and involve them in voluntary work, the sector conducted trainings for local leaders for the purpose of registering new arrivals and participate in information gathering of new displacements	The number of beneficiaries was exceeded because of an increase in emergency cases.	The item distributions sustain living with dignity.

	right time	affected the plan.			
--	------------	--------------------	--	--	--

Organisational Development and Capacity Building

DAC/Norad Evaluation Criteria	Relevance (and Appropriateness)	Effectiveness	Sustainability	Results (outputs)	Impact (outcomes)
Indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. National partners benefit from OD and CB which is appropriate for their needs and organizational plans 2. NCA staff benefit from CB which is appropriate to their needs and departmental development plans 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Annual ODCB objectives and plans for NCA and national partners are met 2. National partners are able to manage increased budgets 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Capacity that is developed within the national partners is retained 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No. of staff within partners and NCA received training/capacity building interventions 	Limited useful data on impact
Performance	<p>Indicator 1.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collaborative annual planning of national partners OD and CB needs with senior management of national partners ensures appropriateness of ODCB support • Monthly SMM meetings provide opportunity to formally raise issues of concern in relation to NCA and ODCB <p>Indicator 2.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NCA departments prepare annual training plans that, 	<p>Indicator 1.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ODCB's capacity has been significantly constrained by gaps in the ODCB Manager position – post filled for only 12 out of 34 months to March 2011 • As a consequence some key activities have not been initiated or completed in the year planned <p>Indicator 2.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sudanaid's funding from the Appeal has grown from \$0.4m in 2005 to \$1.4m in 	<p>Indicator 1.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • January 2011 introduction of training bond for staff receiving international training will help retention of staff receiving significant investment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Numbers of staff benefitting from training and capacity building 2008 to 2010: • SCC = 129 • Sudanaid = 84 • NCA = 488 	Limited useful data

	since 2010, are linked to staff appraisals	2011 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SCC's funding has grown from \$0.35m in 2005 to just over \$1m in 2011 • Audits successfully completed on time for both partners in 2010 			
Rating 14/25	4 (coverage)	2 (staffing capacity)	2 (closure SUDO)	3 (targets met)	3 (limited data on impact)
Strength / Weakness	Refer to points under Performance	Refer to points under Performance	Refer to points under Performance	Refer to points under Performance	Refer to points under Performance

**Crosscutting issues
HIV/AIDS**

DAC/Norad Evaluation Criteria (Indicators)	Relevance (and Appropriateness)	Effectiveness	Sustainability	Results (outputs)	Impact (outcomes)
Improved awareness of HIV/AIDS by beneficiaries in target areas	It is necessary to create awareness among the targeted beneficiaries to empower them to be able to minimize the spread of HIV/AIDS despite the low prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Sudan.	Delivered according to targets and plans. Dissemination of HIV/AIDS undertaken using simple messages that are culturally appropriate.	Increased involvement of beneficiaries HIV/AIDS awareness initiative. Training of peer educators, religious leaders and health personnel from the communities in targeted areas.	% of community members with an understanding of HIV/AIDS transmission: 54% in Zalingei IDP camps and 54.2% in Bilel IDP camp	Limited useful data
Rating / Performance 12/25	3 (limited interventions)	2 (culture)	2 (strategy delayed)	3 (culture)	2 (limited evidence)
Strength / Weakness	The HIV/AIDS program approach is limited to awareness creation and VCT services only leaving out other important preventive aspects of HIV/AIDS.	Effectiveness is severely hampered by cultural stigma and discrimination (eg. condoms can only be provided to married couples) Effectiveness of embedding HIV/AIDS within work of all sectors has been limited due to repeated postponement of visit by CAFOD HIV/AIDS specialist due to visa and insecurity issues	Strategy mainstreaming HIV/AIDS across sectors and workplace HIV/AIDS policies yet to be developed	Awareness data in camps covered by NCA is average Coverage is limited by cultural/religious and official constraints	Evidence base very limited

Environment

DAC/Norad Evaluation Criteria / Indicators	Relevance (and Appropriateness)	Effectiveness	Sustainability	Results (outputs)	Impact (outcomes)
<p>Safe disposal of clinic and nutrition centre waste.</p> <p>Use of biodegradable materials</p> <p>Tree planting initiatives with support from NCA</p> <p>Replacement of temporary, short-life, structures with permanent buildings using environmentally-friendly techniques</p>	<p>Environmental pollution due to poor disposal of clinic and nutrition waste is a serious threat to the well-being of the environment.</p> <p>Minimizing pollution of the environment is very relevant initiative.</p> <p>Preventing environmental degradation</p>	<p>Delivered according to the SMOH guidelines.</p>	<p>Community members trained on dangers of poor handling and disposal of plastics bags to the environment.</p> <p>Staff trained on safe disposal of clinic waste.</p> <p>Replacement of diesel pumps with community-maintained solar powered pumps in WASH Sector</p> <p>Long-lasting effects of SUDO tree-planting schemes in Zalingei</p>	<p>75% of health facilities with functional incinerators.</p> <p>100% key staff members with enhanced capacity on how safe disposal of clinic waste.</p> <p>Community members with better understanding of how to minimize the pollution of environment with plastic sheets.</p>	<p>Safe and protected environment around the health facilities.</p> <p>Change in the attitude and practice of target communities on the disposal of waste to the environment.</p>
<p>Rating / Performance 13/25</p>	<p>3 (coverage limited)</p>	<p>2 (closure of SUDO)</p>	<p>3 (awareness)</p>	<p>3 (partly met)</p>	<p>2 (evidence limited)</p>
<p>Strength / Weakness</p>	<p>The focus on environmental protection targets a small proportion of the community benefiting from the programme. This leaves out a large proportion of the business community which contributes immensely towards the pollution of the environment.</p>	<p>Loss of SUDO tree-nursery project in 2009 was a setback</p>			

Gender

DAC/Norad Evaluation Criteria / Indicators	Relevance (and Appropriateness)	Effectiveness	Sustainability	Results (outputs)	Impact (outcomes)
<p>Women inclusion in programme activities</p> <p>Distribution of NFI that caters for women needs (e.g. sanitary pads)</p> <p>Emphasis on female child education and facilities designed to cater for their concerns</p> <p>Women participation in IGAs</p>	<p>Gender balance and empowerment of women in programme areas</p> <p>Provision of services that cater for all genders. All sector activities are designed in a way that ensures special needs of women addressed</p> <p>Empowerment of female children in communities and making communities appreciate the value of educating girls</p> <p>Contribution to household incomes amidst prevailing circumstances in camps</p>	<p>Delivery according to plans on quarterly basis</p> <p>Safe motherhood and neonatal services delivered according to the SMoH guidelines.</p> <p>Midwives and TBAs trained on safe motherhood practices.</p> <p>Provision of clean delivery kits in all supported health facilities.</p> <p>The programme gives women in the camp an opportunity to prepare the clean delivery kits and in the process earn some income.</p>	<p>Capacity of community midwives and TBAs enhanced through regular training. This ensures transfer of skills and knowledge to individuals at the community level.</p> <p>Training and inclusion of women in various committees ensures skills transfer</p> <p>Through community centres, women skills have been developed in many IGAs activities conducted in the community centres</p>	<p>At least 44% of women in WASH water committees</p> <p>Enrolment and retention of girls in schools in programme areas has increased</p> <p>Improved quality of antenatal and postnatal services offered in all supported health facilities.</p> <p>Women able to be on their own and socialize during the clean delivery kits preparations – an opportunity to share issues that are of concern to them.</p>	<p>Decrease in maternal mortality rates in most areas of operation. No maternal death was reported since 2009. A substantial decline in the number of still births from 3.2% in 2009 to 0.6% in 2010.</p> <p>Community midwives and TBAs with a better understanding of safe motherhood practices. Community midwives and TBAs more willing to mobilize mother to seek antenatal and postnatal services than before.</p> <p>Improvement in household incomes in areas where women have been actively involved in IGAs</p>
Rating / Performance 14/25	3 (aggregated data and gender included in most programmes)	4 (delivery according to plans)	2 (partly met – sustainability not documented)	3 (partly met)	2 (limited documentation)
Strength / Weakness					

Protection

DAC/Norad Evaluation Criteria/ Indicators	Relevance (and Appropriateness)	Effectiveness	Sustainability	Results (outputs)	Impact (outcomes)
<p>Food and NFI distributions</p> <p>Water points nearer camps/community</p> <p>Girls' child education and facilities designed to cater for their concerns</p> <p>Protection sensitive contact agreements</p>	<p>Enables IDPs to live a dignified life in given circumstances; and protection of vulnerable beneficiaries (malnourished under five children, pregnant and lactating women) accessing nutrition services is an important aspect.</p> <p>Mitigates effects associated with long distances e.g. violation of women. Access to water and other services is right for IDPs</p> <p>Empowers girls from childhood to be able to make informed decisions</p> <p>Minimises child abuse and child labour and ensures that communities are aware that child labour and / or use of children on contract work is not allowed by NCA</p>	<p>Food and NFI distribution undertaken following a distribution plan that ensures clients from each specific area to fully understand the specific day and duration allotted to each respective village / section of the camp.</p> <p>Food and NFI distributions undertaken in a timely manner in all nutrition centres. Distribution of food rations undertaken between 9:30 AM and 14:00 PM to allow beneficiaries ample time to return back to their homes.</p> <p>The distribution plan is designed to ease congestion at the nutrition centre and ensure manageable number of clients allotted for each specific day and period.</p>	<p>The programme designed in a way that addresses immediate problems and the root causes of malnutrition.</p>	<p>Incidences of reported cases on women abuse and fights related to water have been reduced</p>	<p>No cases of insecurity incidence have been reported happening to beneficiaries either while traveling to or out of the nutrition centres.</p>
<p>Rating Performance</p> <p>9/25</p>	<p>2 (protection issues partly identified/addressed)</p>	<p>2(protection issues partly identified/addressed)</p>	<p>2 (protection issues partly identified/addressed)</p>	<p>2 (protection issues partly addressed) identified/addressed)</p>	<p>1(documented impact limited)</p>
	<p>Establishing satellite</p>				

Strength / Weakness	distribution sites has been very well supported in the rural set up but not in the IDP camp. Host communities have been very eager to voluntarily participate and support initiatives that bring services closer to the community.				
----------------------------	--	--	--	--	--

Summary Beneficiaries for 2010

Sector	Planned 2010 total targets	Summary Beneficiaries (2010)				Overall 2010 Beneficiary Achievement	% Variance
		IDPs		Host community			
		Male	Female	Male	Female		
Health and Nutrition**	236,476	95,906	154,226	28,908	40,924	319,964	35.3%
WASH	344,449	86,569	145,453	42,520	74,250	348,792	1.3%
EPRU*	138,000	249,744	273,748	5,416	8,122	537,030	289.2%
Early recovery/ peace building***	92,089	16,587	40,591	44,604	24,388	126,170	37%
Education support	14,356	3,914	3,257	4,940	3,260	15,371	7.1%
Vertical count	824,970	452,720	617,275	126,388	150,944	1,347,327	63.3%

*Over achievements during the year in EPRU are partially explained by: a delay of winter season NFI distribution in 2009, which later took place in first quarter of 2010 targeting 20,036 HHs. Increase of new emergencies in South and West Darfur (new arrivals and fire cases) Double counting of beneficiaries that happens in NFI distributions when same beneficiaries are reached with different NFIs.

** The over achievement in Health/Nutrition may be explained by the: Increase in number of patients treated through OPD surpassing annual target by 26.9% due to increase in morbidity conditions and displacement of people especially in Nertiti. The high rates of malnutrition witnessed during the year also contributed towards the increase in morbidity cases and directly the number of patients seeking medical attention. Increase in number of pregnant and postnatal mothers who utilized ante/postnatal services during the year surpassing the annual target by 34.6%. This is attributed to intense mobilization of pregnant and lactating women carried by staff and traditional birth attendants / community midwives following identification and training of 180 TBAs and 38 community midwives during the year. Increase in number of malnourished beneficiaries fed during the year surpassing the annual target by 30%. This was attributed to the poor harvests, increase in food prices and general insecurity as a result of escalation of fighting in the region.

*** The DCPSF project reached a larger number of nomads and farmers than had been planned.

A6 – Recommendations from the Joint Review 2009

In August 2009 a Joint Review of the program was carried out by ACT/Caritas members³⁹:

Recommendations (Final Report 5 th October 2009)	Acceptance Status	NCA Notes ⁴⁰
Program quality		
1. Rigorous contingency planning both for increased humanitarian response and return scenario.	Accepted	Contingency planning for response is fully accepted and will be undertaken.
2. Log frame analysis (throughout) with impact indicators and gender disaggregated data.	Accepted	Log frames for Sectors and overall programme being prepared as part of Appeal 2010 process.
3. NCA, SCC and Sudanaid leadership vest the relevant decision-making authority in programme.	Partially accepted	Accepted by NCA.
4. Communication Officer included in programme budget.	Accepted	The need for adequate Communication capacity within the programme is fully supported.
5. Accountability measures increased with respect to local communities.	Accepted	Plans have been included in the 2010 appeal to improve accountability towards beneficiaries.
Partnership		
6. Prioritize an increased activity level for national partners based on satisfactory completion of currently stated objectives.	Accepted	Some activities under formerly known PPP sector will be handed over to communities (i.e. community centres) in 2010.
7. Implement and complete an OD assessment process with NCA, SCC and Sudanaid which includes a baseline study and a clear description of organizational decision-making structure.	Accepted	Ongoing. National partner assessments to be completed by end of 2009. NCA assessment to be undertaken during 2010.
8. Continued use of accompaniers, located in partner offices with language and CB skills.	Accepted	Ongoing; to be further considered after the partners assessments are complete; currently a finance accompanier is working with partners.
9. Personal commitment to the partnership reaffirmed regularly by all three partners	Accepted	Review recruitment, induction and appraisal systems with regard to partnership. Review partnership

³⁹ Joint Review Mission of the NCA Darfur Program funded by the ACT and Caritas Networks, Final Report, October 5th 2009

⁴⁰ Management Response to the Joint Review Recommendations (following discussion by the CSA Group Meeting of 23rd-24th November 2009).

and expectations openly communicated.		guidelines.
10. Proactive strategy for local recruitment (minimize expatriates).	Accepted	NCA is proactive in looking for qualified national personnel and building capacity of national staff inclusive of partner staff.
11. Continue to report on SUDO situation.	Accepted	This is best followed up at the Khartoum level.
Organisation of the programme and involvement of the network		
12. Annual sector evaluations by ACT/Caritas members should be built into the ACT appeal planning cycle annually.	Accepted	Planned evaluations during 2010: Watsan, Health and Nutrition and Logs and procurement.
13. After the HAC investigation in 2008, the programme was required to make adjustments in the governance and management structure. The result was the development of a CSA group. The reason for its development, its decision-making authority and its way of working need to be explained more clearly to all senior level management across the programme.	Accepted	Improved explanation of role of CSA and NCG to be carried forward by Learning Support Advisor and Senior Management in consultation with all actors.
14. The formation of the National Coordination Group (NCG) was also a result of the HAC investigation, and as a new entity, it is necessary that its membership, its decision-making authority and its way of working are clearly explained to senior level management.	Partially accepted / Partner support offices must be aware of this decision and commit to Nyala leadership.	Moving decision making to Nyala as much as possible is supported.
Funding and budgets		
15. The review team recommend a planning figure of USD 9million for the programme.	Not accepted	CSA Group requested 2010 Appeal to be around \$10m level.
Administrative Issues		
16. NCA to take on roll as co-chair of WASH cluster in Zalingei and Nyala in order to contribute technical guidance to the UN and other NGOs in the WASH cluster.	Partially accepted	Whilst the proposal is encouraging, it must be recognised that the co-chair role would be onerous and can only be taken on if human and financial resources allow. Programme will carefully consider taking on the co-chairing role in Zalingei.
17. Regular senior management meetings, with all three partners in Nyala.	Accepted	Commitment to regular, minuted, monthly SMTs with national partners, established in Appeal 2010.
18. Regular sector meetings prior to cluster	Accepted	Partners must attend regular

meetings with all three partners.		cluster and line ministry meetings. Regular sector meeting schedule, NCA and partners is being established.
19. Posted meeting schedules for all three partners.	Accepted	This process has already been initiated.
20. Posted organograms with photos of all three partners in NCA office.	Accepted	The organograms are being updated for each partner at this time.
Overall Results: Accepted = 16; Partially accepted= 3; Not accepted= 1		

A7 - Vision 2015

The organisations committed themselves to following vision in 2015:

A programme jointly supported by the ACT Alliance and Caritas Confederation that seeks to address the needs of populations affected by insecurity and conflict in South and West Darfur.

A programme undertaken through a partnership between Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) and Sudanaid (Caritas Sudan). Relationships with other national NGOs and CBOs will be developed but it is envisaged that these will be contract-based relationships rather than the close partnership that exists between members of the ACT and Caritas networks.

A programme that supports efforts to achieve peace and stability.

A programme that recognises the critical importance of gender in the situation in Darfur and is committed to the provisions of the IASC Gender Handbook and the Beijing Platform.

A programme that constantly monitors developments in the political, security and humanitarian context, regularly revises its analysis of the overall context, updates its contingency plans accordingly and undertakes the necessary preparedness measures.

A programme that supports communities (whether in camp, urban or rural settings) to establish and sustain viable livelihoods.

A programme that supports communities to ensure that they have access to basic essential services such as health, water sanitation and hygiene, and education.

A programme that (in line with the 2009 UN Framework for Returns in Darfur) upholds the right of IDPs to freely choose their place of residence, specifically the right to make a free and informed decision to return to their area of origin.

A programme that is able to respond rapidly to new humanitarian needs within current programme areas, or in immediately adjacent areas.

A programme that determines the precise nature and content of its programmes through regular assessments and consultations with the different communities as to their most pressing needs and in coordination with assessments and prioritizations undertaken by UN coordination bodies, Clusters and local authorities.

Where IDP returns take place that have been verified to be both voluntary and appropriate by the UN Joint Verification Mission they will be supported with assistance to enable returnees to re-establish their communities and livelihoods as rapidly as possible:

Should substantial populations continue to remain displaced in camps, support will be provided; Ensure that minimum standards of health, water supply, sanitation and hygiene are achieved or exceeded through programmes that, as far as realistically possible, are managed and operated by the IDP communities themselves;

Assist IDP households and communities to reduce their reliance on externally funded assistance through the development of income earning opportunities and activities that do not involve risky behaviours and practices.

A programme that is cost-efficient in its operations and support services and regularly reviews its costs so as to improve the longer-term sustainability of its activities

Whilst human resource capacities in Sudan have been significantly affected by decades of war and HR development faces many challenges, the programme will continue to actively develop the capacities of national staff within NCA and those of SCC and Sudanaid. Except for key representation and accountability posts, such as the Director and Finance Manager Positions, all posts will, with time, be staffed by Sudanese nationals. Where international staff occupies other posts, they will have counterpart staff with clearly articulated programmes and schedules for replacing their international colleagues.

A programme that conforms to the principles of 'Do No Harm', the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership Standard, the NGO/Red Cross Code of Conduct and other relevant policies and guidelines of NCA, the ACT Alliance and the Caritas Confederation.