

Evaluation of “Transparent and Accountable Governance of Oil and Gas Resources in Myanmar” (TAGOR, 2014-2016)

Final evaluation report

Prepared for DCA-NCA Joint Country Program Myanmar



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Executive summary

Introduction

The TAGOR project (2014-16) in Myanmar has focused on engaging and mobilising youth, religious leaders and other key stakeholders to contribute to public dialogue on natural resource governance – in this case, of oil and gas resources. An improved public dialogue and higher capacities of participants are seen as foundations for improved governance. The project has been implemented by two local partners: Spectrum and Shalom, and it has been funded by the Norwegian Government's Oil for Development program. The particular focus for the project has been on the Shwe Natural Gas Pipeline.

This is a scheduled, end-of-project evaluation. Its focus is on the:

1. Achievements, design and operation of the project within the changing Myanmar context
2. Added value by NCA and in-country donor representatives
3. Lessons and recommendations for future programming.

The evaluation considered available project documents and included consultation with 50 stakeholders such as interfaith youth, community members, religious leaders, key informants, project staff and others. The main limitations are long time periods between some of the activities and the evaluation, and incomplete monitoring and evaluation data.

Achievements, design and implementation

Public dialogue has been enhanced through the engagement of parliamentarians, government and civil society. In addition, the increased availability of resource materials has contributed to public dialogue. Especially significant is the building of capacity of parliamentarians, including engagement with members from the military as a new audience.

The capacity building of youth, interfaith youth and community members has been more limited. Case studies show that they have higher awareness and increased motivation to engage further. There are limited examples of application of capacity beyond the direct data gathering in this project.

Unintended outcomes include a reach by national conferences to high levels of government, the engagement of parliamentarians at sub-national level including those from the military, and replication of training about social accountability.

The quality of outputs and outcomes varied and achievements have been limited due to the design and implementation of the project. The main design limitations are an unclear design process and partnership, unquestioned assumptions and theory of change, insufficient planning and budgeting and insufficient linkages to existing networks and actors. The main implementation limitations are lack of clear linkages between project components, delays and staff turnover, lack of flexibility and adaptation to changes in context, weaknesses in M&E, and limited use of risk analyses and conflict sensitivity.

Changing Myanmar context

Relevant changes that provide opportunities and constraints for the project include:

- General political, social and economic changes
- Natural resource governance
- Religious leader engagement and interfaith

In general, the project did not respond well to the opportunities and constraints identified. Exceptions are using existing momentum on public reforms and opportunities for engagement of parliamentarians and government officials at sub-national and regional levels.

Added value

There has been limited communication with the in country donor representatives, and their main contribution has been in providing speakers for the two main national conferences.

For NCA, the best value add comes from the advocacy in Norway to Statoil regarding the community level impacts of extractive industry projects. Indeed, this advocacy needs to be shared with relevant Myanmar partners. Other positive value add has come from building capacity of one of the partners, Shalom, although the extent of capacity gains has not been assessed. Other areas of value add have been limited, which is not characteristic of NCA's programs.

Lessons

The main general lessons are around:

- NCA and its partners capturing the added value
- NCA enhancing project design and implementation processes
- Project partners reviewing their roles in the project
- Donors enhancing their engagement

Programming lessons are around:

- Engagement of religious and interfaith leaders in natural resource governance
- Focal points for natural resource governance programs
- Engagement of youth

Recommendations

Recommendations are made for:

- NCA's programming
- Capturing NCA's value add
- In-country donor
- Project partners

1. NCA programming:

- NCA programming for engaging faith leaders and natural resource governance should build on roles and influence around justice and inequalities at the local level, particularly relating to awareness of rights and mobilising action by communities about specific developments. There are limited roles at national or sub-national levels, especially due to the preoccupation in defining their own roles and engagement in peace processes.
- NCA programming in natural resource governance in Myanmar should focus on land rather than extractive industries or broader natural resources. The purpose should be enabling communities to be aware of their rights and to claim them, and to be able to voice their needs to various stakeholders, government, private and civil. To do this strong networks with existing actors is needed. A high commitment is needed to start a new program.
- NCA programming that engages with youth should be clear about its purpose, have careful participant selection, and support reflection and application of skills.

2. Capturing NCA value-add. NCA needs to develop plans to address:

- Ensuring suitable processes for the selection of partners. Having an internal discussion as to how to handle the tension between working with existing partners who may be inexperienced and bringing in new partners that may have more experience (content, networks and relationships, geographical focus). Utilising the distinctions between different types of partners (core, strategic and resource). Ensuring agreement of roles and contributions (either budgeted or in-kind). Ensuring clear communication paths between NCA and the partners.
- Recruiting appropriately skilled staff and emphasising partnership management, especially for difficult partnerships or where these go wrong (as from time to time they do). This includes developing negotiation and conflict resolution skills, which may require further training modules and follow-up support.
- Assessing partner capacity and developing suitable capacity building plans. Similarly, NCA staff should have equivalent assessments and plans. Apart from relationship management highlighted above, project officers need to be able to cover project design, M&E, consortia development, grant management and capacity building.
- Making available relevant international experience and networks and looking for joint advocacy opportunities.

- Having tighter checks-and-balances and more active interventions by management and head office staff if things are not going well, within thresholds developed. In implementation, following internal procedures for assessing risks and conflict sensitivity.
- Encouraging adaptations to changes in context and being flexible.
- Ensuring rigorous design processes that fully involve partners. Improving the theory of change and logframes, in particular actively surfacing assumptions and testing their applicability, as well as developing good M&E. Ensuring that there are clear linkages between project components and activities are not isolated. Ensure there is adequate follow-up and opportunities for application.

3. In-country donors

- In country donors need to consider further their engagement with civil society in Myanmar, including setting up focal people for communication, seeking learning opportunities between funded partners and enhancing links to government (within reason).

4. Project partners

- Project partners need to ensure a strong theory of change and surfacing of assumptions for their planned interventions. Activities need to be linked, with good participant selection, suitable follow up and opportunities to apply their findings. Partners should be proactive about improving their M&E.
- Project partners need to hold NCA accountable to their stated strategies for adding value, as well as look to ensuring their own added value to the partnership.

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- Assistance from Shalom with fieldwork and logistics
- Assistance for local data collection by Daw Khon Ja, as well as translation of some project material

Responsibility for the findings and recommendations rest with the author.

1. Introduction

1.1 About the project

The project has focused on engaging and mobilising youth, religious leaders and other key stakeholders to contribute to public dialogue on natural resource governance – in this case, of oil and gas resources. An improved public dialogue and higher capacities of participants are seen as foundations for improved governance. Improved governance directly means transparency and accountability, as in the project title, but the hope is that Myanmar can use revenues from its resources to avoid the ‘resource curse’ and see a wide range of benefits accrue to its citizens, both for this and future generations.

The project has run from January 2014 to December 2016, and has been implemented by two local partners: Spectrum and Shalom (Nyein Foundation)¹. Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)² has known these organisations for many years, but this is a new area of focus on natural resource governance for Shalom. The project has been funded by the Norwegian Government’s Oil for Development program and the budget was 3.2 Million NOK.

The main targeted stakeholder groups included:

- Youth (building capacity; mobilising other stakeholder groups; monitoring and documenting)
- Communities and local religious leaders (awareness; monitoring and documenting; advocacy)
- Faith-based actors and religious leaders at national levels (advocacy)
- Parliamentarians, civil society technical experts and media (capacity)

Project outputs focused on reaching these target groups, with an additional output regarding making resource material regarding natural resource governance available in Myanmar language (both publications and on-line). Note in practice that no distinction has been made between “youth” and “interfaith youth”, nor between “interfaith leaders” and “religious leaders”.

The specific focus chosen was the Shwe Natural Gas Pipeline. This pipeline crosses Myanmar from Rakhine State through to Northern Shan State, a distance of 700 kilometers (Figure 1). It is nationally significant in terms of the expected revenues for the Myanmar government, and 20% of the gas will be used in central Myanmar (the majority, 80%, will be used in China). Alongside the natural gas pipeline, a second parallel pipeline carries oil from Chinese-owned concessions in the Middle East and Africa, to avoid longer and riskier shipping routes. The oil pipeline has not received any attention in this project.

¹ In this evaluation report, the name Shalom is used rather than Nyein Foundation. Spectrum is used rather than the longer form ‘Spectrum – Sustainable Development Knowledge Network’.

² The report is prepared for DCA-NCA Myanmar, following the merger in Myanmar from January 2017. All references in the report and recommendations are made to NCA.

The intention in the project has been to look both at the national significance of the natural gas pipeline as well as community level impacts from its construction in Northern Shan State.



Figure 1: Map of the Shwe Natural Gas Pipeline

1.2 About the evaluation

This is a scheduled, end-of-project evaluation. Its focus is on the:

1. Achievements, design and operation of the project within the changing Myanmar context
 - Mainly covering effectiveness and appropriateness, with minor attention to efficiency and impact
2. Added value by NCA and in-country donor representatives
3. Lessons and recommendations for future programming, both general and specific for natural resource governance.

Sub-questions for each are indicated in Table 1, along with priorities as each sub-question is not of equal importance.

The evaluation has been conducted between late December 2016 and March 2017. An evaluation plan and inception report was shared with NCA and its partners on 12 January 2017, and subsequently approved. A draft report was shared on 28 February 2017 and comments incorporated in this final report.

Table 1: Key questions of interest for the evaluation, showing priorities

Key focus area	Sub-questions
Achievements, design and operation of the project within the changing Myanmar context (covers mostly effectiveness and appropriateness, with some attention to efficiency and impact)	-Was the project effective (refer to logframe; intended outcome and outputs and their indicators of achievement; quality)? (High) -Reasons for achievement or otherwise? (High) -Was the design clear, appropriate and effective? (partnership model, partners' involvement in design, role & influence on faith based leaders, engaging interfaith platforms, inclusion of skills & capacities needed) (High) -Project management and implementation challenges? (re efficiency) How were decisions made during the project? Could the project adapt? (High) -Extent of networking and coordination with other civil society efforts? Existing coordination mechanism? (Medium-High) -Beneficiaries (disaggregated) and impacts? (policy, community, civil and other; noting the main aim is to contribute to public debate) (Medium) -Unintended outcomes? (Medium) -How has the context in Myanmar changed? What opportunities and constraints resulted? Was there sufficient consideration of context, timing and risks in the project? (Medium)
Added value by NCA and in-country donor representatives	-Value add and niche for each? (High) -Quality of relationships and communication? (High) -Coordination and support provided? (High) -Opportunities and constraints? (High) -Contribution to national debates in Myanmar and Norway? (Medium) -Extent of good donorship principles being followed? (Medium) -Extent of building capacity of partners? (Medium) -Use by NCA and partners of risk assessments & conflict sensitivity during the project? Did the project follow NCA's own guidelines? (Medium)
Lessons and recommendations for future programming (general and specific)	-Lessons for NCA and its partners (High) -Lessons for donor (and communication) (High) -Lessons for other stakeholders and civil society networks (Medium) -Potential roles and influence of faith leaders in NRG (High) -Recommendations for future programming (High)

1.3 Methods used and limitations

The main methods for the evaluation are:

- Desk top review of project documents (see Annex 1) and related literature, according to evaluation question
- Consultations with key stakeholders (outlined below)
 - Using semi-structured interviews with individuals and groups based on the evaluation questions and sub-questions
 - For the community-related components of the project in Northern Shan State, participants came to a central place for a focus group discussion
 - Opportunities for 'participant-observation' included attendance at interfaith conferences in December 2016
- Presentations and debriefing on findings to key audiences in both Myanmar and Norway, in order to obtain feedback and validate findings
 - The evaluation is not intended as a participative evaluation, but opportunities have been sought to obtain feedback and identify lessons for partners.

Stakeholders consulted (50) are outlined in Annex 2. These included:

- Community (4) and CSO members (3) from pipeline affected areas
- Youth and interfaith youth participants (5)
- Interfaith and religious leaders (7)
- Media (1) and parliamentarians (2)
- Key informants (11)³
- Donor and OfD representatives (3)
- Staff of Shalom (4), Spectrum (3) and NCA (7)

Limitations of the methods include:

- There were long time periods between most of the activities and evaluation – many people had moved on, including within the three organisations or did not remember full details (e.g. of training and such). This is especially the case for the community-related activities conducted in 2014. Low numbers of potential stakeholders have been nominated by Shalom and some were not available to participate in the evaluation. As the project finished before the main part of the evaluation, one former staff from Shalom could not be contacted.
- There is incomplete documentation of activities across the three years, but particularly in 2016. Only limited gender-disaggregated data is available. Generally reporting focuses on activities and monitoring by partners has not tried to follow up with participants to assess increased capacity, change or application.
- The methods chosen for the evaluation concentrate on understanding changes in key individuals rather than trying to capture broad-scale results (e.g. as from a survey with all training participants, not that this would have been possible), so consultation has been limited.
- The evaluation does not capture a range of recognised Buddhist and Muslim religious leader inputs. To alleviate this, more key informants who have familiarity with leaders have been included. Note that only limited religious leaders have actually been engaged by the project.
- There have been minor perceived limitations due to the duration of the evaluation, its timing (beyond the first issue) or language used by the participants. These often plague other evaluations in Myanmar.

1.4 Structure of the report

The findings and their significance are presented according to the three evaluation questions. Section 2 outlines the main achievements, design, implementation and changes in context. Section 3 describes the value-add. Section 4 presents general lessons. Conclusions and recommendations are presented in Section 5. Various annexes support the text.

³ Not including at least 5 informal discussions with prominent faith based actors regarding the religious landscapes in Myanmar and how these have changed over the project duration.

2. Achievements, design and operation of the project within the changing Myanmar context

2.1 Project achievements

Outcome level

The intended outcome is that civil society actors contribute to public dialogue on transparency and community rights in oil/gas extraction in Myanmar. The main contributions to public dialogue are through the two conferences about a possible Sovereign Wealth Fund/Natural Resource Fund, as well as trainings relating to Social Accountability (mainly about government budgets and citizen roles in budget development). Approximately 90 parliamentarians, government officials and political party members, at both Union and regional levels, have increased their awareness on budget and revenue transparency. At least two regional parliamentarians are known to have engaged their colleagues in discussions about government budgets at regional levels and are starting to track government expenditure on schools and such, which has also been encouraged by other actors and projects. Many civil society members are expected to have increased their awareness due to the project, which can add to public dialogue, although it is hard to capture how many, their awareness levels or their application of this awareness.

Formally, against the nominated indicators, the findings are:

- 3 events where civil society actors have met with government representatives and parliamentarians: 2 national conferences and one follow-up training in Northern Shan
- An undefined number of media statements attributable to the project. There has been some media coverage of SWF conferences, as well as broader activities by Spectrum and Shalom
- No recommendations from a national interfaith group

However, these findings dramatically undersell the achievements. For example, the two national conferences have engaged high levels of government and reached a wide audience including a broad range of civil society groups. The SWF activities were not fully intended, but emerged through project-related and other activities. The conferences were mostly funded by TAGOR with some contributions from other donors. It is worth noting that SWF did not just cover a “fund” or revenue collection and transparency, but also what constitutes good public financial management and how revenues should be used. Part of the debate is about whether a SWF is appropriate at this point in time in Myanmar, in light of the level of public debt and need for investment in infrastructure, as well as the need for on-going public reform, but this is in itself useful to raise, especially in the context of the ‘wider’ aspects to a SWF. That is, even if a SWF is not set up, the discussion about it has been constructive. The discussions about SWF have not just been limited to the conferences, but there has been different points of engagement over time. Another example is that there have been minor contributions to EITI and other national processes, mostly through a study tour and parallel projects by Spectrum.

The availability of resource materials can support improved public dialogue, but this has not been monitored. Partners have distributed these materials at various events and such, both within and outside this project. Spectrum has distributed over 9,000 copies of the cartoon guide that presents the 2013 EITI guideline, for example, including to Union and regional governments, as well as civil society groups and NORAD. One EITI member highlights how this guide has increased her understanding and engagement (see the case study below). The videos and publications that capture “community voice” about pipeline impacts can be a valuable contribution to public dialogue, as often these voices are marginalised or not heard. A more explicit mechanism to reach those needed would have improved these achievements at outcome level.

It is unclear what is meant by “public dialogue” nor how much a little project would be expected to contribute. The intentions probably have been firstly to see “more discussions” about natural resource governance amongst networks familiar to the partners and “more informed” network members to have those discussions. Then, secondly, the circle could be broadened. Thinking through “what discussions”, “with who” and “how can these be entered” would have changed the design and led to more achievements. Other issues relating to project design are discussed later.

Outputs

At the output level, there are modest achievements relating to capacity building of youth, interfaith youth and community members (Outputs 1-2). Changes in knowledge and skills could not be assessed. However, awareness of natural resource governance has increased, along with a broadening of the “content” of the existing interfaith youth networks that have concentrated on peace-building.

Three case studies collected by partners show an increased motivation to engage in natural resource governance due to the project: for a community member, for a youth and for a CSO representative on a working committee.

Ma Htet Htet Soe, aged 23, is a university graduate living in Yangon. She was not aware about issues related to Shwe Gas pipe line construction and other environmental impacts, but she attended training and collected data about the impacts of the pipeline construction.



She said she used to be a shy person and feel insecure talking in front of a group of people. But now, she feels confident talking what she thinks about the issues. Also, she started to have strong interests in natural resources extraction, environmental impacts and rights. For instance, she would watch news and listen to the radio about the issues related to natural resources extraction and its impacts on communities. She became more interested in EIA, SIA and learned more

about them. She says she would like to work for the communities sharing her knowledge and experiences regardless of her own benefits.

U Sai Kyar Pwint, aged 68, is a member of a Peasants Union in Thi Baw Township, Northern Shan State. Before, he had limited awareness of the pipeline and its impacts. He attended trainings and participated in field assessment and data collection activities. He became more eager to continue working on this and he became a representative of the Northern Shan EITI Implementation Group. He shared the information and received from the trainings and experiences to others. He says “to foresee and act for the wellbeing of the country is a good thing and we should do it together. I am ready for any activities that I might be invited for the goodness of the community.”



Daw Moe Moe Tun, a female Mult-Stakeholder Group representative reflects that “as a result of exposure trips to Timor Leste, Mongolia, Laos and Thailand, the level of my confidence has increased significantly. I have become more outspoken and been able to discuss more confidently during Multi-Stakeholder meetings as I have learned good practices and resource-related experiences from other countries. I also noticed that my knowledge on value chain of revenue management has improved, being able to share with other CSO fellows. For instance, I get to know more about Natural Resource Fund, the launch of the Philippine's EITI report, and local content”. Also, regarding the publications, “the publication and distribution of the EITI cartoon book helps improve the knowledge of CSOs members on the EITI standard as the simple cartoon illustration has them led to understand the standards. As a result, they are more able to discuss or debate with representatives from the government and private sectors on natural resource governance matters”.

Consultations also show at least two more local individuals with more motivation, but they do not feel equipped as such. Other participants either did not intend to continue⁴ or do not ascribe much benefit from being involved. One further case study emerged in consultations, which is described further in the unintended outcomes section.

For output 1, more than 30 (approx. 16 Male and 14 Female) youth, interfaith youth and community members received training and participated in data collection activities at the community level. This is wider than just youth. Note that some only participated in the collection of data and not in its analysis, which dramatically reduces the scope for both learning deeply about the issues and building skills in research/ monitoring/ documentation. It is unclear the extent that overall capacity has increased for youth, or has been applied beyond the direct data gathering in this project. More than 60 (approx. 60% Male) youth, interfaith youth and community members have participated in general awareness trainings (1-3) regarding natural resources. Some youth have participated in other events, and some have received resource materials, but there are limitations to the available data.

⁴ Hence this could not provide a “negative” case study, which can still be good for learning, but rather participation was more of a “one-off” that did not lead anywhere. Of course, consultation with a wider range of participants may have identified other case studies and achievements.

For output 2, some community members participated in the data collection and these may have a higher awareness of their rights (see one case study). In addition, a project orientation with 27 community members and local religious leaders was held at Kyaukme, one of the pipeline sites, and also at Lashio and Myitkyina. The participatory videos were screened in these locations, which may have increased awareness. There is limited engagement with local religious leaders.

For output 3, the three data collection exercises relating to the pipeline are the main documentation exercises. These are captured in the project publications and videos. There are limited mechanisms for on-going monitoring or documentation, and none has been reported.

Outputs 4 and 5 have not been achieved.

Outputs 6 and 7 have been achieved, and the capacity of parliamentarians is higher and resource materials are available. For one media participant, the trainings and exposure gave her confidence to interview Chinese companies and diplomats regarding natural resource extraction - in this case, about Letpadaung Copper Mine.

See Table 2 for a more detailed listing of achievements at output level against the nominated indicators.

Table 2 Summary findings for intended outputs

<p>Output 1: Youth are capacitated with knowledge and skills for engaging in oil/ gas resource management</p>	<p>More than 30 (approx. 16 Male and 14 Female) youth, interfaith youth and community members both received training (1-3 trainings) and participated in data collection activities at the community level (data constrains further comments or breakdowns – a total of 49 participant-occasions). About 6 of these were from Kachin State. Note that these data collectors did not participate in the design, analysis, nor reporting, so it was a short exposure to data collection. There is no reported further application of skills (not monitored but also not supported by TAGOR). See one case study of increased capacity and motivation to engage in NRG. There is limited information regarding the extent of capacity increases, but this is expected to be limited due to the lack of continuity in the project.</p> <p>More than 60 (approx. 60% Male) youth, interfaith youth and community members have participated in general awareness trainings (1-3) regarding natural resources. Some youth, interfaith youth and community members have participated in 1-2 social accountability trainings (undefined).</p> <p>Some youth, interfaith youth and community members have participated in social media which may have increased awareness. A total of 288 people signed up to a Facebook page “Trace our citizen’s money (no longer active; included more than just project stakeholders).</p> <p>Some youth (undefined) have participated in 1-2 SWF conferences.</p> <p>NB Limitations in data re aggregation and disaggregation.</p>
<p>Output 2: Communities and local religious leaders are aware of their socio-economic rights in relation to oil/gas extraction</p>	<p>A project orientation with 27 community members and local religious leaders was held at Kyaukme (and also at Lashio and Myitkyina; the latter two with 35 people). Community members trained and participating in data collection (especially Kyaukme) are included in data for output 1. These members may have higher awareness of their rights, but this has not been assessed. See one case study.</p> <p>The participatory videos were screened in Kyaukme (also Lashio and Myitkyina), which may have resulted in some awareness, with limited scope to utilise this.</p> <p>Overall, only minor levels of awareness would be expected due to TAGOR. There is limited engagement with local religious leaders.</p>

<p>Output 3: Interfaith youth and local interfaith leaders are monitoring and documenting socio-economic & environmental consequences of oil/gas extraction in Kachin/Shan state</p>	<p>The 3 data collection exercises relating to the pipeline are the main documentation exercises (captured in the project publications and videos). There are limited mechanisms for on-going monitoring or documentation, and none has been reported.</p>
<p>Output 4: National level interfaith religious leaders are mobilized by the youth and local religious leaders on oil/gas extraction and the Shwe pipeline case</p>	<p>This output is not achieved. An Economic and Social Justice Committee, under the Interfaith Working Group, has been started with six volunteer members.</p>
<p>Output 5: National interfaith platform recommendations on oil/gas governance are publicized</p>	<p>This output is not achieved. The briefing papers produced as part of the project contained some recommendations regarding dealing with the community level impacts, but these did not involve the interfaith platform.</p>
<p>Output 6: Members of Parliament, EITI and journalists are capacitated on oil/ gas resource governance</p>	<p>Parliamentarians and government: The SWF conferences engaged at least 60 members at union and regional level. The Social Accountability trainings and follow up engaged at least 60 members at regional levels (Kachin and Northern Shan), mainly parliamentarians. There is some overlap between these. EITI: Multi-Stakeholder Group (MSG) members (2) participated in the exposure visit to Timor Leste – see case study for one. Spectrum also provided on-going technical support to the EITI process, as a parallel activity, particularly in 2014. Journalists (5) – minor contributions to parallel training at the Yangon School of Journalism on natural resource governance. Some isolated media coverage from SWF as well as broader activities by Spectrum and Shalom (not necessarily under this project, and not well monitored).</p>
<p>Output 7: Oil/gas governance resource materials are available in Myanmar language, including online</p>	<p>Project generated outputs included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shalom Foundation (2015) “Report of the analysis of negative impacts for villages in Kyaukme Township, Northern Shan State, crossed by Shwe Oil and Natural Gas Pipeline” (Myanmar language only) • Spectrum, Shalom and NCA (2015) “1. Farming, land loss and compensation along the Shwe gas pipeline”. Briefing Paper (English and Myanmar language) • Spectrum, Shalom and NCA (2015) “2. Community fears, communication and accountability along the Shwe gas pipeline”. Briefing Paper (English and Myanmar language) • Shalom, NCA and Spectrum (2015) Citizen participatory videos for Shwe gas pipeline (Myanmar language with English sub-titles) • Spectrum (2015) “Myanmar’s Sovereign Wealth: Towards People Centred National Savings” Conference Proceedings • Spectrum (2016) Myanmar’s Resource Wealth: Towards People Centred National Savings, Benefit Sharing and Social Protection” Conference Proceedings (draft) • (not published: Another Development (2016) Social-economic survey: Impacts of the Shwe Gas Pipeline at Met Mong & Mong Hsein villages) <p>Myanmar resource materials made available included: Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Standard cartoon book, 5000 copies. Widely distributed including to government. English resource materials made available included: Covering Oil, 100 copies, Sector Wide Impact Assessment Executive Summary. Spectrum also published during the project period a range of publications relating to budget transparency and natural resource governance. On-line resources via the Spectrum website.</p>

Unintended outcomes

Unintended outcomes include:

- The reach by the SWF conferences to high levels of government far exceeded expectations.
- The 2016 SWF conference included an opening by Cardinal Charles Bo (Roman Catholic), who made strong statements about transparency and natural resource governance. There are not many occasions where religious leaders have made these types of public statements regarding natural resource governance⁵.
- The social media (Facebook page) was not included in the design (and was largely a parallel activity).
- Social accountability trainings was introduced as related project content and this highlighted participation in public dialogue at sub-national levels. The reach to military parliamentarians in Kachin State was not initially intended. One pamphlet on social accountability has been reissued in Kachin State using their parliamentary logo (showing ownership).
- In Northern Shan State⁶ one CSO led a replication of the training about social accountability in another township. Daw Ah May from Northern Shan State Women's Organisation Network, participated in the video screenings in 2015 and the social accountability training in 2016. She was inspired with her organisation to organise a replication training at Theinni, in Northern Shan State, involving State-level government (2), parliamentarians (1) and several political party members. She also has questioned local Township and Ward level government officials about their budgeting processes⁷. Although regional CSO members were not a nominated target group⁸, the project has triggered a "spark" that could lead to more public dialogue.

These unintended outcomes generally enhance the project achievements.

Quality of outputs and outcomes

The main measure of quality reported here is what the partners and NCA themselves say, and this matches the evaluator's own judgements. The publications of briefing papers and resource materials are generally of high quality. Community satisfaction with the videos is reportedly high, although several stakeholders commented that they could have been improved with either better instruction or editing. The two surveys of community level impacts do not have a sufficient evidence-base to be useful for advocacy (the Kyaukme report could be useful as a resource for youth to gain an understanding of the issues,

⁵ This is best attributed partly to Spectrum's sensitization process with the Catholic Bishops Conference Myanmar (CBCM) over a longer period, under a different and complementary project. Cardinal Bo went on to include comments in his Christmas speech (2016) and has issued a public statement in February 2017, including to the government, regarding peace and overcoming fears.

⁶ In Myitkyina, there were two follow-up meetings, but led by project staff

⁷ To which the answer was that they were waiting for budget allocations to be given to them and that they did not have an active role in formulating budgets.

⁸ Regional CSOs were invited to participate in several project activities and the partners saw CSOs as part of the local stakeholders (i.e. not just youth, community leaders or religious leaders). Perhaps this could have been clearer in the design.

perhaps). More description as to the extent of impacts and verification of statements is needed.

Presentations at the SWF conferences were of a high quality. The extent of capacity increase has been discussed previously. In general, this is not perceived as a problem with the quality of the training material used, but more from the nature of isolated activities, and project design, which reduced quality.

Cross-cutting issues

Although not directly asked for, two cross-cutting issues are highlighted here: engagement with different religions and gender.

Regarding engagement with different religions, the project engaged quite well with different religions, especially Christian, Muslim and Buddhist (minor with Hindi). Shalom continued to promote interfaith activities and the inclusion of participants from different faiths throughout the project. Buddhist youth and religious leaders are under-represented compared to the total population.

Regarding gender, the partners made careful efforts to ensure participants at activities, including speakers and trainers, were both male and female. The impacts on community in the research outputs included gender considerations, but not for girls and boys. Spectrum has undertaken a separate project also to document gender impacts of hydropower projects and relocations. There was limited engagement of religious leaders, so the issue of gender inclusion by them is rather secondary. Similarly, there was limited empowerment of community members, regardless of gender. No decision making structures were intended or established that can enable participation by women in decision-making, for example. Overall, gender empowerment was not a great focus for the project. The suitable participation in activities by females, and inclusion of gender-dimensions for both community impact (e.g. briefing papers) and broader governance (e.g. SWF), mean that the project has been gender sensitive, within other general limitations.

Beneficiaries and impacts

The main direct beneficiaries are the actual project participants, both intended and unintended, and listed above (not disaggregated). It is hard to see the potential impacts at this point, largely because of the nature of the isolated activities, lack of follow-up and limited data. It is unlikely that the contributions to public dialogue that have been described can translate into changes in policy or practice in the short term, for example, to increase the numbers of direct and indirect beneficiaries (nor to change public opinion, which is mentioned in the theory of change). A higher awareness among government (mostly legislative but some executive) and civil society (especially youth), when combined with increased motivation, might lead to increased engagement in other initiatives, but this becomes quite speculative and largely beyond the achievements of the project. Indeed, the context for the project includes that there is a lot of effort going on to train parliamentarians, for example with a related project by NRGi in Kachin State also funded under OFD, with some cross-over. In this regard it is best to consider the outcomes rather than potential impacts.

Factors for achievement

Factors for achievements or otherwise mostly relate to project design, implementation and context, which are covered in the following sections.

2.2 Project design

The design of the project did not enable the best set of achievements to emerge. The following factors contributed, and these are discussed in turn:

- Design process and partnership
- Assumptions and theory of change
- Insufficient planning and budgeting
- Insufficient linkages to existing networks and actors

Design process and partnership

The project involved two partners and NCA, yet these were not brought together in a joint design process. If project partners had engaged in a joint process then more ownership and synergies might have resulted. Partners would have been more clear about their roles. Also, perhaps some of the assumptions could have been tested. Alternatively, splitting it into two distinct sub-projects may have achieved better outcomes with less fuss.

The partnership tried to bring together three sets of experiences:

- Interfaith youth and leaders
- Technical NRG and advocacy
- International experience with NRG (although mostly mining, rather than oil and gas) and engaging religious leaders.

These experiences are all necessary, although it is generally undesirable to have such a huge disparity in skills (especially technical), unless there is intentional capacity building. The project is too small to support the involvement of too many partners, so any gaps are difficult to fill. The partners had credentials in their respective areas, subject to some assumptions described below. Indeed, Spectrum also has youth and interfaith networks that could have been captured. So, perhaps the partnership could have worked better than it did. It is clear that the project never “got off on a good foot” though, and the achievements were limited by the selection and design of the partnership, let alone project design.

Assumptions and theory of change

Many substantial assumptions were made in the design that should have been more carefully examined, and these are outlined in Table 3. These related to the theory of change and nominated ‘mechanisms’ to achieve project outputs. In particular, the key assumptions that needed examination are about working with youth, religious leaders and national interfaith platforms, as designed. This questioning is not saying that working with these actors is inappropriate – far from it. Other assumptions relating to the context are discussed in other sections (e.g. relating to the openness of government for formal and informal advocacy; also that policies and laws actually reflect informed public dialogue), with the main distinction being that these assumptions are either far beyond the project’s direct influence and control, or simply could not be known.

In practice, a second theory of change is evident. This covers direct capacity building of parliamentarians, media and civil society experts and production of resource materials. This should have been explicit. In addition, engaging government officials (executive and line ministries) is not explicit.

Table 3: Assumptions made and their impacts on achievements and lessons

Assumption made	Why the assumption needed questioning	Impact on achievements	Lesson
Youth can mobilise other actors, especially local religious leaders	Culturally, youth have a lower position and should not question or instruct elders, especially religious leaders. Note, most youth involved were interfaith youth so there is no operational distinction	It needed other actors (at the same level) to engage with and mobilise local religious leaders	Youth enthusiasm is valued but not sufficient for all audiences – may need multiple access points depending on who is being mobilised
Capacity can be built through trainings and that increased youth capacity will be applied, regardless of follow-up. Also, the “extra content” could be added to already active youth (re interfaith youth)	Youth are mobile and it is hard to engage them for long periods (without careful investment). Participant selection did not seem to focus on who would best apply the skills (but concentrated on adding another ‘sector’ to existing interfaith youth participants already active regarding peace). The design did not include follow up processes. As shown in one case study, some youth could “learn” the new content and be motivated to act, but it is not clear how many. (Note the inclusion of Kachin State in the project area was based on this assumption that youth would apply their skills to the NRG issues there).	Attrition between trainings (especially in 2014, made worse by delays in activities) which meant fewer people with deeper understanding and skills. Isolated and not well linked activities did not help. There was limited application reported.	A longer term “investing in people” approach, as with various leadership programs, are an alternative. Trainings by themselves (even as a series) do not necessarily build skills. Need careful participant selection. Need explicit follow-up and support for application.
Religious leaders can be mobilised regarding NRG	It takes time for religious leaders to understand and own their potential roles, especially in a Myanmar context (described later)	There were limited results against these intended outputs (but see unintended result)	Mobilisation takes more time and deliberate processes
The Interfaith Working Group could advocate nationally	The IWG is a loose network; and its members act as individuals rather than institutional representatives. Many do not have strong roles back within their own communities. Thus interfaith leaders and religious leaders may be different. The main advantages for IWG nominated by its members are in sharing information and promoting mutual understanding, rather than action, per se.	The IWG was not very active or engaged during the project (either collectively or its members). There were no advocacy related outputs.	Advocacy needs recognised people and mechanisms (recognised by the main actors, i.e. government, community, civil society and private sector)
From above, that local results can feed into national public dialogue	There was no evident link between local and national.	Local results (e.g. community level impacts) were not linked to national or regional. Spectrum and Shalom distributed project outputs to various audiences, ad hoc.	As above, there needs to be a mechanism to link levels.

Actors can contribute to public dialogue "out there"	The formulation of the outcome as "contribute to" public dialogue is much more passive and disconnected than "participate in" or such, where the mobilised actors then have agency.	Limited emphasis on follow up or being active agents for change	Consider how actors can have agency rather than be passive (this needs the right actors to be engaged).
Community (rights holders) would be empowered through data collection	The project relied on a few individuals to attend trainings and participate in data collection, aside from a one-off screening of videos.	Limited community results (also linked to no outlet for the captured 'voice')	Consider community empowerment in design (for example organisation and mobilisation)
The partners would work well together	(discussed in another section, as perhaps they could have, if everyone had equal ownership of the project and/or if it was structured differently. Alternatively, other partners could have been chosen).	Quantity and quality of outputs was much lower than expected. Synergies did not occur. A lot of time and effort in negotiation.	Suitable partner selection and design processes are essential.
TAGOR's mandate comes from the 2013 Tanzania exposure trip	Exposure trip participants may have contributed ideas for design, but they were not involved in the project. There was substantial discussion about differences in religious leader roles between Tanzania and Myanmar, but this was not reflected in design. Actually, another project being proposed under a Religious Minority call may have better utilised one of the participant's motivations to act after the exposure trip. TAGOR probably more broadly reflected Shalom's 2013 activities funded by NCA than this specific trip... and interests were more on community impacts rather than governance, <i>per se</i> .	The project was not changed even if these assumptions became evident.	(Re better design process with surfacing assumptions?)
Shwe gas pipeline is a good example	It could have been for national advocacy, as revenues from this project are substantial. However, the pipeline had already been constructed, and the main community issues were around compensation and monitoring – which this project did not address ⁹ . Also, some thought the focus had to be Oil and Gas related, due to the funding, rather than broader natural resources.	Community members had difficulty recalling facts. Their 'voice' had no natural outlet (e.g. to lobby companies about grievance mechanisms, compensation and mediating impacts, to government about better consultation processes, e.g. FPIC and EIA) or to other civil society groups to mobilise responses.	Change example if it is not working, or change activities to reflect situation and opportunities.

⁹ On the other hand, there are rumoured plans for road (if not rail) construction along the pipeline, as part of China's so called "Two Oceans Policy", which are likely to have far more severe negative impacts than the pipeline construction, including social issues around migration and workforce. Some key informants referred to this. Is there any way that the project could have been proactive about this in 2016? That is, keep Shwe as an example but extend it beyond the past pipeline construction towards the future? This remains idle speculation, but is noted as it relates to this key assumption that Shwe is a good example. In addition, the pipeline's EIA was apparently updated during the project period, which could have offered opportunities for broader engagement by civil society groups about environmental and social impacts.

TAGOR did not need to involve the private sector	See above	See above	Important stakeholders should not be neglected
NCA could influence audiences in Myanmar and Norway	NCA was not perceived in this way in Myanmar, but it did engage with certain audiences in Norway.	Missed opportunity for these outputs in Myanmar (but some results in Norway)	Better inclusion in design

Insufficient planning and budgeting

Perhaps related to the points about the proposal development process, the activities were not clear and insufficient budget was allocated. This was especially notable for resource people for training activities and technical support. This also impacted the implementation of the project.

Linkages to broader efforts

There were broader efforts going on, as the proposal recognised, however there was not sufficient attention paid to trying to link with these (e.g. supporting the addition of a faith and ethnic-focused component to the Myanmar China Pipeline Watch Committee (MCPWC) or Shwe Gas Movement, for example). During implementation, some links at a local level were formed (e.g. to MCPWC) but not captured in terms of having sharing of information or promoting joint activities. The Myanmar Alliance for Transparency and Accountability (MATA) might have been a good network to link with. Many of the key informants interviewed only knew of some of the activities (like SWF) and were surprised to hear of Shalom and NCA's involvement. Spectrum made available resource material (e.g. from Natural Resource Governance Institute, NRGI, and Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business, MCRB), and NRGI was invited to speak at the conferences, but otherwise there was very little linkage to broader efforts under this project. This is not commenting on the nature of broader links that each of the partners have, rather limitations of the design.

2.3 Project operation and implementation

The implementation of the project also did not enable the best set of achievements to emerge and a low level of efficiency. The following factors contributed, and these are discussed in turn:

- Lack of clear linkages between project components and isolated activities
- Delays and staff turnover
- Lack of flexibility/adaptability/redesign
- Weaknesses in M&E/data to guide the project
- Limited risk analysis and conflict sensitivity

Linkages and isolated activities

The project in practice operated as isolated activities rather than being well integrated. In effect, it operated as 4 distinct sub-projects with limited linkages:

1. National engagement on EITI, SWF
2. Youth and community: documentation of impacts
3. Sub-national capacity building on budget transparency (social accountability)
4. National religious leader engagement (very minor)

The lack of synergies between partners also contributed.

Delays

In effect, the first half of each year was lost to project activities due to both funding delays and as extended negotiations took place with the partners (extra needed because of the design). So, the intended three year project was more like an 18 month project... and partners crammed activities into the latter part of each year. Often this meant that planning was rushed, which in turn reduced quality. Any continuity between project years was lost and this contributed to the isolation of activities and lack of follow-up. In effect the project was three sets of approximately 6 monthly activities, with 6 monthly intervals in-between (time periods are generalised). Partners indicated that they were not willing to do activities without security of funding. Perhaps NCA could have arranged some bridging funding, or such, to ensure that project delays did not have such a negative impact on the project, but there were other issues with implementation as will be described.

As a minor point, due to currency fluctuations, the budget available for the project activities also decreased, which generally meant some planned activities were further delayed or not done at all.

Staff turnover

All three partners had a turnover of staff and each nominated it as a factor that limited project achievements. In some cases there was limited handover (a complete break), which probably meant that there was less understanding of the original intentions by subsequent staff. The level of individual staff capacity varies, but the turnover may have had a bigger impact.

Lack of flexibility/adaptability/redesign

When it became obvious that the project was not going to work as intended, then it may have been better to 'go back to scratch' and re-design it. Decision making during the course of the project was generally difficult, with long periods of negotiation between NCA and the partners as to who would do what, when (with difficulties then to gain those commitments, for various reasons).

Some activities like the committee formation and the additional survey appeared to be solely 'ticking the box'. That is, both sets of activities were not clearly justified in terms of what benefits they would bring and were seemingly done because they were in the original design (although too late).

On some content issues, there was flexibility displayed. In 2014, the initial focus was on EITI. In 2015 a minor focus was on Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) relating to development projects (including oil and gas). In 2016, TAGOR included activities on Social Accountability (which was mostly limited to government budget processes and citizen involvement in budgets). All three are important. A change of focus away from EITI reflected less space in 2015-16. Transparency in budgeting was always there but became stronger in 2016. The focus on Social Accountability is clearly linked to both transparency of revenue

collection for natural resources and public expenditure of these revenues (as highlighted in SWF conferences). It also allowed the project to 'piggyback' on other projects looking at social accountability at sub-national levels, particularly in Kachin State, and enhance project achievements at this level (unintended). The progression between content areas was not predicted in the design so represents a degree of flexibility.

It is clear that the lack of flexibility or re-design aside from some content changes has significantly constrained project achievements.

M&E data

The lack of good M&E data is clear. Even basic gender disaggregation is incomplete. Some data is not available (partly due to staff turnover?). Reporting by all partners focuses on activities rather than outputs. Whilst Shalom went through a massive internal exercise to improve its M&E within the project period, the quality for this project has not risen. Follow up with training participants would have gathered more data about application, and case studies were only collected in 2014-15 (not beyond). There is no evidence of use of M&E data to guide decision making regarding the project.

Limited risk analysis and conflict sensitivity

The main risks that were monitored related to the conflict situation (and safety of staff for activities) and local authority permission for activities. Other risk areas (e.g. those identified in the proposal) were not explicitly covered and there was not a periodic exercise to identify, assess and address risks. The activities were probably small enough and resources were generally not made available to community actors, to mean that there was little chance that they would even indirectly contribute to conflict (either religious or ethnic-based). However, there does not seem a formal analysis to identify the potential conflicts. Whilst NCA espouses a Do No Harm approach, it is unclear what the partners actually understand by that or how it contributed to this project.

Other

Participant selection (e.g. for training or for data collection) is important. At times, it seems that partner organisations (like Kachin Baptist Convention) nominated participants – although there was then no role or involvement in the project for the organisation. It is not known how other participants were selected. There is insufficient data to say whether participant selection has been appropriate, to allow on-going application, except for comments questioning this. It is not raised as a “constraint” of the project that affected achievement, but rather as a positive statement that good participant selection is important, both in design and implementation.

2.4 Changing Myanmar context

The aim here is to present changes in context of relevance to the project, and not all changes. However, “contributing to public dialogue” is a broad topic, so it means this task is challenging. The presentation is based on the broad consultations conducted and the author’s own reflections, rather than reviewing all available literature, which is outside of the scope of this review.

Changes are discussed under three headings:

- General political, social and economic changes
- Natural resource governance
- Religious leader engagement and interfaith

For each section, a description is provided of the main changes, including opportunities and constraints. On the surface, the project did not respond well to these opportunities and constraints. What seems likely, however, is that partners responded better in their other projects, but just not through TAGOR. This relates to the lack of adaption discussed earlier.

Political, social and economic change

The main change regarded formal Political and Institutional change. Here, the primary events are the 2015 election and the new NLD-led government taking office in 2016. In general, the election became a constraint for the project, as it took a lot of attention of various stakeholders, slowed down citizen and civil society engagement with government, and election campaigns did not get close to canvassing issues of relevance to natural resource governance. The change of government in April 2016 particularly slowed down engagement and public debate, as decisions were centralised and policy decisions were pending. Some debate went to high profile laws, such as the 2016 Investment Law, and to “repairing” other laws¹⁰, and public consultation processes by government seemed to decrease over the project period (and be confined to certain portfolios such as “environment” rather than others like “energy” or “planning”).

In addition, many civil society members experienced that the new government is less responsive to them – and even questions their legitimacy (“we were elected by the people – who elected you?”). This has a huge bearing on how advocacy and “public dialogue” can take place, and who has legitimacy and voice. It is evident that some actors are included and some are excluded. As a sub-set, religion and faith in public dialogue has become more contentious. In general, these changes are constraints for the project.

On the flip-side, one opportunity that came out of the Political change, was more space to engage with sub-national (regional) parliamentarians. There has been a quite healthy public dialogue about decentralisation and the roles of regional governments (limited by the 2008 constitution), revenue sharing and the need to build capacity at this level.

¹⁰ Informal comment to the author by a sitting MP (unrelated to this project).

Another opportunity is that certain reforms initiated by the previous U Thein Sein government, like public fiscal management have continued at a rapid pace. It seems unlikely that initiatives such as producing a “citizen’s budget” would be reversed. There is much more clarity on public debt, which is increasing. There is more disclosure about the budget to parliament than before. There is continued openness to talk about transparency and accountability, and some international standards are in the process of being applied (for example, in Production Service Contracts for oil and gas). The need for development projects to produce Environmental Impact Assessments is more formalized by the regulations in 2015. A range of relevant laws have been passed. MEITI appears to have been revitalised, and subsequent reports are expected in March 2018. This will give more room to bring in useful concepts like ‘Beneficial Ownership’ and such. Initiatives such as the Myanmar Network for Parliamentarians against Corruption (MNPAC, from 2013, and Open Government, from 2015-16, are likely to continue although clearly might change form. In general, there is more information available about natural resource governance and transparency. Increased freedoms for the media, whilst far from complete, have contributed to this.

In the formal sphere, another factor has been the continued violence and civil conflict. The National Ceasefire Agreement and “21st Century Pang Long” peace processes have not secured nationwide peace. This has been a constraint for the project in a few ways: conflict is evident in some of the project areas in Northern Shan State; some conflict is fuelled by religious actors; and natural resource governance is subsumed into much greater and more complex dynamics involving ethnicity, sovereignty and such. Conflict sensitivity implies an awareness of how interventions can contribute to conflict – whereas this has not been clearly spelled out, aside from crude generalisations that 25% of resources are in ethnic areas, that government is one side of the conflict, and such.

Three other categories of general context change are important: two are opportunities and one is a constraint. The first is that overall, freedoms for citizens have increased. More people can meet together and speak out with less fear, than before. This is not absolute, of course, and there are still many infringements on these freedoms. The second is the huge explosion of communications, internet and social media, particularly Facebook, which enables quick information sharing as well as coordination and mobilisation of responses (as seen, for example, in the responses to the 2015 floods in western Myanmar). It also has aided a rise of ‘hate-speech’ and such. The previous discussion of “public dialogue” should be modified to incorporate potential roles and contributions of social media. The third is that engaging youth in Myanmar is becoming more and more difficult. Many of those consulted referred to the mobility of youth and difficulties in keeping their attention for long periods unless it results in an educational certificate. This has been mentioned among the design assumptions, but is really a much broader part of the context changes in Myanmar, particularly over 2014-16.

Natural resource governance

Natural resource governance is a relatively new term in Myanmar, and it pertains mostly to decision making (who makes decisions and by what rules), legal and policy frameworks, institutions relating to natural resources. Previously, it was more uniformly called *natural resource management*, whereas now that term means more of the implementation of decisions and administration of procedures decided under governance. Many civil society and community actors are operating more at management levels – trying to ensure that resources are utilised sustainably.

A lot of attention has gone to extractive industries (e.g. oil and gas, mining). Within extractive industries, one of the key concerns is the transparency and use of revenue flows. The significance within Myanmar is spelled out in the first MEITI report (2016) which shows about 2.5 Billion USD accounted for in 2013-14, which represented over 23% of government receipts, but still significant revenues not accounted for (Global Witness estimate the jade business to be 31 Billion annually, although the revenue flows to government from this are obviously a small percentage of this). Part of the broad benefit of MEITI is that there is such a better understanding of the oil and gas sector (who are the actors, how are they connected, and such). The revenues from oil and gas are over 2 Billion USD per year in 2013-14. There has been a rapid expansion of contracts for exploration (more than 30, 2013-15), although it is unknown how many will progress to extraction. The Sector Wide Impact Assessment also describes how the oil and gas sector operates in Myanmar.

Attention has also gone to other sectors, including land, water, forests (and community forestry, both for timber & non timber products and ecosystem services) and renewable energy (including hydro-electricity). So, the scope of natural resource governance can be seen to be enormous.

One consequence of the huge scope is that there is a need to focus and specialise – otherwise efforts are dissipated and the potential contribution is weak. Some of this specialisation is in terms of type of natural resource (e.g. extractives, also land, water and forestry, described above).

Some specialisation is in terms of process, such as enhancing transparency and holding actors accountable, providing technical and legal input into laws and policies, participating in regulatory processes, facilitating community input, increasing community awareness of rights and capturing these, and such. In some ways, this specialisation in natural resource governance is reflecting different perceptions in civil society in Myanmar about their own roles and credibility, especially between the ‘technical skills provision’, ‘being a watchdog’, ‘ensuring community voice’ and ‘providing public services (in lieu of government)’. Of course, these are not mutually exclusive... at least not in theory. Some formal mechanisms have been set up to include civil society voice. Part of this has been as a genuine desire to improve quality through ensuring that voices are heard that are not government nor business. One mechanism is in participation of civil society in the multi-stakeholder group of MEITI, but this is seen to have favoured technical capacity rather than community-based work.

This is a further form of specialisation. Technical capacity is needed in order that members can actually talk, as counterparts, with government and private industry. The same occurs with participating in regulatory processes such as ensuring companies develop and honour their environmental management plans and such (part of their Environmental Impact Assessments). Over time, whilst there may be efforts to ensure that there is more technical capacity at regional and sub-regional levels, the increase in specialisation will create differences between those that can talk the technical talk and those that cannot. This may exacerbate the perceived gaps between those that are included and those who are not, unless there are means to ensure linkages and a wide coverage of different actors. MATA is one group that could try to bridge different levels and capacities, but its interests are limited, too. Bringing together different interests and voices is essential.

Within natural resource governance, the main intersections with TAGOR have been interests in:

- Transparency of revenues collected and used (mainly captured under MEITI, but very much broadened to include revenue sharing, budget transparency & disclosure, social accountability)
- Fiscal management, including savings/SWF
- Broader reforms including State Owned Enterprises, improved public-private contracting
- Responsible projects and investment (EIA/FPIC/grievance mechanisms, also contingency planning for accidents and such)
- Contract transparency
- Beneficial ownership
- Public policy development, including community consultation (or lack thereof). There are still many items not yet covered within oil and gas, including expansion of exploration and extraction, future revenue flows meeting domestic demand (including potential pipelines from Yadana), and such.
- Reform of laws (especially mining, but also the need for oil and gas, noting that the existing petroleum laws and regulations are very dated)¹¹

Indeed, a casual observer looking at the achievements of TAGOR might see more of a focus on broader government processes and accountability rather than oil and gas governance, *per se*. This is a further trend within natural resource governance, that there are increasing linkages to broader reform processes. It provides opportunities to capture synergies but with a constraint of the high technical specialisation that is needed.

¹¹ A further legal issue is the harmonization between different laws – do investment, environmental or other laws take priority and how are cross-overs managed?

Religious leader engagement and interfaith

Generally, religion and government have been separated in Myanmar, although the latter has usually sought the approval of religious leaders through acts of merit and charity. The rise and influence of some radical religious movements are important exceptions. Is it possible to have engagement without extremism? In addition, historically leaders of non-Buddhist faiths, have tried to “keep their heads down” and not attract too much attention. The passing of a series of four Race and Religion Protection laws has increased nervousness about roles of religious leaders and pushed interfaith work into less formal spheres. Local media coverage has also become more guarded and self-censored. Officially there is freedom of religion, as stated in the 2008 constitution, but in practice these freedoms are not complete.

Each of the major religions are very divided and there are few structures that capture these divisions. For example, Buddhism in Myanmar has Theravada (Tadhamma and Shwekyin) and Mahayana. The Sangha Maha Nayaka (literal *big patrons for monks*) is the highest coordination body for Theravada acknowledged by government, and it concentrates on control of doctrine and Sangha (e.g. registration, administration and such). It has not engaged in natural resource governance issues as a body. What can be seen, is that many individual monks and nuns are interested in natural resource governance as it applies at a local level (generally regarding specific projects, such as Leptadaung Copper Mine). It is nearly impossible to coordinate and aggregate these levels, nor get the leaders involved to speak out at a national level. One relevant movement among Mahayana Buddhists is socially engaged Buddhism, coming from its base of deep-ecology and connections. This is active but relatively limited and not acknowledged under Theravada.

Christianity too, sees separation between the registered and official churches and others. There is a far higher degree of organisation, with structures such as Myanmar Council of Churches (MCC), also Myanmar Evangelical Christian Association (MECA) and Myanmar Christian Missionary Council (MCMC). Some formal consultation processes try to include the views of representatives of each. Having said that, there are many local churches and adherents that do not come under these structures. The Myanmar Council of Churches and Catholic Bishops Conference Myanmar are two national bodies that have engaged in awareness raising about natural resources and governance.

For Islam, there are 5 recognised bodies and another 5 that are not. But there are competing “Muslim Councils”, which leads to differences in proclamations of religious dates and breaks of fasts, for example. There appears little coordination between the different groups and there are no known cases of engagement in natural resource governance except by individuals.

For Hindu, almost by definition, there are no organising structures as each ‘sect’ recognises its own deities and such. Similarly, for animism, whilst being a faith (or many faiths) rather than a religion, also has no organising structures.

So, the ability to engage with a religion in its entirety, rather than a small part, is extremely limited. Most approaches identify active and interested leaders – but without structures this means that most efforts will be very localised, rather than being able to influence wider processes, as such. Opportunities for interfaith work needs to reflect that it is hard to work across religions and involve many.

In addition, as consultations reveal, some “so called leaders” that participate in interfaith work do not have the legitimacy or influence back within their own faith community. So they participate as individuals rather than representatives. This is very key point.

Under each of these broad religions, there are many youth and student groups. Indeed, some groups, like Kalyana Metta Foundation (formerly Buddhist Youth) have not been engaged in the project. At the local level, Muslim and Christian youth groups appear quite strongly engaged. The influence of these youth groups on their leaders is more questionable. Interfaith youth are also quite active – this project drew on one such network established to promote peace.

The government has brought together the major religions in interfaith committees at national, regional and township levels (note some wards also have equivalent committees). The main point of these committees is seemingly to have a suitable group that can spring to action when interfaith tensions arise (problem and conflict resolution). There are other interfaith groupings, including Metta Setwaing (local, mainly focusing on co-existence and mutual understanding) and Religions for Peace (based on an international model), as well as ad hoc groups like in Mandalay. In general, despite the scope to work with interfaith, these other groups were not engaged significantly.

Church of Sweden and DCA-NCA are working on a religious landscape mapping for Myanmar, as a way to better understand the context, and as a basis for decisions about programming. This exercise is highlighting, further, that many groups do not wish to be mapped. The recognition of which groups and who are they connected with, are also part of legitimacy questions.

The main types of issues that religious and interfaith leaders most commonly engage with are peace, humanitarian aid and education. In particular, the main priority is peace. Some religious leaders are trying to carve out a bigger role in peace than what they have been granted. For example, some want to participate in the 21st Century Pang Long processes. Natural resource governance is often seen as a root cause for conflict, but there are no known attempts to more formally link it with peace.¹² The main engagement by religious leaders in natural resource governance also depend on the perceived roles for civil society and for religious leaders. If the roles are technical and formal, then there is less scope for connection. If faith is kept to moral and ethical domains, rather than ‘faith-in-action’, there is also less connection.

¹² Either inside or outside of engagement with religious leaders. The Sector Wide Impact Assessment for Oil and Gas also noted how extractive industries have become intimately intertwined with ethnic conflict over the last few decades.

It seems likely that the main opportunities for engagement of religious leaders will be highest for local communities and project-related issues, rather than for broad governance at national or sub-national levels. Faith leaders are respected and can have an important role in mobilising communities, endorsing action, making available information, and such. Faith leaders can be important in assisting a broader awareness of rights at local level, which are mainly about FPIC and communication/grievance mechanisms, as well as mobilising action by communities about specific developments.

Some actors might not be so receptive to involvement of religious leaders, in any case. There is a disincentive to engagement, given especially the fear of extremism and the historical context, that needs to be addressed.

Summary

The main opportunities and constraints for TAGOR resulting from context changes are presented in Table 4.

Table 4: Summary of context changes, opportunities and constraints

Context change	Opportunities	Constraints
General political, social and economic changes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Space to engage with sub-national (regional) parliamentarians -Continuing reforms on public fiscal management, transparency and accountability. Increased information availability -Increased freedoms for the media and public speech -Expansion of communications, internet and social media 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Slowing down of engagement with government due to the elections and change in government -More contested roles for civil society and inclusion/exclusion of certain actors -Continued and complex conflict situations -Difficulties engaging youth for long periods
Natural resource governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -High attention to extractive industries for the transparency and use of revenue flows -Links to broader government reform processes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Large scope of natural resource governance and the need to focus and specialise -Increasing technical requirements to engage can exclude community based actors
Religious leader engagement and interfaith	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Large influence at community level -Some religious leaders are active and interested -Active youth groups (but limited influence on leaders) -Some existing interfaith networks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Rise and influence of radical religious movements -Some want to keep a low profile and not engage -Some do not want religious leaders to engage -Lack of intra-faith structures to capture the diversity within religions as well as to coordinate or aggregate from community levels -Some interfaith participants do not have legitimacy in their own faith communities (participate as individuals rather than representatives) -Religious leaders concentrating on peace, humanitarian aid and education

On the surface, the project did not respond well to these opportunities and constraints. Exceptions would be the engagement of parliamentarians and government officials at sub-national and regional levels, and utilising momentum on public reforms. What seems likely, however, is that the partners may have responded but just not through TAGOR.

3. Added value by NCA and in-country donor representatives

In some countries, there is a very active communication between NCA and the in-country donor representatives. In this case, OfD did not have an official project in Myanmar at the time of this program, although it supports both government and civil society actors, particularly around public fiscal management and accountability. There are broader issues at stake regarding OfD's increasing intention to work with civil society, which limits communication with any one of its partners. The project also coincided with the establishment of a Norwegian Embassy and the opening of Nordic House in Myanmar, so a small project like this would not have received much attention. There has been limited communication, except regarding the SWF conferences, so the opportunity for adding value was low. NORAD facilitated presenters for both national conferences, particularly one of its technical consultants, and the Norwegian Ambassador opened the first conference. The donor did not try to promote networking and learning between OfD recipients. One other OfD recipient also indicated that its communications with in-country donor representatives are limited, too. Donor representatives have contributed to the evaluation process.

So, most of the attention in this section is on NCA and its value-add. The openness of NCA to consider this is encouraging. Within NCA, both in-country and head office staff contribute. These are generally at management, financial, technical adviser and project officer levels. This evaluation has not consulted with financial staff nor considered financial aspects of the value add. Part of the context, too, is that the Myanmar office is relatively new (since 2013) as programs used to be managed by the regional office in Laos.

Theoretically, the value add and increase in quality comes in several ways, which are discussed in turn:

1. Coordination and partnership management. Partners are seen as legitimate and credible local actors that can reach right holders and duty bearers... and to increase the ownership and sustainability of results
2. Connections/networking for partners with national and international networks and resource people, both to enhance quality of outputs and learning processes
3. Advocacy in-country and in Norway, including communication and visibility
4. Capacity building of partners, including organisational development, project management and their technical capacity. In addition, regular learning platforms are held between partners
5. Donor communication and further fundraising

Coordination and partnership management has had weaknesses, exacerbated by changes in staff in all three organisations. For NCA there were staff changes in management, technical and project officer roles, with limited or no handover. Partners also experienced turnover for project staff. Delays in funding and extended contract negotiations did not help, as noted previously. The implementing partners also had unhelpful roles in the process (perhaps inevitable from the start?). Technically, the project officers for NCA had less capacity than one of the partners, which led to some contentions, even if efforts

were made to upgrade these skills. It needs to be said that staff tried hard – so it is not that individuals are being blamed. There are a host of other cultural issues at play (age, seniority, local-expat relationships, etc).

Local NCA staff have participated in international technical conferences and exposure trips about extractive industries. The 2013 exposure trip to Tanzania for religious leaders to view its Public Expenditure Tracking System (PETS) predated, but is linked to, this project. One partner participated in training on PETS in Angola. Otherwise there seems few connections or networking initiated by NCA. One intention was to link with other local and international researchers, which does not seem to have happened. Opportunities for input by technical advisers (from Oslo) have been limited.

In Norway, NCA took part in 2 advocacy meetings with Statoil, which has been awarded a licence for a deep water exploration block in the Bay of Bengal. Incidentally, there is a possibility that they may make use of the Shwe gas pipeline to transport gas to China, but decisions on this have not been made as the production would only occur in 2027 at the earliest and there are several options. In March 2016, NCA gave a presentation to Statoil about local communities' rights related to natural resource extraction, which included the participatory videos produced by this project. NCA are also building on constructive dialogue with Statoil in Tanzania. Several other Norwegian based organisations gave presentations about Myanmar's political context, civil society and natural resource management, along with recommendations. Jointly their messages were about who to engage with, ensuring transparency, protecting rights and developing good strategies for Corporate Social Responsibility in Myanmar. This advocacy demonstrates potential for NCA's value add, even if only currently one Norwegian oil and gas company is involved in Myanmar.

The main advocacy efforts in Myanmar were directly related to project activities, and the added value by NCA is not clear.

Capacity building of both partners at the start of the project included trainings on advocacy, conflict sensitivity and Do No Harm. Near the end of the project, additional trainings on theory of change, advocacy and photo-documentary were held, but the timing would not have enabled application in the project. During the project capacity building was provided for one partner, Shalom, for project management (logframe, M&E, planning, budgeting) and also training in Angola on public expenditure tracking. A formal capacity assessment and plan may have revealed other needs, the timing could have been improved and trainings are probably overemphasised. The extent of capacity increases cannot be gauged. It is clear that NCA has added value to developing at least one partner's capacity through this project.

Regarding donor communication – until late 2016, where extra meetings were initiated, communication seemingly revolved around scheduled reporting rather than being proactive. The donor does not see the potential value add for NCA to technically engage in the oil and gas sector in Myanmar, which may have been prompted by limited communications. Further fundraising was not appropriate.

Overall, the opportunities to add a high level of value have not been captured aside from the Statoil advocacy. Partners would not be aware of this, for example, and would agree that NCA's value add has not been as high as it could have been. As an observation, NCA appears to have had more success in adding value in other countries and projects¹³. Some lessons emerge, combined with those from project design and implementation, including the importance of:

- Selection of partners and assessing their capacity, including their willingness to accept roles and responsibilities. How should NCA handle the tension between working with existing partners and bringing in new partners?
- Having skills in partnership management, especially for difficult partnerships or where these go wrong (as from time to time they do). This includes negotiation and conflict resolution skills.
- Maintaining the distinctions between different types of partners
- Having tighter checks-and-balances and more active interventions by management and head office staff if things are not going well (within thresholds). In this case, it seems that NCA did not really follow its own systems. NCA did not explicitly encourage or utilise risk assessments and conflict sensitivity, for example
- Making available international experience and looking for joint advocacy opportunities
- Ensuring timely and relevant capacity assessments and capacity building
- Capturing advocacy opportunities
- Having proactive communications with the donor

¹³ Like Angola and Tanzania on extractive industries. Or in Myanmar, as with the Breaking the Silence project.

4. Lessons

4.1 General lessons for NCA, partners, donors and other civil society stakeholders

For NCA, the main lessons are around ensuring their value add is achieved (see section 3). In particular, the project design process needs to be much more rigorous and relationships better managed. There are many issues that are raised in this report that should promote discussion both in Yangon and in Oslo. Some of these issues should also be discussed more broadly with other partners in country.

Note, there could be a sense that the project would never be repeated, as it had deficiencies from the start, there have been many mitigating circumstances like staff turnover, and that there is no intention to continue this project. This sense would be to dismiss the findings, which would be a lost opportunity to reflect and change.

For the project partners, the main lessons are similar. All partners had unhelpful roles in the process which need to be reviewed. This report can be a start of that process. These unhelpful roles have not been listed as there are no mechanisms in the evaluation process to practically or constructively work on any of these items. However, it should be clear that, even though this evaluation has detailed NCA's value add, partner value add is also critical, and this has clear weaknesses.

For the donor, the main lessons are around engagement rather than detachment. Appointing focal people is essential, especially within NORAD. This is beyond concern if a project is not performing well, but looking to taking a more active role, including, for example, in providing links between different OfD-funded civil society partners locally, making available experience in other countries and, further, helping to create better access to government¹⁴. As mentioned previously, reservations around suitability of a NRF, for example, should not limit the extent of public dialogue that is encouraged. Perhaps there have been other points of engagement, too, like working with parliamentarians and trying to capture and make available community voice about impacts.

For other stakeholders, the lessons are weak aside from the need for good partnerships and project design. This was largely because the project did not engage well with a broader set of actors.

¹⁴ Of course, the nature of government to government work (the bulk of OfD) means that there needs to be credibility that comes with some separation (that information will be confidential and not shared).

4.2 Specific lessons for future programming

In addition to the general lessons discussed above, there are three sets of lessons for future programming, discussed in turn:

- Engagement of religious and interfaith leaders in natural resources
- Focal points for natural resource governance programs
- Engagement of youth

Engagement of religious leaders

For religious leaders and natural resources, the main roles and influence are around justice and inequalities at the local level, particularly relating to development projects. As discussed, this is because faith leaders are respected and can have an important role in mobilising communities, endorsing action, making available information and assisting a broader awareness of rights at local level. Note that this local role can be proactive, e.g. about general rights, which would be difficult to identify relevant actors unless self-nominated or connected to partners. It can also be reactive, e.g. about specific development projects, which is easier to identify specific communities and then map relevant actors. Note too, that there are a range of interests by different leaders who may give more or less attention to natural resource governance.

The roles at national or sub-national levels are less defined and some deny any role, due to:

- Desired separation of religion and state (not complete)
- Fears of religiously fuelled conflict and a lack of 'pluralism'
- Lack of organisation and accessible structures at regional and national levels for some faiths, meaning 'representation' and intra-faith communication flows are difficult
- A very broad set of interests amongst many religious actors, but dominated by peace, humanitarian responses and education... with natural resource governance a long way down the list far lower even than general environmental conservation and natural resource management
- A lack of speaking out, let alone action, on policies and laws (for many reasons, but including historical reasons to "keep one's head down" and perceptions that religion relates mainly to morals and ethics¹⁵)
- A lack of suitable existing platforms and mechanisms to work between together faiths.

Having said this, the potential role at these levels is not zero, as shown by the example cited of a Roman Catholic Cardinal speaking out for justice, including natural resource governance. It means that any roles will take a lot of time and investment to develop, especially to address the limitations mentioned above. This is beyond the capacities and interests of the current set of partners for NCA, but perhaps may be of interest as an initiative of the broader ACT Alliance. Based on consultations, many religious leaders are preoccupied in defining their own roles and engagement in peace processes, for example, to be very interested in natural resource governance at this point in time.

¹⁵ For this reason, it is easier to imagine engagement about Gender Based Violence, for example, as it has a moral/ethical domain and a clear 'duty-bearing' within religion.

Natural resource governance

For future programming about natural resource governance, there is a critical need to make decisions about where to focus. For NCA, there are already some pointers:

- Geographically, the agreed coverage is dryzone and south east. There are a myriad of land, water and forestry sector issues within these areas
- Working with partners will continue, as opposed to direct implementation, for example. The numbers of partners needs to decrease over time rather than increase, which means the scope to bring in new partners will be limited. Longer term programs are prioritised over one-off projects (will this also mean having larger partner-oriented programs rather than smaller topic based projects?)
- There is a need to rationalise the number of programs, as the combined interests are quite wide and will spread resources too thinly
- Assessments of community needs and partner interests prioritise land as the most important natural resource sector. This concerns both governance and management of natural resources). There is limited interest by existing partners in broader natural resource governance
- There is limited perceived value-add for DCA-NCA Myanmar by existing donors to address extractives in general (and oil and gas specifically)
- DCA has some previous experience regarding forestry governance, but no desire to scale up in this sector
- There is limited existing in-house capability for natural resource governance in DCA-NCA Myanmar (a technical position is reserved but not yet filled, depending on program development). So capacity needs to be built from scratch or more support provided by respective head offices.
- Engaging with faith communities and organisations will continue to be a major strategy, especially to promote human rights and agency.

Given all of this, it seems prudent that future programming about natural resources is about land. Land is seen as a cross-cutting theme that goes across both intended joint program outcomes of reducing inequalities and building resilience (especially climate resilience). At least 3 existing partners are already actively involved in land issues, and two have expressed further interest. There are established networks and organisations to work with (e.g. Land Core Group, Land in Our Hands), either in joint action, learning or resource sharing. This is both an opportunity and constraint. DCA-NCA Myanmar will need to find a niche to support these other groups, which already have a large momentum. The main opportunities to engage faith based actors are to promote customary tenure and practices, and share information on rights at community level.

Engagement of youth

Many NCA partners stress working with youth, and there are lessons that come from this evaluation on that. The purpose of engagement is critical. Is it capacity building, action-focused or mobilising others (or other)? In this case, it was all three. However, the assumptions were not made explicit and the abilities to act and mobilise others have been limited. The nature of engagement needed to be much more long term, especially given the attrition of youth participants between activities. In addition, the discussion of context notes short attention spans, which is a constraint. A longer term “investing in people” approach, as with various leadership programs, is probably a better alternative.

Careful participant selection is needed. Key selection criteria need to focus on those with some experience that can utilise the specific content/skills. It is not just sufficient to send a quota for training. Whilst some organisations ‘nominated’ participants, and others came from focal networks, it is unclear what criteria have been used and whether the best people could come. A mild contradiction exists here, that those that are best able to act may not be the ones that are available, particularly at any point in time for training.

Explicit follow-up and support for application is needed. Training by itself is not sufficient to build skills. The lack of application in this project severely limited its achievements. Reflection and application need to be supported, perhaps more within a mentoring or peer-support model.

5. Conclusions and recommendations

Achievements, design and implementation

The main achievements of the project at outcome level have been through engaging parliamentarians, government and civil society in conferences about a possible Sovereign Wealth Fund/Natural Resource Fund (SWF/NRF) and in trainings about government budgets. This has contributed to public dialogue, as intended. The increased availability of resource materials can support improved public dialogue, too.

At the output level, there are high achievements relating to the capacity building of parliamentarians, including engagement with members from the military as a new audience. There are also strong achievements regarding the production of resource materials. Some of these resources have been widely distributed. Products also included briefing papers and participatory videos that highlight the impacts of the pipeline at community level, which gives 'voice' to the community. These were not utilised well for evidence-based advocacy, however.

There are modest achievements relating to capacity building of youth, interfaith youth and community members. These have been the primary groups targeted by the program. It is likely that their awareness of natural resource governance has increased, and it also shows a broadening of the "content" of the existing interfaith youth networks that have previously concentrated on peace-building. Case studies suggest that some participants have increased motivation to engage further. There are limited examples of application of capacity beyond the direct data gathering in this project.

Outputs relating to engagement of national religious and interfaith leaders have not been achieved.

Unintended outcomes include:

- The reach by the SWF conferences to high levels of government and the opening of the 2016 conference included an opening by a prominent religious leader about transparency and natural resource governance.
- Social accountability trainings was introduced as related project content and this highlighted participation in public dialogue at sub-national levels. The reach to military parliamentarians was not initially intended.
- In Northern Shan State, one CSO led a replication of the training about social accountability in another township.

The quality of outputs and outcomes varied due to partner capacity, and achievements were limited due to the design and implementation of the project. The main design limitations were due to:

- An unclear design process and partnership, where partners were not involved in a joint design and did not have ownership
- Unquestioned assumptions and theory of change, especially about working with youth, religious leaders and national interfaith platforms
- Insufficient planning and budgeting
- Insufficient linkages to existing networks and actors

The limitations due to the implementation of the project included:

- Lack of clear linkages between project components and isolated activities
- Delays and staff turnover
- Lack of flexibility/adaptability/redesign
- Weaknesses in M&E/data to guide the project
- Limited use of risk analysis and conflict sensitivity

Changing Myanmar context

There have been many changes relevant to TAGOR, discussed under three headings, which provide opportunities and constraints for the project:

- General political, social and economic changes
- Natural resource governance
- Religious leader engagement and interfaith

Opportunities from political, economic and social changes have included:

- Space to engage with sub-national (regional) parliamentarians
- Continuing reforms on public fiscal management, transparency and accountability. Increased information availability
- Increased freedoms for the media and public speech
- Expansion of communications, internet and social media

Constraints have included:

- Slowing down of engagement with government due to the elections and change in government
- More contested roles for civil society and inclusion/exclusion of certain actors
- Continued and complex conflict situations
- Difficulties engaging youth for long periods

Opportunities from natural resource governance have included:

- High attention to extractive industries for the transparency and use of revenue flows
- Links to broader government reform processes

Constraints have included:

- Large scope of natural resource governance and the need to focus and specialise
- Increasing technical requirements to engage can exclude community based actors

Opportunities for religious leader engagement and interfaith have included:

- Large influence at community level
- Some religious leaders are active and interested
- Active youth groups (but limited influence on leaders)
- Some existing interfaith networks

Constraints have included:

- Rise and influence of radical religious movements
- Some want to keep a low profile and not engage
- Some do not want religious leaders to engage
- Lack of intra-faith structures to capture the diversity within religions as well as to coordinate or aggregate from community levels
- Some interfaith participants do not have legitimacy in their own faith communities (participate as individuals rather than representatives)
- Religious leaders concentrating on peace, humanitarian aid and education

On the surface, the project did not respond well to the opportunities and constraints identified from changes in context. Exceptions would be the engagement of parliamentarians and government officials at sub-national and regional levels, and utilising momentum on public reforms. What seems likely, however, is that the partners may have responded but just not through TAGOR.

Added value

There has been limited communication with the in country donor representatives, and their main contribution has been in providing speakers for the two main national conferences.

For NCA, the best value add comes from the advocacy in Norway to Statoil regarding the community level impacts of extractive industry projects. Indeed, this advocacy needs to be shared with relevant Myanmar partners. Other positive value add has come from building capacity of one of the partners, Shalom, although the extent of capacity gains has not been assessed.

The potential for NCA's value to be added has been limited by weaknesses in:

- Coordination and partnership management
- Connections/networking with national and international networks
- Advocacy in-country
- Proactive donor communication

These weaknesses can be addressed and a stronger value-add, as evident in other countries and programs, would be expected in the future.

Lessons

The main general lessons and recommendations are around:

- Capturing the added value, especially by NCA and its partners
- Enhancing project design and implementation processes
- Project partners needing to review their roles in the project
- Enhancing donor engagement

Programming lessons are around:

- Engagement of religious and interfaith leaders in natural resource governance
- Focal points for natural resource governance programs
- Engagement of youth

Specific recommendations

Recommendations are made for:

- NCA programming
- Capturing NCA's value add
- In-country donor
- Project partners

1. NCA programming:

- NCA programming for engaging faith leaders and natural resource governance should build on roles and influence around justice and inequalities at the local level, particularly relating to awareness of rights and mobilising action by communities about specific developments. There are limited roles at national or sub-national levels, especially due to the preoccupation in defining their own roles and engagement in peace processes
- NCA programming in natural resource governance in Myanmar should focus on land rather than extractive industries or broader natural resources. The purpose should be enabling communities to be aware of their rights and to claim them, and to be able to voice their needs to various stakeholders, government, private and civil. To do this strong networks with existing actors is needed. A high commitment is needed to start a new program.
- NCA programming that engages with youth should be clear about its purpose, have careful participant selection, and support reflection and application of skills.

2. Capturing NCA value-add. NCA needs to develop plans to address:

- Ensuring suitable processes for the selection of partners. Having an internal discussion as to how to handle the tension between working with existing partners who may be inexperienced and bringing in new partners that may have more experience (content, networks and relationships, geographical focus). Utilising the distinctions between different types of partners (core, strategic and resource). Ensuring agreement of roles and contributions (either budgeted or in-kind). Ensuring clear communication paths between NCA and the partners
- Recruiting appropriately skilled staff and emphasising partnership management, especially for difficult partnerships or where these go wrong (as from time to time they do). This includes developing negotiation and conflict resolution skills, which may require further training modules and follow-up support.

- Assessing partner capacity and developing suitable capacity building plans. Similarly, NCA staff should have equivalent assessments and plans. Apart from relationship management highlighted above, project officers need to be able to cover project design, M&E, consortia development, grant management and capacity building.
- Making available relevant international experience and networks and looking for joint advocacy opportunities.
- Having tighter checks-and-balances and more active interventions by management and head office staff if things are not going well, within thresholds developed. In implementation, following internal procedures for assessing risks and conflict sensitivity.
- Encouraging adaptations to changes in context and being flexible.
- Ensuring rigorous design processes that fully involve partners. Improving the theory of change and logframes, in particular actively surfacing assumptions and testing their applicability, as well as developing good M&E. Ensuring that there are clear linkages between project components and activities are not isolated. Ensure there is adequate follow-up and opportunities for application.

3. In-country donors

- In country donors need to consider further their engagement with civil society in Myanmar, including setting up focal people for communication, seeking learning opportunities between funded partners and enhancing links to government (within reason).

4. Project partners

- Project partners need to ensure a strong theory of change and surfacing of assumptions for their planned interventions. Activities need to be linked, with good participant selection, suitable follow up and opportunities to apply their findings. Partners should be proactive about improving their M&E.
- Project partners need to hold NCA accountable to their stated strategies for adding value, as well as look to ensuring their own added value to the partnership.

Annex 1: Project documentation

List of TAGOR Documents

Sr. No	Document Name
1.1	Contract between NCA and NORAD
1.2	Signed Proposal (from NCA to NORAD)
1.3	Power Point presentation used in Inception Workshop
1.4	MOU between NCA and Shalom
1.5	MOU between NCA and Spectrum

List of Documents from Shalom

2.1	2014 Project Agreement
2.2	2014 Budget and Workplan
2.3	2014 Periodic Narrative Report
2.4	2014 Year End Narrative Report
2.5	2015 Project Agreement
2.6	2015 Budget and Workplan
2.7	2015 Periodic Narrative Report
2.8	2015 Year End Narrative Report
2.9	2016 Project Agreement
2.10	2016 Budget
2.11	2016 Periodic Narrative Report
2.12	2016 Year End Narrative Report

List of Documents from Spectrum

3.1	2014 Project Agreement
3.2	2014 Budget and Workplan
3.3	2014 Revised Budget
3.4	2014 Periodic Narrative Report
3.5	2014 Year End Narrative Report
3.6	2015 Project Agreement
3.7	2015 Budget and Workplan
3.8	2015 Project Agreement Amendment
3.9	2015 Revised Budget
3.10	2015 Periodic Narrative Report
3.11	2015 Year End Narrative Report
3.12	2016 Project Agreement
3.13	2016 Budget and Workplan
3.14	2016 Periodic Narrative Report
3.15	2016 Year End Narrative Report

List of products and IEC materials from the Project

4.1	Impact Assessment Report for Kyauk Mei Township (the area where Shwe gas pipe line pass through) (Myanmar)
4.2	Briefer No. 1, Farming, Land loss and compensation along the Shwe gas pipeline (2 versions : both English and Myanmar)
4.3	Briefer No. 2, Community Fears, communication & accountability along the Shwe gas pipeline (2 versions : both English and Myanmar)
4.4	Video clip No.1, Behind the Shwe village (Myanmar language with English subtitle)
4.5	Video clip No. 2, Wishes from the bottom of the heart @ voices from the heart (Myanmar, Shan language with English subtitle)
4.6	Socio Economic Survey (draft report, pending finalization)
4.7	SWF Conference Report (2015)
4.8	SWF Conference Report Draft (2016)
4.9	EITI Cartoon Guide

List of Financial Documents

5.1	2014 Financial reports from partners
5.2	2015 Financial reports from partners
5.3	2016 Financial reports from partners

List of other documents

6.1	2011-14 Myanmar 4 Year Report From NCA
6.2	2015 Myanmar Country report From NCA
6.3	2015 NCA Global report on results
6.4	Submitted proposal for NORAD's Religious Minority Call
6.5	2013 Project reports from Shalom, Spectrum and MID
6.6	DCA-NCA Joint Country Programme Myanmar, 2017-21

Other general references

- BadeiDha Moe Civil Society Organization (2014) Public opinion research report for Myanmar-China Oil and Gas Pipelines
- Bauer, A., Shortell, P and Delesgues, L (2016) Sharing the wealth: a roadmap for distributing Myanmar' natural resource revenues, NRGi
- Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business (MCRB), IHRB, DIHR (2014) Myanmar Oil & Gas Sector-Wide Impact Assessment
- Myanmar Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (MEITI) (2015) EITI report for the period April 2013 to March 2014: Oil, gas and mining sectors
- Natural Resource Governance Institute and Global Witness (2016) Beneficial ownership: Tackling hidden company ownership through Myanmar's EITI process
- Oil for Development Program, NORAD (2015) Annual report 2015

Annex 2: Consultation List

Community

U Soe Naing, Farmer/ AFFM association, Naung Cho
U Kyaw Aye, Farmer/ AFFM association, Naung Cho
U Sai Kyar Pwint, Township Farmer Union, Hsipaw
U Tun Tun Mg (a) U Than Lone, Township NLD Secretary, Hsipaw

Local CSO (Project area)

Ko Tun Linn, Myanmar China Pipeline Watch Committee MCPWC, Kyauk Mei
Daw Eh May, NSS Women Organisation Network, Lashio
U Sai Oo, Freelance consultant, Lashio

Youth and interfaith youth

Ko Nyein Pai Oo, Interfaith Youth, Lashio
Ma Thin Thuzar Htwe, Muslim Youth, Hsipaw
Ko Mai Htun Aye, community member Nantmatu
Ko Aung Naing Htwe, community member, Nantmatu
Gum Hkawng Naw Ding, data collector, Myitkyina

National interfaith networks

U Myo Min, Smile Education
Saya Sai Arti, Judson Baptist Church, formerly Student Christian Movement
Ko Naing Aung Min, Yway Lat Yar Institute
Ko Shine @ Aung Naing Win, Interfaith Youth Coalition on Aid in Myanmar
Saya Saw Shwe Lin, Myanmar Council of Churches
Dr Thein Hlyine, Shalom Board member (Buddhist)

Other religious leaders at local level

Bishop Phillip Za Haung, RC Lashio Diocese
NB Sayadaw U Pa Wa Ya from Netkayan Monastery has moved

MPs

Daw Khin Htar Yee, MP, Theinni (Northern Shan State)
Daw Marang Ja Seng Khawn, MP, Njang Yang (Kachin State)

Key informants

Ms. Vicki Bowman, Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business MCRB
Dr Kyaw Thu, Paung Ku
Ko Maw Htun Aung, Natural Resources Governance Institute NRG
Ko Ye Lin Myint, Myanmar Alliance for Transparency and Accountability MATA
Ko Mung Dan, MATA in Kachin State; TANK
Ma Wai Wai Lwin (formerly BadeiDamoe)
Ko Bo Bo Lwin, Kalyana Metta Foundation (formerly Buddhist Youth)
Ko Thet Nai, Gaia Sustainable Management Initiative
Ms. Eva Oestbye, CDA
Ms. Marte Nilsen, Peace Research Institute Oslo PRIO
Mr. Russell Peterson, formerly American Friends Service Committee AFSC
(many others: causal chats)

Spectrum and Shalom staff (current and former)

Spectrum: David Allan (Director), Nyo Ma (trainer) and Salai Lai Laung (trainer)

Shalom: Nang Raw (Assistant Director), Nang Shin (Program Coordinator), Han Min Lwin (NSS Area Coordinator), Nang Aye Moe (Kachin Area Coordinator)

NCA

Hanna Mollan, Country Representative (late 2016 on)

Jennifer Fish and Camilla Buzzi, former Country Representatives

Saw Mar Taw Gyi and Naw Dora Tha, former project coordinators

Silje Ander and Jane Evensen, current and former technical advisers, Oslo

Donor/OfD

Harald Mathisen, Counsellor and Oil for Development focal person, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Yangon (via Hanna Mollan)

Marte Briseid, Civil Society Department, OfD

Vidar Ovesen, Consultant - Fiscal Governance, OfD

Other

Daw Carol Moet Moet Aye, Another Development (Consultant)

Daw Ei Ei Toe Lwin, Myanmar Times (Media)