WHO TAKES THE BULLET?
The impact of small arms violence
WHO TAKES THE BULLET?

The following is a report on various activities to address the problem of small arms and light weapons undertaken by Norwegian Church Aid and its partners as well as by other humanitarian and developmental organisations from around the world.

International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) was commissioned to write up this report and present contemporary research on the humanitarian and developmental aspects of the small arms crisis.

Stein Erik Horjen, special advisor on peace and reconciliation in Norwegian Church Aid was project coordinator for this publication. Inger Torunn Sjøtrø was picture editor. Sven Even Froyn, Laurie MacGregor, Lise Grung, Riborg Knutsen, Øystein Lied, Verónica Sagastume and Stein Villumstad also contributed to this publication.

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13. January 2000: one of the worst days in the history of our organisation. A group of soldiers from the Lord’s Resistance Army ambushed a Norwegian Church Aid car in Southern Sudan, killing eight people. Two of the killed humanitarian workers in the car were our own colleagues. It was not a planned ambush, and some would say they were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. We at Norwegian Church Aid disagree; we believe our colleagues were in the right place at the right time, but that it was the soldiers and the guns that were in the wrong place.

This was not the first time NCA staff members had been killed, but once again we were reminded of the harsh reality our colleagues face in many wartorn areas around the world. Humanitarian aid workers are victims of the widespread proliferation of small arms, and like the civilian population they work among, they have become those who take the bullets.

There are no wars, within or between states, in which armed personnel represent the majority of casualties. Civilians are molested, killed and raped. Women and children live in fear of warfare, witness the destruction of their homes and livelihoods, and are forced to seek refuge in distant places.

In countries where there is no war, a great number of people are targets of violence and small arms abuse. Many large cities in the Southern Hemisphere have areas that literally have become war zones. Weapons fit the hands of children and young people, and in street gangs guns have become an integrated part of members’ everyday outfits. The same is true for child members of both armed insurgent groups and regular troops.

This is the reality under which development and humanitarian organisations operate. Armed violence hampers development, destroys people’s livelihoods and causes large-scale humanitarian disasters. If we ever were in doubt, we now realise that addressing this violence has become a necessary part of the humanitarian agenda. Upon closer examination, we also discover that small arms and light weapons have become the modern weapons of mass destruction. To address small arms proliferation is to take seriously the issue of weapons of mass destruction disarmament.
In this report we look at the devastating consequences of widespread small arms proliferation, especially in developing countries. Children, men and women experience human suffering in different ways. The global magnitude of this problem can be clearly illustrated by its social side effects and the economic costs incurred. Knowledge gathered by the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfer (NISAT), showing the ways in which these weapons are trafficked across borders and how legal guns become illegal, is an important resource for any work towards the control of small arms traffic. This is a matter that has so far been raised by some human rights and development organisations, but that should be supported in wider circles.

We hope this report will promote greater awareness and engagement among those who today are taking the bullets, encourage new alliances to be forged between humanitarian and developmental forces, and increase focus among decision makers within politics, business and civil society to address this issue effectively.

The ten-year campaign in Mozambique took its slogan from Prophet Isaiah who described his vision for a new human society where weapons are transformed into ploughshares. That vision should be our vision – locally, nationally and globally.

And yet we should not, when confronted by the many negative trends within this field of research, overlook the signs of hope at grassroots level, and among non-governmental organisations and UN initiatives to control these weapons, promote micro-disarmament, and create new alternatives to the use of violence. Not least, we understand the great potential that exists for cooperation between civil society and the security sector, which is currently underdeveloped – especially at the local level, where police forces and civilians can, together, strengthen human security.
... in times past these columns [of cattle raiders] were armed with spears and arrows. During a skirmish, several people died, and the rest either surrendered or fled. And today? There are still these columns of men, but now they are armed to the teeth with automatic weapons.

They start firing right away, massacre the local population, destroy villages with grenades, sow death. There are still the traditional tribal conflicts, the same ones as centuries ago, only now they claim an incomparably greater number of victims.

Modern civilisation has not reached us ... there are no electric lamps here, no telephones, no television. The only aspect of it that has penetrated is automatic weapons.

Regarding Uganda – From The Shadow of the Sun by Ryszard Kapuscinski

Small arms measures should be part of a broader local, regional and global strategy, and should also be integrated into development policy measures at country level.

From Peacebuilding – a Development Perspective Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004

In a world fraught with poverty, injustice and insecurity, NCA will, in this Global Strategic Plan, give priority to the central task of upholding human dignity. NCA will focus on human dignity in the context of people’s struggle for justice. As recent trends have shown, justice without compassion and respect for human dignity can quickly lead to extremism, division, conflict and violence.

From Norwegian Church Aid’s 2005–04 Global Strategic Plan
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Launched in December 1997, the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) is a coalition of Norwegian Church Aid, the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) and the Norwegian Red Cross.

The NISAT coalition is a Norwegian response to the unrestrained flows of weapons that fuel conflict and violence across the world. Small arms transfers destabilise regions where peace is fragile, contribute to abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law, threaten human security and hinder sustainable development.

PRIO plays a central role in the coalition by hosting a small arms project based around an online small arms database. This is the world’s first academic project focused on researching and analysing the international trade in small arms and light weapons. PRIO manages the NISAT website at www.nisat.org

The NISAT project at PRIO works for the prevention and reduction of small arms proliferation and violence.
INTRODUCTION: SMALL ARMS AND VIOLENCE

Violence arising from the global proliferation and diffusion of small arms has been identified by many development agencies as a severe challenge to their humanitarian objectives. For example, in August 2004, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a strategy document on development and peacebuilding. In a section entitled Control of small arms and light weapons, the document states that:

"Internal and smaller regional conflicts are often triggered and prolonged by ready access to small arms and light weapons. These weapons also fuel crime and violence, displace civilians and undermine humanitarian assistance. ... in many regions of the world small arms and light weapons constitute a serious threat to peace, reconciliation, safety, security and sustainable development."

The position held by Norway is mirrored by a wide variety of governments, international organisations and NGOs.

The proliferation of small arms can be aptly described as a crisis because in many areas across the world high powered weaponry is increasingly being diffused into communities. This flow of weapons has shown no sign of slowing down – every year millions of new weapons are produced and sold on world markets (see Section nine on the supply chain). Small arms violence will not be controlled easily – indeed, after a decade of international attention it shows little sign of abating.

HUMAN DIGNITY

Norwegian Church Aid’s central task is to uphold human dignity. In real terms, this means that NCA will “uphold and protect human dignity by working on an agenda of human development, human rights and human security.”4 motivated by a concern for human rights, human development, and human security. In particular, Norwegian Church Aid seeks to integrate these three pillars into all of its development work. The small arms crisis affects all three components of human dignity. The consequences of armed violence on human security, human rights, and human development are shown below.

Human Security

A human security perspective means a shift in focus from threats to the state, such as interstate war to threats to the individual. Small arms violence immediately becomes a key concern both as a primary human security threat and as a threat multiplier.

Box 1 What are small arms and light weapons (SALW)?

Small Arms are those weapons designed for personal use and capable of being carried by an individual, e.g. pistols, rifles, sub-machine guns and assault rifles.

Light Weapons are also easily portable but sometimes require a team to operate them. They include heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, anti-aircraft guns, mortars, recoilless rifles and man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems.

Small arms and light weapons have several attributes that allow their worldwide proliferation:

They are inexpensive: new weapons often only cost a few hundred dollars; black market and second-hand firearms can be bought for even less.

They are easy to use and maintain: most small arms and light weapons only require a short period of training.

They are portable: SALW can easily be moved (legally or otherwise) within countries or across borders.

These factors in turn contribute to two ways in which small and light weapons are used differently from other conventional weapons [such as tanks or warships]:

Small arms, such as pistols or hunting rifles, are widely owned by the civilian population, and there is a significant black market for small arms and light weapons.

In this report, the terms small arms, firearms and guns are used interchangeably. Furthermore, except where stated, the use and acquisition of SALW includes their ammunition, and associated components.
Today’s reality is that most preventable premature mortality is not a result of interstate wars. In fact, disease, violence, natural disasters and civil conflict are the leading threats to human security as we enter the 21st century (see Table 1).

These figures are taken from several different sources, and may well underestimate the extent of casualties. The ‘disasters’ figure is based upon information downloaded from the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)/Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) International Disasters Database. War, homicide and suicide figures are taken from the WHO World Report on Violence and Health. The figure for war includes indirect casualties as well as battle deaths. In many countries, especially in the developed world, suicides far outnumber homicides. For example, in Norway during 2003, there were 502 suicides and 44 homicides. The figure for communicable disease is taken from the WHO World Health Report 2001.

The human security approach recommends the protection of the individual as well as the state, and in so doing encompasses a wide range of internal non-military threats.

Concerning small arms, as Don Hubert of the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs argues, using a human security approach does more than simply bring more issues to the security rubric. More fundamentally, it shifts the focus from the weapons to the safety and welfare of the individual:

"Reducing the number of arms is a means to an end rather than an end in itself - the real objective is not just fewer guns but safer people."
INTRODUCTION: SMALL ARMS AND VIOLENCE

Awareness of the numerous threats to the individual has prompted a substantial shift in relevant security issues and thinking. For development and humanitarian aid organisations, adopting a human security approach is critical, for it is at the local, human level that they can work to mitigate the effects of small arms violence.

Human Rights

For many years, human rights organisations have reported on the relationships between small arms misuse and serious violations of human rights. While governments and international organisations have repeatedly spelled out their concerns, Amnesty International in particular has continued to highlight transfers of arms to parties that use them to commit serious human rights violations.

For example, a 2001 report by Amnesty International calculated that in at least 100 states, governments and non-state armed forces were using small arms and light weapons to abuse human rights and break international humanitarian law. As a report by Oxfam and Amnesty International for the Control Arms Campaign (see Section nine) points out, small arms:

“play a key role in perpetrating abuses of international human rights and humanitarian law – through their direct use or through the threat of use. More injuries, deaths, displacements, rapes, kidnappings and acts of torture are inflicted or perpetrated with small arms than with any other type of weapon.”

The importance of highlighting the links between small arms violence and human rights violations was confirmed with the appointment of Barbara Frey as the UN Special Rapporteur on
the prevention of human rights violations committed with small arms and light weapons.

Human Development

This report highlights the ways that small arms violence often prevents humanitarian and development organisations from achieving their objectives. The most direct impact of small arms violence on development is the death and injury of hundreds of thousands of people. In addition, there are indirect effects that have a much wider range. These include:

- Violent crime
- Collapse of health and education services
- Damage to infrastructure
- Displacement of people fleeing violence
- Declining economic activity
- Preventing development assistance

In subsequent sections, this report highlights the ways in which development organisations can limit the effects and incidence of gun violence.

SMALL ARMS AS A VIOLENCE MULTIPLIER

Armed violence is not the same as violence. The addition of weapons to a violent situation can dramatically increase its lethality. Knives are much more deadly than fists, and guns are much more fatal than knives. As an example, one study of hospital admissions in Australia found that the mortality rate of gunshot wounds was some 100 per cent higher than stab-bings.10

Violence is, and has always been, a part of societies across the world. The role of guns is to dramatically intensify this violence. With a firearm, such as a pistol, a single gunshot wound can prove fatal, and a person can kill many people around them. It is very hard to run away from a gun, and almost impossible for an unarmed person to defend himself. Often, as is discussed in Section ten, the response to a threat by others using guns is for the threatened to acquire small arms of their own.

The threat of their use can be enough to instil fear. This fear can be used to intimidate political opponents, to commit crimes with impunity, to silence the victims of sexual abuses or domestic violence.

This role of small arms as a multiplier was pointed out in a document entitled Tackling Poverty by Reducing Armed Violence produced by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID):

“Although SALW are rarely the root cause of conflict, crime or insecurity, their wide availability acts as a ‘multiplier of violence’, making conflict more lethal, crime more violent and people’s lives, assets and livelihoods more insecure. ... By increasing the risk of armed violence, SALW availability can obstruct and raise the costs of development and humanitarian aid in areas where these are desperately needed. Virtually all sectors of society can be badly affected, but the impact on the poor and the marginalised tends to be most traumatic.”11

The role of small arms as a multiplier means that there is not a direct relationship between the number of guns in a society and its propensity to violence. However, when mixed with other factors, the addition of small arms can, quite literally, be explosive. Such risk factors include communities that also suffer from:

- Little or no effective law enforcement
- Cultures in which disputes are settled through violence
- An association between masculinity and violence
- Powerful criminal gangs
- High levels of poverty and social inequality

As a multiplier of violence, small arms can also contribute to social deterioration. Small arms are instruments that provide their possessor with power – literally the power of life and death. They can then be used to erode (or destroy) traditional social norms, values and relationships.

For example, in Uganda Oxfam has noted, “the possession of small arms has greatly affected the power relationships within families. Sons with guns rarely obey parents and elders. The gun – especially in rural pastoral Kotido – settles feuds and personal vendettas.”12 Once the possessor of a gun realises its power, they can become aware that laws and customs prohibiting murder, robbery, trafficking, assault, or rape can be ignored.

While effective police and law enforcement can attempt to slow down the influx and impact of weapons, in many developing regions of the world, mitigating mechanisms and institutions are overwhelmed by the rising tide of violence. Furthermore, as will be shown in Section one of the report, the main response to rising armed violence is often greater use of weapons by state’s military and security forces.

ARMED VIOLENCE DISPROPORTIONATELY AFFECTS THE DEVELOPING WORLD

The 2003 World Bank publication Breaking the Conflict Trap notes that countries with economically marginalised economies (with low incomes, economic decline and reliance upon commodity exports) have a tenfold higher risk of being involved in civil conflict than their more successful neighbours.13 As is
shown in Section one on mapping global gun violence, this risk of war is mirrored by the concentration of firearm violence in developing countries.

Not only are there vastly more small arms deaths in the developing world than in the developed world; the impact of these casualties, as well as the de facto effects of the presence of these guns, are both far greater in poorer nations.

Put another way, a gun in Rio de Janeiro is likely to have a greater societal impact than one in Oslo. This discrepancy is due to the lack of policing, healthcare and social limits on violence in Rio that are found in Oslo.

Development policy makers and workers are uniquely placed to tackle many aspects of the small arms crisis. Armed violence, whose effects are felt widely and indiscriminately around the world, should no longer be regarded as a simple security issue, but more importantly as a threat to human dignity, human security, human rights and development.

**REPORT OUTLINE**

- Section 1 introduces the concept of a ‘continuum of armed violence’ to comprehend the nexus between small arms violence and development. It also analyses the critical relationship between small arms and modern warfare, interpersonal violence, as well as states’ use of armed violence.

- Section 2 presents children and youth as particularly vulnerable groups to small arms violence. It principally looks at children and youths’ involvement in armed gangs, as well as their participation in fighting forces during conflict.

- Section 3 focuses on the impacts of armed violence against women. It also underlines the role of women as users of arms and perpetrators of violence, and conversely as advocates for disarmament and peacebuilders.

- Section 4 puts an emphasis on men as the primary victims of small arms violence, more specifically of firearms homicides and suicides. It further analyses the role of arms acquisition and use in the definition of violent notions of masculinity and gender identities.

- Section 5 considers a number of small arms violence issues unique to conflict and post-conflict settings, especially for those faced by internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees in war zones.

- Section 6 evaluates the perception and consequences of threat of small arms violence upon humanitarian and development organisations, based principally on two surveys conducted among NCA field workers. It then suggests the use of conflict-sensitive approaches to development aid.

- Section 7 reviews and analyses some of the most critical and indirect social impacts of armed violence upon health, education, transportation, and access to fresh water resources.

- Section 8 looks at the economic costs of armed violence and its impacts on countries’ economic activity and development. This is further illustrated by the assessment of small arms violence impacts on coffee farming in Nicaragua and the fishery sector in Bangladesh.

- Section 9 gives an overview of the supply chain from the production and trade of small arms to their diversion and illicit trafficking through black markets. It then briefly review existing international arms control instruments and current campaigning objectives.

- Section 10 presents recent thinking and field experiences in community safety and disarmament, with particular attention given to post-conflict arms collection programmes and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes.

- The Conclusion is an appeal for better mainstreaming of small arms violence in humanitarian and development organisations’ mandate and strategies.

Our argument is illustrated by example of small arms violence mainly from the following countries: Bangladesh, Brazil, Guatemala, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and the United States. Although they represent a diverse array of socio-economic, ethnic, regional and cultural contexts, taken together, these countries offer an interesting snapshot of the global small arms violence issue.
1. THE CONTINUUM OF SMALL ARMS VIOLENCE

THE GLOBAL EPIDEMIC OF SMALL ARMS VIOLENCE

The 2002 World Report on Violence and Health published by the World Health Organization (WHO) states that the impacts of violence:

“... can be seen, in various forms, in all parts of the world. Each year, more than a million people lose their lives, and many more suffer non-fatal injuries, as a result of self-inflicted, interpersonal or collective violence. Overall, violence is among the leading causes of death worldwide for people aged 15–44 years.

Although precise estimates are difficult to obtain, the cost of violence translates into billions of US dollars in annual health care expenditures worldwide, and billions more for national economies in terms of days lost from work, law enforcement and lost investment.”

There are, of course, many causes of violence. In its 2002 report, the WHO listed the risk factors as being “prevailing cultural norms, poverty, social isolation and such factors as alcohol abuse, substance abuse and access to firearms.”

In 2003, the WHO noted that the “availability of small arms and light weapons is an important factor in increasing the lethality of violent situations.” In particular, if large numbers of guns are added to pre-existing cultures of violence, poverty, exclusion, or alcohol and narcotic abuse, the consequences can be lethal.

The map below shows the global distribution of firearms homicides. It is, for the most part, based upon official statistics on the numbers of people killed by firearms in each country published by either the World Health Organization, or the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). In cases where such statistics were not available, a judgement was based upon other published sources. The information that was used to build the map can be found in Appendix one.

The use of death statistics is perhaps a rather blunt measure of the full consequences of gun violence, yet this strikingly illustrates the worldwide spread of arms proliferation and misuse around the world – and not just in war zones.

Whether one is concerned with domestic homicide in the USA, urban violence in Guatemala, pastoral conflict in Uganda, or civil war in Nepal, one factor remains salient: the role of small arms and light weapons is a common tool of violence. By looking at a continuum of violence this report examines the full extent of the small arms crisis.
1. THE CONTINUUM OF SMALL ARMS VIOLENCE

Figure 1  Map of global gun deaths

LEGEND

- **High**
- **Medium**
- **Low**
- **No data**
- **War**

See Appendix one for Data and Methodology
1_ THE CONTINUUM OF SMALL ARMS VIOLENCE
Since the end of the cold war, of the 34 lowest ranking countries on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index, over 20 were affected by conflict.17 These conflicts were overwhelmingly within states – all but 6 of the 101 conflicts between 1989 and 1996 were civil rather than inter-state.18

Small arms, being cheap, portable, and easy to use, are the ideal weapon for conflicts in the developing world. One study published in the British Medical Journal estimates that of all civilian and combatant deaths, half are directly attributable to small arms.19

The arms flow into the hands of rebels via trafficking networks, and to states via the global arms markets [see Section seven on the supply chains]. As well as fuelling existing conflicts, as noted by the World Health Organization, the proliferation of small arms can increase the risk of conflicts breaking out:

“The ready availability of small arms or other weapons in the general population can also heighten the risk of conflict. This is particularly problematic in places where there have previously been conflicts, and where programmes of demobilization, decommissioning of weapons and job creation for former soldiers are inadequate or where such measures have not been established.” 20

When conflicts occur, they do not just affect soldiers, but to an alarming degree it is civilians that feel the brunt of conflict. Both direct and indirect casualties are heaviest amongst civilians and those touched by war are widespread. For example, a report published by the UNDP stated that more than 20 per cent of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa was directly impacted by civil war during the 1990s.21

In post-conflict environments, guns dissolve into society, killing, maiming, and tormenting long after the official end of hostilities. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimates that, for at least 18 months after cessation of conflict, weapons-related casualties are 60-80 per cent higher than the pre-war rate.22

INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE

As shown in the above map of gun deaths, in many countries the levels of interpersonal violence with small arms are as high, or higher, than in many war zones. For example, there were 10,854 homicides committed with a firearm in South Africa during 2000,23 while between February 1996 and December 2004, the total number of conflict deaths under the eight-year long civil war in Nepal was 10,884.24

In countries emerging from conflict the levels of interpersonal violence can remain high for very long periods – sometimes decades. In such places, one of the legacies of warfare is a very high level of homicide. One reason explaining this phenomenon is that the small arms that were dispersed among a population during the conflict remain to facilitate interpersonal violence during the peace.

Guatemala offers an unfortunate illustration. The 36-year long civil war between guerrilla forces and the Guatemalan government officially ended in 1996. However, it retains one of the highest levels of homicide in the world: between July 2nd and September 30th 2004, an average of 33 persons were murdered every week in Guatemala City. Of these, 92 per cent died from gunshot wounds.25

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in 2000, Brazil suffered 30,855 homicides committed with a firearm (out of a total 45,904 by all methods).26 This level of homicide is higher than in many countries involved in war.

Research by the WHO also found that urban areas were especially prone to violence: “almost one in five firearm deaths for the entire country occurred within the states of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco.” And this violence was overwhelmingly suffered by men. During the period 1991–2000, “over 90% of the 265,975 firearms-related deaths occurred among young males.”27

Interpersonal violence encompasses a range from organised criminality to domestic violence. Even in countries with low average levels of homicide, the acquisition of arms by criminal elements can have profound consequences. For example, in 2000, it was estimated that Bangladesh hosted some 80 organised crime syndicates called ‘mastans’, which were estimated as possessing at least 50,000 of the 200,000 small arms circulating in the country.

More importantly, reports indicated that the possession of small arms by Bangladesh’s organised criminals led to the death of four people and injuries to a further ten people every day.28

Two studies from the United States indicate the role that firearms play in domestic violence. They assessed the many risk factors involved in homicide, and the first found that access to a gun increased a woman’s chances of being killed by her husband fivefold.29 The second found that having a gun in the home increased the overall risk of someone in the household being murdered by 41%.30
1_ THE CONTINUUM OF SMALL ARMS VIOLENCE

STATES’ USE OF ARMED VIOLENCE

States have a key role in ensuring effective control over the legitimate use of force within the borders of their national territory. However, national security forces often have a tense and dangerously imbalanced relationship with the individuals and communities they are meant to protect, particularly in regions marked by high levels of small arms proliferation and violence.

Illegitimate use of force and misuse of guns by law enforcement officers in response to criminality or rebellion only perpetuates cycles of violence and exacerbates what is often a tentative balance between the power of the state, and the respect for human rights, safety and development.

The rising prevalence of ‘shoot on sight’ policies by police forces is a growing concern in many regions of the world, and illustrates the ambiguity of states’ role to uphold the law and protect people’s safety. In Bangladesh, for example, the government had decided to grant its police force the right to shoot on sight, and only revoked it following pressure from NGOs and civil society. As Brad Adams, Human Rights Watch (HRW) Asia Division director, put it: “a crime wave does not justify law enforcement that does not observe basic standards of due process.”

Box 3  Local arms races

In traditional societies, replacing spears and arrows with guns has dramatically intensified the lethality of interpersonal violence. In many parts of the developed world, for example, the presence of firearms has made what have always been common inter-communal disputes much more deadly. Take, for example, Papua New Guinea:

“In past years, traditional inter-clan payback fights saw perhaps a handful of combatants killed with spears, arrows, blades, and clubs. During the 1980s, shotguns became the weapon of choice in many tribal disputes, increasing their lethality by several magnitudes. From the late 1980s, the use of high-powered rifles spread rapidly, as villagers sought their superior range. ”

Rural farming communities are increasingly vulnerable to organised criminal rustlers. Indeed, gun violence has developed in certain rural areas into a vicious cycle fed by uninterrupted fighting between neighbouring pastoral communities. For Ruben de Koning from Pax Christi Netherlands in a study dedicated to armed violence in Uganda:

“Small arms violence is a response to the high vulnerability of pastoralists families. Vulnerability arises from crop failure, pests and disease, and insecurity. Particularly raids are part of a family’s livelihood strategy and prevent it from dropping out of the livestock economy. […] Small arms violence thrives because of arms proliferation, the commercialisation of the livestock economy and the exclusive state and NGO policies and activities”.

Box 4  International standards for the use of firearms by law enforcement officers

The United Nations has developed specific and detailed international standards concerning the use of firearms by police and other law enforcers. While not legally binding instruments, these international standards have received global backing, and many states have integrated them into national law and regulations.

Although high poverty levels in combination with high levels of gun ownership and availability are often found in places of high crime and homicide rates, Tanzania seems to defy this generalisation by showing low levels of armed violence and high levels of gun ownership.

Approximately 10% of Tanzanian households own a firearm (as high as 24% in some areas), and the GDP per capita is only $5804 yet levels of firearms-related homicide are amongst the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa.35 While some provinces bordering conflict regions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, and Rwanda have been affected by potentially destabilising flows of refugees, the level of civilian armed violence in Tanzania remained low.36

However, there have been recent incidents of political violence on the Tanzanian island of Zanzibar. In January 2001, government security forces opened fire on political demonstrators protesting against the October elections. Human Rights Watch reported in its bulletin that during the week after the protests, armed security forces arbitrarily arrested, beat and sexually abused citizens at gun point. This violent campaign resulted in 35 deaths and over 600 injuries.37

In addition to killings by armed police officers, abuse of human rights by armed security personnel can, according to Amnesty International “lead people to fear leaving their homes – preventing them from earning a living, going to school, seeking medical help, reporting theft and corruption – thereby undermining development.”38

In civil conflicts military personnel often assume the role of the civil police force. This change can result in increased human rights abuses because soldiers often are not trained to use non-violent methods, and military forces operate under different international laws and codes than police.

In Nepal, for example, the International Crisis Group (ICG), in its latest Asia Report Nepal: Dealing with the humanitarian crisis states that the Royal Nepalese Army “fully controls both the national police and the paramilitary Armed Police Force and in effect rules the 75 district headquarters, which have become increasingly militarised, with local military commanders holding sway over the nominal civilian local power, Chief District Officers.”39

As analysed in Section ten, the training and reform of security forces is a necessary condition and essential measure for enhancing communities’ safety and development.

In Nepal, the Kathmandu-based Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC) reports that, between February 1996 and December 2004, the majority of conflict-related deaths were victims of governmental forces. As of January 11, 2005, of the 10,884 people killed in the conflict, 7,111 persons were killed by the Royal Nepalese Army, compared to 3,773 by the Maoist insurgency.40 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have repeatedly released well-documented reports that assert government security and armed forces are responsible for systematically violating human rights.

In a statement delivered on March 1, 2005, HRW accused Nepali security forces of being “one of the world’s worst perpetrators of enforced disappearances”. According to the United Nations Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances, in 2003 and 2004 Nepal recorded the highest number of new cases of ‘disappearances’ in the world.41 However, this international attention may have had unforeseen consequences. In its report Killing with impunity released in January 2005, Amnesty International warns that, partly as a result of international pressure on the issue of ‘disappearances’, Nepalese security forces have replaced their tactic of arrest and secret detention with that of increasing extra-judicial executions. According to Amnesty, “the most commonly reported pattern of extra-judicial executions by security forces is that, during a search operation in a village, a number of local people are taken into custody, interrogated and beaten, then taken to a secluded place and shot.”42
CHILDREN AND YOUTH AS VULNERABLE GROUPS

In this report, the term ‘children’ is used as defined by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child:

**Article 1:** For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.

Regarding ‘youth’, an internationally and commonly accepted definition does not exist, and thus each international organization has developed its own concept in line with its mandate and mission. The World Health Organization, for example, distinguishes between three different categories: adolescents (10–19 years-old), youth (15–24 years-old) and young people (10–24 years-old).

In this report, the terms ‘youth’, ‘young people’ or ‘adolescents’ are used for people over the age of 11 and under 18.

Box 7  Defining ‘children’ and ‘youth’

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**Putting Children First** identified at least eight ways in which small arms violence affects children. Although many of the following threats are also felt by adults, their impact on children can be far more devastating:

- Long term psychosocial trauma
- Family and community breakdown
- Loss of access to healthcare
- Loss of access to education
- Lack of food security
- Loss of humanitarian assistance
- Insecurity and the culture of violence
- Loss of opportunities

Indirectly, the loss of adult family due to gun violence also forces children to drop out of school and into early child labour in order to support themselves and other siblings. Children are also particularly vulnerable to forced migration. In 2001 it was estimated that nearly half of all refugees and internally displaced people were children.

**CHILDREN AND YOUTH ARMED GANGS AND VIOLENCE**

The problem of children and youth gangs affects many societies in the developing world that are not at war, but in which levels of armed violence are often equal to and sometimes higher than in conflict zones [see the world map of gun deaths in Section one. In many countries, youth gangs are a widespread phenomenon.

A study published in 2002 by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) reports that for Honduras only, “a nation-wide register lists 340 gangs, with a membership level of 14,696 young people between the ages of 11 and 30. However those working with juvenile offenders in Honduras estimate this is nearer the figure of 60,000.”

Youth gangs or ‘maras’ as they are commonly referred to in Central American countries such as El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala or Nicaragua, often engage in deadly rivalries and violent criminal activities, and are usually heavily armed:

“Violence between maras ranges from fist fights, to the use of knives, guns and even grenades, with the current proliferation of arms in Central America particularly evident among maras. […] In El Salvador maras reportedly have major military weapons in their possession, including M-16s, AK-47s, M-3 hand grenades and RPG-2 rocket launchers. […]

The increasing use of firearms in territorial fighting also heightens the risk of death and injury to non-gang members if, as happens, they are caught in the crossfire. Whatever the benefits of being part of a mara, the dangers they face are extreme.”
NCA supports the work of the Instituto de Enseñanza para el Desarrollo Sostenible (IEPADES – Institute for the Study of Sustainable Development). IEPADES works for the prevention and reduction of small arms violence in Guatemala by organising advocacy and social awareness activities that principally focus on children and adolescents.

For example, IEPADES has since 2002 organised an annual children’s painting contest. In 2004, 2282 boys and girls aged between 6 and 12, from national and private schools, participated in the contest under the slogan: “Manos libres de armas, manos libres de violencia” (“Hands free from arms, hands free from violence”).

In addition, towards the end of the year 2004, IEPADES coordinated a sensitisation campaign against ‘war toys’ bought for children and adolescents for Christmas. The campaign includes visual tools such as a poster entitled: “Si nos gusta vivir, ¿por qué jugar a matar?” (“If we like to live, why play to kill?”), which was distributed in four important cities in Guatemala: Quetzaltenango, Chimaltenango, Alta Verapaz and Guatemala City.

NCA also supports the work of the Foro Ecumenico por la Paz y la Reconciliacion (FEPAZ, Ecumenical Forum for Peace and Reconciliation). FEPAZ was started in 2002 to promote and facilitate opportunities for the advancement of the 1996 Peace Accords.

More recently, and in order to address the enduring high level of armed violence in Guatemala since the end of the civil war, FEPAZ has launched an educational strategy to fight against small arms use and dissemination, with special attention given to the promotion of a culture of peace in 6 departments of Guatemala: Petén, Zacapa, Chimaltenango, Sololá, Quiché and Huehuetenango.

While youth gangs generally tend to be a male phenomenon, some gangs in Guatemala are known to be led by female leaders, and exclusively female gangs have also emerged in countries like Nicaragua. However, in male dominated gangs, girls generally have an inferior status and are often victims of rape and violent sexual abuses.

In a testimony collected by the Christian-based relief and development NGO World Vision, Rosa Jimenez, a 12 year-old Guatemalan girl, explained that she decided to leave her gang after the gang’s leader tried to rape her, and after witnessing the rape and murder of another girl from the gang.

The reasons and motivations for young boys and girls to become members of gangs are multiple and complex:

“Violent youth are more than just rebels without a cause. Gangs replicate the culture of violence that has taken root in virtually all strata of society. They seek alternatives to the frustration of living with little hope, to intolerable family and community environments, and to their lack of access to basic services, especially education.”

In general, girls and boys who decided to join gangs have found themselves with very few or no alternatives. In fact, boys and girls in non-conflict zones are often faced with many of the same challenges as children living in countries at war, and this can result in taking up arms and joining armed groups to ensure their survival.

In Guatemala, Brazil, Kenya, Nigeria or South Africa, urban centres are deeply affected by criminal and gang violence, whose perpetrators and victims are mainly young men and women armed with guns. Indeed, in these ‘non-conflict’ areas, child deaths from armed violence are much higher than in war settings. Between 1987 and 2001, for example, 467 children were killed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict compared to 3,937 in Rio de Janeiro.

However, the legal instruments and political measures protecting children in conflict do not apply to these regions, and only few humanitarian and development organisations are trying to address the issue of small arms violence in non-conflict zones at the community level.

In response to this gap, the Brazilian NGO Viva Rio, with the support of Norwegian Church Aid, runs the project ‘Children and youth in Organised Armed Violence’ (COAV), which works at identifying cases where children and youth are involved in armed groups in countries that are not at war, producing and disseminating information on the problem within the international community, and sharing best practices and solutions.
CHILDREN AND YOUTH ASSOCIATED WITH FIGHTING FORCES

The advent of modern military-style assault rifles has changed the role children can play in conflict. The characteristics of modern automatic weapons – their light weight, ease of use, portability and inexpensiveness – make employing child soldiers an easy option in wars around the world. As the journalist Ryszard Kapuscinski pointed out:

"The wars of children are also made possible by technological developments. Today, handheld automatic weapons are short and light, the newer models increasingly resembling children’s toys. The old Mauser [rifl e] was too long, too big, and too heavy for a child.

A child’s small arm could not reach freely for the trigger, and he had difficulty taking aim. Modern design has solved these problems, eliminated the inconveniences. The dimensions of weapons are now perfectly suited to a boy’s physique, so much so that in the hands of tall, massive men, the new guns appear somewhat comical and childish." 57

Children are widely recruited and in many cases, forcibly abducted in conflict regions. In its 2004 ‘Child Soldiers Global Report’, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers states that "between 2001 and 2004, armed hostilities involving children less than 18 years old – “under-18s” – occurred in Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, India, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Indonesia, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda." 58

In Uganda, for example, Amnesty International estimates that nearly 80 per cent of Uganda’s Lords Resistance Army (LRA) were abducted as children. 59 Similarly, in Mozambique, more than 20,000 of the 90,000 Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) forces demobilised between 1992 and 1993 were officially recruited as children. Of those whose ages are known: 4,678 were recruited under 13 years old; 6,289 were recruited between 14-15 years old; 3,982 were recruited between 16-17 years old. 60

Box 10  Child soldiers

The terms ‘child soldier’, ‘child combatants’ and ‘children and youth associated with fighting forces’ are used interchangeably in this report. They refer to the definition based on the ‘Cape Town Principles and Best Practice on the Prevention of Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces and Demobilisation and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa’, adopted by UNICEF and the NGO Sub-group of the NGO Working Group on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 30 April 1997:

“any child – boy or girl – under 18 years of age, who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including, but not limited to: cooks, porters, messengers, and anyone accompanying such groups other than family members. It includes girls and boys recruited for forced sexual purposes and/or forced marriage. The definition, therefore, does not only refer to a child who is carrying, or has carried, weapons.” 57

Advances in technology have allowed weapons to be manufactured that are smaller and lighter in weight. This makes them easier for children to use. [Photo: Bjørn Roar Bye].
Abduction of boys and girls is not a practice limited to non-governmen- 
tal forces’ warfare strategies. States are also often responsible for regularly recruiting child combatants in wartime. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers reports that:

- The governments of Burundi, DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Myanmar, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda used child soldiers in armed conflict.

- Government-backed paramilitaries and militias were using under-18s across the world, including in Colombia, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe.

- Government forces and authorities also made informal use of children as informants, spies or collaborators in conflicts, including in Israel, Indonesia and Nepal.

While there is a plethora of reports on child soldiers, a systematic study of the factors explaining high child recruitment rates remains scarce. Non-governmental organisations engaged in field or advocacy activities have only collected anecdotal evidence that some children join fighting forces voluntarily in order to survive or to avenge atrocities committed against their family or community.

However, recent academic research conducted at the Ford Institute for Human Security interestingly challenges the most common and accepted explanations for children’s participation in conflict (which have generally focused on poverty and orphan rates). According to Reich and Achvarina, “the key factor in explaining child soldier recruitment rates is the degree of access to refugee and/or internally displaced people (IDP) camps enjoyed by the belligerent parties in each conflict.” This finding is also supported by the Human Rights Watch report on West Africa’s `regional warriors’ published in March 2005.

Aside from children’s reasons and motivations for joining armed groups and participating in the fighting, Elisabeth Jareg from Save the Children Norway also underlines that:

“While the ideologies they [children] have either chosen to fight for, or which are imposed upon them, differ widely, so does the way in which they are treated in different armed groups. For example, girls fighting with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE] have in general not been exposed to sexual abuse within these forces.”

Finally, girls associated with fighting forces face severe gender-specific challenges. Girls abducted during the conflict face greater difficulties than boys in reintegrating with their communities after the war. According to Elizabeth Jareg:

“Girls in general return to societies who regard with contempt women who are single mothers, who have had unsanctioned sexual relationships, who can no longer fetch a bride price, and who bring shame upon the family and clan.”

| Box 11 | CHARM/NCA small arms survey and investigation on child soldiers in Darfur |

In 2000, the Centre for Humanitarian Affairs Resource Management (CHARM) conducted a series of interviews and a survey in Darfur, Sudan. This project was supported by NCA and aimed to better understand the magnitude of small arms proliferation and violence, identify its causes, examine its social and economic impacts, and to investigate the use of children as soldiers.

The findings from the survey and interviews clearly demonstrate the prevalence of small arms proliferation and violence in the region. Police forces have collected over 9000 small arms over the past seven years out of an estimated total stockpile of 130,000. During the same period, police recorded 856 armed robberies, 736 incidents of drug trafficking, 972 lost lives due to armed tribal conflict and over 190,000 crimes, of which 51% involved small arms.

The results from the survey build on these statistics to show the humanitarian impacts of armed violence, and more particularly the role played by small arms in children’s lives. All those surveyed believed that armed violence has negative social and economic implications.

Interestingly, the children surveyed believed that the use of small arms is primarily a male business, and that it is encouraged by religious beliefs, local cultures, tribal commitments and the government. Demonstrating hope for the future of the region, 70% of the children suggested education as the first response to the problem.

(See also Box 22)
In August 2004, Norwegian Church Aid was granted the Crown Prince and Princess of Norway’s Royal Humanitarian Fund award for its work in the Democratic Republic of Congo on the reintegration of child soldiers. Teamed with local partner the Association for Traumatised from Nyiragongo, the NCA project rehabilitates children who have been the victims of conflict though education and vocational training.

According to Gundrun Engstrom, NCA programme co-ordinator in DRC, one of the main challenges is getting girls and young women involved in the reintegration activities. In DRC, she explains, “many young women and girls have been victims of gross physical abuse and rape. Many have been used as sex slaves. They are severely traumatised. These girls have been cast out by their families and have little self-respect.”

Several of the international human rights and humanitarian legal instruments adopted over the past 50 years address the rights, protection and well being of children. The growing attention given to the impact of armed violence on children was also underscored by the decision of the UN Secretary General to appoint, in September 1997, Mr. Olara O. Otunnu as his Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict.

Furthermore, in May 1998, leading international human rights and humanitarian organisations formed the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers in order to promote the adoption and implementation of international law. As outlined in the following international agreements, one of the most important normative questions relating to child soldiering concerns the age at which a person is deemed to be old enough for combat:

- The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 May 2000 and entered into force on 12 February 2002. It sets 18 as the minimum age for direct participation in hostilities, for recruitment into armed groups, and for compulsory recruitment by governments. States may accept volunteers from the age of 16 but must deposit a binding declaration at the time of ratification or accession, setting out their minimum voluntary recruitment age and outlining certain safeguards for such recruitment.

- The Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted in 1989. Although the Convention on the Rights of the Child generally defines a child as any person under the age of 18, Article 38 uses the lower age of 15 as the minimum for recruitment or participation in armed conflict. This language is drawn from the two Additional Protocols to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.

- The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU, now the African Union) and came into force in November 1999. This is the only regional treaty in the world to address the issue of child soldiers. It defines a child as anyone below 18 years of age without exception. It also states that: “States Parties to the present Charter shall take all necessary measures to ensure that no child shall take a direct part in hostilities and refrain in particular, from recruiting any child” (Article 22.2).

In addition, other key international legal instruments also address children’s rights and protection against recruitment or abduction in armed forces, such as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Minimum Age Convention 138, the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 182, the Additional Protocols to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (1977), and the UN Security Council resolutions 1261 (1999), 1314 (2000) 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003) and 1539 (2004).
3_SMALL ARMS VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

Small arms violence can directly affect women and men in similar ways (through death or injury). Nonetheless, the damage to health, education and other social infrastructures caused by armed violence (discussed in Section 7) can have disproportionate effects upon women. As a result of armed violence, girls may suffer more than boys if access to education and healthcare is hindered. For example, girls are generally the first to be held back from school, whether it is due to the risk of violence or lack of resources.\textsuperscript{72}

Furthermore, in traditional societies where women have limited access to the labour market, the death or disablement of male family members can leave a woman impoverished. In the meantime, the loss of a male partner sometimes results in an expansion of economic responsibilities for women as they have to take on work traditionally regarded as men’s; and subsequently in a ‘feminisation’ process whereby women receive greater recognition for the roles they play in their communities.

Women are also victims of gender-specific violence caused by men’s misuse of small arms and light weapons. Women are, for example, often victims of domestic violence, rape and other sexual abuses committed by men at gunpoint.\textsuperscript{73} However, the relationship between women and weapons is far more complex. For example, in some cases women are also perpetrators of gun violence.

SMALL ARMS AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

The critical relation between small arms availability and sexual violence committed against women has been highlighted by a number of gender-disaggregated studies in developed countries.\textsuperscript{74} Guns exacerbate the already imbalanced physical power relations between men and women, and often turn this imbalance into a deadly equation. Women’s vulnerability is exacerbated in heavily armed environments where they receive little or no protection from police or community members. Women are often victims of violent and abusive partners or relatives in their own homes.

More critically, women and girls are also threatened outside their homes by gun misuse and violence committed by law enforcement officers. Women are particularly at risk in failed or weak states, where national security forces often operate in a context of impunity.

As noted earlier in the report, Human Rights Watch documented important violations of human rights by police forces in Zanzibar, Tanzania, at the time of the 2001 elections, during which policemen committed repeated acts of brutal rape and sexual abuses against women.\textsuperscript{75}

Armed conflicts generally exacerbate already asymmetric force and power relations between men and women. At times of war, societal restraints against men tend to decrease just as women’s vulnerability increases. Wars leave immediate and lasting traumatic psychological and physical scars on women, who are commonly victims of collective rape and sexual crimes committed at gunpoint.

As underlined in a recent report published by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) on Northern Uganda:\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{76}“It is impossible to sum up the negative effects of SALW in Garissa District (Uganda), or their consequences. Women and children are the...
most negatively impacted ... Women suffer rape, the loss of a spouse, death, maiming and the extra responsibility of heading a family.”

Displaced women are also particularly vulnerable to sexual violence committed by members of fighting forces within refugee camps. A 2001 Small Arms Survey report notes for example that:

“In approximately 75% of all reported incidents of rape and attempted rape in Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camp, one or more assailants were armed.”

**SMALL ARMS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN**

While the home is commonly regarded as a safe place, the presence of weapons in the house greatly threatens women’s physical integrity. While women and men might be assumed to have equal access to firearms kept in the home, as noted in Section one, in practice women are much more at risk than men from gun violence. Small arms kept in the home by men have an impact on women’s lives in two major ways.

Firstly, as shown in Box 14 on female homicides in South Africa, men’s domestic use of their guns often results in the death of their female partners. Moreover, the 2005 Control Arms Campaign report on “the impacts of guns on women’s lives” notes that women are also at risk from other male relatives:

“family killings are the only category of homicides where women outnumbered men as victims. When a woman is killed in the home, it is her partner or male relative who is most likely to be the murderer”.

Secondly, men also use guns at home to instigate fear in their partners or relatives in order to obtain forced compliance with and silence about sexual assaults and other abuses. According to the 2002 WHO World Report on Violence and Health:

“One of the most common forms of violence against women is that performed by a husband or an intimate male partner. This is in stark contrast to the situation for men, who in general are much more likely to be attacked by a stranger or acquaintance than by someone within their close circle of relationships.”

In conflict and post-conflict settings where violence is widely diffused, the threat posed by small arms on women’s lives at home is often greatly exacerbated. As the Women’s caucus of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) states in a brief on “Women, Gun Violence and the Home”:

The South Africa National Injury and Mortality Surveillance System (NIMSS) publishes an annual report profiling the country’s fatal injuries. The data collected for the 2003 NIMSS victimisation survey highlights the dramatic impacts of gun violence on women in the home. As shown in the graphs below, firearms caused 41.1% of all female violence-related deaths in 2003, and in 42.2% of cases, the scene of death was the home.

Moreover, the South African Medical Research Council (MRC) published in June 2004 a national study of female homicide. According to the MRC, of the cases where relationship status could be established, 1349 women (50.3%) were killed by an intimate partner in 1999. This amounts to four women killed per day by an intimate partner.

**Box 14 Domestic violence and female homicides in South Africa**

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“While gun related domestic violence occurs in peaceful settings as well as in conflict zones, domestic abuse increases during and after conflict. After a conflict officially ends, guns circulate in the community. Post-conflict stress, combined with economic prospects and a reduction in basic services, contribute to the dynamics of domestic violence after war. In Cambodia in the mid 1990s, as many as 75% of women in one study experienced domestic violence, often at the hands of men who had kept the small arms they used during the war.”

FEMALE COMBATANTS AND WOMEN ASSOCIATED WITH FIGHTING FORCES

Women should not be viewed as just the passive victims of armed violence. Significant numbers of women fight alongside men in wars. In 2004, the BBC reported that women make up some 30 per cent of the revolutionary armed forces of Colombia (FARC) – Colombia’s most powerful opposition army. These female combatants joined the FARC because they were motivated by their revolutionary ideals.

The presence of women combatants in the developing world often depends on the strategy or ideology adopted by fighting forces. For example, women were excluded from military action in Algeria due to Islamist religious beliefs. Conversely, women are particularly active in Nepal and Sri Lanka largely due to the Nepalese Maoists’ and the LTTE’s recruitment campaigns which promise better women’s rights and roles. According to the 2005 Control Arms Campaign report on gun violence and women:

“The majority of women in Nepal have traditionally participated in the public sphere only through their fathers and husbands, and have suffered social, legal and cultural discrimination. The CNP-Maoist has capitalised on this, and attracted women into their armed forces by promising greater gender equality.”

Nonetheless, in practice, women associated with fighting forces are often cantoned to roles that replicate pre-existing and enduring gender divisions. As regards the FARC, for example, the BBC noted that:

“Visiting these camps the practice seemed to contradict the theory as far as women are concerned. In the field kitchens it was the girls that were peeling the potatoes and preparing the lunch. It was the girls who served the meal and then cleared up after it.”

Women often forcibly associated with fighting forces also play significant roles by supporting the logistic burden of warfare. Furthermore, when these women are demobilised after a conflict, they often find that they are expected to return to a more traditional role. As noted in a report published by PRIO on the reintegration of female combatants:

“Even where large numbers of women have been carrying arms in revolutionary movements, peace seems to put enormous pressure on those women to return ‘home’, and to give up both jobs and political representation in favour of men.”

Women associated with fighting forces also played an important role as arms suppliers by smuggling or hiding weapons and thus often have key information on arms routes and caches. The umbrella network of NGOs, Women Waging Peace, which advocates for the recognition of women’s role in peace processes and peacebuilding activities, reports that:

– In Kuwait, during the Iraqi invasion of the early 1990s, women carried weapons for resistance fighters under their traditional clothing.

– Insurgents in Bangladesh have used young girls to smuggle weapons by coercion or in exchange for payment.

In October 2000 the UN Security Council unanimously passed resolution 1325. The resolution calls for action in four areas related to women and peacekeeping:

1) The participation of women in conflict prevention and resolution;
2) The integration of gender perspectives in peacekeeping missions;
3) The protection of women and girls in conflict zones, and
4) The mainstreaming of gender sensitisation in UN reporting and implementation systems.

The resolution recognises that:

– Women and children make up the vast majority of those affected by conflict;
– Women have a unique and important role to play in post conflict peacebuilding;
– Existing human rights law protecting women must be enforced;
– Mine clearance programmes must take into account female needs; and
– Gender mainstreaming into peacebuilding operations is essential.
WOMEN’S RESPONSES TO ARMED VIOLENCE AND DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES

Across the globe, women are powerful actors in initiatives to prevent and reduce small arms violence within their communities. As Vanessa Farr noted in a report on gender perspectives on small arms and light weapons:

"Women, as peace activists, play essential roles in maintaining social connections, build coalitions across communities divided by violence, and therefore are ideally positioned to play important roles in rehabilitation, reconciliation, reintegration support and peacebuilding roles in the aftermath." 89

IANSA notes that across the world hundreds of women’s groups are working to restrict access to arms in their communities.90 These include many that are working on innovative campaigns to sensitize and mobilise people against armed violence. In Brazil, NCA partner Viva Rio organised a women-led campaign whose slogan was: “Choose gun free! It’s your weapon or me.”91 The campaign aimed to challenge macho attitudes and show that guns do not affirm masculinity or make men more desirable to women.

In addressing the impacts of small arms violence against women, humanitarian and development organisations can:

- Develop a community-based approach to address gender-based violence fuelled by the presence of small arms;
- Ensure that small arms programmes are based on a clear understanding of gender roles, relations and inequalities, to both facilitate the effectiveness of the initiative and ensure that opportunities to support more equal relations between women and men are maximised;92
- Develop strategies to ensure women’s participation in decision-making and eliminate the obstacles that work against their equitable participation;93
- Understand and incorporate the lessons from development programming on gender mainstreaming strategies and the linkages between gender equality and different sector areas; 94
- Look for ways to increase the involvement of women and women’s organisations and movements in disarmament discussions;15
- Pay special attention to the shift in gender relations during and after conflict.
Men are more likely to use a weapon to commit suicide than women. The 2004 Small Arms Survey Yearbook shows that firearms homicides and suicides are “an overwhelmingly male phenomenon”. This gender gap is even more striking when looking specifically at suicide rates between males and females, with 90 per cent of firearms suicides victims in the world being men.

Recent studies conducted by the Harvard Injury Control Research Center indicate that there is a very high propensity for men (69 per cent of those surveyed) to commit suicide after killing their female intimate partner, especially when the homicide was perpetrated with a firearm.

Targeted measures to reduce gun violence against women, especially in the case of female homicides by intimate partners, would therefore also contribute greatly to reducing the impact of armed violence on men’s lives. As Catherine Barber from the Harvard Injury Control Research Center rightly points out, better enforcement of federal and state laws that restrict access to guns by people with domestic violence records would not only protect victims but save abusers’ lives as well.
Box 17  Guns and cultures of violence

Cultures of violence, “whereby instruments of violence and their use are normalised”, often exist in tandem with the use and possession of small arms. When the two converge, it is the normalisation of violence in the culture, rather than the guns themselves, which can be devastating. The effects of this glorification of violence can range from the relatively less harmful glorification of war, weapons and violence in the media, to at its worst, the actual perpetration of armed violence.

Perhaps most damaging factor is that cultures of violence prioritise violent solutions over peaceful ones. In such circumstances, communities abandon traditional conflict transformation practices for violent physical confrontation, often involving firearms. As noted by the UNDP, “In societies affected by such cultures of violence, and particularly where perceptions of insecurity are high, individuals become more likely to acquire arms for self-protection.”

This propensity to resort to arms is amplified if allied with cultures that equate masculinity with violence and the ownership of guns. As the United Nations Special Rapporteur on small arms and human rights notes:

“In many communities there are no adequate social controls, and the ideology of masculinity and guns is exploited to promote armed violence (that can) destroy the entire spectrum of rights in their communities.”

GUNS, VIOLENCE AND GENDER IDENTITIES

The critical relationship between men and weapons, and its close links with violent notions of masculinity is a key aspect of the small arms crisis. Guns are a causal factor in the formation of violent masculinities, and reversibly, patterns of violent masculinity, and not masculinity itself, are central to armed violence.

The initiation of boys/young men into the possession and use of weapons is, in many regions of the world, central to masculine identities. Initiation processes play a key role in the definition of male adulthood within communities, and this definition is often associated with warrior-like attributes.

“In traditional Albanian society, every man was supposed to hold his own firearm, representing both his status as an adult and as a participant in the Albanian polity. The gun therefore served as a symbol of masculinity, linking personal security, and the security of the family, clan, and tribe throughout centuries.”

Thus, just as in some societies a ‘house without a weapon is not a home’, the possession of a gun by men is also often viewed as a necessary defining element of masculine identity.

“A complicating factor for disarmament is that in several parts of Africa, particularly in the Horn, ownership of arms is culturally accepted. In some areas a man without a gun is not considered a real man.”

More problematically, the diffusion of small arms into communities has radically altered the passage into manhood. Previously, violence could be controlled, and limited, to ensure that few were killed or seriously injured. With the addition of guns, such fights become much more deadly. As Lorochom, a village elder living in Uganda, explains:

“When I was initiated, we were fighting with the Bokora and Jie. Fighting then was fair. You would fight for one month with spears, then you would not fight again for one or two years. Now it is constant and many die.”

As Ruben de Koning points out in his study What Warriors Want, violence perpetrated by young men with small arms “is considered a display of manhood”. Young men participate in [cattle] raids in order to be accepted by their peers, liked by women and praised by society.

While less prevalent than in traditional communities, initiation processes whereby youths prove their manhood by being introduced to weapons also occur in developed countries. As Henri Myrttinen explains in developed societies with conscription armies or voluntary military service:

“Weapons training in the national armed forces can be seen as a legally prescribed rite of passage, usually at the age of 18. The armed forces have traditionally been seen as ‘the school of the nation’, where boys become men and earn full rights of citizenship.”

However, as described in Sections two and three, numerous girls and women are associated with and play multiple roles in criminal gangs or fighting forces. Female combatants and gang members increasingly receive the same initiation and training in the use of weapons as their male counterparts.

Therefore, guns have also played an increasing role in the formation of violent feminine identities. In Rosa Jimnez’s testimony collected by World Vision, the 12 year-old girl explained that, as part of her initiation, she participated in the murder of...
an elderly woman, the grandmother of a member of the Salvatruchas’ rival gang, ‘Calle 18’.118

Similarly, studies undertaken on the experiences of boys and girls associated with fighting forces in Sierra Leone, report that:

“Girl combatants went through extensive training. [...] The training of combatants included physical and technical training. Girls reported learning how to kill, cut throats, load guns, dismantle guns quickly, and to fire on people above the waist to ensure that their enemy was killed.” 119

**DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES**

In addressing the issue of men as the primary victims of small arms violence, humanitarian and development organisations can:

- Contribute to developing culturally sensitive programmes that reduce young men’s alienation from communities through reintegration opportunities such as formal education programmes, apprenticeships/skills traineeships, and peace and civic education;120

- Develop education programmes for boys and men to develop alternative concepts of masculinity not associated with guns and arms;

- Reiterate at every occasion that sexual violence is not only prohibited but also preventable. Some humanitarian organisations have, for example, printed information about this on relief parcels for distribution;121

- Support local communities in discouraging the glorification of violence and the trivialisation of its impact in the media and in popular culture;

- Develop education and awareness-raising measures to address the risks and disadvantages of weapons ownership and misuse, and the benefits of peaceful conflict resolution, that can be promoted within the framework of existing education projects;

- Build on and support community-based administrative and conflict settlement structures by supporting conciliation, mediation and arbitration programmes for traditional institutions and neighbourhood panels.
While both are the victims of forced displacement, refugees are people who are forced to leave their country, while internally displaced persons (IDPs) have remained within their state’s borders. Both situations are, however, often closely related to the issue of small arms proliferation and violence.

**SMALL ARMS VIOLENCE FORCING FLIGHT**

First and foremost, small arms are often used to instigate forced migration. The distinction between threat and actual use is important. Simply the threat of violence by small arms is generally enough to influence mass numbers of people to leave their homes.

The Refugee Report of May 2003 states that, at the beginning of 2003, there were an estimated 13 million refugees and 22 million IDPs worldwide. Moreover, a recent report by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion points out that refugee flows are usually caused by immediate human security threats such as individual persecution, armed conflict, repression, violent collapse of civil society and human rights violations.

Refugees and IDPs often share a common characteristic, as Oxfam noted: “They are motivated by the fear that people with guns will use them on vulnerable communities.” Furthermore, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) underlines, “armed conflict is now the driving force behind most refugee flows.” Violence perpetuated with small arms plays a key role in such ‘immediate, human causes’.

**SMALL ARMS VIOLENCE DURING FLIGHT**

While small arms clearly contribute to the initial forced displacement of refugees and IDPs, once people have fled, guns continue to play an important role in individuals’ insecurity.

Although outlawed by numerous international legal measures concerning the militarisation of refugee camps, guns continue to flood into these enclaves. The UNHCR regularly highlights the problems linked with the militarisation of refugee camps, which often turn out to be safe havens for militias to regroup, recruit and stockpile weapons.

Furthermore, as noted in the section on child soldiers, easy access by fighting forces to IDP and refugee camps is one of the main causes of the high recruitment of children during conflicts.

Availability of arms also results in the ‘criminalisation’ of refugee or IDP camps. Armed groups perpetrate robbery, sexual assaults, murder and other crimes with impunity. It can be difficult to distinguish militia members from refugees as they live side by side in the camps.

This also often results in a shift of power towards those with weapons, which can affect the rationing of food and medicines. Surrounding communities are also affected by armed refugee camps, as violence spills out, leading to antagonism between groups and potential for further violence.

“We are increasingly confronted...with the problem of separating refugees from fighters, criminals or even genocidieres.” – Sadako Ogata, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees

**SMALL ARMS VIOLENCE IMPEDING RETURN**

Finally, in post-conflict situations, lingering violence often associated with the proliferation of SALW can discourage or disallow refugees from returning to their homes and communities.

Firstly, violence in, and surrounding, refugee camps often impedes repatriation. Secondly, the journey from a refugee camp back to a home community often involves crossing dangerous borders and takes displaced persons through areas of high violence. This journey is rarely completed with security protection.

Finally, refugees and IDPs often face high levels of armed violence when they return home. This is in part due to guns having been dispersed into their communities during and after the conflict, in addition refugees and IDPs may be targeted for having ‘abandoned’ the community during the conflict.

**DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES**

In addressing the impacts of small arms violence on internally displaced persons and refugees, humanitarian and development organisations can:

- Help build the capacity of local law enforcement authorities to maintain the rule of law in refugee-populated areas;
- Develop and reward gun-free zones in camps. With minimal investment, weapons-free zones and mini awareness-raising campaigns can be initiated in camps to re-instate the non-militarised nature of refugee camps. If a local security committee is willing to take up the idea, this can further enhance its credibility.
In 1998, The United Nations developed the Guiding Principles in order to address the specific needs of internally displaced persons worldwide.

At the crossroads of international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law, these Guiding Principles identify rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of persons from forced displacement and to their protection and assistance during displacement as well as during return or resettlement and reintegration.

More specifically, the UN Guiding Principles strongly prohibit recruitment and abduction by any fighting forces:

**Principle 10:** 1. Internally displaced persons shall be protected in particular against:

(d) Enforced disappearances, including abduction or unacknowledged detention, threatening or resulting in death.

**Principle 13:** 1. In no circumstances shall displaced children be recruited nor be required or permitted to take part in hostilities; and

2. Internally displaced persons shall be protected against discriminatory practices of recruitment into any armed forces or groups as a result of their displacement. In particular any cruel, inhumane or degrading practices that compel compliance or punish non-compliance with recruitment are prohibited in all circumstances.
The widespread proliferation of small arms has severely altered the working environment of humanitarian and development practitioners, both within and outside of conflict zones. Access to certain areas is hampered due to levels of violence and field workers are at great risk of being harmed. However, despite the threat of armed violence, the relief community remains committed to working with some of the most vulnerable communities in conflict areas.

**SCALE OF THE PROBLEM**

Although no broad systematic studies covering all humanitarian personnel have been undertaken, existing findings paint a telling picture of the danger the aid community faces from small arms violence.

Between 1992 and 2001, over 200 UN personnel were killed. Firearms were involved in 75 per cent of these deaths. This toll has risen dramatically following the recent attacks on UN personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq. A 1994 study of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) personnel found that 41 per cent of males and 28 per cent of females had been attacked, injured, harassed or threatened.

More recently, in Afghanistan, thirteen aid workers were killed during the first six months of 2004, and in February 2005, rebels of an armed group not participating in the international disarmament process murdered nine UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Such dangers are not limited to the world’s major conflict zones – UN staff members have been killed in 40 different countries.

In addition to gun-related death and injury, humanitarian workers have often been held hostage or raped at gunpoint. Between 1994 and 2001, over 240 UN workers were taken hostage in 60 separate incidents. Rapes, sexual assaults, armed robbery, car jacking and arbitrary arrest and detention also increased during this period.

According to the ICRC, aid workers are also actively targeted because they are witnesses to criminal acts and wartime atrocities; because they may be seen as impeding the progress of an armed group or government army; or because they are the ‘rich’ impostors in an impoverished country.

**NCA FIELD WORKERS’ PERCEPTION OF THREAT**

As seen in other aspects of the small arms crisis, armed violence has a remarkable ability to create a climate of fear. A perception of threat can stop a fieldworker from entering a situation in which they are at risk. This may save their life, but will also prevent them from carrying out their humanitarian role. It is therefore important to accurately assess the level of actual threat.

**Box 19**

Reported number of humanitarian aid workers killed in acts of violence between 1997 – 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expatriate Staff</th>
<th>Local Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
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<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Box 20**

Perception of threat by Norwegian Church Aid field workers

Asked to comment on the manners in which small arms have affected his project, an NCA employee in Eastern Africa listed the following factors:

- Death of colleagues caught in cross-fire; killed by small arms
- Opportunity costs due to lack of mobility
- Opportunity costs due to fear among local population
- Opportunity costs due to lack of local investments
- Increasing delivery costs, mainly due to the need for air freight and inflated transport prices.

Experiences and perceptions of armed violence in the field: two surveys by NCA

NCA field workers participated in two surveys on armed violence; the first -“Work to Overcome Violence in NCA” – was conducted by Stein Erik Horjen in January 2003 and was distributed to all NCA regional and country offices. The question-
naire principally addressed the kinds and levels of violence experienced, witnessed, and formally addressed by NCA field workers and their regional partners. The role of small arms in violent conflict was only one among eleven types of violence polled (others included domestic violence, drug and alcohol related violence, police harassment, etc).

Of those questioned, half were concerned about armed violence in their regions, and the same number of individuals stated that they were attempting to control or curb the proliferation of small arms. Initiatives directed at small arms represented one of fourteen specified activities; others included peace training, mediation, and advocacy for political change, promotion of human rights, psychosocial assistance and service delivery to targeted groups.

When asked what they considered to be the main reasons for human insecurity in their region, one third of the respondents mentioned the proliferation of small arms as a major cause (particularly in East Africa and Malawi). Although field workers were not asked to comment specifically on the impact of attempts to curb small arms, the majority thought that NCA efforts had helped to reduce violence – while the rest considered that it was too early to evaluate.

The second NCA survey conducted in September 2004 was also sent to NCA regional offices. This survey focused specifically on the perceived threat and interference of small arms violence upon the NCA development community.

The survey was structured in order to first identify the types and amounts of weapons NCA workers believed groups in their regions/countries (such as the military, rebel or insurgent forces, civilians, non-organised criminal groups) possessed and then to assess the perceived effects of these weapons on the civilian population and the development community.

Half of the respondents considered gun ownership in their regions to be either too high or very high and a majority had witnessed specified groups using or carrying handguns and assault rifles. Two thirds believed that weapons were among the leading causes of death within the civilian population in their regions, while all agreed that the availability of weapons severely affected the level of safety and security among the civilian population. They also shared the view that the relationship between the availability of arms and violations of international humanitarian law was strong.

Rachel Perks, a NCA worker in Sudan, commented on what she saw as a Sudanese attitude to small arms: “The gun has become associated with access to resources. This perception of arms equalling power is difficult to overcome in the minds of the local stakeholder.”

Norwegian Church Aid field workers are becoming increasingly concerned about the relationship between the availability of arms and violations of international humanitarian law (Photo: Petter Skauen/Norwegian Church Aid).
The presence of weapons is clearly a threat to the personal safety of NCA workers, as well as a threat to NCA operations. Threats were in particular posed to those transporting goods - two NCA respondents were involved in severe armed security incidents. Nevertheless, few incidences were reported where beneficiary populations became inaccessible on account of armed violence. All but one reported that their NCA operations were suspended on average once every six months due to war, complex humanitarian emergencies, or urban and rural armed insecurity such as crime or banditry.

Opinions on the most effective way to manage the threat of small arms violence to NCA operations mostly referred to education (advocating adherence to the ‘Do No Harm, Local Capacities for Peace’ programme, for example, or by bringing the warring factions to round table talks) and the strengthening of ties between NCA and local communities. Nevertheless, all of the NCA workers who responded agreed that any assessment of the threat posed by small arms should be incorporated into the development process.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE THREAT OF ARMED VIOLENCE

There are at least four interrelated consequences of the increased threat of armed violence against development organisations and humanitarian relief operations:

- Programmes in the field are affected by hindered access and limited capacity
- Increasingly large amounts of money are spent on security measures
- Projects are suspended and personnel may be forced to leave the region entirely
- There has been a shift towards the provision of humanitarian objectives by military forces

Many organisations now spend between 5 per cent and 30 per cent of their operating budgets on security. Much of this goes to private security companies and armed guards from among the local community, but also to fencing, armed convoys, and emergency evacuation. The global security industry is indeed booming, filling in for the huge gaps in the national security sector.

Even with curtailed operations and increased security, development organisations are increasingly terminating projects and removing personnel, or refusing to enter an area. The pullout in 2004 of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) from Afghanistan, a country in which they had operated for decades, and that of the UN from Iraq following the bombing of their headquarters, are just two examples of this. Entire operations can be brought to halt very quickly. In Africa, missions are regularly suspended in DRC, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Congo.

These are of course areas that desperately need humanitarian aid. The international community must determine a way for humanitarian work to be protected and allowed to continue in the areas that need it most.

“Delivery of services to areas outside of the main centres/garrison towns is difficult due to insecurity. Even when an area is relatively stable, due to the history of conflict and unpredictability of it flaring up once again, many security precautions must be taken. These details can at times slow down or even constrain the ability of staff to implement projects effectively. At times of increased conflict or insecurity, it becomes impossible to travel to project areas outside of the major town centres.” - NCA Employee, Angola

A fourth consequence of this increased insecurity is the shift of development operations to military personnel. The use of the military to conduct and oversee development projects is a relatively recent phenomenon. Until the 2001 war in Afghanistan, there had been a clear separation between military and humanitarian operations. In the tradition of the Red Cross, aid was generally seen as neutral and was not targeted by warring parties.

Box 21  Military engagement and the changing nature of humanitarian aid

Although humanitarian aid groups have always worked in and around conflict zones, there has in the past been a Code of Conduct, produced by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has protected aid workers from armed violence.

A central premise of this Code is the separation of military from humanitarian operations. Known as the Oslo Principles, the Code limits the role of militaries in provision of humanitarian aid to exceptional circumstances. What has changed is the routine provision of humanitarian or development aid by armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This blurring of roles has caused many problems in these countries, and has been blamed by some for the targeting of humanitarian workers in both conflict areas. This reasoning is thought to be at the root, however, of recent relief worker killings in Darfur and the subsequent withdrawal of Save the Children UK after years of work with the local communities in the region.
6_HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT AID WORKERS

However, in recent years the lines between military operations and humanitarian assistance and aid have become increasingly blurred. This has resulted in a vicious cycle whereby the militarisation of aid has left humanitarian organisations threatened and unable to safely conduct operations which in turn continues the shift of operations to military forces.

This phenomenon also has a profound effect on the legitimacy, political neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian assistance. As described of the situation in Iraq:

“Under a military-controlled relief effort, humanitarian assistance can easily become a tool of war. Hostile forces might see aid workers as easy targets and allies of the occupying force. Moreover, the neediest Iraqis may never receive assistance if their needs don’t match the Pentagon’s political goals. The reconstruction effort is likely to lack international legitimacy and financial support.”

CONFLICT SENSITIVE APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT

This chapter has addressed the impacts of SALW on development conditions in conflict settings. Within the aid and development community there has been a growing recognition that operating in these dangerous and complex environments requires a unique skill set. This skill set was highlighted in the 2001 publication Development and Conflict Guidelines by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

Humanitarian operations can in some cases actually increase the chance of conflict onset or aggravate ongoing fighting. This can occur in a number of interconnected ways such as: the manipulation of aid resources by warlords; the co-opting of aid for partisan political interests; the cementing of divisions between conflicting groups; and the distortion of unequal social relations allowing armed groups to benefit from unrest and artificial war economies. Small arms and the power they provide play a significant role in each of these dynamics and must be addressed by the development community.

A central tenet of conflict sensitive development is isolating the local trigger factors of conflict and, where appropriate, targeting them using development tools. As discussed above, small arms proliferation is often an important contributing factor to conflict in volatile regions and therefore must be a priority of development organisations. This can often take the form of preventive disarmament, whereby the development community can tackle the proliferation of these weapons using the broad range of tactics addressed throughout this report.

Another problem for humanitarian relief operations is the danger that they might inadvertently use known arms traffickers to transport emergency supplies of food or equipment to conflict zones. In the worst case, arms could be flown in on the same flight as aid. Humanitarian organisations may therefore wish to avoid employing companies with a history of trafficking arms.

Unless international organisations are prepared to withdraw localised humanitarian aid programmes, they must determine ways for humanitarian work to be protected and allowed to continue. In addition, taking the impact of small arms proliferation and violence on development and humanitarian workers into consideration, governmental agencies and international organisations should provide personnel with access to security training programmes, debriefing and counselling.
Norwegian Church Aid’s partners in Sudan, CHARM, uses posters like these to inform people about small arms violence and proliferation in Darfur. Many people, being illiterate, do not have access to written information, yet here they can see clearly both the negative effects of widespread availability of small arms and the potential for peaceful coexistence, prosperity and development in a society without arms.

(See also Box 11)
In most developing countries, social services are under strain. However, in areas with high levels of armed violence, this strain can take on unique characteristics. This chapter shows the indirect social costs of small arms violence upon health, education, transportation, and access to water resources.

**HEALTH**

In countries with high rates of violence, gun injuries invariably place stress on the healthcare system. However, when these high rates occur in developing countries, where resources are scarce, the strain can be devastating.

**Gun injuries and direct stress on health systems**

While assaults using small arms kill hundreds of thousands a year, millions more are wounded and may be left permanently disabled or with mental health problems. Gun injuries can easily overwhelm a clinic or hospital. The treatment of gunshot wounds requires urgent and intensive treatment, often requiring periods of long-term recovery. Surgery is expensive and time-consuming.

Perhaps most importantly, gun victims receive priority over other potentially less urgent and immediately life threatening concerns in terms of the provision of basic health services. This diverts medical staff and resources away from others at the most immediate, local level. As one Ugandan doctor put it:

"are you going to take a child off the respirator to put on the firearm injury patient?" 150

These immediate costs are of course compounded significantly in conflict and post conflict settings, where the number of injuries far surpasses the capacity of healthcare infrastructures. It is interesting to note that according to Oxfam’s study of hospital admissions in the Kitgum and Kotido districts of Uganda:

- Gunshot wounds are the main cause of deaths and injuries (particularly among males) in both Kitgum and Kotido.
- Nearly ten times as many people are injured by gunshots than by mines/bomb blasts (536, compared with 56 in the records of the four hospitals available for 1998–2000).
- 69 people were killed by gunshots, compared with 40 by mines/bomb blasts.” 151
Hindering access

The insecurity caused by high rates of violence prevents people from accessing health services and often seriously degrades the ability of the state to provide a service at all.

In many cases, warring factions limit access to clinics. Routes are blocked, or clinics and hospitals are destroyed. In other situations, violence hinders clinics from getting the supplies they need. As basic services are cut, injuries and illnesses that otherwise could have been treated easily can become life threatening.

As the report Putting Children First points out, a major consequence of armed conflict on healthcare delivery is the inability to monitor treatable diseases, magnifying their human impact.152

Uganda offers a poignant example of the effect of violence on healthcare. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) continues to pillage clinics and hospitals for drugs and services. Healthcare personnel have been abducted and widespread insecurity has prevented access to clinics and made health monitoring very difficult. Subsequently, curable conditions such as malaria, diarrhoea, pneumonia and acute respiratory tract infections become avoidable killers.153

“Injuries, deaths and disabilities from these small arms are not just a ‘social ill’ or a ‘social justice’ problem. They are public health problem.” 154

Diverting resources

The economic costs of violence on the healthcare systems of developing countries are significant. In South Africa, the cost of treating small arms injuries in one hospital was estimated at US$ 2.5 – 10 million per year.155

On a micro level, families are often burdened by treatment and rehabilitation costs following gun injuries. Trauma and disability often leave people unable to work, further straining family resources and local social networks. Both at the macro and the micro level, money that could be spent elsewhere is being diverted to cover the health costs of armed violence.

Contributing to the spread of infectious diseases: The case of HIV and AIDS

There is a growing recognition among the development community that armed conflict has a direct impact upon the spread of HIV and AIDS. Indeed, the issue receives high priority in the United Nations Development Programme’s Millennium Development Goals. Nowhere is this connection between conflict and HIV and AIDS clearer than in Sub-Saharan Africa, a region blighted by armed conflict that has just under an estimated 25 million HIV-positive citizens (from an estimated world infection rate of 38 million).159

As a report by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) notes “conflict and displacement is associated with increased risk of HIV transmission among affected populations because of behavioural change due to interruption of social networks and economic vulnerability (particularly among women and adolescents) as well as sexual violence and disruption of preventive and curative health services”.160

This research published by UNAIDS suggests that as a result of the general withdrawal of both state and non-state welfare services and the sexual conduct of soldiers engaged in combat, there will usually be a higher prevalence of HIV and AIDS in conflict zones.151 In a post-conflict situation, HIV and AIDS will geographically disperse as transportation routes are opened and soldiers and displaced persons return to their communities.

In addition, a report by the International Crisis Group states that African governments must learn to see HIV and AIDS as more than a public health issue, and recognise that the disease is also a threat to states’ internal stability and security. It singles out The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as...
Development Initiatives
In order to address the impacts of small arms violence on healthcare in developing regions, the humanitarian and development community can:

- Engage local communities in the design, monitoring and evaluation of healthcare services notably concerning specialised services for victims of armed violence;
- Support the creation of follow-up structures to provide psychological and social counselling to victims of small arms violence;
- Support the creation of prevention programmes and other services to protect families at risk of armed violence and reduce stress on care-givers;
- Support the development of pre-hospital care, itinerant and outreach health centres for isolated populations living in regions affected by armed violence;
- Develop programmes to educate healthcare providers in violence prevention by introducing modules on violence prevention into the curricula for medical and nursing students, and organising emergency first aid training to all staff;
- Help to set up and monitor national violence and injury surveillance systems;
- Improve emergency response mechanisms and to build the capacity of the healthcare sector to treat victims of small arms injuries in times of conflict;
- Use political pressure to oblige fighting forces in war zones to guarantee unobstructed access to health services (truce for limited amount of hours, days of tranquility, or corridors of peace for longer periods of intervention).

EDUCATION

Compared to healthcare, the effects of small arms violence on educational systems are less deadly, but their harmful impacts are very similar and long-term consequences can be very serious. As with health, the widespread availability of small arms affects education in a number of direct and indirect ways. First, armed violence can hinder access to education. Armed gangs often take children out of the school system and child soldiers have been known to be recruited by kidnapping directly from schools. In this sense schools are specifically targeted and can actually attract violence.

In western Nepal, for example, Maoist rebels have kidnapped both children and teachers directly from schools. These incidents have terrified other students and teachers who have stopped going to schools, forcing the school management to close down many schools in the conflict affected area.

As with healthcare, access to education is a major issue. In areas of high insecurity, travelling to schools may simply be too dangerous and long interruptions in the year are common due to violence and war. It is, of course, also very difficult to attract teachers to areas where the threat of violence is great.

As the Small Arms Survey has pointed out, several studies suggest that when levels of violence are high, participation in the education system decreases. During periods of significant violence in Afghanistan, Colombia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Uganda, for example, enrolment in all levels of education dropped dramatically. After conflict, in most cases, the level resumed quite quickly.

Of course, it takes only limited violence or even just the fear of violence to affect access to education, as the following statement about Garissa, in Kenya’s North Eastern Province illuminates:

“According to District Education officials, there has been a drop in school enrolment, participation, completion and performance in the last decade due to persistent insecurity. Several schools were closed down while boarding school wings for girls are empty because parents have withdrawn their children after several incidents in which schoolgirls were abducted or raped on their way to or from school. The drop-out rates were also very high: by March 2001, 40-44% of boys and 61.43% of girls who joined Standard 1 in 1993 were dropping out of school before reaching grade 7.”

Studies have also shown that in regions with high access to firearms, schools can become hubs for violence; in areas of high gun ownership, armed violence rates in schools and on campuses rise.

Development initiatives

The development community, in partnership with local authorities and communities, should, amongst other initiatives, encourage and support:
The direct consequence of small arms violence is the regular indiscriminate killing of students and teachers. For example, in January 2004, teacher Narad Niraula was abducted by Maoists. His body was later found riddled with bullets. The same month, Karam Chanda Das, a teacher at a local lower secondary school in Govindpur, was also shot and killed by Maoists. The Maoist armed rebels have even publicised their violent recruitment campaign by pasting on school buildings a declaration of abduction.

Furthermore, UNICEF reports: “some schools in conflict-affected areas have been turned into barracks, have been used for political meetings and enforced political-indoctrination sessions, and have been bombed and attacked. There are also reports that mines and other explosive devices have also been placed in and around school buildings and playgrounds.”

Despite the enduring commitment of the international community to enhance literacy in Nepal, UNICEF reports that in 2005:

- Nepal is lagging behind its South Asian neighbours in terms of education;
- Efforts to increase school enrolment are significantly undermined by the continuing armed violence;
- More than half a million children receive no education at all, meaning that one in five children aged six to ten is not in school;
- The majority of these children are girls or children from disadvantaged groups.

For Cecilia Lotse, UNICEF’s Regional Director for South Asia, “the fear and violence that is eating away at the education system in Nepal is eating away at the future of its children.”
- Schools and playgrounds to be declared and monitored by civilian authorities as ‘zones of peace’ or ‘gun-free zones’;
- The rebuilding and re-opening of schools and recreational areas in regions affected by armed violence;
- The promotion of a culture of peace by introducing peace education modules in core curricula in order to teach children constructive self-expression and non-violent conflict resolution skills;
- Awareness-raising and prevention activities regarding small arms violence in schools;
- The setting up of collective/individual psychological and social assistance structures in schools for children and teachers that are victims or witnesses of violent acts committed with guns.

**TRANSPORT**

The movement of goods is often delayed and disrupted by armed violence, and armed robbery on major transportation routes heightens personal vulnerability. High violence rates, whether or not in conflict environments, affect a society’s ability to move people and goods. This can have a significant effect on both economic and physical well being.

When goods cannot be moved freely due to armed robbery, at best the economy slows, and at worst, people do not receive the resources that they need to survive. In terms of physical safety, transportation hubs are often hot spots for violent assaults. In many states, highway robbery is a significant threat.

In El Salvador, gun violence on the nation’s streets and highways is a serious concern. Indeed there are specific units within the ministry of transport that organise weapons collection and seizure programs. Between June and August of 2001 alone, the Small Arms Survey reported the following gun-related incidents on the road:

- The Policía Nacional Civil (PNC) recovered two M-16 and one AK-47 assault rifles at the scene of an accident, after a pick-up truck crashed into another car after driving through a red light near the national university.
- Criminals shot and killed a police officer and stole his gun when he tried to stop an assault on a bus travelling on the Pan-American Highway.
- Three on-duty taxi drivers were shot and killed in a two-week period in the city of Sonsonate.

Guatemala is plagued with high crime rates, many incidents being linked to the violent activities of armed gangs, especially in the country’s capital and other main urban centres. In Guatemala City, most urban routes end at the central bus terminal, a hub of violent crime. According to a study published in 2002 by the Small Arms Survey:

>“Certain stops are known as ‘paradas de la muerte’ or ‘death stops’, because they are infamous for being locales where delinquents armed with guns and knives wait to pounce on their victims.”

Large areas of Guatemala City are entirely controlled by armed gangs called ‘maras’, which conduct violent armed attacks on buses and other types of vehicles. As a result, each major bus company experiences armed assaults in the capital city on a daily basis.

News reports underline that the risk of attacks is also particularly high for vehicles delivering food and goods to the capital’s various shops and restaurants. The private armed guards who accompany some delivery vehicles are especially aware of the danger, as assaults are often carried out in order to kill the guard and acquire his weapon. In January 2005 alone, at least five security guards were murdered by armed assailants.

The transport of goods outside the capital on district roads is also frequently hindered by armed robbery and crime. Armed robberies of trucks carrying consumer goods between regions are regular, as well as robberies of buses or cars carrying tourists. Thus, in addition to being a threat to the population of Guatemala, small arms violence also has a negative impact on local tourism and development.

**Development initiatives**

The development community, in partnership with local authorities and communities, should, amongst other initiatives:

- Support, together with police forces and local stakeholders, unarmed volunteer civilian watch patrols to improve safety in public transportation systems;
- Support weapons searches and collection on public transport and main bus stops and terminals.
While access to fresh water is a problem in much of the developing world, countries with high violence rates suffer unique problems. Small arms violence often exacerbates water stress caused by dramatic climate shifts and droughts, especially in conflict zones.

Bodies of people shot dead and left on riverbanks or thrown into the water contaminate fresh water supplies. In Iraq, for example, the BBC reported on April 21, 2005 that more than fifty bodies of men, women and children, badly mutilated and at an advanced stage of decomposition, had been recovered from the River Tigris in the town of Suwayra, south of Baghdad. These individuals were either killed in separate bomb attacks or executed in groups by Iraqi insurgents.

Moreover, water scarcity has created different types of water-related conflicts, which include disputes related to ownership of water resources like dams and dells; access to land under irrigation or lands with better water supply; and the supply of water for irrigation or for livestock.

Small arms proliferation and diffusion within communities has dramatically increased the lethality of such local water conflicts. In Somalia, for example, the BBC reported in December 2004 that, in one single incident, at least 50 people were killed and another 130 people injured as a result of armed clashes between two rival clans in the Galgudud and Mudug provinces near the Somali border with Ethiopia. The fighting reportedly began over access to pastoral land and water wells. According to the BBC’s correspondent in the region:

“About 500 militiamen were thought to be fighting each other, using anti-tank weapons and heavy machine guns mounted on pick-up trucks. There were reports of anti-aircraft guns being fired horizontally, wiping out people’s mud homes.”

Similarly, Taya Weiss analysed the impacts of small arms proliferation on the shared use of the Tana River waters by the Pokomo agricultural and Orma pastoral communities in Kenya:

“The utilisation of the waters of the Tana River has been in the middle of a conflict pitting these two communities against each other. The Pokomo claim the land along the river and the Orma claim the waters of the river. This has been the major source and cause of a conflict that is usually predictable.

“The conflict between these two communities and their different yet uncompromising lifestyles previously resulted in few casualties because the weapons of choice were traditional weapons such as clubs, spears, and bows. However, the increasing introduction of
small arms and light weapons has caused the number of casualties to escalate and more property to be destroyed than in the past.”  

Furthermore, small arms proliferation has deeply altered traditional and relatively peaceful conflict management mechanisms relating to the access and use of fresh water resources between local communities. In the Kenyan province of Garissa, for example, traditional social controls on water management have been undermined due to violence levels. The use of water that was once based on long standing inter-group conventions “is now utilised in a free-for-all manner, a scenario which has led to the current state of insecurity”.  

Finally, blocking or destroying access to water can actually be used as a tool of war. The international community has reacted strongly to this type of inhumane warfare strategy, and has declared a human right to water (see Box 25). However, in many developing regions affected by high levels of armed violence, fighting forces ignore this recent development in international human rights law.

For example, in November 2004 the Ivorian government led a military attack to destroy water installations in the rebel-controlled northern part of the country. As a result, Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) reported that the populations living in these areas were prevented from accessing clean water and forced to drink stagnant water from polluted ponds during a major cholera epidemic.
While international humanitarian law does not include any legal regime regarding water, the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, includes provisions directly related to water infrastructures:

– (Protocol I, art. 54) prohibits, “whatever the motive”, the attacking, destroying, removing of “objects indispensable to the survival” of civilian population, such as “drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works”.

– (Protocol I, art. 56) prohibits attacks against “works and installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations”.

Furthermore, in November 2002, access to water was declared a human right with the adoption of the General Comment on the right to water, adopted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR):186

“The right to drinking water entitles everyone to safe, sufficient, affordable and accessible drinking water that is adequate for daily individual requirements (drinking, household sanitation, [BA] food preparation, and hygiene (9).

“The adequacy of drinking water should be interpreted in a manner consistent with human dignity, and not in a narrow way, by mere reference to volumetric quantities and technologies, or by viewing water primarily as an economic good. The manner of the realisation of the right to drinking water must also be sustainable, ensuring that the right can be realised for present and future generations.”

Development initiatives

The development community, in partnership with local authorities and communities, should, amongst other initiatives:

– Promote and support peaceful conflict transformation mechanisms based on traditional indigenous and environmentally relevant practices to resolve water disputes within and between communities;

– Encourage the setting-up of local water management committees representing all of the community’s stakeholders and responsible for organising shared access to and use of water supplies, and if necessary for mitigating water conflict between community members and/or between neighbouring communities;

– Engage necessary technical expertise and technologies for mapping existing water supplies and identifying new potential sources of fresh water.

Tana River Peace Development and Reconciliation Committee in Kenya187

Tana River Peace Development and Reconciliation Committee (TRPDC) is an inspiring grassroots initiative that addresses, at the local level, the impact of small arms proliferation and violence upon access to water resources.

The TRPDC is an umbrella of district peace and development committees, which draw their membership from local area chiefs, youth, elders, women and religious groups. It aims principally at strengthening community capacity to peacefully transform and resolve water conflicts through the application of traditional indigenous and environmentally relevant mechanisms.

In response to deadly competition over access to river waters, one concrete solution was to pave an access road to one part of the river to provide farmers with unhindered use of the water for their animals. In exchange for access, cattle herders agreed to the presence of a checkpoint for small arms so that farmers will be ensured that the route is not being used for gun trafficking.
"Our development project is affected by small arms in the sense that the community expresses concern regarding the availability and circulation of small arms in some areas that costs them productivity. Others have been affected by armed robberies. Many have been injured from gunshots and the availability of small arms undermines livelihoods and economic security." – NCA employee, Malawi.

ARMED VIOLENCE AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Insecurity is one of the main impediments to development. Of the 34 countries at the bottom of the UNDP 2000 Human Development Index, more than 20 have been severely affected by conflict, and of the 45 counties in Africa where the UNDP operated, more than half are in civil war and eleven experience severe armed violence. In states with internal conflict, human development is likely to be lower in regions where small arms violence is prevalent than in unaffected areas.

The northern and north-eastern Tamil regions in Sri Lanka were the location of much of the fighting in Sri Lanka’s civil war. These regions have been excluded from infrastructure development and have some of the lowest economic development rates in the country. This pattern of economic imbalance is repeated in other states where violent regional conflicts exist, such as in Colombia, Indonesia and Nepal.

Although it is often the case that the mere threat of violence can reduce economic activity, there are in fact many other ways in which armed violence fuels poverty and hinders development. Armed violence often destroys physical infrastructure. Mortar attacks destroy roads, ports, factories, and buildings, leading to either significant reconstruction costs, or simply the deterioration of the very infrastructure needed to facilitate development. If the transportation infrastructure is damaged, the delivery of goods, or humanitarian aid can be strained.

In areas of high violence, trade and industry are also hindered. In addition, violence can discourage foreign direct investment. High violence rates "create a climate of fear that can prevent public and private foreign investors from proceeding with essential projects."

A significant additional cost often incurred by development organisations and companies that do operate in areas prone to armed violence is the hiring of private security. Companies are often targets of banditry and generally spend vast amounts on protection. The Colombian government estimates that guerrilla groups have earned $140 million annually from ransom and extortion and European companies reportedly paid $1.2 billion to such groups during the 1990s.

Moreover, armed violence and criminality disrupt local economic activity, from tourism to agriculture. Violent conflict and criminality, as well as the lingering negative perceptions that accompany post-conflict situations, discourage tourists from travelling to certain destinations or make sites inaccessible. In several African states, violence reduced tourism by up to fifty per cent in the late 1990s.

In Africa also, armed banditry disrupts trade and supply routes, undermines communities’ willingness to engage in agricultural activity, and leads to traditional economic activities such as cattle herding becoming both a market and a conduit for the trade in small arms.

In some communities, the small arms trade provides economic benefits. Demand for weapons can make small-scale arms production a relatively lucrative industry in impoverished regions where there are few employment alternatives. Near the borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan, craft production has become a high-status profession.

The challenge has become to identify and introduce alternative sources of income for these communities. Poverty in the Philippines has increased the value of skills in the craft production of guns. In the coastal city of Danao, where most people are employed in the fishing and farming sectors, small-scale arms producers can earn twice the average local wage through the manufacture of pistols.

COUNTING THE COSTS

Studies conducted in the late 1990s estimated the cost of fire-arm violence to the United States at US$ 100 billion a year.
This is a large but absorbable cost for a wealthy developed country. In a developing nation, however, the relative effect of this economic burden is magnified.

The Inter-American Development Bank roughly estimated that the cost of armed violence to Latin America was some US$ 140 billion, or 12 per cent of GDP. In these environments, whether in conflict or with high rates of armed violence (such as South Africa), small arms violence compounds existing poverty and underdevelopment.

However, in these cases, measuring the full costs in typical economic terms is difficult to assess, particularly in the local context. It is nevertheless clear that any expenditure on arms and on ameliorating the effects of violent conflict leaves less money available for poverty reduction, healthcare and education.

One of the most comprehensive attempts to put a cost on violent conflict was published in 2002 by the Steering Committee of the Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda. The research found that the 16-year conflict had cost Uganda US$ 100 million annually, or three per cent of GDP.

Although the violence was mostly concentrated in the north of the country, the effects have been felt nationally. The figures were calculated by assessing the costs of lost: personal possessions and shelter; tourism earnings; tax revenues; foreign exchange; tobacco exports; failure to attract investments; and the brain drain of the country’s most educated.

**IMPACT OF SMALL ARMS VIOLENCE ON COFFEE FARMING IN NICARAGUA**

Considered to be the second poorest country in Latin America, Nicaragua suffers from an uncontrolled proliferation of firearms. For Elvira Cuadra, researcher at the Nicaragua Centre for International Studies (CEI), “no one, not even the international organisations, has been able to estimate the amount of weapons that circulate in Nicaragua”. Indeed, recent accounts of civilian illegal firearms vary from 50,000 according to the National Police Force, to more than 200,000 according to Nicaraguan Human Rights Centre (Cenidh).
Firearms proliferation and violence harms development in rural coffee-growing regions, which are also affected by poverty. According to the 2001 World Bank’s poverty assessment report, while overall poverty in Nicaragua fell from 50.3 per cent in 1993 to 45.8 per cent in 2001, the incidence of poverty among ‘coffee households’ increased by more than 2 per cent between 1998 and 2001.

Matagalpa, the main coffee-growing region in Nicaragua, has the highest poverty rates and the highest number of poor people in absolute terms after the capital, Managua. It also has the highest frequency of violent acts committed with firearms.

One cause of small arms proliferation in Nicaragua is the government’s decision at the end of the 1990s to distribute arms to coffee farmers as a security measure. According to the Association of Coffee Growers of Matagalpa (ASOCAFEMAT), nearly all coffee growers were given two or three military rifles. They also acquired other firearms on the black market.

However, most of these weapons were stolen by rural gangs and used against the farmers they were intended to protect. Indeed, especially at harvest time, coffee farmers are often victims of criminal acts committed by these gangs – such as armed robbery and kidnapping. As a result, most farmers have invested in private security guards, radio communication, and armed transport to protect their plantations.

The ASOCAFEMAT estimated that coffee production could increase by at least 30 per cent if they could work under peaceful conditions. Also, many families in rural areas have moved to larger cities, resulting in a drain of available labour for coffee production. It was also estimated that armed violence in coffee-farming regions reduced the country’s production by 300,000 quintals of coffee in 1999, which could have generated at least US$ 25 million in extra income.

According to the International Chamber of Commerce Annual Report on Piracy at Sea, in 2003 pirate attacks worldwide increased in both frequency and level of violence. More specifically, the number of attacks involving guns rose, and Bangladesh was ranked second in terms of attacks on ships.

Chittagong, Bangladesh’s main landing site for marine and inland fisheries, offers the best illustration of the small arms problem in the country. The harbour city is home to several criminal gangs engaged in arms smuggling, and is thus considered a major trafficking point for small arms in the sub-region. Bangladesh’s biggest illegal arms haul took place in Chittagong on 2 April 2004. The seizure included 1,290 7.62mm sub-machine guns, 400 9mm automatic carbines, 100 automatic rifles, 150 40mm automatic T-69 rocket launchers, 5,192 sub-machine gun magazines, 400 rifle magazines, 400,000 pistol cartridges and 25,020 hand grenades.

Bangladeshi fishing industry is the primary victim of the violence accompanying piracy and arms smuggling. Maritime security analyst Commander Vijay Sakhuja states, for example, “in one incident pirates attacked and killed 14 fishermen; the trawler carrying fish worth US$ 50,000 was hijacked. The survivors reported that the pirates were carrying automatic weapons and ordered the crew to jump overboard.”

In addition, fishery activities are also hindered by the spread of armed violence, because mariners/ships are reluctant to use Bangladesh’s city ports, which are seen as vulnerable and insecure. Foreign shipping companies have subsequently imposed additional charges for discharging cargo, resulting in higher costs for the export and import of goods.

**DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES:**

In order to address the economic costs of small arms violence, development and humanitarian organisations can:

- Incorporate arms reduction and violence prevention initiatives into poverty reduction strategies, especially into the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP);
- Engage with the World Bank and other international financial institutions and encourage them to consider the role of armed violence in eliminating poverty;
- Integrate small arms issues into states’ development assistance programmes;
- Improve understanding of the direct and indirect effects of small arms on development, through the collection of comparative data and production of surveys.
Years of conflict, first during the Soviet-Afghan war and then the Afghan civil war, have brought the Afghan economy to a standstill (Photo: Hege Opseth/Norwegian Church Aid).
As outlined in this report, the global problem of armed violence is fuelled by the proliferation of small arms and their diffusion into communities, both through legal arms transfers and the black market. This chapter looks at various dimensions of the international arms trade and efforts to establish global norms and criteria that states should consider when granting export permits.

9_THE SUPPLY CHAIN

SMALL ARMS PRODUCTION

While many of the costs of small arms violence are felt most in the developing world, production of these weapons and their ammunition is concentrated in the industrialised North.

The concentration of small arms-producing companies in Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and North America was shown by a 2003 survey carried out by the Omega Foundation. The survey found that at least 1249 companies were involved in small arms production, and their distribution is as follows:219

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number companies</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe/CIS</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North/Central America</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Pacific</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Omega Foundation. Survey available on www.smallarmssurvey.org

The 2003 survey identified over 90 countries in which small arms production took place, the most significant were: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, China, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Russian Federation, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the US.220

One notable trend in recent years has been the transfer of production to factories in developing countries. For example, in 2002 it was announced that the Norwegian ammunition producer Nammo had agreed to license production of some of its ammunition products to SME Ordnance, a Malaysian company.

In many cases, the motivation to diversify production partly follows the same logic as outsourcing in other industries – production is set up where labour costs are lower. In addition, the defence industry often makes use of ‘offsets’- agreements by the seller to produce some of the contract in the purchasing country.221 However, the diversification of production also raises the possibility that controls introduced by the major producers, such as the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (see below), could be evaded.

THE GLOBAL TRADE IN SMALL ARMS

The overwhelming majority of small arms used to commit acts of violence have been legally produced, exported, bought, and stored. PRIO has calculated that, according to official statistics, in 2001 the ten largest exporters of firearms and associated ammunition were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Millions US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NISAT database; Comtrade

In addition, Russia, Israel and China should also be included among the top exporters (Israel does not publish any information on its arms exports, while Russia and China only publish partial data).

An indication of who the recipients of these weapons are can be found by examining the destinations for exports from Western European countries. As is shown in Table 4, as much as 64 per cent of this trade flows to other Western European states or North America. However, the value of transfers to Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia amounts to over US$ 200 million for one year only.

While the financial value of this trade is cause enough for concern, this figure represents the transfer of hundreds of thousands of small arms, and millions of rounds of ammunition, to the developing world.
Furthermore, as organisations such as Amnesty International have pointed out, there are numerous examples of sales by EU members of small arms that have been used by their recipients to commit gross violations of human rights.\(^\text{222}\)

Guatemala is a post-conflict country that suffers one of the world’s highest rates of gun violence. As noted in Figure 2 below, in recent years there has been a dramatic increase in imports of small arms, and particularly handguns. Over the period 1998 to 2003, Guatemalan government statistics state that 84,574 handguns were exported to this booming market.

When one examines the sources of these weapons, the supplier countries are broadly similar to the main producers and exporters described above. Regionally, the most important supplier to Guatemala in 2003 was Western Europe, producing 44 per cent of imports into the country.

### BLACK MARKET SUPPLY CHAINS

Notwithstanding the millions of small arms produced and traded under government licences every year, the black market is also a key source of supply. While the number of weapons being transferred via black markets is much smaller than the government licensed trade, the impact of black market transfers may be greater because they allow access to guns for people that cannot obtain them legally.

Almost without exception, all arms currently in illegal circulation started off in the legal trade and under legal control. They were produced in government-licensed factories, stored under a variety of regulations, and often exported with a valid licence. The arms, at one point, were diverted from government control into the illicit trade. There are a number of methods by which this diversion takes place:

- Deliberate transfers of arms by governments to non-state parties involved in civil war;
- Violations of the export licensing system through the use of forged documentation;
- Theft or corrupt purchase from government stockpiles;
- Battlefield recoveries of firearms after combat;
- Purchases from gun shops by civilians that are then illegally passed on.

In many civil wars such as in Colombia, Sri Lanka, or Nepal, the main source of arms for opposition movements in a civil war has been the theft or capture of government arms. As noted by a RAND Corporation report on *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*:

---

**Table 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Millions US$</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe (intra-region trade)</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Pacific</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Saharan Africa</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified destination</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>921</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NISAT database; Comtrade

Note: percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding
“Guerrillas usually are also able to acquire some of what they need through theft; raids on police, paramilitary, and army outposts; from corrupt members of the security forces or sympathizers within their ranks; or from adversaries who simply leave their weapons behind after an attack.” 223

It is therefore likely that arms supplied to a government fighting an insurgency will, through the above methods, get into the hands of their opponents.

The role of black market arms traffickers has also been highlighted in numerous UN Security Council reports on arms embargo violations. A 2002 report on illegal arms supplies to Liberia documented six air cargos of surplus Yugoslav arms that arrived in Liberia during the summer of 2002. These shipments comprised 210 tons of small arms, light weapons and ammunition, including 5,000 automatic rifles.

These arms transactions involved the systematic violation of a whole spectrum of national and international laws concerning end-user certificates, shipping manifests, the ban on travel by Liberian officials, and the financing of arms purchases through exports of diamonds and other conflict goods, whose trade was also subject to UN sanctions. The report also noted that the arrival of fresh supplies of arms to combatants in Liberia coincided with intensified fighting in the ongoing civil war.

These arms shipments were facilitated by a number of brokers (or middle men) using five companies located in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Liechtenstein, Liberia, and Nigeria. These unscrupulous brokers represent a key link in the black market supply chain. However, in many countries, the activity of arranging an arms deal, instead of purchasing or selling arms, is unregulated.

As a result there has been a number of international initiatives to encourage states to introduce legislation to control the activity of arms brokering (such as in the 2001 UN programme of Action (see below)). 224

An important contribution to helping governments fulfil their commitment under the UN Programme of Action to introduce brokering regulations is the Dutch–Norwegian Initiative on Further Steps to Enhance International Co-operation in Preventing, Combating and Eradicating Illicit Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons.

One of the Initiative’s activities was an international conference in Oslo on 23–24 April 2003, at which 27 governmental experts, as well as specialists from international organisations and academic institutions, met to discuss ways of enhancing control over brokering activities. The conference was hosted by the governments of the Netherlands and Norway, and organised by the NISAT coalition partners – Norwegian Church Aid, the Norwegian Red Cross, and PRIO.

Finally, it is important to note that in many regions the greatest source of supply is from a large number of relatively small black market transactions. As a study on arms trafficking in Colombia pointed out:

“Most small arms enter Colombia singly or at most by the dozen rather than by the hundreds or thousands. This ‘trickle effect’ necessitates a constant supply of arms and ammunition to insurgent groups for them to continue their operations.” 225

Similar local, or regional, small-scale trafficking networks exist in many of the world’s violence-ridden regions. They represent a significant source of supply that has yet to be fully understood by researchers and decision-makers.

CONTROL MECHANISMS AND CAMPAIGNING OBJECTIVES

Controlling illicit trafficking: the UN Programme of Action (PoA)

In 2001, states met at the United Nations to discuss international response to the problem of small arms and light weapons trafficking. The conference resulted in the non-binding Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, in All Its Aspects. The UN PoA contains a comprehensive set of 59 measures that governments should take in order to prevent and control black market transfers.

The measures included in the PoA ranged from the establishment of national coordination agencies, controls over arms brokering, the destruction of surplus small arms, to keeping records of weapons held by governments. In addition, it included measures on regional and international cooperation on combating arms trafficking.

Some subjects were discussed at the UN conference, but did not receive the consensus needed to be included in the PoA. They included the deliberate transfer by governments of arms to ‘non-state actors’ such as insurgents, and controls over civilian possession of small arms. Both of these are outside the PoA’s remit.

In defining measures to stem the flow of black market arms, the PoA has made a valuable contribution to international efforts to stop the further spread of arms into communities. It also stipulated two biennial meetings of States and a review conference in 2006.

These meetings provide governments and civil society with an important focus and meeting point. However, the PoA does not address the licensed trade in small arms, and proposes little to control the arms already in circulation in communities (especially those not involved in war).
Therefore merely following the PoA will not reduce or prevent much of the small arms violence described in this report. The development community should continue to campaign for the UN Programme of Action and work towards strengthening and enforcing international arms controls, at the 2005 Biennial Meeting of States, and the review conference in 2006.

Controlling licensed trade

There are no global international treaties governing the licensed trade in small arms and light weapons. Instead there are some non-binding agreements that specify criteria that governments should use when evaluating arms export licence applications.226

The most important agreement is the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, which covers all exports of conventional weapons by European Union states. The Code of Conduct includes eight criteria governments should consider in their decision-making processes. These include the risk that the arms in question could be used to commit serious violations of human rights, the existence of armed conflict in the recipient state, or the risk that the arms could be diverted to terrorists or other parties of concern.

The Code of Conduct also stipulates that governments must notify all member states of licence denials. If another state wishes to subsequently make an “essentially identical” export then it must first consult with the government that first refused the licence.

Unfortunately, non-binding agreements such as the EU Code of Conduct have failed to prevent the export of arms to parties that use them to commit gross violations of human rights or international humanitarian law. As an Amnesty International report, entitled ‘Undermining Global Security: the European Union’s Arms Exports’, noted:

“There are numerous reports of exports of MSP [Military Security and Police] equipment, technology and expertise from existing EU Member States or new EU member states which have been transferred mostly in secret to recipients who have used such items for grave human rights violations or breaches of international humanitarian law.” 227

Furthermore, regional agreements, such as the EU Code of Conduct, will never be able to include all the world’s arms exporting states. An additional problem is that many regional and international agreements tend to be worded in terms that states interpret in different ways. In an apparent contravention of the EU Code of Conduct, Belgium approved a licence for arms exports to Nepal in 2002, despite an earlier licence refusal for similar equipment by Germany.228

The Control Arms campaign and the Arms Trade Treaty

In 2003 Amnesty International, Oxfam and IANSA launched the Control Arms campaign. This campaign has two aims, first to introduce a legally binding treaty on the arms trade (known as the Arms Trade Treaty). The second aim is to encourage community safety in areas affected by high levels of armed violence.

For several years pressure has been growing for the establishment of an international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) that would contain provisions to control the illegal transfer of arms and set out strict criteria for licensed trade. So far, the ATT has attracted public statements of support from countries including Cambodia, Costa Rica, Finland, Kenya, Mali and New Zealand. In addition, a larger number of states have indicated potential support for the treaty, this group includes: Brazil, Canada, Ireland, Macedonia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Senegal, Slovenia and Sri Lanka and the UK.229

The proposed ATT, which has been drafted by NGOs and international lawyers, is based on states’ existing obligations under international law. The first article of the treaty requires states to ensure that all arms transfers are authorised and are fully in accordance with national legislation. States would be obliged to enact minimum standards for licensing systems, and scrutinise each application on an individual basis.230

The second article states that arms transfers should not contravene embargoes or any conventions that outlaw specific weapons, such as mines. It codifies limitations on manufacture, possession, use (including potential use) and transfer of arms.231

The third article of the ATT obliges states to consider the potential impact of arms transfers on human rights and development. Where there is risk that arms could be used to violate international humanitarian law or negatively impact on development, states would be required to refuse an export licence.232
The key task for development organisations is to make people safer. This goal necessarily requires that the diffusion, and use, of small arms be addressed. However, experience shows that simple changes in legislation are unlikely to be sufficient.

**COMMUNITY SAFETY**

Identifying the impacts of gun violence

While estimates of the number of guns in a particular country or region may make media headlines, such crude figures are not a useful means of indicating the extent, or existence, of a small arms problem. Such estimates may have a very high margin of error, and may also misrepresent the extent of a problem.

Most importantly, the key variable is not the quantity of guns. Instead, access to small arms, and social norms and legal regulation concerning gun use, are much more important.

Certainly, access to firearms is influenced considerably by the number of guns in a society. However, access can be influenced by determining who is allowed to own and use firearms; how securely they are stored; and where they are located (in rural areas or in cities for example).

The best means of understanding the extent of a country's armed violence problem lies in assessing public health and crime indicators. The aim of all small arms initiatives should be to improve people’s safety. The success or failure of weapons collection initiatives should be measured in terms of changes in the numbers of victims of armed violence, and not just by the numbers of guns destroyed.
Unfortunately, many of the countries most affected by armed violence are least able to provide detailed statistics on mortality or crime victimisation. However, such information is not impossible to obtain. Interviews with doctors, community leaders or policemen can provide a snapshot in a particular location. In addition, the most fruitful approach is to ask the people affected by violence to describe what they fear. This can be done via surveys of individuals or via dialogue with groups.

**Understanding why people acquire and use small arms**

Any strategy aimed at influencing the possession and use of small arms must first evaluate why people want them. Different groups within a society may have markedly different motivations, as may people in different countries. In general, some of the following factors may apply in various situations:

**Insecurity** – one of the most important reasons why people acquire arms is the perception that guns protect the user, their families, and property. While one can assert that on a macro-level increased firearms availability may lead to higher levels of violence, for an individual, this is a difficult argument to accept.

Furthermore, if the possession of small arms by others is deemed to be a threat, this can be a major contributor to an individual’s sense of insecurity. A consequence of the widespread availability of small arms in some communities is an increase in demand for weapons.

The influence of insecurity is most important in areas in which the state fails to provide an effective police service. People may feel threatened by armed criminals, other groups, or by the very security forces that are supposed to protect them. Frequently, their response to this threat is the acquisition of weapons.

**Economic opportunity** – small arms provide unscrupulous individuals with tools useful for committing robbery, extortion, kidnapping, and many other crimes. In addition, profitable activities, such as dealing drugs, are also associated with the possession of small arms. As was mentioned in Section four, young men may see activities such as raiding cattle as the best way to provide the necessary riches for them to achieve social advancement.

**Cultural practices and values** – small arms are frequently associated with a variety of cultural practices. In particular, the carrying and display of small arms is often linked to masculinity. Furthermore, being taught how to use a gun is often linked to the transition from boyhood to adulthood. The cultural role of small arms is further exemplified by examples of the display of weapons without ammunition. Their role is to signify the social status of the owner.

**Hunting as subsistence** – while hunting is nowadays generally regarded in Western societies as a recreational activity, in most of the developing world it remains a fundamental means of subsistence. Not only do hunters provide entire communities with game, they also help to protect cultivated lands and crops against destruction committed by, for example, monkeys.

As a result, hunters have always occupied – and still do occupy – central positions among traditional indigenous communities, where they enjoy elevated social status. This social standing is hereditary and is passed on from father to son. Hunters are organised in closed ‘corporations’ and are often attributed magical powers that allow them to ensure the survival of the community against evil spirits.

However, in recent conflict settings, in the West African sub-region for example, traditional hunters have reportedly been recruited into fighting forces because they already possess arms and know how to use them efficiently. Thus hunters’ arms, which originally were used as tools of subsistence, are turned into weapons of war.

In the turbulent West African sub-region, the United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) reports that in Côte d’Ivoire, traditional Dozo hunters have joined the Ivorian rebel forces controlling the Northern part of the country. Similarly, during the war in Sierra Leone, the traditional Kamajor hunters had been part of the fighting, but on the side of government forces.**233**

**Sport and recreation** – in many countries, target shooting and the collection of small arms are popular activities.

As important as the availability of small arms are the regulations and cultural practices concerning their use. Small arms will have a very different role in communities in which firearms are primarily used for sport marksmanship than in communities in which guns are routinely used to threaten, or attack, other people.

A rise in the number of incidents in which firearms are used to intimidate people may be as important an indicator of a small arms problem as estimates on the numbers of guns in a society. If they are available, police statistics on crime using small arms, such as armed robbery, rape, or kidnapping, will provide an invaluable picture of changes in patterns of small arms use. If such statistics are not available, then surveys of victimisation, or focus groups, could be an option.

**Changing attitudes and sensitisation**

This strategy aims at changing the way that weapons are used and perceived. The most important actors are the media, churches, civil society organisations, community leaders and government agencies. Attempts to change attitudes concern both the ownership of small arms and their use. Public information campaigns could include:
Highlighting the dangers of keeping small arms in the home;
- Promoting non-violent conflict resolution;
- Church condemnation of violent behaviour;
- Criticising the association between firearms and masculinity;
- Promotion of non-violent alternatives to criminality.

Women and women’s organisations can be key allies in changing attitudes toward guns and violence.

Providing trust, security and economic opportunity
As noted above, one of the most important reasons why people own and use guns is their sense of insecurity. Promoting trust in the police, and law enforcement agencies, is a key requisite. This trust can be promoted by:

- Establishing close links between police and community leaders;
- Ensuring a fast response to reports of crime;
- Tackling corruption;
- Ensuring that the police fully respect human rights standards and do not themselves terrorise communities.

Second, it may be necessary to focus on changing firearms use in addition to ownership. The creation of weapon-free zones in public spaces such as schools or bars may help to reduce insecurity.

Finally, as noted above, some people view firearms as an economic tool. It will therefore be necessary to provide them with an alternative in exchange for their gun. Buy-back schemes where guns are exchanged for cash have been widely criticised. They can raise black market prices of arms, and may not target the people that use guns to commit crime. However, there has been more success in countries where development projects have been offered to communities in exchange for arms, or tools are exchanged for guns.

Collecting and destroying weapons
Collecting and destroying small arms is the surest way of preventing their misuse. This subject is dealt with in more detail below. In all of these initiatives, it is essential that the communities are fully involved in their planning and implementation.
In 2004, NCA supported, in partnership with the Kimbanguista Church of Angola, a project to exchange weapons for agricultural implements and seeds in Kindeje in the Northern Angolan province of Zaire bordering the Democratic Republic of Congo. The project was also supported and promoted both by local authorities in Kindeje and government authorities at district level.

The Kimbanguista church succeeded in convincing 500 people to voluntarily exchange their weapons for seeds and agricultural implements. The volunteers delivered their arms to representatives of the local police in Kindeje. The name of the volunteer and the weapon type was registered. After the collection, the weapons were sent to provincial police headquarters for destruction.

The volunteers received some of their promised seeds, plants and agricultural implements when they handed over their weapons. The remaining agricultural implements were given to volunteers during an official ceremony in Kindeje. The Kimbanguista Church, and representatives of local government, the Norwegian Embassy and NCA were present, as well as representatives of Halo Trust, an NGO responsible for demonstrating methods and procedures for destroying handguns. Not one single gun part remained that could be used in assembling a new weapon.

The main lessons learned from the project were that:

1. A successful exchange depends on the acknowledgement that weapons have value.
2. Weapons submitted should be completely registered, not only by type.
3. Ammunition should be included in the exchange, not only weapons.
4. Weapons (and ammunition) should be destroyed at point of delivery.
5. Systems, procedures and somewhere to test if weapons are loaded or not must be in place before the exchange begins.
6. Each weapon destroyed should be fully documented.
7. Participants and others should be informed about human security and the importance of reducing the number of arms in circulation among the general public.
Public, ceremonial destructions are often used as advocacy and demonstration tools. In 1996, in a ceremony that has been repeated in many countries since, Mali held a ceremonial ‘Flamme de la Paix’ (flame of peace) destruction of 3000 small arms in recognition of the recently-signed peace deal. While the absolute number of guns involved was relatively insignificant, the ceremony galvanised support for the peace process and publicised the fledgling weapons collection drive.

Box 28 NCA’s role in the process leading to the ‘Flame of Peace’ in Mali

Norwegian Church Aid started its humanitarian work in northern Mali in 1984 in response to the drought and famine that ravaged all of the Sahel countries at that time. At an early stage, the organisation decided to couple relief operations with more long-term development assistance, and thus established an integrated development programme in Gourma county targeting food security, management of natural resources, and capacity building of community groups. A central feature of the programme was the recruitment of project leaders originating from Northern provinces, who subsequently played a key role in NCA’s work in peace and reconciliation.

NCA’s efforts to promote peace and reconciliation in Northern Mali can be divided into two phases. The first phase involved strengthening personal contacts and communication with key actors and local leaders. Two former NCA leaders became the leaders of two different rebel movements, while another former NCA employee became a Malian government minister in 1991. This gave NCA a unique opportunity as mediator to change parties’ attitudes and willingness to negotiate.

The second phase (from August 1995 to March 29, 1996) is more directly linked to the process leading to the ‘Flamme de la Paix’ ceremony. NCA decided to become more directly involved in peace and reconciliation in Gourma, and thus engaged in facilitating inter-community meetings, during which traditional conflict resolution methods were used. An immediate effect of these meetings was the rapid diffusion of a feeling of hope in the ongoing peace process and the visible improvement of the security situation as, for example, market places re-opened and started to function normally once again.

More importantly, the issue of small arms proliferation and possible disarmament measures were central to the discussions. The first series of meetings coordinated by NCA served as a model and was expanded to other areas affected by conflicts. A total of 38 meetings were organised in the regions of Tombouctou, Kidal and Gao.

Collecting and storing all of these weapons can be difficult and dangerous. The difficulty of securing the storage of arms in the past has resulted in many incidents whereby weapons collected found their way back into society (because of theft, attacks on peacekeeper convoys, and the sale of weapons by individuals involved in the disarmament process).

Storing arms, ammunition and explosives can also pose a physical risk to the staff of organisations/agencies coordinating disarmament activities. Therefore, the focus of disarmament activities has shifted from simply removing arms from combatants, to also destroying/disabling their weapons and ensuring that their storage meets international standards.

Community disarmament initiatives should not take place in isolation.

- In more traditional societies, it may be necessary to first obtain the support of elders before disarmament will take place. In such a situation, the community may act together, rather than as individuals.

- People that hand in their small arms need to be certain that they will not be arrested, or information passed on to the police.

- Long-term weapons collection facilities must be set up at local level. Weapons collection should not only be carried out during the short period of an amnesty.

- In areas of high insecurity, weapons collection needs to be undertaken on a regional basis – people need to know that neighbouring communities are also disarming.
There is a growing consensus in both peacekeeping and development communities that the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Re-integration (DDR) of former combatants are critical steps to post-conflict recovery. Large-scale DDR operations have been undertaken after wars have ended in areas such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and DRC. The success or failure of these initiatives is a key indicator of whether conflict is likely to break out again.

It is very important that DDR processes take full account of the needs of child, female and disabled combatants. Ineffective DDR can cause long term problems; in Iraq, for example, the occupying powers’ decision to disband Saddam Hussein’s army, but not to collect their weapons, has created a force of 400,000 unemployed, armed men.

Technically, only members of the various armed factions are considered eligible to enter DDR processes, but the distinction between regular combatants and armed civilians is often very blurred. This is why it has been generally necessary to organise follow-up arms collection programmes within communities to allow a larger number of individuals to be disarmed.

As well as removing guns from the hands of ex-combatants, their military units must be disbanded. This means moving large amounts of young men away from the war zone and back to their communities and homes. Demobilisation therefore consists of assembling soldiers, orienting them into the entire DDR process (showing them that it is a viable alternative to fighting) and transporting them home.

Finally, ex-combatants must be reintegrated into their communities. As civil wars are comprised of many unemployed young men this can be a huge task. Often the very reason they took up arms in the first place was because they were not effectively integrated in their communities. Simply returning them to this status will only fuel further violence. Long-term economic integration is therefore absolutely essential. This can come in the form of education programmes, micro-credit support and access to land. The development community is ideally suited for this type of work.

Norwegian Church Aid: tackling gun violence in Eastern Africa

Stein Villumstad, Norwegian Church Aid’s Regional Representative in Eastern Africa, noted that the proliferation of small arms in Eastern Africa:

“... has been manifested in escalated conflicts, which eventually disintegrate into violence and stall development programmes. Due to the availability of weapons, the cycle of violence promotes new cycles for more efficient weapons, perpetuating a general culture of violence in many parts of the region.”

Norwegian Church Aid plays a key role in efforts in Eastern Africa to control small arms and reduce gun violence. NCA is part of the Nairobi-based Small Arms Working Group, which provides a civil society counterpart to the secretariat of the Nairobi Declaration (a regional intergovernmental agreement concerning small arms control, and a successor to the Nairobi Declaration). Both the Protocol and the Working Group are involved in activities across Eastern Africa. Most of the members of the working group are ecumenical in orientation:

- Fellowship of Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA)
- Association of Member Episcopal Conferences in Eastern Africa (AMECA)
- Norwegian Church Aid
- Pax Christi, Netherlands
- Africa Peace Forum (AFPO)

An important part of NCA’s work in Kenya has been the production of a video produced in English, French and Kiswahili on the Nairobi Protocol. The video was designed to encourage grass roots support for the Declaration, and is part of a tool kit for mobilising civil society.
DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES

In order to address community safety and encourage disarmament, development and humanitarian organisations can:

- Provide development support in areas such as healthcare, training, and income generation measures during the process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration;

- Provide resources to establish and maintain demobilisation centres and ensure food, clothing, housing and other basic needs for ex-combatants;

- Combine demobilisation programmes with post-war recovery programmes to promote social development and economic/trade opportunities for the ex-combatants, their dependents, retired political officers, and for the community at large;

- Provide skills and vocational training for ex-combatants and for victims of conflict;

- Provide psychological care for traumatised ex-combatants.

Development and income-generating activities are important factors to provide a basis for disarmament (Photo: Håkon O. Listerud/ Norwegian Church Aid).
MAINSTREAMING SMALL ARMS VIOLENCE IN DEVELOPMENT WORK

“NCA considers the strengthening of values, positive attitudes and respect for Human Rights to be important. We also believe that these can be accomplished through permanent campaigns, the changing of values and by counteracting the messages of violence that have invaded minds and culture. It is necessary to start with changing oneself, the NCA team, families and little by little influence positive changes in our areas of work”—NCA employee, Central America.

In general, governments have recognised that small arms violence is a pressing humanitarian crisis and a threat to sustainable development. This commitment was underlined in the 2001 UN Programme of Action (see Section nine) which stated that both the “excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread in many regions of the world” of small arms and light weapons have:

“... a wide range of humanitarian and socio-economic consequences and pose a serious threat to peace, reconciliation, safety, security, stability and sustainable development at the individual, local, national, regional and international levels.”

However, four years after the UN conference that agreed upon the Programme of Action, small arms projects remain to be mainstreamed as a development issue.

Certainly, this report has highlighted the important role of many development organisations in addressing small arms, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, and the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID). However, it is the case that small arms projects are not being habitually integrated into development planning at country level. Instead, there is a high profile political process focused upon the UN Programme of Action, similar regional intergovernmental agreements, and many ‘stand alone’ small arms projects (some of which have been mentioned in this report).

The reasons for this lack of mainstreaming are varied. Of course, many issues compete for the capacity and budgets of development agencies. In general, one can speculate that small arms have not been prioritised because:

- Perceptions persist that the small arms issue is a disarmament issue and one that is being dealt with by foreign ministries at the United Nations;
- Development organisations and their personnel are reluctant to become involved in what are perceived as ‘security’ or military issues;
- Integrating thematic issues into country-level programmes can be difficult;
- The high number of child soldiers in Congo and other countries shows clearly that small arms violence is a human crisis that must be integrated into development work at different levels (Photo: Norwegian Church Aid).
There is a shortage of information on the impact of armed violence on development;

Government personnel in affected countries are reluctant to highlight the problems associated with armed violence.

These problems can be addressed. Fundamentally, development organisations need to recognise that in many of the poorest countries, armed violence dramatically inhibits social and economic development. Violence can be reduced, and can be prevented. One important way to limit violence is to control the availability and use of firearms.

As a first step to recognising the problem, development organisations need to assess the impact of armed violence at a country level. While the research community can help, this process should be carried out internally if it is to result in any institutional change. Organisations do not need to immediately conduct a worldwide review. Nevertheless, if they are operating in countries such as South Africa, Guatemala, Brazil or Uganda, they can hardly ignore the effects of violence on projects in these countries.

Second, much more work needs to be done to assess the lessons learned from existing small arms projects. The development community needs a tool kit of successful strategies to address gun violence. Small arms issues have been on the international agenda for over a decade, and there have been a wide variety of projects run within this field. The time is certainly ripe to start to evaluate what works, and what doesn’t. Again, this is a process that should best be carried out primarily by development organisations rather than research institutes.

Third, development organisations need to cooperate and share information and experiences. Governments have committed themselves, on numerous occasions, to cooperate on addressing small arms. These commitments need to be operationalised, and a dialogue among government and NGO personnel developed. There is already much discussion among ministries of foreign affairs [especially at a UN level]. However, this activity has not been matched in the development community.

This report is a modest contribution to these goals. As was shown in the map of global gun deaths in Section one, armed violence affects countries across the developing world. It is not confined to war zones. Ultimately, the best means of mainstreaming small arms work may be a recognition, at some point in the future, that the problem is not going to go away.

'STAND ALONE' OR INTEGRATION?

Development agencies need to distinguish between 'stand alone' small arms projects, and small-arms sensitive development programmes. 'Stand alone' projects involve those that are directly related to weapons collection and destruction, or to changing attitudes toward guns. In addition, existing (or planned) programmes can also contain elements designed to address armed violence. 'Stand alone' projects are described throughout this report. They include:

- Collecting weapons from individuals and communities (perhaps in exchange for development projects or tools, etc);
- Gun amnesties;
- Post-conflict disarmament of ex-combatants;
- Mentoring of youth at risk of being involved in gun violence;
- Sensitisation and attempts to change social attitudes to guns (through media campaigns, etc);
- Changes in legislation concerning the ownership, storage or carrying of small arms;
- Controls on the international trade in small arms;
- Measures to prevent illicit arms trafficking.

Small-arms sensitive programmes concern mainstreaming an awareness of armed violence. For example, in Timor Leste (formerly East Timor) the UN set up a new police service – the Polícia Nacional de Timor Leste (PNTL). The policemen received international donations of equipment, which included firearms. However, their training only included technical skills on how to maintain and fire a gun. They were not trained in the circumstances in which they should, or should not, use lethal force.

The consequences of this lack of training were made clear when, as Amnesty International reported on December 4, 2002:

“Forced to respond to disturbances in the capital of Dili, PNTL officers shot some 18 people, two fatally. […] Although details of the day’s events remain sketchy, it is clear that command and control rapidly broke down and that, in the absence of procedures, effective training and access to non-lethal alternatives to firearms, the PNTL was unable to respond appropriately.”

In this case, a small-arms sensitive approach to the development of the Timor Leste police service would have involved full training in the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials [see Box 4].
Instead of being tackled through a number of ‘stand alone’ projects, the issue of small arms violence should be mainstreamed into development work. Dialogue, peace building and destruction of arms were among the methods used in Mali (Photo: Håkon O. Lislrud/Norwegian Church Aid).

Community policing, and other aspects of security sector reform, are a clear candidate for the inclusion of sensitivity to small arms issues. Other areas in which the prevention or reduction of gun violence could be included as an element of wider activities include:

- Education (in particular sensitising school children to the dangers posed by firearms);
- Peace-building and conflict resolution;
- Suicide prevention;
- Gender identity and relationships;
- Healthcare;
- Peace education;
- Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs);
- Pre-screening aid flights.

Integrating small arms sensitivity into planned development projects is probably the most challenging aspect of mainstreaming small arms work. However, failure to undertake this task will also be a failure to follow one of the most important principles of humanitarian work – to save lives.
In its work to promote human security, Norwegian Church Aid identifies stakeholders by classifying *rights holders* as those who are vulnerable and affected by insecurity, and *duty bearers* as state, market and civil society actors that each have different responsibilities and different opportunities to make and sustain safe communities.

**DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES**

Humanitarian organisations can address the main issues with development initiatives and through their advocacy agenda. Many development initiatives are mentioned in this report. Some of them are:

- Identifying the distinct needs of girl and boy soldiers, reconnecting them to their families and communities, and providing psychological care for traumatised ex-combatants;
- Increasing the involvement of women and women’s organisations and movements in disarmament and other human security discussions;
- Developing and rewarding gun-free zones in refugee camps;
- Supporting the creation of prevention programmes and other services to protect families at risk of armed violence and reduce stress on caregivers;
- Developing community-based approaches to address gender-based violence;
- Promoting a culture of peace by introducing peace education modules in core curricula in order to teach children constructive self-expression and non-violent conflict-resolution skills;
- Developing education programmes for boys and men for alternative concepts of masculinity not associated with guns and arms;
- Promotion and support of peaceful conflict transformation mechanisms based on traditional indigenous and environmentally relevant practices to resolve water and land disputes within and between communities;
- Incorporating arms reduction and violence prevention initiatives into poverty reduction strategies, especially into the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP);
- Improving understanding of the direct and indirect effects of small arms on development through the collection of comparative data and production of surveys;
- Combining demobilisation programmes with post-war recovery programmes to promote social development and economic/trade opportunities for the ex-combatants, their dependents, retired political officers, and for the community at large;
- Supporting follow up structures for psychological and social counselling to victims of small arms violence.

The issue of small arms need to be addressed politically and at all levels: locally, nationally, regionally and globally.

**AWARENESS AND ENGAGEMENT**

At the national level, as well as in regional strategies, armed violence prevention and reduction measures need to be integrated. This should be done with different methods, by

- Encouraging and supporting local disarmament initiatives;
- Preventing the misuse of firearms through security sector reform and encouraging responsible use by legitimate civilian owners;
- Including sensitivity to small arms issues in wider development initiatives (such as education, healthcare and gender relations).

In terms of overall awareness, it is also important that international initiatives by NGOs, states and multinational actors ensure that existing and planned development initiatives do not inadvertently contribute to small arms violence.

Development organisations actors and UN organisations have a particular responsibility in promoting a “no arms” culture among the development and humanitarian community.
Simultaneously there is a need to support regional and multi-lateral agreements on small arms control. Important initiatives are The Nairobi Protocol, SADC Protocol, ECOWAS moratorium, OAS Convention, the EU Code of Conduct and EU Joint Action and the OSCE Document.

Regional initiatives have particular strength in that they address specific needs and build upon existing cooperation mechanisms.

CHALLENGING DONOR GOVERNMENTS

It is a matter of utmost importance to place the issue of small arms and light weapons on the development agenda and to mainstream small arms proliferation and violence as a development and humanitarian issue.

Norwegian authorities and other donor countries should be challenged to evaluate the impacts of small arms violence in their priority countries for development aid - at local and regional level.

OECD countries should support lessons-learned exercises documenting grassroots initiatives that successfully tackle small arms violence at the community level.

The international community and development organisations can play an important role by joining together in partnership with regional initiatives to curb small arms proliferation.
Methodology
Countries’ firearms homicide rates have been labelled high, medium and low and colour-coded on the following scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firearm homicides per 100,000</th>
<th>Ranking and map colour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 1 per 100,000 population</td>
<td>Low (white)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 1 – 5 per 100,000 population</td>
<td>Medium (pink)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 5 per 100,000</td>
<td>High (red)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data (grey)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Armed conflict
Certain states that are experiencing armed conflict are marked with a conflict symbol. See under each country below for explanations. The list of countries with armed conflict is sourced from the SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security.1

Statistical sources
Unless otherwise listed below, data on countries’ firearm homicides is collected from the World Health Organisation Mortality Database2, March 2005 update (and previous years), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Seventh United

WHO Mortality Database, March 2005 update
The following codes were used to calculate firearm homicide statistics:

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<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Assault by handgun discharge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X930</td>
<td>Assault by handgun discharge, home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X931</td>
<td>Assault by handgun discharge, residential institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X932</td>
<td>Assault by handgun discharge, school, other institution and public administrative area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X933</td>
<td>Assault by handgun discharge, sports and athletics area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X934</td>
<td>Assault by handgun discharge, street and highway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X935</td>
<td>Assault by handgun discharge, trade and service area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X936</td>
<td>Assault by handgun discharge, industrial and construction area</td>
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<td>Assault by handgun discharge, farm</td>
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<td>X938</td>
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<td>Assault by rifle, shotgun and larger firearm discharge, street and highway</td>
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<tr>
<td>X945</td>
<td>Assault by rifle, shotgun and larger firearm discharge, trade and service area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X946</td>
<td>Assault by rifle, shotgun and larger firearm discharge, industrial and construction area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X947</td>
<td>Assault by rifle, shotgun and larger firearm discharge, farm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X948</td>
<td>Assault by rifle, shotgun and larger firearm discharge, other specified places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X949</td>
<td>Assault by rifle, shotgun and larger firearm discharge, unspecified place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X95</td>
<td>Assault by other and unspecified firearm discharge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X950</td>
<td>Assault by other and unspecified firearm discharge, home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X951</td>
<td>Assault by other and unspecified firearm discharge, residential institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X952</td>
<td>Assault by other and unspecified firearm discharge, school, other institution and public administrative area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X953</td>
<td>Assault by other and unspecified firearm discharge, sports and athletics area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X954</td>
<td>Assault by other and unspecified firearm discharge, street and highway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X955</td>
<td>Assault by other and unspecified firearm discharge, trade and service area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X956</td>
<td>Assault by other and unspecified firearm discharge, industrial and construction area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X957</td>
<td>Assault by other and unspecified firearm discharge, farm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X958</td>
<td>Assault by other and unspecified firearm discharge, other specified places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X959</td>
<td>Assault by other and unspecified firearm discharge, unspecified place</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WHO Mortality Data base documentation6

**Years**

Country ratings are calculated from the latest year available. For information on the years used for each country, see the WHO Mortality Database and the UNODC crime survey. For countries where the above data is unavailable, see the list of referenced sources and explanations below.

**Alternatively sourced information**

In some cases, official statistics on firearm homicide rates are unavailable. Where possible, information from specified sources has been used to make judgements on countries' firearm homicide rates. For example, countries with overall homicide rates of less than one per 100,000 were assumed to have a similar or lower firearm homicide rate. Where available information on a country is insufficient to make such a judgement, countries have been left as 'no data', and correspondingly coloured grey on the map.

### Country Information sources and explanation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Information sources and explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Over 200 people killed every month due to armed conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>No statistics available on firearm homicides. Since the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, ‘mortality rates remain at emergency levels’ and the large numbers of small arms (including those not turned in by UNITA during its demobilisation) ‘will also create opportunities for increased crime and localised instability’; ‘there are lots of arms out there. If these men [erstwhile UNITA fighters] are not reintegrated, and are starving, they have the means to dig up weapons and become bandits.’ International Crisis Group (ICG). 2003. Dealing with Savimbi’s ghost: The security and humanitarian challenges in Angola. 26 February. p. 1 – 2. &lt;www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400905_26022003.pdf&gt; Accessed 13.05.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>82 firearm homicides in 2002 (1.97 per 100,000).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Colombia is marked with a ‘conflict’ symbol.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I_APPENDIX TO MAP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Source/Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>The DRC has experienced high levels of armed violence as a result of recent conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Eriksson, Wallensteen &amp; Sollenberg, 2003; Gleditsch, et al. 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenland</td>
<td>No figures available. Same as Denmark.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Although India’s firearm homicide is ‘low’, Kashmir is ‘high’ and marked with a ‘conflict’ symbol (see also Pakistan). Dwan, R. and Gustavsson, M. 2004. op.cit. p. 141.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>UNODC’s statistics for 2000 state a total homicide rate of one per 100,000. Indonesia therefore has ‘low’ firearm homicide. However, because of conflict, Aceh is ‘high’ and has been marked with a ‘conflict’ symbol. Dwan, R. and Gustavsson, M. 2004. op.cit. p. 141.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel and the Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>Total figures for 2004 firearm deaths from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: 182 (2.83 per 100,000).   <a href="http://www.ict.org.il/">http://www.ict.org.il/</a> Accessed 13.05.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>The total homicide rate in 1994, according to UNODC is 0.60 per 100,000. Therefore, firearm homicide in Morocco is ‘low’. There is no data on Western Sahara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>According to Interpol, there were 818 homicides in 1999 (4.34 deaths per 100,000). According to a report by BICC, armed crime is over-estimated in Mozambique, especially in rural areas where there is little firearm-related crime. In the city of Chimoio [population over 170,000] there were two murders in 2002. Repeated nationally, this is firearm homicides 1.17 per 100,000. Therefore, Mozambique firearm homicide is ‘medium’. Faltas, S. and W-C. Paes. 2004. Exchanging guns for tools. Bonn: BICC and World Vision. <a href="http://www.bicc.de/publications/briefs/brief29/brief29.pdf">http://www.bicc.de/publications/briefs/brief29/brief29.pdf</a> Accessed 13.05.05</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>According to Interpol data for 1998, total homicide rate is 0.69 per 100,000. Niger is therefore 'low'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Krips online databank <a href="http://www.krips.no">http://www.krips.no</a> Accessed 13.05.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Pakistan is 'low', but Kashmir is 'high' and is marked with a 'conflict' symbol. Dwan, R. and Gustavsson, M. 2004. op. cit. p. 141.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>‘Armed conflict report 2005’, Project Ploughshares [<a href="http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/ACR/ACR00/ACR00-Senegal.html">www.ploughshares.ca/content/ACR/ACR00/ACR00-Senegal.html</a>]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Project Ploughshares. Undated. ‘Armed conflict report 2004.’ <a href="http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/ACR/ACR00/ACR00-SierraLeone.html">http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/ACR/ACR00/ACR00-SierraLeone.html</a> Accessed 13.05.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>According to Interpol, in 1999 the total homicide rate was 0.91 per 100,000. Therefore, the firearm homicide is 'low'.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Endnotes

ENDNOTES

89 Farr, Vanessa. 2002. ‘A Gendered Analysis of International Agreements on Small Arms and Light Weapons’ in Farr, Vanessa et al Gender Perspectives on Small Arms and Light Weapons:Regional and International Concerns. BICC Brief 24. Bonn: BICC.


91 United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs. 2001. Gender Perspectives on Disarmament and Development. Briefing Note 6. The Department for Disarmament Affairs in collaboration with the office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women. Ibid.

92 ibid.


94 Farr, Vanessa et al. 2002 op. cit.


100 Florquin, N. and Wille C. 2004. op. cit. p. 179.


104 ibid.


ENDNOTES


ibid.


ibid.


ibid.


ibid. p. 32.

La Prensa [Managua, Nicaragua]. 1999. ‘El temor, impuesto directo a la economia y la produccion.’ 30 August.


ibid.


Muggah, Robert. 2003. op. cit., p. 157

ibid.


Such offset agreements can also involve complex counter trade deals and technology transfer involving both civil and military industries.


These include the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Wassenaar Arrangement’s Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons [SALW].


Department for International Development. 2003. op. cit.

ibid.

As an ecumenical, church-based organisation, Norwegian Church Aid’s vision and mission are founded in the faith that all human beings are created in God’s image as equals with the same basic rights and obligations. Norwegian Church Aid’s mission is to manifest God’s love in the world by promoting basic rights, challenging indifference, improving the living conditions of the poor and participating in strategic alliances that aim to translate God’s love and compassion into practical action.

Together with the World Council of Churches and the Ecumenical Network on Small Arms (ENSA), Norwegian Church Aid has been advocating for a better control of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Norwegian Church Aid has been implementing and supporting partner’s implementation of various projects to curb violence and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons throughout the world.

The Norwegian Initiative for Small Arms Transfer (NISAT) is an instrument for research, awareness raising and advocacy and has been a forum for cooperation between Norwegian Church Aid and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) since 1997. The Norwegian Red Cross is also a member of NISAT.