EXPLOITING INEQUALITIES:
CONFLICT AND POWER RELATIONS IN BEL AIR

HAITI
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Once a buzzing middle-class neighborhood of artists and intellectuals, Bel Air is today an impoverished neighbor- hood with a reputation for chronic instability, controlled to a large extent by gang leaders and criminals. Less known and researched than its infamous neighbor Cité Soleil in the Haitian capital city of Port-au-Prince, Bel Air represents an interesting case study of the complex structural and proximate factors that – individually and collectively – explain the state of fragility in this urban hotbed. Taken together, these factors offer a new understand- ing of the destabilizing consequences that the urban violence in Bel Air could lead to at the local, national and even international levels.

Through the process of rapid urban migration, the densely populated and increasingly impoverished neighborhood Bel Air came to be strongly associated with former President Aristide’s Lavalas movement. Aristide drew heavily upon the existing neighborhood associations or baz to safeguard his power, following in the footsteps of a long history of Haitian presidents who employed local armed groups to solidify their power. Embattled by the economic elite who felt their interests threatened by his pro-poor rhetoric, Aristide was blamed for arming the base structures and creating the paramili- tary phenomenon responsible for the acute increases in violence. Violence had begun to decline following politi- cal rapprochement efforts and violence reduction strate- gies, combined with the actions of the UN Stabilization Mission and NGOs to implement law enforcement opera- tions, beginning in late 2006. However, since the January 12, 2010 earthquake, the area known as Greater Bel Air has experienced an upsurge in violence, peaking in 2012.

This conflict analysis for Greater Bel Air examines the driving factors of conflict, key actors, “connectors and dividers” and gender dimensions of conflict. The overall purpose is to improve the effectiveness of future peace- building programs in Greater Bel Air, by ensuring that they are addressing key driving factors of conflict. A spe- cific objective for Norwegian Church Aid is to systematize and make explicit the information and insights gathered from a wide range of informants and organizations working on conflict resolution and violence reduction in furthering Bel Air, and to create a baseline upon which further programming can be developed.

The conflict analysis is primarily based upon a desk study of existing analyses, academic research and other studies, combined with updated information gathered through interviews with key informants and focus groups. Key informants were identified among stakeholders from civil society, the private sector, local/ national government including the police, the United Nations, national and international NGOs, religious lead- ers and peace practitioners. 46 interviews and six focus groups, made up of 13 participants from different sectors of society and from different sub-areas of Greater Bel Air, were carried out over a two week period in July-August and one week in November 2013.

Greater Bel Air and Haiti provides a unique context for understanding violence as it is a country that has never undergone war, and yet it is a situation where cyclical violent conflict has become entrenched in the socio- political life of Haitian society. A country born out of the world’s first successful slave revolt, the roots of violence and resistance to injustice run deep, dating back to the system of slavery and the legacy of structural injustice perpetuated by this economic model. The disparities of power and wealth between the impoverished urban masses and the elite have often been marked with violence. Pervasive political, economic and social ten- sions are played out through local level violence between individuals and small groups, largely centered in Haiti’s popular neighborhoods, but are often linked to national level turmoil, political and economic crises.

Findings

In its examination of key driving factors of conflict, this study posits that multiple structural and proximate fac- tors converge to provoke the violence in Greater Bel Air today.

Poverty is the underlying factor explaining the violence perpetrated in Bel Air, yet the convergence of inequality and exclusion was found to be more significant causal factors of violence. The most common reply among the respondents of the study with regard to the underlying factor of violent conflict in Bel Air was poverty. Yet, while the analysis found deep-rooted poverty to be an impor- tant contextual factor, the convergence of inequality and exclusion was found to be more significant causal fac- tors of violence. Poverty in Haiti is rooted in a system of economically, socially and racially based class divisions that dates back over its 200-year history. Horizontal and vertical inequalities in Haitian society have created a col- lective sense of humiliation and resentment toward the privileges held by the political and economic elite, and the vast disparities in wealth, access to social services, employment and political power. Bridging these vast dis- parities, violence has become the primary mode through which the elites and the frustrated youth of the popular neighborhoods interact.

Weak state institutions and political leadership are an important root cause of poverty, which contributes as a driving factor of violence. Respondents noted the lack of political will to provide social services and uphold the rule of law to safeguard its citizens. Likewise, increases in violence at the local level very commonly coincide with national level political crises when political leaders often mobilize armed groups to serve their own interests. In popular neighborhoods such as Bel Air, violence has increased as armed groups have stepped in to fill the governance voids created by the weakness of the state.

The breakdown of vertical and horizontal social bonds predisposes individuals and groups to take part in violent political mobilizations. The breakdown of social bonds is often articulated as low levels of trust in na- tional and international actors and institutions that have "failed" to protect and fulfill commitments towards the population. Rapid urbanization triggered by severe defor- estation and neo-liberal economic policies have con- tributed to the break-down of horizontal social bonds, exacerbating existing economic and social inequalities. Frustration due to the unmet human identity needs of society and the actions of the new criminal groups. Peacebuilding agency further fosters feelings of powerlessness and humiliation, which contribute to conflict tipping over into violence.

Negative stereotypes of “Haiti’s gangs” often do not correspond to how these groups construe themselves and are viewed by the local population. The term gang is employed to describe disparate phenomenon ranging from criminal networks, insurgent groups, neighbor- hood associations and private militias. Many respondents described a “new generation” of armed groups that were created after the earthquake. The newer armed groups are frequently referred to as “criminal groups”, distin- guishing them from the local groups popularly known as “baz” ( baz ). It is difficult to draw a clear line between the armed activity of a baz and armed violence attrib- uted to criminal groups, as they are often not mutually exclusive groups, with fluid alliances, and violence is closely linked to the political context. Criminal groups were noted to differ from baz in being less territori- ally based and less hierarchical, operating as networks spread throughout the city. Their ephemeral and non- hierarchical nature makes it difficult to identify specific individuals or groups associated with them or allied to them at any specific time and place. A “generational gap” exists between the old and new armed groups with the latter described as “opportun- ists” aligned to whichever political and economic elite best serve their interests. Informants explained the conflict between the members of the baz who were histori- cally linked to Aristide’s Lavalas party and the younger generations as a struggle of the youth to find space and gain recognition within existing baz. Many of the young men who operate with the “new generation” of armed groups are amongst those who escaped from prison after the earthquake and who failed to carve out a power base linked to a geographic territory within the neigh- borhods of Bel Air. Other disgruntled youth frustrated by failed attempts to gain power in the micro areas have amalgamated to them. Differentiating between armed groups is key for new criminologists and development work- ers as the use of generic and all-encompassing concepts such as “gangs” may obscure the impact of violence reduction programs and policy interventions. After the January 2010 earthquake, several leaders of baz died and in many cases the baz were fragmented, leading to the birth of the local mayors and other leaders. The change in the nature of armed groups was noted as corresponding with “disruptions” in the politi- cal and economic context partly prompted by the 2010 earthquake. The death of many government officials in the earth- quake, as well as the change in government in the sub-sequent elections severed the existing linkages between the baz and the national level leaders. These changes further upset the balance of power and shifted
alliances between baz. The earthquake also caused widespread displacement of the population, weakening customary ties between local baz and communities.

Violence in Haiti is often linked to high-level political and economic actors with connections to globalized systems of trade or illegal transnational networks such as the drug trade. Over the past few decades opposing elites have co-existed with armed groups who collaborate with them in exchange for the opportunities offered to them. In this way, political and criminal economic interests merge at specific points in time and violence has become a structurally entrenched mode of interaction between the elite and the masses. Young unemployed men who lack access to more positive ways of participating in governance and the economy are included and integrated into the violent political system.

Recommendations

The overall purpose of the analysis is to improve the effectiveness of future peacebuilding programs in Greater Bel Air. Many of the key recommendations cited below would be difficult to implement successfully in Haiti. They require the commitment and collaboration of various organizations and actors at multiple levels. A detailed list of recommendations, linked directly to the analysis’ main conclusions, and divided between the individual/personal level and relational/community level, can be found on pages 44 – 54 in the report.

1. Regularly carry out market assessments to determine what skills are needed and tailor vocational training programmes accordingly. Develop linkages with goodwill members of the private sector to create personal relations and training opportunities. Create incentives to demonstrate to business that peace is in their interest.

2. Integrate life skills and psycho-social elements related to identity-needs into violence reduction initiatives. Target specifically at risk children and youth. Strengthen alternative sources of belonging (religious youth groups, community groups).

3. Increase opportunities for youth to engage in positive civic participation activities with the increased involvement of local level leaders including mayors and city delegates as a way of developing bonds of accountability and transparency.

4. Regularly carry out stakeholders’ analyses to identify key individuals who can make linkages between grassroots and national level peacebuilding – and those who will resist change.

5. Reinforce the role of leaders who can serve as models for leadership; not elevate former armed group leaders unless they have displayed positive leadership qualities through actions in favor of community interests.

6. Create and support multi-track dialogue processes at local, middle and top levels, and bring the tracks together, using tools such as “Transformative Scenario Planning” to promote an inclusive, action-oriented dialogue process.

7. Identify key individuals who are able to influence specifically the younger generation of baz leaders and members, and bring them into peacebuilding activities including community development projects and cultural events.

8. For NGOs working in Great Bel Air, regularly undertake “Do No Harm” analyses in relation to hiring practices, community partners and community leaders with whom they engage. For donors supporting NGOs, request that such analyses are underpinning the NGOs’ work.

9. Render mediation work between different neighborhoods and baz more effective through collaboration between different NGOs, which may wield different levels of influence with different baz.

10. Increase responsibility and ownership for conflict resolution and violence reduction efforts amongst the local population: activities should be done by and with the local population, not for them.

11. Engage in coordinated advocacy amongst NGOs and international donors engaged in Bel Air targeted at specific political and economic actors to create greater political will for peace in Bel Air. Advocate for formal spaces for mediation and liaison with the government.

12. Carry out a gender barrier analysis to identify barriers to greater participation of women in associative life, and a gender analysis on roles, responsibilities and workloads of women and girls to inform gender sensitive programming. Use spatial mapping to identify urban configurations that make women more vulnerable to violence.

13. Strengthen the community policing programme and build linkages with HNP and MINUSTAH’s civilian policing division to bring concerns and priorities of the inhabitants of Bel Air to the police reform agenda.

14. Engage in specific coordination of violence prevention efforts amongst international donors, INGOs, local associations before “trigger” events such as elections.

15. Adopt a “whole of society” approach to peacebuilding: a multi-sectoral approach linking different sectors of peacebuilding and including stake-holders from multiple levels of society.

In Haiti, post-earthquake efforts to “build back better” have been impaired by the historic weaknesses of the Haitian state and its inability and unwillingness to form true partnerships with its own citizens. The lack of a national level strategy for the development of marginalized urban communities such as Bel Air and the deep, long-standing gap between state and society on socioeconomic issues raises serious questions about the effectiveness of bottom-up peacebuilding efforts without intentional linkages to peacebuilding at other levels of society.

This report is the result of a conflict analysis carried out by Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) from July 18-August 5, 2013. Additional interviews and validation meetings were carried out from November 4-9, 2013. The overall purpose in carrying out the study is to improve the effectiveness of future peacebuilding programs in Greater Bel Air through a participatory conflict analysis. In order to improve program effectiveness, the aim of the conflict analysis is to ensure that peacebuilding programs are addressing key driving factors of conflict.

A specific objective of NCA is to systematize a conflict analysis, which serves as a baseline study providing information on driving factors of conflict, root causes, key actors and recommendations to be considered in future programming. While there are several organizations working in Bel Air with deep insight into local level conflicts, their information and ideas are often not systematized or widely shared. An objective of the analysis is therefore to systematize and make explicit the information and insights gathered from a wide range of informants and organizations working on conflict resolution and violence reduction in Greater Bel Air.

A conflict analysis for Greater Bel Air was particularly pertinent at this time because of the sharp increase in violence in 2012. This coincides with the development of a new NCA strategic plan and subsequent revision of future peacebuilding and violence reduction programs. In this light, the analysis seeks to understand the changes in conflict in Greater Bel Air that have produced the recent upsurge in violence, as well as to provide an interpretation of the changes in actors and dynamics, in order to better address these conflicts in the future.

For the purposes of this conflict analysis, Greater Bel Air includes the following neighborhoods: Bel Air (Haut Plateau), St. Martin, Delmas 2-4, Soline-Bastia (Front Nation- al), La Saline, and Warf Jeremie.

2. BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT ANALYSIS

2.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE ANALYSIS

2.2 CONFLICT ANALYSIS PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY

PROCESS:

a) Preparation:
   - Identification of “Greater Bel Air” as the focus of the conflict assessment.
   - Development of the key informant interview guide and focus group interview guide.
   - Identification of organizations and individuals for key informant interviews.
   - Selection of target groups/communities in Bel Air for focus groups.
   - Desk study of existing analyses, baseline studies, academic papers and other available reports.

b) Data gathering:
   - Field visit for key informant and focus groups interviews in Bel Air.
   - Synthesis of the data gathered through interviews.

2.3 Verfication, analysis and reporting:

Triangulation of findings from conflict analysis with secondary data and report-writing. Production of draft report.

*Feedback on draft report gathered.*

*Revision of draft report based on feedback.*

*Additional interviews, focus groups and implementation of verification meetings.*

*Information gathered and analyzed is integrated into the revised conflict analysis.*

*Production of final report.*
2.3 FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONFLICT ANALYSIS

The framework for the conflict analysis is based on the draft Conflict Analysis Framework developed by NCA in collaboration with Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (Collaborative Learning Projects), and the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, dated May 2012.

Main elements of the conflict analysis:

a) Connectors and positive factors for peace
b) Dividers: sources of tension or divisions which escalate the conflict
c) Key driving factors of conflicts and the dynamics between them
d) Actors: key people and groups implicated in the conflict and linkages between them
e) Dynamics: historical and structural factors/issues that contribute to the conflict
f) Triggers: events, resources and key actors that can transform the conflict into violence
g) Gender dimensions of the conflict
h) Linkages between conflict at the local and national levels.
i) Past and Current Peacebuilding/violence reduction interventions
j) Recommendations for future programming.

2.4 METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

The geographical focus for the conflict analysis was Greater Bel Air, with an effort to identify links to other subarea dynamics (in Port-au-Prince) and national level factors. The conflict analysis is primarily based upon a desk study of existing analyses, academic research and other studies, combined with updated information gathered through interviews with key informants and focus groups. Key informants were identified amongst stakeholders from civil society, the private sector, police and United Nations, national and international NGOs and donors, religious leaders, peace practitioners and local/national government. A gender balance was sought, although there were more male key informants, as many positions in these institutions are held by men.

Five focus groups with community members from Greater Bel Air were carried out. Each of the focus groups was made up of 8-13 people from different sectors of society, namely: community leaders, local associations (Organisations Populaires); religious leaders; women’s groups; youth associated with armed groups and “reinserted” youth. The composition of focus groups made efforts to be inclusive of participants of various ages and genders.

For purposes of representativity, two focus group participants from each “block” or sub area were included from the following neighborhoods of Greater Bel Air: Bel Air (Haut Plateau), St. Martin, Delmas 2-4, Solino-Bastia (Front National), La Saline, and Warf Jeremie. While there are advantages to having mixed focus groups with representatives from different areas, this also presented certain limitations. Given the tense situation between certain zones at the time of the conflict analysis, mixing informants from neighborhoods in conflict could have affected the amount and type of information participants were willing to share and the dynamics of the discussion.

The key informant and focus group interviews were carried out during a two-week period in Haiti, with subsequent interviews done through Skype. In total we conducted forty-six interviews and six focus groups. Two questionnaires were developed to guide discussion on the main elements of the conflict analysis: one for the key informant interviews, and the other for the focus groups. The questionnaires were to be used as discussion guides, and as such the questions were adapted to each informant and group, with additional themes identified and followed up on.

Data collected during the interviews was compiled and analyzed during the reporting phase. A draft report reflecting the preliminary analysis was written before the validation meetings and follow-up interviews, with feedback from the subsequent meetings incorporated in the final draft. During the reporting phase of the conflict analysis, the information gathered during the previous stage was triangulated and used to complete and update information from secondary sources.

Practical limits constrained us from a larger and more diverse sampling at the community level and the national level. National holidays (Carnival des Fleurs) and annual leave for many members of the international community in Haiti coincided with the interview period, making it impossible to reach some key members of government and international NGOs/donors. The organization of focus groups was also somewhat limited due to the holiday period.

In addition it should be noted that due to the relatively recent outbreaks of violence in Greater Bel Air in January-March 2013, there were sensitivities and risks associated with discussing the conflict issues openly, particularly for participants in focus groups and community-level informants. It was evident that many people were reluctant and afraid to discuss sensitive topics such as “actors” openly in focus groups, and the consultants wanted to remain mindful and respectful of “Do No Harm” considerations. To address this limitation the consultants conducted confidential follow-up interviews with certain participants that were hesitant to speak openly in the focus groups. However, due to time limitations we were only able to speak separately with a few of the participants, so this limitation should still be noted.

Among the individuals interviewed, the disjunctions and dissonance of perspectives and information revealed a mosaic of disparate experiences that was challenging to hold together in a comprehensive analysis. This reflects the differences of perspective and location that make up the wide range of duty bearers in peacebuilding and violence reduction in Haiti today. It is also reflective of the challenges associated with harmonizing the multiple perspectives and arriving at a common narrative on the causes of violent conflict, as well as a unified vision for peace. Thus, several questions remain unanswered in the report and new questions have been raised.

3See lists of focus group participants for more details.
4The in-country interviews were conducted between July 23 and August 5, 2013.
3. GREATER BEL AIR

3.1 PRESENTATION OF GREATER BEL AIR

The focus of the conflict analysis is the Greater Bel Air area of central Port-au-Prince. There are differing opinions as to what constitutes Greater Bel Air, but for the purposes of this conflict analysis, it includes the following neighborhoods or “blocks”: 1. Bel Air, St. Martin, Delmas 2-4, Solino-Bastia (Fort National), and Warf Jeremie. Bel Air is one of the oldest neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince, dating from 1740. It is strategically located in the heart of the city, close to the Champ de Mars, the port, the National Palace and the central market (Croix de Boussales). Until the 1970s, Bel Air was a middle class neighborhood of artists, academics, government employees and professionals. The neighborhood boasts of a proud history, home to the first secondary school in Haiti in the heart of the city, close to the Champ de Mars, the port, the National Palace and the central market (Croix de Boussales). Until the 1970s, Bel Air was a middle class neighborhood of artists, academics, government employees and professionals. The neighborhood boasts of a proud history, home to the first secondary school in Haiti. Bel Air became aristide’s stronghold and was an area of “Greater Bel Air”, which encompasses La Saline, Fouturon, Fort Dimanche, Pont Rouge, and Walf Jeremie on the lower part of the city near the ocean, as well as the zones of Portail Saint Joseph, Tokyo, Delmas 2, Solino, extending up to Fort National-Bastia. It should be noted that the inclusion of neighborhoods such as Delmas 2 and St. Martin is contested and does not correspond to the perception of all of the informants in the conflict analysis. See “key driving factors” section for more information on this national dynamic.

Today Bel Air is one of the poorest neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince, with a reputation of violence and insecurity. Since 1986 Bel Air has experienced cyclical outbursts of violence, closely linked to political dynamics at the national level. Seeds of violence were sown in June, 1957, when under the support of Francois Duvalier the Haitian army massacred hundreds of supporters of President Daniel Fignole in Bel Air. This event increased the widespread disapproval of the neo-patrimonial regime, which drained Haiti of its wealth and maintained order through fear and coercions. The Tonton Macoutes, Duvalier’s feared paramilitary force, were groups of youths recruited from popular neighborhoods, and were known to commit violent human rights abuses.6

In the 1970’s the demographic of Bel Air was altered by the influx of thousands of migrants from rural areas, instigated by an agrarian crisis triggered by the adoption of neoliberal economic policies and intense deforestation.7 The increased population density put additional strain on the already weak infrastructure and social services, generating an urban flight of middle class residents to outlying suburban areas. Today the majority of the adult population are migrants, or the children of migrants from the interior of Haiti. According to the census conducted in 2007 by the Brazilian non-governmental organization Viva Rio, there were 135,000 people living in the area of Greater Bel Air.7

3.2. RECENT HISTORY OF GREATER BEL AIR

The end of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986 was noted by those interviewed from Bel Air to be the pivotal point in recent history, so this historical overview will focus on events from this juncture forward. After the military ushered Jean Claude Duvalier into exile with the support of the US government, a struggle ensued over who would control Haiti’s future. Since the early 1980’s the impoverished population of the popular neighborhoods had already began to organize themselves into community associations and self-help groups. An organized grassroots movement arose of the fear of Haitian elites that they would be the targets of mass rage. The elite itself was divided between those advocating radical change and those resisting reforms. When the army failed to dismantle the Makout militias, angry mobs took it upon themselves to kill the militia members.8 The years between 1986-1990 were marked by political instability as the army struggled to reconsolidate their power. After an interim government, three ousted Presidents, and an internationally backed provisional government, internationally recognized fair and free elections were carried out on December 16, 1990. Jean- Bertrand Aristide was swept to victory, winning 67 percent of the popular vote.

Aristide, a priest educated at the Salesian Seminary who pastored at the Church of St. Jean Bosco in La Saline, gained widespread popularity among the poor by preaching liberation theology. The charismatic priest became the leader of a broad network of grassroots, pro-democracy organizations known as Lavalas, “the flood”. Lavalas became the theme of Aristide’s campaign for social change. Aristide’s pre-poor message, calling for opposition to repression and radical change in the social order earned him the widespread support of popular neighborhoods such as Bel Air.9

Bel Air became Aristide’s stronghold and was an area that greatly benefited from his patronage. Aristide’s “second revolution” aimed at eliminating the caste-like system of racial and social divisions and inequalities, deeply rooted in the slavery system during the colonial period.10 The “revolution” consisted of a series of reforms aimed at restructuring the relationship between political power and social class. He also purged the top ranks of the military, arrested leaders of the former Makout militias, and instituted a proposed tax on the elites. Under Aristide many people from Bel Air were employed in government offices, ministries, and companies; a practice of patronage that he reinforced during his second mandate.

Aristide’s fierce rhetoric of class struggle induced fear in the privileged class, as it represented a threat to the status quo. Nine months into his first mandate, the army, which had remained loyal to the elite and the neo-Duvallers, mounted a coup against Aristide, sending him into exile. When a UN-sponsored and US-led military intervention returned him from exile in 1994, he disbanded the army. However, the demobilization process was left incomplete, and many of the command structures and weapons of the ex-FA DH soldiers remained intact.

During this time, many of the political elite began arming youths in the popular neighborhoods as personal protection forces. To create a protection force loyal to him, Aristide began supporting groups of young men in Bel Air who could be armed and mobilized for violence when needed. The groups that benefited from Aristide’s patronage were known as chimeres by his political opponents, and popularly they were known as “bases” [baz], drawing on and reinforcing the existing networks of baz in Bel Air.11 Since then Bel Air has won the reputation as a “highly politicized” neighborhood, an area that has been heavily instrumentalized by politicians to garner support during electoral periods. Informants spoke of the tendency of people to “give themselves to political action” as part of the culture of Bel Air.11

When Aristide won a second term in office in 2001 in order to secure his position and prevent a repetition of the 1991 coup, he reinstated many of the clientelistic prac-

8Ibid.
9The term ‘baz’ can be used to refer both to an armed group and a neighborhood, which had remained loyal to the elite and the neo-Duvallers; a practice of patronage that he reinforced during the 1994 coup. Seven months into his first mandate, the army, which had remained loyal to the elite and the neo-Duvallers, mounted a coup against Aristide, sending him into exile. When a UN-sponsored and US-led military intervention returned him from exile in 1994, he disbanded the army. However, the demobilization process was left incomplete, and many of the command structures and weapons of the ex-FA DH soldiers remained intact.
11The phrase used by informants was, “C’est une culture a Bel Air que les gens se donne à la politique.”
ties of his predecessors. By strengthening the gangs with streams of cash and arms, Aristide unofficially sanctioned their activity and connected them to police and security officials of the government. This created linkages between the gangs, the police and institutions of the government, which were unofficially branded by Aristide. The gangs gained political authority and some succeeded in controlling their zones by taking control of state services such as policing. The gangs loyal to Aristide created Lavallas strongholds in many of the poor neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince, including Bel Air. However, the gangs quickly spiraled beyond the central control of Aristide’s regime, and oppositional movements provoked an atmosphere of social unrest.

3.3 DEPLOYMENT OF THE UN TO PRESENT

In the wake of the coup, the UN deployed a Multinational Interim Force, which was replaced by the arrival of MINUSTAH, an 8,000 member peacekeeping force. The second coup against Aristide sparked heated protests in Lavallas strongholds such as Bel Air. For seven months the demonstrations were non-violent, but on September 30th, 2004 the Haitian National Police (PNH) fired on a legal demonstration of 10,000 people gathered outside the National Palace to mark the 12th anniversary of the 1991 coup that ousted Aristide, demanding his return. The use of force against the demonstrators by the interim government marked the beginning of a violent uprising in Bel Air and other popular neighborhoods that came to be known as “Operation Baghdad”. This incident marked the beginning of a period of violence in which an estimated four hundred people were killed in a string of joint MINUSTAH-PNH raids, including many from Bel Air. Armed groups from the popular neighborhoods carried out opportunistic kidnappings targeted at the political and economic elite, in revenge for their complicity in the coup. The protest movement revealed the tense relationships between the impoverished masses of the slums and the class of political and economic elite, as well as their frustrations related to their marginalization.

The bases of Bel Air armed themselves against attacks of the PNH and former FADH members. The patrimonial structures of the pro-Aristide baz already existed in Bel Air, which made their rapid mobilization possible. Aristide used the local structures of the baz and the popular organizations (OPs) to transfer resources from the state to the local communities, thereby consolidating his political support in Bel Air. The increasingly overlapping structures of the OPs and armed bases were used to distribute resources and provide services to the local population, such as money for school fees, electricity bills, food and clothing. Aristide also hired those associated with the baz or OPs for public employment in the PNH, Teleco (the national telephone company) or the port. Lavallas created the 14th promotion of the National Police in 2004, 90% of which were youth without training. When Aristide was again ousted from power, many of those associated with the baz or OPs were fired from the public services, many of whom were unemployed youth who joined the armed bases.

During Operation Baghdad the baz were mobilized for violence and joined together into a loosely organized movement under the leadership of Dread Mackenzie, a local leader. Tight rules were enforced among his combatants, and violators were executed. For example, interviewees stated that it was forbidden to rape, or to steal from or attack members of the community. When Mackenzie was killed early in Operation Baghdad, his successor did not enforce the same discipline and the situation quickly degenerated into extreme violence. Opportunistic criminals as well as pro-Aristide groups from other parts of the country joined the fighting, most of whom were not embedded in the local community and did not share the linkages of the baz to the communities.

This led to fighting between rival gangs with short opportunistic goals for control of territory in Bel Air and other neighborhoods. The MINUSTAH and PNH forces used excessive force in the neighborhoods of Greater Bel Air in attempts to dislodge and weaken the gangs. This contributed to an escalation of violence, spiraling into fighting across conflict lines, waves of kidnappings, murders, arson, theft and sexual abuse. In response, the government mounted a DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion) program to enforce the remittance of arms and provide partial immunity and social services to former combatants. These violent and non-violent interventions eventually quelled the political unrest of the Lavallas movement and its violent suppression. The election of President Préval, former Prime Minister of Aristide, was a political compromise that aided in subduing the unrest.

This brief review of the historical context of Bel Air serves as important background for the conflict analysis of the current context. The focus on the period from 1986-2006 illustrates how violent conflict in Bel Air is historically rooted in the clientelistic relationship between the state and its citizens. The heavy-handed, centralized Duvalier regime inflicted brutal political violence against the citizens, but as interviewees pointed out, “It was controlled and predictable”. Since the departure of Duvalier there has been a rise in violent crime linked to political unrest. On the local level this has degenerated into violence between and within the armed baz, as well as an increase in violence against the population. The neoliberal economic agenda of globalized intensification of the historical conflictive interests of the poor majority and the small elite class. While the violence of 2004-2006 was triggered by the coup d’etat against Aristide, it was rooted in the long-standing frustration generated by the social, political, and economic exclusion felt by those in low-income popular areas, such as Bel Air.

Greater Bel Air was one of the areas most devastatingly affected by the January 2010 earthquake in which an estimated 220,000 people were killed and 2.3 million were displaced. NGOs flooded into Haiti to provide relief and by the end of the year the international community had pledged 3.6 billion USD in aid. Three years later, it was noted by many interviewees that the majority of the population of Greater Bel Air is worse off than before the earthquake. As international actors flooded into Bel Air, the balance of power shifted from long-time leaders whose influence declined in the face of the newly forged influence of opportunists and criminal groups. Adding to this dynamic was the escape of 6,000 prisoners from the central penitentiary during the earthquake. As NGO cash-for-work and other short-term projects providing employment have come to an end, the number of unemployed, frustrated youth has risen. The marked increase in violent crime since the 2010 earthquake has been documented and was also noted by many participants in the conflict analysis. In light of the promises and expectations the highly visible international presence created, there is a strong feeling of discontent and frustration amongst the population of Greater Bel Air.
4. KEY DRIVING FACTORS, NATIONAL LINKAGES AND TRIGGERS

Cities are inherently conflictual spaces, containing high concentrations of people with frequently incongruent interests within confined spaces. When strong social bonds exist and social/political supports are in place, these conflicts are often managed or resolved in a peaceful manner through a range of social, cultural and political mechanisms, but at times these mechanisms break down and conflict tips over into outbreaks of violence. Greater Bel Air presents a situation of urban conflict that has tipped over into cyclical, protracted violence, particularly over the past 25 years.

The concept of a tipping point goes back to the 1950s, and refers to the point in time a given social process becomes generalized rather than specific, in a rapid rather than a gradual manner.29 When applied to violence, tipping points refer to the juncture at which conflict-based power struggles inflict unacceptable or intolerable levels of physical and/or mental harm on others. The tipping point of violence is subject to the perceptions of local communities and social actors which determine when conflict has moved past the “acceptable” levels of chronic endemic daily violence to acute, generalized violence.

4.1 POVERTY ROOTED IN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INEQUALITIES

As Haiti is the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, poverty was unsurprisingly the most common response when participants were asked to identify driving factors of violence. “Misery” (la misère) was the term often used to express the intolerable level of poverty in Bel Air. Images of a struggle reminiscent of Darwin’s “survival of the fittest” were invoked to describe the popular sentiment of frustration. These tensions were heightened after the 2010 earthquake when, despite the highly visible international presence and USD 3.6 billion in humanitarian assistance, the majority of the population of Bel Air still find themselves in a situation of extreme poverty.

Every socio-economic measure confirms the reality of Haiti’s extreme conditions of poverty. Haiti is a country dependent on foreign aid and remittances from overseas. More than 80% of the population lives in poverty. Between 1997 and 2012 the annual growth rate averaged 1.14%. Haiti ranks 161 in the Human Development Report.33 These statistics reflect the dismal living conditions for the majority of Haitians, conditions which declined after the 2010 earthquake.

While entrenched structural poverty has long been considered a key determinant of urban violence, the linear causal relationship between poverty and violence is disputed as being too simplistic. Recent statistical studies have challenged this assumption, demonstrating that inequality is more influential in instigating violence, particularly with income inequalities being more pronounced in urban than in rural areas.35 In Haiti poverty is inextricably linked to inequalities rooted in class divisions. The richest 20% of the country owns 63% of the country’s wealth, while the poorest 20% owns 3.1% of it.36 This distribution puts Haiti among the top five countries with the highest income inequality in the world.37

The current inequalities are rooted in the system of slavery and the legacy of injustice perpetuated by this economic model. Within the French colonial system a small mulatto class developed which experienced some privileges under the colonial rule. When Haiti won its independence through a successful slave revolt in 1804 (the only such successful rebellion in the world’s history), this small
class of mixed-race Haitians - les gens de couleur - who had backed the revolutionaries, attained a privileged status. After independence the mixed race Haitians came to make up a small urban elite who, in alliance with the military, morphed into a mercantile class that gradually came to control the extractive state. The vast majority of the black, Creole-speaking peasants continued to subsist through a system of subsistence agriculture. The mercantile elite who led the state flourished through the customs houses that taxed the peasant surplus. This gave rise to the extractive, predatory nature of the state that still exists today.

Horizontal and vertical inequalities

Respondents in the conflict analysis emphasized that the structure of this economically and racially based class division (reinforced by social and cultural divisions) goes back over 200 years of history, “a history from which we haven’t escaped.” A recent study by NORFED affirms that disparities among social categories, or horizontal inequalities, insofar as they reflect collective feelings of injustice, or humiliation, can unleash violence in powerful, cumulative ways. Social groups that carry historical cultural markers of race are commonly interwoven with material or economic markers of exclusion/inclusion. This collective sense of humiliation and resentment toward the privileges held by the elite has built up over generations in places such as Haiti. Horizontal disparities are also manifest in inequalities between men and women, as well as between generations, disparities that are often marked by violence.

Vertical social cohesion between classes in Haiti is influenced by the extent to which political and economic structures meet the functional expectations effectively and equitably. Equity is an extremely important variable in this equation because it is based on and influences citizens’ perceptions of whether or not they believe they have a stake in the country’s social contract. Historical inequalities in Haiti are linked to the current frustrations expressed by people in Greater Bel Air, who have unequal access to basic services and unequal political and economic influence created by skewed distributions of income and assets.

As one respondent clearly stated, “violence in Bel Air is an economic issue.” Indeed, over the past twenty years, violence has been increasingly resorted to as a means of addressing economic inequalities. Particularly during the period between 2004 and 2006, violence was used as an attempt to rectify inequalities in wealth. Through kidnappings of wealthy businessmen, lootting and stealing, the bar “redistributed” wealth in their communities, thereby reaffirming their legitimacy amongst the local population. In a situation of increasing insecurity, many business owners hired gangs or private security forces to protect their businesses located around Bel Air and Cité Soleil. In hiring gangs or criminal elements for protection, the elite participated in the reproduction and continuation of networks of violence.

In the absence of political will to create formal channels for dialogue and social change, violence has become a normalized mode of interaction between the elites and the masses. Armed groups from Bel Air are often recruited by the urban elite and are instrumentalized to carry out politically-motivated violence. In this light, the links between gang violence and discrepancies between political classes seems to be less associated with political exclusion, but rather more closely related to the elite obtaining or maintaining power through the selective inclusion of the masses in the violent state system. As such, violence is a mechanism by which the unjust structures and state systems perpetuate themselves and reinforce inequality. Inequality in systems and structures produces intolerable conditions of poverty, which in turn provokes violence that further entrenches structural violence and the relations of inequality. It is a cycle that is difficult to break.

In discussing the persistence of historical inequalities, respondents spoke of the need for dialogue, reconciliation and social repair. Haitian society was described as segmented and fractured, where each economic class meets amongst themselves, but does not mix with other.

4.2 Weak state institutions

Many of the respondents connected poverty to weak state institutions and poor leadership at the national level. Haiti is considered by several indexes to be a “weak state” and ranks eighth on the 2013 Failed States Index. While definitions of weak state differ, common characteristics include inadequate provisions of public services, loss of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and the absence of conditions to achieve sustainable economic development. Informants cited multiple indicators of Haiti’s dysfunctional state, such as the non-provision of public services, corruption in the PNH and judicial system, lack of control over criminal groups and criminal activity (i.e. smuggling, drug trade, human trafficking) and “poor governance”. Many also noted the lack of political will or commitment on the part of the government to providing these services. The need for a “new profile” of political leaders was also expressed by several informants.

The linkage between weaknesses in governance at the national level and violence at the local level was also highlighted. This response is substantiated by recent research showing that increases in violence in the popular neighborhoods very often coincide with broader political crises or political turmoil at the national level. In addition, the deterioration of social service delivery to the already underserved area of Greater Bel Air has coincided with times of political uncertainty. The further
The impact of the national level governance crisis on the local level was described as a situation where gangs thrive in a weak state that has largely failed to provide public services or sufficient rule of law to safeguard its citizens. Armed gangs and criminal groups have increased in the past twenty-five years as they’ve stepped into the governance voids created by a weak state. Violence soared from 2004 to 2007 after Aristide’s departure widened the void in governance. Running local neighborhoods, the gangs maintained social control and provided a sense of protection, becoming de facto micro-governments of neighborhoods. Further governance voids, death and displacement after the earthquake contributed to the upsurge of violence in 2012 in Greater Bel Air.

Beyond creating the conditions of a weak state that fosters armed groups, many informants emphasized how political leaders intentionally mobilize baz and criminal groups to gain or maintain power. Over the past few decades opposing elites have co-existed with armed groups who collaborate with them in exchange for the opportunities offered to them. In this way, political and criminal economic interests merge at specific points in time, often triggering violence.

Many informants highlighted the role of the political and economic elite in “exploiting the misery of the masses” as a trigger of violence. As the elite are above the law, they can orchestrate criminal acts from behind the scenes with impunity. Those who manipulate the masses were not easily identified, and were described by informants as the “invisible hand” or the “gangster operating from up above.” The weakness of the state and lack of rule of law fosters impunity for state and non-state actors alike, contributing to the perpetuation of politically and economically motivated violence.

### Drug Trafficking

Haiti has been a major transit point for drugs – particularly cocaine and marijuana – from the Andean countries of South America to the US since the 1980s. One factor that has contributed to this is because Haiti is an opportune place for transshipment of drugs to the US. Haiti’s 1,200 miles of unprotected coastline and 225 miles of unpatrolled land border make it an attractive location for drug traffickers. According to key informants and a United States Institute for Peace (USIP) report, drug shipments transit by “fast boats” and small planes that land at tiny ports and on clandestine airstrips scattered along Haiti’s southern coast. Haiti’s weak and dysfunctional police force is unable to respond to the challenge, as traffickers often take as little as five minutes to offload their cargo and refuel. The coast guard has only two patrol boats, 95 personnel, and no air assets, making it an opportune place for transshipment of drugs to the US.

Despite the presence of the UN stabilization mission since 2004, Haiti remains a major transit country for cocaine trafficking, enabled by the weak law enforcement capacities of the Haitian National Police, the absence of Haitian political leadership and the chronically weak justice system. While criminal groups facilitate the drug transshipment activities, according to informants in the conflict analysis and to a recent report by the International Peace Institute (IPI), they benefit from a high degree of complicity with key figures in local and national government, including within the Haitian National Police. Corruption among Haiti’s law enforcement authorities is common. The seizure of 925 pounds of cocaine on May 31, 2007 in the coastal town of Loegane highlights Haiti’s challenges in controlling drug trafficking. The drugs were discovered at a road checkpoint in vehicles with government license plates. Five police officers were among the ten people arrested. To understand the challenges Haiti faces with drug trafficking it is helpful to return to the historical overview and highlight a few points. The brutal Tonton Macoute paramilitary force created by Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier operated alongside the Haitian Armed Forces (FADH). When Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier succeeded him, he became involved in the drug trade as well as other illicit activities. His overthrow in 1986 left a security vacuum until Aristide became President in the first free elections in 1990. When Aristide was overthrown in a military coup just eight months later, the FAD H who were notoriously engaged in drug trafficking and political violence ran the country from 1991-1994. A UN Security Council blockade on Haiti during this time devastated the licit economy and created lucrative incentives for smuggling, thereby cementing the nexus between criminal groups and the army.

When Aristide was returned to power in 1994, the FAD H was disbanded and the new Haitian National Police (HNPP) was created. While Aristide’s government tried to restrict the drug trade it tolerated a degree of police involvement in trafficking in order to win over their support. In 2000, Aristide faced an armed rebellion coordinated by forces allied with the opposition group 184 (comprising political parties and private sector actors), which was led by Guy Philippe who had strong ties to regional drug trafficking networks and received training from US special forces in Ecuador in 1991. He allegedly escaped several joint operations by the US Drug Enforcement Agency and the HNP and lives in quasi-hiding in Haiti. The decade between 1994 and 2004 was characterized by lawlessness, partly due to the failure of the Haitian government to deal with the underlying conditions that enabled illicit activity and violence to flourish.

In the absence of public security in the popular neighborhoods, armed groups filled the vacuum and became the de facto leaders. While their illicit activity was mostly local-level racketeering and small-scale trafficking, some groups also developed links with drug traffickers and private security companies. During the second presidency of Réné Préval between 2006 and 2011, there was a general decrease in organized crime, partly as a result of efforts to â€œclean upâ€ the HNP, but also due to the arrest and killing of many armed group members through the anti-gang operations of the HNP/MINUS- TAH. There was likewise a reported decrease in the amount of drugs transiting the country after the January 2010 earthquake, but concerns have been expressed that organized crime is becoming further embedded with state institutions due to the recent return of individuals with connections to these networks in the highest circles of power. Reliable data is difficult to attain, but the US Drug Enforcement Agency and State Department reported a decrease from around 11 tons of cocaine transiting through Haiti in 2009 to 3.7 tons in 2011, and from twenty-one drug flights in 2009 to seven in 2011. The decrease might be partially explained by the destruction of infrastructure, including roads and airstrips, which make it more difficult for drug trafficking. Another possible explanation is that drug traffickers have displaced some of their activities to the Dominican Republic, the Caribbean’s primary drug hub. However, the US Congress recently assessed that, as Haiti rebuilds following the earthquake it is likely to see an increase in clandestine drug flights and maritime drug trafficking in the coming years.

Interviews along with information from secondary sources indicated that drug shipments arrive in Haiti from South America by boat and plane, primarily on the southern coast and in the Artibonite region. They are then transported across the country in vehicles and loaded onto speedboats on Haiti’s northern coast, bound for the US. Transnational drug trafficking networks operating in Haiti have been known to benefit from accomplices within local authorities, police and customs, as well as prominent senators who are granted blanket immunity by the Haitian constitution. Despite significant drug transit through Haiti, crime rates in the regions with the highest volumes of trafficking are low, and there are few violent drug related incidents despite the limited...
KEY DRIVING FACTORS, NATIONAL LINKAGES AND TRIGGERS

The USIP likewise reported that despite the significant amount of drugs transiting through Haiti, narco-terrorism does not pose a threat.46

When asked about the links between drug trafficking and local level violence within and between armed groups in Greater Bel Air, informants expressed that it was not a major driving factor or cause of violence. When asked about the level of consumption of drugs in Bel Air, informants responded that marijuana and to a lesser degree “crack” are consumed by armed group members, and might contribute to participation in violence or violent behavior. Reports from secondary sources confirm that while there is some use of marijuana, cocaine and heroine are beyond the purchasing power of all but a tiny fraction of Haiti’s population.48 Particularly in the rural areas that are hubs for drug trafficking, social cohesion and traditional moral values continue to be influential in preventing the development of an internal drug abuse problem. However, the USIP report expresses concerns that experience from other countries with significant drug trafficking often eventually leaves the negative consequence of local drug addiction.49

Recent research into organized crime in Haiti raises serious concerns that the 2011 election of President Michel Martelly opened up a new and permissive era in which organized crime is becoming further embedded in state institutions. HNP director Mario Andresol gave an interview in February 2012 near the end of his term in which he openly denounced the return of certain individuals enjoying political protection who had been involved with kidnapping, murders, and the trafficking of drugs and arms in the early 2000s.50 Similarly in a June 2012 open letter, the Haitian National Network to Defend Human Rights (RNDDH) pointed to the presence of “several ex-police men of dubious morality” in President Martelly’s entourage. Two former senators linked to the former Duvalier clique and with alleged connections to drug trafficking have also been brought into the presidential palace as advisors.51 The return of individuals with connections to both the former Duvalier regime and trafficking networks in the highest circles of power raises concerns that organized crime is becoming further embedded in state institutions.

While Martelly has been trying to attract foreign investment by declaring “Haiti – Open for Business” in November 2011 at the inauguration of the $257 million Korean industrial park near Cap-Haitien, virtually no foreign investments have been made since the earthquake. However, there are suspicions that some recent small to medium size investments in hotels and supermarkets, particularly on the southern coast and in Port-au-Prince, might be at least partially funded by drug-money laundering. This has been accompanied by a surge in violent crime since late 2011, including kidnappings and homicides. One possible factor that could have contributed to the upsurge in violence is that armed groups formerly associated with and primarily financed by politicians may have become less organized and more criminal at the same time. This change in the nature and activity of armed groups is discussed further in this conflict analysis in the “Actors” section. Other possible explanations include the possibility that criminal groups may be testing the new HNP leadership or they might be attempts by drug traffickers in one part of the country to distract the HNP while large amounts of drugs are being used elsewhere.52

One of the biggest challenges is the limited capacity of the Haitian state to address issues of trafficking (both drugs and the trafficking of persons and arms). Sea and land borders are porous and both the HNP and coastguard are very small. The HNP is mainly concentrated in Port-au-Prince and has a very weak presence in areas such as Saint-Michel-de-l’Atalaye in Artibonite district and the hills of Jacmel in the South-East district that are allegedly hiding places for criminals and traffickers.53 The UN effort to reform and professionalize the HNP in the late 1990s had minimal success in part due to the politicization and corruption in the HNP. As Haiti’s surveillance capacities remain extremely limited, the HNP counter-narcotics unit relies heavily on information provided by the US DEA and Interpol.54 Without an effective Haitian police force there is little prospect of addressing Haiti’s drug trafficking-related problems.

Another governance-related challenge is the weak and corrupt justice system, as well as outdated laws that don’t address organized crime and human trafficking. The idea of mixed international-national courts and bringing temporary outside judicial capacity to assist in reforming the Haitian legal systems from the inside has been proposed. Based on the International Commission Against Impunity model in Guatemala, the model was rejected by the Haitian government on the grounds of violating national sovereignty. This points to a lack of political will to address drug-trafficking interests, due to entrenched personal interests and corruption, where crime is a lucrative opportunity for personal enrichment rather than a threat to national security.

The UN mandate and structure has prevented it from addressing the complex national and transnational drug trafficking issues.55 As a result, it has largely overlooked the political economy of organized crime and its links to political violence at all levels, which hinders the security and development it is there to encourage. Due to their limited mandate and challenges related to partnering with the Haitian state, the UN has been unable to address the underlying factors that allow drug trafficking and related crime to flourish. While President Martelly declared Haiti “Open for Business”, Haiti won’t attract foreign investment unless there are minimum rule-of-law guarantees. High unemployment remains a problem and without foreign investment and other job creation, Haitians remain vulnerable and more likely to participate in the illicit economy. Although it is not possible to establish a direct link between drug trafficking and the local level violence in Greater Bel Air, the large numbers of unemployed youth are more prone to participating as accomplices in criminal networks. As drug trafficking is embedded in the corrupt structures of a weak state, it will be difficult to address the problem until the vicious cycle is broken.

4.3 BREAKDOWN OF VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL SOCIAL BONDS

The purpose of the social bond is to unite individuals and social groups and to ensure their peaceful co-existence through shared rules. To understand the nature of what informants described as political instrumentalization and how it operates as a driving factor of conflict, it is important to examine the quality of social bonds that exist between the elites and the masses. What facilitates the rapid mobilization of the masses? What conditions and processes predispose individuals and groups in the popular neighborhoods to taking part in these mobilizations?56 Studies show that weak social bonds and low levels of trust in both social relationships and formal institutions are causally linked to the probability that social unrest will become violent.57

During interviews with key informants and focus groups in Bel Air, respondents expressed low levels of trust in institutions, such as the state, NGOs and MINUSTAH. In examining attitudes about security provision, many respondents expressed little confidence in the ability of the MINUSTAH to provide security in their neighborhood. They noted the MINUSTAH patrols, but doesn’t
deter crime because those arrested are held in very good conditions and released without being abused. Thus, members of armed groups expressed a lack of fear of the MINUSTAH as opposed to the PNH. Likewise many respondents expressed the view of MINUSTAH as an "occupying force", and the need to plan for their transi- tion out of the country. Others expressed concern around the blurring of the MINUSTAH's military and civilian interventions, which they cited as a potential trigger of conflict.

Likewise, household survey studies conducted from March 2012 and September 2012 report that confi- dence in the Haitian National Police has dropped among residents of popular zones [including Bel Air] for the first time since 2007. One in five respondents expressed concern that the HNP were unable or unwilling to protect them from crime.76 In a situation of generalized mis- trust, operations of the PNH can easily trigger violence, particularly when the PNH collaborates with one armed group to carry out operations against another armed group.

Demands for bribes also reportedly increased in 2012, and disturbingly more than half of sexual assault victims and household members who tried to report the crime to the police complained that the officers either refused to make a report, tried to dissuade them from doing so, or demanded a bribe.77 A story of two young men fighting over a girlfriend illustrates this problem. When the conflict escalated to involve other family and community members, they went to the police, who told them to go see their baz for a solution to the dispute. When people do not trust the institutions of the judicial system or the security forces of the state, this creates a proclivity towards settling differences by their own means, not ex- cluding violence. The social contract, granting the state the only legitimate right to use violence, breaks down when the population no longer has trust in the institu- tions of the state to bring justice.

Overall trust in NGOs is also exceptionally low, and there were extremely high levels of frustration expressed at the way NGOs operate in Greater Bel Air, particularly the influx of NGOs in the wake of the 2010 earthquake. Low levels of trust were partly attributed to communication gaps and the lack of information that reaches the popu- lation. It was also noted that the activities of NGOs have weakened the horizontal social bonds within local com- munities and between communities by creating divisions or exacerbating existing divisions.78 The competition for employment with NGOs, and the means of accessing jobs was said to promote jealousy and trigger violence. In addition, the stimulation of an unsustainable demand for employment (i.e. cash for work and other quick impact projects that have now dried up) has increased frustra- tion amongst youth.

**Urbanization**: Levels of trust in horizontal social bonds between in-dividuals and groups within Greater Bel Air were also described as low, another determining factor in social conflicts becoming violent. A critical dimension that has negatively affected social bonds is intense urbanization, leading to the emergence of popular neighborhoods or the “siumification” of what were middle class neighbor- hoods such as Bel Air.79 (See graphs in annex 1) As one informant expressed, “people don’t know each other and this has created a lack of trust.” Sociologist Emile Dur- kheim contended that social cohesion is undermined by intensive urbanization when markets do not provide job opportunities that create new social bonds linked to the division of labor. The loss of the social bonds from blood or kinship ties to a restricted geographic area (or village) and the absence of new social bonds creates mistrust and fosters violence.80 The “popular neighborhoods” also tend to have weaker vertical social bonds that link them to people of different statuses (classes), and to neigh- borhoods outside of Bel Air, as well as to national level actors.

Many respondents also highlighted contextual factors in the urban spatial configurations of Bel Air that increase the likelihood of violence. The lack of electricity in the narrow alleys of neighborhoods facilitates criminal acts and inhibits movement after dark. Similarly, the high population density coupled with the lack of public space where different social groups can interact was noted as increasing the likelihood that local conflicts become vio- lent. Dysfunction land tenure systems, often resulting in forced evictions (especially since the 2010 earthquake) can likewise be associated with urbanization, displacement and the weakening of social bonds.

The weakening of social bonds caused by rapid urbani- zation is linked to national level factors, particularly neoliberal economic policies and deforestation. The im- povery of the countryside as a result of a deliber- ately designed import food culture is one of the underlying causes of urbanization cited by informants. In the 1990’s Haiti was pressured by the US and the International Monetary Fund to adopt neo-liberal economic policies that exac- erated existing economic and social inequalities. This created a fundamental shift away from local productions of food toward importation of food staples, reinforcing its unjust economic system. The few wealthy families that control the import market buy and sell food staples such as rice and beans at a price local farmers can’t possibly compete with, driving migration from rural areas to the cities. This has destroyed local production, making Haiti dependent upon imports to meet the food needs of its people.

This shift also made residents of popular neighborhoods such as Bel Air particularly vulnerable to the spike in world food prices in 2008, when the population took to the streets in angry protests. Neo-liberal policies demanding cut-backs on government spending for social services while privatization of government-owned companies and an end to import tariffs has unleashed new forms of violence in poor neighborhoods. For example, the decline in agricultural output has obliged the country to turn to international aid, migrant remittances and profits made from smuggling and drug trafficking.

**Environmental Degradation**: Severe deforestation that has eliminated ninety-seven percent of Haiti’s forests is another factor stimulat- ing rural migration and the breakdown of social bonds. Deforestation has turned Haiti into an environmental disaster, ranking 161st out of 155 countries according to a study conducted by Yale University based upon the Environmental Sustainability Index.81 Haiti ranks low on every aspect of environmental quality; stress on the en- vironment; human vulnerability; social and institutional capacity and environmental systems. Uncovered water- sheds have also left the country vulnerable to natural disasters, such as flooding, hurricanes and droughts. Haiti’s manufacturing-based development has encour- aged the construction of factories while not simultane- ously investing in agriculture and other more sustainable forms of development to mitigate natural disasters. As a result, when natural disasters hit, Haiti is particularly exposed to food insecurity.82

When social bonds are broken through migration, the harshness of poverty and weak institutions, horizontal social relationships become tense and conflicts are more likely to become violent.83 In healthy societies, the state is the main institution that generates social bonds through the reduction of social inequality and the promo- tion of the collective well-being or common good of the society. Weak state institutions are thus linked to the un- supportive role of the state in establishing mechanisms that solidify and integrate vertical and horizontal social bonds in Haitian society.

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76Athena Kolbe and R. Muggah, op cit., March, 2012. Reports of
77A. Gilles, op cit.
78A. Gilles, op cit.
79A. Gilles, op cit.
80A. Gilles, op cit.
81A. Gilles, op cit.
82A. Gilles, op cit.
83A. Gilles, op cit.
85Ibid.
Poverty, as increases in violence inflict serious economic costs upon the general population. Multiple studies show that the circumstances for stability and security in Haiti have decreased since the earthquake.44 There was a dramatic increase in homicidal violence in the popular zones of Port-au-Prince between August 2011 and August 2012, in contrast to the rapidly declining rates between 2007 and early 2011.45,46 Vice Rond, to the governmental organization operating in Greater Bel Air, reported an increase in homicide from 16 per 100,000 in 2009 to 101 per 100,000 in 2012. From January to June 2013 the homicide rate reportedly decreased from 101 per 100,000 to 52 per 100,000, the decrease ostensibly linked to the recent police action against the armed group 117.47

Although the popular zones of Port-au-Prince experience less homicide and violent crime than many other major cities in Latin America, perceptions of insecurity are high both amongst the population and the international community. The UN labeling of Bel Air as a “red zone” reinforces negative stereotypes and perceptions of insecurity. Although perceptions of insecurity cannot be reflected in statistical evidence of incidents, the perceptions nonetheless fundamentally affect well-being. The decrease in security also has a negative impact upon the collective memory of slavery was cited as a cause of the exclusion that still characterizes the economic and social relationships today. Creating a sense of national belonging would necessarily include addressing the deeply internalized trauma that has accumulated in the individual and collective psyche through cycles of violence that have torn apart Haiti’s social fabric over the centuries.48 Dialogue, in this lens, is a means to create a commonly shared narrative and identity.

Belonging vs. exclusion

Many respondents expressed the need for a national dialogue to begin to heal the deep social divisions and create a common narrative of what it means to be Haitian. They reflected on the absence of the sentiment of belonging to the nation and any sort of common identity amongst Haitians. In Bel Air, informants expressed the absence of belonging as exclusion. Exclusion was described by informants as the lack of access to social services, unemployment, greater exposure to environmental and health hazards, and lack of influence and inclusion in the political and economic systems of the country. In describing the feeling of exclusion, one respondent from St. Martin asked the question, “Do they (the elite) see themselves as related to those in St. Martin? We will never have peace unless we Haitians come together and decide we’re one people.”

The collective memory of slavery was cited as a cause of the exclusion that still characterizes the economic and social relationships today. Creating a sense of national belonging would necessarily include addressing the deeply internalized trauma that has accumulated in the individual and collective psyche through cycles of violence that have torn apart Haiti’s social fabric over the centuries.49 Dialogue, in this lens, is a means to create a commonly shared narrative and identity.

Gang violence is often linked to the construction of social identity. The exclusion of youth from a sense of belonging. Participants in the focus group with armed groups explained that a central purpose of forming a baz is to have a ‘way of identifying yourself. The group becomes your identity, your clan.’ In this way, the baz fills a social function in the lives of its members. It provides a community of belonging in a social context where many have weak linkages to their families, or are excluded from other social and political institutions that address these needs.50 The baz also traditionally filled social functions in the community by organizing cultural events, and sporting events.

Underlying structural causes of violence are generally related to unequal power relations. Galtung, who examined the relationship of violence and power using a power typology, stated, “violence can be built into the structure of society….showing up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances”. Key driving factors of exclusion, inequality, and the breakdown of social bonds are all linked to inequalities in power, at both the micro and the macro levels, as well as between those levels.

Human agency is a concept that recognizes individuals as social actors who face alternative ways of formulating their objectives, however restricted their resources. When people perceive their options for action as limited, they might seek violence as a means of increasing their power. One informant described violence as a “tool for expressing themselves”, a way of expressing their frustration and demanding better living conditions. The use of arms as an exercise of power was cited by informants as an incentive for youth to associate with a baz or criminal group. In the focus group, young men expressed that having arms is a way to be recognized and gain respect. When asked whether they personally have arms, they stated, “That’s not a question, everyone has arms.” It’s the only way not to be naked.” “Being naked” signifies the feelings of humiliation that so often emerge living in situations of extreme poverty. In these circumstances a weapon becomes protection against the humiliation and degradation of self-worth of living in poverty, and is paradoxically a way to be recognized and assert one’s human dignity.

Feelings of humiliation were also expressed in another story told by an informant who worked with an NGO operating in St. Marin. A cyber café run by the NGO was robbed at gunpoint by a young armed man who stole five computers. When questioned as to why he did it, he stated that they ‘live like dogs and are treated like dogs’. Feelings of humiliation and discrimination from living in subhuman conditions were expressed throughout the interviews. In these conditions a gun represents respect and recognition, and provides a sense of purpose.51

Conclusion

Although poverty was cited as the most common key driving factor of violence, this analysis argues that while entrenched poverty is an important contextual factor in Bel Air, issues of inequality, exclusion from basic services and positive forms of political and economic participation, combined with “exclusion” in the violent state system are far more important driving factors of violence in Bel Air. Poverty, like violence, is a systemic phenomenon and its underlying causes include inequality, weak institutions and the state, exclusion and rapid urban migration, all of which contribute to the circumstances in violence tips over in Bel Air. Upon examination of the relationships between the elites and the masses, it is suggested that another key driving factor of violence is the way in which the poor (particularly unemployed youth) have been included in a violent political system, rather than facing political exclusion. Relationships of violence characterize the vertical social bonds between the state and the masses, that lack access to participative forms of political and economic participation, and recognition, and provides a sense of purpose.52

Exploiting Inequalities: Conflict and Power Relations in Bel Air

44 expulsion inequalities: conflict and power relations in bel air

86 The crude murder rate for Port-au-Prince increased from 60.9 to 72.2 murders per 100,000 between February and July 2012, with residents of “popular zones” being 40 times more likely to be murdered than other urban dwellers. Athena Kolbe, R. Muggah and M. Puccio, The Economic Costs of Violent Crime in Urban Haiti, Results from Monthly Household Surveys: August 2011-July 2012. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Ingarape, September, 2012. See also: A. Kolbe and R. Muggah, op cit., March 2012.

87 Ibid.

88 See Viva Rio statistics on total recorded homicides in Greater Bel Air.

89 For example, the September 2012 study by Kolbe and Muggah shows that funeral and burial costs averaged USD $4,958.70. Nearly all of the households surveyed took out loans to pay for the costs of the funeral, the interest charged on loans from money-lenders and morticians ranged from 50-150 per cent. Likewise, a single physical or sexual assault on a household member costs roughly 20 per cent of the household’s annual income while a murder can leave households with expenses that are more than five times the annual average income. Lower income households are likely to cut other essential expenses including food and education for children in order to cope with the unanticipated economic costs of the incident. A. Kolbe and R. Muggah, op cit.)


92 H. Lunde, op cit.

93 See Caroline Moser, op cit.


95 For more on the relationship of humiliation to violence see: James Gilligan, Preventing Violence (New York : Thames & Hudson: 2001).

96 H. Lunde, op cit.

97 See Caroline Moser, op cit.

It is difficult to address key driving factors of conflict in Greater Bel Air without an understanding of the nature of organized violence and the actors involved. Discussions on violence prevention, conflict resolution and stabilization in Haiti tend to focus on the issue of “Haiti’s urban gangs”. The dominant narrative portrays Haiti’s gangs as static entities, omnipresent groups responsible for overthrowing governments, terrorizing the local population, destructive of investment and involved in lucrative kidnapping and drug trafficking networks. However, these negative stereotypes do not always correspond to how all the gangs are viewed by the local population in the popular neighborhoods.

Contrary to popular assumptions about the role and behavior of these groups, little empirical knowledge exists about their nature, composition, and motivations. The lack of a common definition on what constitutes a “gang” became blatantly apparent as we spoke with informants from the international community, academics, and the local population of Bel Air. As no agreed upon definition has been established amongst these disparate groups, one question is who defines what is a gang, versus a community development group, an armed base or local development association. What criteria differentiate these different types of groups and are these criteria helpful when the lines between groups are often unclear, making it difficult for armed groups to be easily categorized? This question is key, as the way a group is socially constructed has implications for how violence prevention and reduction initiatives are designed and implemented.

It is outside the scope of this conflict analysis to propose or establish a definition of gangs or categorization of armed actors; rather it is a modest attempt to unpack the various understandings of and relationships between armed groups that arose during the interviews. One of the challenges in understanding the various armed actors in Haiti is that they are fluid, predominantly non-hierarchical informal conglomerations that are constantly in flux. Another challenge is the range of terms used to describe disparate phenomena, from groups of friends who occasionally get into fights, “neighborhood protection groups” and small community development associations, to actors who engage in violence ranging from petty crime to criminal networks with connections to members of the political or economic elite. There are multiple perspectives on what is considered to be an armed group and what is not, and how to classify the different groups.

As the term “gang” is a pejorative label imported from the US context, informants from Bel Air often used the more neutral concept of baz or bases to describe the neighborhood groups. Baz is a generic term describing a localized social and/or political group or space. It can make reference to a place, a social space or unit of sociability, denote the control of particular area or refer to the actors that defends a certain area. Baz are described as a place of belonging and protection, a space of sociability. Simultaneously, they can be a concrete site located in a neighborhood as well as a more or less abstract moral space whose boundaries are mobile and permeable. The term baz is also applied to groups of friends, Rara music groups, or development associations. Likewise informants attributed a diverse range of actions and functions to baz, ranging from community development and cultural activities, to armed action in illegal activities.

Baz were described by informants as four distinct, yet interconnected entities:

- a) Groups of community leaders with political connections to specific candidates or political leaders.
- b) Cultural groups such as the traditional Rara bands or the more modern hip-hop groups (often connected to younger baz). Every baz is connected to a Rara group that performs a cultural function and fosters a sense of identity.
- c) Organisations populairels, community development-oriented groups which create/generate projects to submit to NGOs, the MINUSTAH or government.
- d) Armed elements or units, commonly referred to as “bandits” by those outside of Bel Air.

Every baz (whether referring to a rara group, a group of friends, an armed base or local development association) implies some type of control over their territory, and allegedly protects the population and tries to find solutions to their problems, while sometimes entering into conflict with other baz.

The origin of the bases is frequently traced back to Aristide’s promotion of informal associations of youth involved in community development and cultural events. They were also structures of protection that would be loyal to him and could be armed and mobilized for violent action. The baz were used by Aristide to channel resources from the state to the local communities, and became increasingly overlapping with organisations populaires (popular organizations or “OPs”). The OPs were described by informants as “socio-political movements”, reflecting a form of clientelism that served the interests of the population of Bel Air during Aristide’s time as president. Aristide channelled cash, food items, school materials, and clothing among other things for the local organizations to distribute to their members, in exchange for their political loyalty.

Amongst interviewees from Greater Bel Air, a distinction was often made between baz, which were reflected on your own neighborhood. Amongst respondents, the distinction was often made based on the behavior of the groups in question, describing “criminal groups” as those which “don’t respect the rules of the community”, “immoral”, and disrespectful of human dignity. Many informants spoke of a “new brand” of criminal groups that they described as “not having respect for anything or anyone”.

It is often difficult to draw a clear line between gang-related activity of an armed base and organized crime, as they are often not mutually exclusive. The differences between types of armed groups are also not easily defined the nature of urban armed groups is constantly evolving. In addition, the motivations of armed actors are often a complex fusion of political, economic and social factors rather than exclusively political or economic in nature. One way it is proposed they may be distinguished is by their “current complexity and degree of integration within a geographically specific community.”

Athena Kolbe, a researcher on armed violence in Haiti proposes the following demographic and geographic characteristics in distinguishing between the two types of armed groups:

Urban gangs: Small, geographically isolated groups comprised of [mostly] young men in the popular urban zones. These groups may or may not be politically motivated and are often financially backed by businessmen. They usually engage in small scale crime including violence against those perceived to be a threat to their neighborhood. Urban gangs usually provide social services to residents including assisting with medical care and burial costs, paying tuition fees for disadvantaged children, garbage collection, home repair, and the organization of social and musical events.

Criminal Networks: Not generally identified by a particular name, criminal networks are usually regional or national and are often associated with wealthy and powerful families. These groups engage in both legal or illegal business ventures including imports/exports, trafficking of weapons, drugs and people, the lottery, money-lending, protection rackets and money laundering.

Conventionally the armed activities of the baz were expected to respect certain rules, such as not attacking or stealing from friends, neighbors or NGOs, rape was forbidden and police should not be shot. Armed operations were limited to areas outside of your neighborhood, and not customarily carried out against the population in your own neighborhood. Amongst respondents, the distinction was often made based on the behavior of the groups in question, describing “criminal groups” as those which “don’t respect the rules of the community”, “immoral”, and disrespectful of human dignity. Many informants spoke of a “new brand” of criminal groups that they described as “not having respect for anything or anyone”.

5. ACTORS ANALYSIS

It should be noted that baz are primarily social spaces for men, and there are few women leaders who would speak of being members of baz. Women play limited roles in support positions or roles in the baz. Women play limited roles in support positions or roles in the baz. Women play limited roles in support positions or roles in the baz. Women play limited roles in support positions or roles in the baz. Women play limited roles in support positions or roles in the baz. Women play limited roles in support positions or roles in the baz. Women play limited roles in support positions or roles in the baz. Women play limited roles in support positions or roles in the baz. Women play limited roles in support positions or roles in the baz.

For additional information and index on actors see Annexes 2 & 3.


†See Athena Kolbe, op cit., June 2013.

‡See Athena Kolbe, op cit., June 2013.

§Ibid, page 13

∥Ibid.
Motivations for carrying out armed activity were also noted by respondents to be useful in differentiating between baz and criminal groups. Habitually the baz fulfilled multiple functions in the community (protection, community development, cultural activities), whereas the criminal groups that emerged more recently were said to have “no motives other than to survive.” Their motivations were described purely in terms of individual interests, with little to no regard for the interests of the community. This shift from political and community interests to criminally motivated violence was clearly viewed by informants as a negative shift in the nature of newly established armed groups.

The newer generation of criminal groups were also noted to differ in that they are less territorially based and operate as networks. They were described as loosely affiliated “mobile networks,” non-hierarchical in structure which are not centralized geographically or linked to a specific geographical space. Thus, they don’t follow the usual command structures, modes of operating and territorial affiliations, these networks present challenge to NGOs working on stabilization and violence prevention. They are ephemeral in nature, making it difficult to identify specific individuals with them or allied to them at any specific time and place.

One informant who has researched gang violence over the past seven years was of the opinion that this view of newer gangs is more of an “accusation” than a reality. He emphasized the importance of understanding the contextuality of the armed groups. In his perspective, in examining the history of Bel Air it is evident that the newer gangs’ ways of operating and the factional nature of their network are a reaction to new factors. He noted that the conditions that the groups are operating in that have changed, both the dynamics in Bel Air, and the linkages with national level politics, particularly changes in the National Palace with the election of President Martelly. Before taking office, Martelly did not have connections with the baz of Bel Air (as most were primarily affiliated with Lavalas), but as he made alliances with Lavalas politicians from Bel Air who were close to the bases, alliances began to shift, creating new tensions between armed groups and with the new men.

Political, economic and social changes in Haiti have historically had an impact upon the operations and nature of armed groups. The current change in the nature of armed groups was noted by several respondents to correspond with the disruptions caused by the 2010 earthquake and was specifically attributed to several factors:

- 6,000 prisoners escaped after the earthquake, many of whom were former gang leaders arrests during Operation Bangladesh. They were described as returning to society without family and neighborhood connections and psychologically with extreme frustration and anger.
- Several leaders of baz were killed in the earthquake and new leaders came forward to fill the void in the leadership and social control. Many of the young leaders were said to have experienced and internalized extreme violence in their childhoods, either suffering the abuse of being associated with armed groups as children (child soldiers) and domestic abuse (as restavek).
- As large portions of the population were displaced, customary ties between the baz and their communities were weakened. Governance voids widened in the neighborhoods of Bel Air and criminal actors stepped in, often fighting with the baz that identified territorially with neighborhood at the expense of the civilian population.
- The death of national government officials in the earthquake, as well as the change in government in the subsequent elections broke the existing linkages between the baz and the national level leaders (which often passes through intermediaries in the municipalities/mayor). These changes further upset the balance of power and shifted alliances.
- NGO practices were also noted to have fostered the upsurge of new criminal groups. As some of the long-standing baz leaders were recruited by NGOs and became increasingly implicated in development violence reduction programs, they distanced themselves from their baz and certain leaders moved out of the neighborhood. This created space for new leaders associated with “criminal groups” to move in and operate.

The armed group known as “117” is one example of this type of new group that emerged after the earthquake and is said to operate according to the characteristics of a criminal network.104 Formed by a group of young men 105

from Delmas 2, they morphed into a mobile, criminal network operating in popular neighborhoods throughout the city. This is especially the case with 117’s “importation” - a mobile, cross-neighborhood network-based group that has disrupted the equilibrium of territorially based identities and power bases. Although membership is fluid and loosely defined, many of the young men who operate within 117 and were seen on television broadcasts greeting them. Community informants reported that members of Van Vire entered the homes of the accused, beating them with machetes and arms. Seven serious cases of hospitalization were reported as a result of the beatings. This incident also escalated existing tensions between Delmas 2 and Delmas 4.

Intimidation tactics and violence intended to create fear in the population are causing high levels of tension to persist in Delmas 2 and Delmas 4. Informants from Delmas 2 reported that Van Vire is becoming increasingly violent towards the population, and those with the means are leaving Delmas 2 due to the increase in insecurity. Of particular concern are reports of violence against girls who were associated with 117 as girlfriends or sexual partners when they controlled the neighborhood. 117’s typical way of operating was to commit robbery against certain families and “re-distribute” the stolen goods and money to the families of their girlfriends, wives and other supporters. Some families encouraged their daughters to become girlfriends or wives of members of 117 in order to receive financial support. Since the intervention against 117, the girls and many of their families have reportedly been threatened by Van Vire or asked to leave the neighborhood. Members of the families who were forced to leave the neighborhood have “joined forces” with 117. In this way also, 117 continues to garner support and increase in number.

Another negative consequence of the violent operations against 117 is the exacerbation of tensions between families in Delmas 2 who associated with 117 [or were suspected of being associated] and those who supported Van Vire. A similar situation was noted in the Haut Plateau neighborhood of Bel Air. Many girls left with 117 when they were driven from Bel Air. Following the June peace accords attempts were made by Viva Rio to bring them back to the community, but they are not easily accepted back by their communities.

Footnotes:
104 Although 117 reportedly started operating December, 2011, their origins were traced to a group of five young men carrying out criminal operations together before the earthquake. Their leader was imprisoned and escaped from prison after the earthquake.
105 Philippe Rodelin is the leader of 117, but they are said to operate within a relatively non-hierarchical structure.
106 Ongoing tensions between the baz of Delmas 2 and the population suspected of being in league with 117. One incident of this nature occurred during the recent Carnival des Fleurs (July 27-29, 2013) where associates of 117 were present and some residents of Delmas 4 were seen on television broadcasts greeting them. Community informants reported that members of Van Vire entered the homes of the accused, beating them with machetes and arms. Seven serious cases of hospitalization were reported as a result of the beatings. This incident also escalated existing tensions between Delmas 2 and Delmas 4.
107 Ti-Chinay, the 2nd in command and a key leader of 117 was arrested and imprisoned during the March operations.108
108 “cold war” between them. The civilian population of Delmas 2 reported that Van Vire is becoming increasingly violent towards the population, and those with the means are leaving Delmas 2 due to the increase in insecurity. Of particular concern are reports of violence against girls who were associated with 117 as girlfriends or sexual partners when they controlled the neighborhood. 117’s typical way of operating was to commit robbery against certain families and “re-distribute” the stolen goods and money to the families of their girlfriends, wives and other supporters. Some families encouraged their daughters to become girlfriends or wives of members of 117 in order to receive financial support. Since the intervention against 117, the girls and many of their families have reportedly been threatened by Van Vire or asked to leave the neighborhood. Members of the families who were forced to leave the neighborhood have “joined forces” with 117. In this way also, 117 continues to garner support and increase in number.

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As 117 associates were driven out of Delmas 2 on December 5, 2012, they fled to Plateau Bel Air and allegedly formed alliances with the Bel Air baz AlQaeda.110 and Ti-Pop in Bel Air.111 Ti-Pop was rumored to be receiving payments from 117 in exchange for refuge in the Haut Plateau, which they were using as an operating base for their operations in Delmas 2. This arrangement went on for several months and created internal tensions within Grand Black and with the local population, particularly as 117 members began committing crimes against the population. The tensions eventually erupted and fractured Grand Black.112

A peace accord between the various factions of Grand Black was signed on June 28, 2013. As 117 is labeled a “criminal group” that is wanted by the police, they were not included in the negotiations. This omission raises questions around the usefulness of how these groups are differentiated and labeled, and how this positively and negatively impacts the success of community violence reduction efforts. Shifts in how gangs are viewed often several intermediaries, it is difficult to pinpoint the key economic and political actors at the top level who instrumentalize violence to satisfy their interests. The peace accords of Viva Rio are mainly promoted by the local level leaders or notables who exemplify positive behavior. Violence prevention programs should work to identify and reinforce the influence of local level leaders exercising their structures, motivations and ways of operating. It is developing strategies to reach the younger generation of new gangs (or criminal groups) that differ from the older generation in their structures, motivations and ways of operating. The peace accords of Viva Rio are mainly promoted by the older generation of community leaders, and the younger generation has not been fully incorporated into the process. As many parents and community leaders have lost their influence over these youth, it becomes increasingly difficult to bring them into programs of NGOs or community organizations.

In this discussion of armed actors in Bel Air, it is important to create the strong linkages with national level political and economic elites. Local level conflict is always linked to the national level and Bel Air in particular has historically been an area of central, strategic importance to national politics. Sometimes these linkages are more formal, baz members who are employed by the mayor’s office or as security at the national palace, for example, but they more often serve informal, non-bureaucratic functions. Often the linkages between national level political and baz pass through several intermediaries. The government may in some instances provide a formal space for negotiation with the baz based on a framework by the end of the CNDDR. It was the impression of one informant that there are currently more linkages being made between Martelly’s government and the baz of Bel Air.

While most informants focused on the local level violence, a few emphasized that high-level political actors create the “real violence”. The “gangsters up above” exploit the misery of the masses by mobilizing for violence in exchange for economic or political benefits. Although violence manifests itself at the local level, it is often directly linked to power struggles between politicians and political parties who harness support amongst the poor, the unemployed and less formally educated. As there are often relatively few intermediaries, it is difficult to pinpoint the key economic and political actors at the top level who instrumentalize violence to satisfy their interests. When discussing key driving factors and actors with informants, it was evident that they do not stand alone as static entities, but rather they are connected and interact in ways that are constantly changing. Informants talked about the key driving factors and actors in ways that described their interconnectedness as a system of violence. Thus, one of the questions asked of informants is, who will resist change introduced into the entrenched system of violence and what can be done to work around the push-backs. The most common response was that those with the strongest political and economic interests, who are benefiting most from violence, will resist change. While it was difficult to get names of these specific people or groups due to the limitations of this conflict analysis, they stated that it would be possible to identify those who are instrumentalizing people in the popular neighborhoods, including those economic and political elite who work with local level armed leaders. In speaking about ways to work around potential push-backs from those benefiting from the violence, informants expressed the importance of developing and putting into place strategies that bring people together to dialogue and develop a common vision around community interests. One suggestion was to connect the perceived need to work on the internal fractures inherited from the system of slavery in Haiti. They also noted that political authorities, as well as business and political leaders should be implicated in violence prevention and community development initiatives from the start in order to avoid resistance. Violence reduction and prevention initiatives should find those who are orchestrating violence by trying to influence the discourses they have toward the masses in the popular neighborhoods. Similarly, certain leaders of baz (also referred to in Bel Air as leaders communaires) were helped amongst those who benefit from the system and who would resist change. For example, it was noted that some of them have put up obstacles to NGO development projects to build roads in the popular neighborhoods because the police will be able to patrol the neighborhoods. This also raises questions as to why they do not want the police patrolling their neighborhoods. Given the police’s own role in the system of violence it cannot be assumed that the police are neutral actors and their presence will aid in reducing violence. To work with those resisting violence, prevention programs should work to identify and reinforce the influence of local level leaders exercising their leadership in positive ways, such as certain traditional leaders or notables who also represent values, act in favor of the community and still retain the respect of community members. It was recommended that violence prevention programs build a stronger, more cohesive group of leaders, who can accompany youth and others to do the inner work necessary to resist being instrumentalized into violence.114 Reinforcing the influence and cohesiveness of those who exert leadership in a positive ways at the local level is part of building “platforms for peace” that can influence a critical mass of people at the neighborhood level to resist violence.115

111This is similar to what American Friends Service Committee is attempting to create in other popular neighborhoods outside of Greater Bel Air.
The poor living in the popular neighborhoods have used violence to demand their part in the wealth of the country, but this strategy has not worked in overthrowing the system. In order to work around the push-backs to changes in the system, it was mentioned that violence reduction programs should help people (particularly at-risk youth) to resist the influence of those in the political and economic elite who orchestrate violence and to create alternative strategies. Suggestions for how this could be done included continuing to create alternative economic opportunities in Greater Bel Air so that people are less likely to participate in violence. For example, one suggestion was that St. Martin and other marginalized neighborhoods of Greater Bel Air be declared a special economic incentive zone to increase investment. Transformation of attitudes and behaviors is a long-term process, so it was noted that it is important to create small-scale activities for people at the local level while working to change the interests and patterns of behaviors of the leaders that employ violence at the national and local levels.

### Factors for Peace
- Resilience of population ("la vitalité")
- Creativity
- Proud history of resistance
- Common communal interests
- Common culture
- Desire for peace
- Rational conflict prevention and resolution based on the values
- Of solidarity and consensus
- Strong movement of local associations (in the past and still present in some communities)

### Factors Against Peace
- Inequality (class divisions and low levels of equity)
- Poverty (exclusion of poor from access to social services and employment)
- Violent state system (violent ways of relating between governing and governed - "political manipulation")
- Weak justice system (corruption and impunity)
- Mistrust (breakdown of social bonds)
- Deforestation leading to intense urbanization
- Unmet human identity needs (psychological factors: perceptions of security, common feeling of belonging to the nation, powerlessness/agency, recognition)

### Key Actors
- Wealthy families from private sector
- Key political actors: mayors of Delmas 2 and PAP
- Government liaison (Georges Racine); Ministers of Youth and Sports, Human Rights
- PNH
- Key political and economic actors linked to Baz of Greater Bel Air (I don’t have specifics, and they are fluid alliances, but they should be identified as far as possible)
- Baz of Bel Air (at this point in time key are factions of Grand Black, Van Vire, 117)
- NGOs: Viva Rio, 3PSM, Concern, Lakou Lape, CVR and donors
- Community leaders (specifically religious leaders, notables, leaders of development associations and others with links to gov't)
The Connectors and Dividers analysis is the first step in the broader Do No Harm framework, a process for ensuring that humanitarian, development and peacebuilding initiatives at a minimum do not worsen conflict, and at best, work to address conflict dynamics. It is a basic tool for conflict sensitivity that should be used to ensure that all programming, including peacebuilding initiatives, is conflict sensitive.

Peacebuilding vs. Conflict Sensitivity
Peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity are concepts that are often either conflated or on the other hand treated as two completely distinct concepts. These misconceptions can result in poorly conceived programming and reduced effectiveness. Conflict sensitivity refers to the ability of an organization to: a) understand the context in which it is operating, b) understand the interaction between the intervention and that context, and c) act upon that understanding in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts on the conflict. Peacebuilding refers to measures designed to consolidate peace, strengthen viable political, socio-economic, and cultural institutions capable of handling conflict, and to strengthen other mechanisms that will either create or support the necessary conditions for sustained peace. It aims at addressing the key drivers of conflict, with particular emphasis on reducing or preventing violence as a means of addressing political, social and economic problems and injustices.

While peacebuilders often assume that because they are working for peace, by definition, their programs are conflict sensitive, experience shows that peacebuilding programs are just as capable of intervening in ways that are insensitive to conflict as other fields. Peacebuilding programs might hire staff from economic or socially favored groups, exacerbating inequalities. They can also increase danger to participants in peace activities, disempower local people and initiatives, or inadvertently reinforce the power of key actors in violence. Thus, peacebuilding programs must pay attention to their intended and unintended consequences on conflict dynamics. The Connectors and Dividers conflict sensitivity analysis was included as part of this conflict analysis to guide future programming recommendations and to ensure that peacebuilding programming is conflict sensitive.

Dividers and Connectors
Situations of conflict are characterized by two driving forces or realities: Dividers and Connectors. Some elements divide people from each other and serve as sources of tension. Other existing elements connect people and promote peace. Some connectors might be the same as Factors for Peace, but factors for peace is a broader category of elements that exist now and can be built upon to promote movement toward peace. Likewise some dividers might also be key driving factors, but some factors that contribute to conflict are issues or elements that go beyond the dividers. Understanding what divides people (differences such as ethnicity, religion, socio-economic status, or particular events) is critical to understanding how interventions can exacerbate or minimize these forces. Understanding what connects people despite conflict helps to understand how peacemakers might reinforce or undermine those factors that are positive forces for peacebuilding or that can mitigate conflict. Connectors might be specific places where people from different groups interact or maintain contact across lines of division. They can also be activities, systems or institutions that bring people together across lines of conflict.

When discussing dividers, many participants in focus groups spoke with great frustration about NGO practices after the earthquake that exacerbated existing divisions. They told stories of hiring practices, and choices of beneficiaries, programs and operating areas that disregarded conflict sensitivity principles, and inadvertently aggravated local level conflict. Likewise, cash for work and other quick impact projects that abruptly ended when funding ceased have contributed to frustration amongst unemployed youth. Projects that operate without a long-term sustainability or hand-over plan disempower local communities that resent NGOs pulling out without leaving tangible and sustainable benefits to the community.

6. CONNECTORS AND DIVIDERS ANALYSIS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONNECTORS</th>
<th>DIVIDERS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Community work projects (cleaning the streets, water advocacy)</td>
<td>• Absence of community organization – most grassroots organizations are not well organized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Working together to solve the problems of the community – common interests</td>
<td>• Market: Croix de Bossales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Organizations activities for children/youth</td>
<td>• Central bus station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Organizations such as Viva Rio</td>
<td>• NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conflict resolution activities</td>
<td>• Funding for projects</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Community leaders (who have signed the peace accords)</td>
<td>• Leadership positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sports: Football and other sporting activities</td>
<td>• Money for Carnival celebrations or other cultural events</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Music: Rara bands and hip-hop groups</td>
<td>• Access to jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Churches</td>
<td>• Lack of communication and information – lack of trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Local bars where people meet to talk about their problems;</td>
<td>• Political affiliation and polarization of baz along political lines - elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Manifestations/protests (against or for something);</td>
<td>• Class divisions and social exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 3PSM Peace Center;</td>
<td>• Religion: Tensions between Catholic Church and Protestant churches, and between Protestant churches and Voudou</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Cultural activities events/Carnival</td>
<td>• Hatred and jealousy</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Health centers;</td>
<td>• Poverty</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Creativity and sense of vitality (&quot;All Haitians have good hearts&quot;)</td>
<td>• Levels of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Common history of resistance</td>
<td>• Membership in baz and divisions between baz</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Strong associative movement of local associations</td>
<td>• Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tradition methods of conflict resolution</td>
<td>• Jealousy and competition over women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Consultation mechanism between the state and local authorities</td>
<td>• Competition between neighborhoods over funding for projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Organized activities for children/youth</td>
<td>• MINUSTAH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Working together to solve the problems of the community</td>
<td>• Ra-Ra bands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Organizations such as Viva Rio</td>
<td>• Generational gap [power struggles between youth and elder community leaders]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conflict resolution activities</td>
<td>• Witchcraft used to “settle scores”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Definition from International Alert, 2003, as quoted in the resource pack (see op. cit. in above footnote).
Interestingly, most of the connectors cited by informants were also described as dividers in certain circumstances or time periods. The most common events that bring people together are sporting activities (particularly football games) and cultural events such as Carnival or religious holidays like Fete Perpetuel. Sporting activities were also described as dividers in certain circumstances.

A study carried out by Institute PRIOD on local level conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms identified important methods of conflict management within the Haitian culture and traditions. These traditions and experiences have been neglected by Haitian authorities and external actors, but they represent a resource that served as a connector within Haitian communities. The communities in the study (which are outside of Greater Bel Air) have established consultation mechanisms that serve as a connector between local authorities and state institutions. As a result, they are better able to manage the interests of state institutions in Haiti, these consultation mechanisms represent an important means of potentially repairing some of the past damage and rebuilding trust.

Carnival festivities and music are events that connect people, and it was noted by one interviewee that this is the only time of the year that people from different classes come together and have contact across lines of division. Music, particularly the Rara bands that perform during Carnival can be a unifying element, and have been used as an incentive for peace agreements. At the beginning of 2013, before Carnival, conflict between Delmas 2 and Bel Air escalated around the activity of a Rara group. It was noted that NGOs often hire or work with community leaders who give the benefits of the project (employment and material benefits) to “their own people”. Likewise the choice of activities and beneficiaries was said to intensify exclusion when the “real needs” of the community are not taken into account.

Many NGOs don’t consult the population, or only consult the leaders (baz or “community leaders”) who are not always representative of the local population, and those who promote their personal interests over the interests of the community. This gives power to some community leaders over others, creating competition and jealousy between neighborhoods and baz. It was also noted that sometimes this unifies or creates alliances between baz that are excluded from the projects against the group that is included. It can also create or deepen divisions in status between individual leaders and neighborhoods who have connections and employment with NGOs or and those who do not have access to NGOs.

A study conducted by PRIOD Institute revealed that inhabitants of communities in popular neighborhoods that remained nonviolent felt increasingly ignored by NGOs and the government because they are not a “hot zone.” They expressed that “honesty and nonviolence do not pay off”, whereas violence and gang activity in neighboring areas seemed to pay off and attract international development projects. This raises important questions on the strategy of NGO funding to target “hot zones” and the harm this may cause if funding inadvertently provides incentives for violence. Likewise the study draws attention to serious concerns about MINUSTAH and foreign NGOs’ ability to maintain dialogue with armed actors and to build on existing traditions and structures for conflict resolution and dialogue. MINUSTAH and NGOs are generally not viewed as effective agents of conflict prevention and resolution in the communities, and were cited by informants as creating or exacerbating divisions.

The absence of channels of communication with local communities, or gaps in communication fosters conflict in an environment where information is a means to funding and power (both power that comes from project money and also from differences in status that it creates within the community). Absence of communication and information was also noted to exacerbate mistrust, another source of division within the community. Funding from the government, channelled through the baz, or development associations and foundations connected with baz, also creates or exacerbates conflict between and within baz. An example was money routed through Grand Black to organize the Fete Perpetuel activities at the beginning of 2013, and most recently money designated for the community Carnival des Fleurs celebrations in July 2013.

Religion generally constitutes an important part of the socialization process in communities in Haiti, but it also represents a source of tension and division between religious groups, particularly between Protestants and Voodoo, a conflict that has intensified in recent years. Historically the animist vodou traditions brought from Africa were an integral part of the struggle for independence in the 1970s. The Catholic Church brought by the Spanish and institutionalized by French colonialists has been rivaled by American Protestant church plants, which started arriving in Haiti in 1915. There have been divisions between many of the Protestant churches and the Vodou, particularly after the earthquake when some of the churches placed the blame for all the ill fate of Haiti on the Voodoo, calling them the “original sin” of Haiti. Researchers from the Oslo-based PRIOD Institute ask whether the tension is related to religion begin an arena where two different types of logic and thinking in Haitian society confront one another: “the symbolic and magical thinking” versus “the liberal-analytical thinking”.

On the national level, trust in religious leaders remains fairly high, and they are potentially key people to facilitate dialogue on various levels. Religions for Peace, an inter-religious platform with Catholic, Protestant, Islamic and Vodou representation generally has a high degree of moral authority and credibility at the national level, although they were not mentioned or well known at the local level. The current government also respects Religions for Peace for its work in mediating internal governmental conflicts such as the formation of the electoral commission and other internal issues between the legislative and executive branches. While a small organization, Religions for Peace might have the ability to bridge some of the gaps between the population and government and also the potential to encourage and influence national dialogue.

In Bel Air, the churches are seen as a sign of stability, but with limited influence over armed actors. The religious leaders who participated in the study felt they are not able to “reach” or influence the youth associated with armed groups, with the exception of certain oungs (voodoo priests) who might have influence over the “younger generation” of baz members who participate in their ceremonies. Viva Rio has also been able to bring religious leaders from all religious groups into their program Tambou Lape, as well as to the community forums, which were cited as connector activities.

CONNECTORS AND DIVIDERS ANALYSIS

Key places cited as dividers are the Croix-de-Bossales market and the central bus station. Power struggles between armed groups for control of the market and central bus stations were frequently cited as a major source of division. It is economically advantageous to have power in these locations for extortion of taxes. Similarly power struggles were noted between the younger and older generation of leaders within the baz and armed groups, as well as for employment in NGOs or government. The “generational gap” was noted by many informants as another strong source of division.

Although poverty was cited as major source of division it is important to note that poverty is contextual, not causal. Class divisions that create inequality and exclusion are causal factors that generate divisions. Differences in levels of education is a line of division that is closely associated with class divisions, exclusion and inequality. Participants described this as a division between the “haves” and the “have nots”, and on a more micro level, divisions between ”those who have nothing and those who have something”. These divisions foster jealousy and hatred, described by the common expression, “we destroy each other.”

Political affiliation of key leaders and armed groups is another source of division, leading to the polarization of baz along political lines. Political ideologies contribute to this division, but several informants expressed that ideological differences are less important now then they have been in the past (particularly during Aristide’s time). The division of baz along political lines is strongly linked to ideological divisions between political parties. Elections exacerbate divisions between baz, who each have affiliations with various political leaders.
Gender roles and background on sexual and gender-based violence

According to statistics from January 2010, women made up 52 percent of the Haitian population and had a life expectancy of 54 years, compared with 51 years for men. The Haitian fertility rate was 4.7 children per female. While both women and men participate in the workforce, women often earn less, and are less likely to have schooling as well as higher rates of illiteracy. Eighty-five percent of Haiti’s economy was in the informal sector, of which 75 percent of participants were female. Male-headed households were four times as likely in 2001 to face extreme food insecurity than female-headed households because women were traditionally engaged in food production.

In 2004 an estimated 120,000 girls worked as domestic servants [restaveks], and 67 percent of boys versus 33 percent of girls who attended high school ultimately graduated. In his report on Haiti, the Secretary General of the UN drew attention to the gender inequalities and highlighted women’s vulnerability in the increasing incidence of sexual violence, and the trafficking of young children, especially girls. Human Rights Watch and other organizations report that rape was used as a political tool during the 1990s against female supporters of the democratic movement during the Cedras and Devalier regimes, and in the post-coup period. In 1996, the Centre Haïtien de Recherches et d’Actions pour la Promotion Féminine found that seven out of ten women interviewed had experienced some form of violence of which 37 percent was rape, sexual aggression or sexual harassment. Husbands or boyfriends made up 50% of the perpetrators. Sixty-six percent of the victims stated they had not reported the incident for fear of social judgment or reprisal, or for lack of legal redress. Eighty percent of the men interviewed in the study believed that violence against women was sometimes justified, such as in cases of adultery or refusal to obey.

In 2000, the report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women in Haiti noted individuals called zenglen-dos, who broke into houses and raped and beat women became active during Cédras’s regime as a political weapon. The practice later became a common one among armed groups in the popular neighborhoods such as Greater Bel Air.

In 2004, researchers found 22 percent of women and 15 percent of men had experienced sexual violence. The UN estimated that up to 50 percent of girls living in Port-au-Prince “red zones” during the political unrest from 2004-2006 experienced rape, including gang rape, or another form of sexual violence. According to records from national women’s organizations SOFA and Kay Fann, general incidents of violence against women doubled between 2006 and 2009.

To respond to the increase in violence against women and girls during the early 2000s, a “Concertation Nationale” had been formed in 2003, consisting of the Women’s Ministry, the Ministry of Justice, Kay Fann, SOFA, ENPO-FANM, and some foreign organizations. The Concertation coalition was set standards for cases and referrals for victims of sexual violence. Most of its leaders were university-educated, French-speaking Haitian feminists, many who had been educated or lived abroad and were of a comparatively middle-high socioeconomic class. The Concertation Nationale developed a five-year National Plan to Fight Violence Against Women (2006-11), lobbied to modify the penal code to make rape a crime, and worked to make medical certificates that could be used in prosecution, accessible at all medical facilities.

Current situation of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

Urban violence impacts men and women differently, making girls and women particularly susceptible to gender-based forms of violence. Many organizations working in urban violence do not differentiate the categories of manifestations of violence according to gender and age, and whether men or women are more likely to be perpetrators or victims. Violence is generally underreported and reliable statistics of sexual and gender-based violence in Bel Air are difficult to come by.

Despite the lack of reliable statistics, women who participated in the focus groups stressed the increased levels of violence against women during the past five years. It was also noted that many girls who are now in charge of younger siblings explained that if they do not work and provide food for the family they suffer more “mistreatment” by men. Informants also noted that since the earthquake both women and girls have been forced to take on more responsibilities in order to provide for their families.

In the camps, it was explained that girls often leave their families and move into their own tents to prostitute themselves. Many girls who are now in charge of younger siblings find money through “sugar daddies” or engaging in sexual acts. Several informants expressed that the age girls are starting to engage in sexual acts has gone down, often starting between ages 10-13. It was also noted that even in households with parents, some parents actively encourage their girls to prostitute themselves to provide for the family. This occurrence was particularly linked to increased poverty after the earthquake. It has become an increasingly common practice that many girls do not perceive as abuse or identify as a form of violence.

Many informants described a connection between domestic violence and urban violence, attributed to changes in social controls, in particular the breakdown of social bonds at the family and neighborhood levels.

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The primary social bond and the main socio-economic unit for survival is the family. However, many informants pointed out a certain dysfunction in their families, which has been understood as a consequence of the social bond between parents and children. Informants cited the "resignation" of parents who are no longer able to fulfill their material obligations to their children. Several informants stated that parents' inability to provide for children created frustrations that can lead to domestic abuse. In a study conducted in Cite Soley and Martissant, youth used the words "No bread, no law" ("Pas de pain, pas de loi") to describe the situation in which parents no longer have any moral authority because they cannot meet the needs of the family. This leads to a loss of respect between children and their parents.142

Many parents also expressed this loss of legitimacy and moral authority over their children as well. They often feel powerless to influence their children not to be promiscuous or not to join armed groups. Parents who are unable to provide for their children's material needs feel they can't ask them what they have been doing out at night, or how they have money to buy new clothes or food for the family. Some parents were described as "closing their eyes" to illegal or immoral actions committed by their children or even encouraging acts such as prostitution and delinquency to secure basic provisions for the family. The absence of moral authority has led to a breakdown of the social order of education in families, a principal domain of socialization for children. Key informants described this change not only in terms of the role of the parents in the education of the child, but also a breakdown in the parental supports of the community, that traditionally contributed to the education of the child.

The effects of abject poverty are destructive to social bonds and contribute to instability in the family and neighborhood. Informants often linked violence by parents on children to the decline in the moral and protective influence of parents. When abused children turn to armed groups for a sense of belonging, they are also likely to be beaten or sexually abused, as abuse has become normalized. Several interviews described the chain of violence between domestic abuse and other forms of urban violence such as gang violence through stories of armed group leaders who had been abused as children, both in their families and by other members of the community who beat and humiliated them. The violence chain starting with the breakdown of parent-child relations and domestic abuse, leading to drugs, delinquency and participation in gang violence were strongly posited by several informants to be a cause of insecurity in Bel Air.

Girls and women often become targets for retribution when their boyfriends or husbands are members of armed groups during periods of increased violence. They described being used as an "arm for revenge", targeted for rape when there is violence between armed groups. During the recent conflict in Bel Air many girls who were either forced or voluntarily became girlfriends or wives of members of 117 were targets of violence by other baz. When the Viva Rio-sponsored peace accords were signed in June 2013, many girls were brought back into the communities, but informants expressed that they are not easily accepted back into the community. Likewise, women were often cited as a source of division or conflict due to jealousy and competition over them.

The "Law of 2005" ("La loi de 2005") represents progress in that it made rape and domestic violence illegal, however, women’s perceptions of insecurity reflect that its implementation continues to pose a challenge. Women described one positive aspect of the law being that more men now know that violence against women is illegal and that it opens up the possibility of bringing violence against women to the justice system. However, as in many places around the world, there is a considerable gap between laws and policies that address gender-based violence and their implementation in practice. Victims of sexual violence seeking justice through the formal legal system face stigmatization, weak investigation failure to arrest or jail perpetrators, corruption, court backlog and lack of witness protection. Female informants stated that although they technically now have somewhere to go to report violence, favoritism and corruption within the police often prevent action from being taken. Women in Bel Air relayed that unless you have connections in the police or are able to pay “petrol money” to the police, they won’t come to assist you. They likewise mentioned that bringing cases of violence to the attention of national women’s organizations that provide legal assistance is a “waste of time” because judicial process is so slow.

Women also expressed that going to the justice system to report violence often makes their situation of poverty worse. Women are financially dependent on men to lose their support, and also support for their children. In cases of rape, medical certificates are very difficult to obtain, and women have to deal with a justice system that is not only slow or unresponsive but also biased towards the perpetrators of violence. Medical certificates are often ignored by judges who believe that "women lie".

Consequences and Services available for women

An individual’s access to immediate medical services after a rape or other form of sexual and gender-based violence can be critical, not only to obtain clinical care and testing, but also to promptly document and secure physical evidence of the crime. In addition, survivors often have ongoing general health-care needs and needs for emotional care for theirfic Well-being. When asked about the availability of health-care and psychological support in Greater Bel Air, female informants expressed there is an absence of services, or if there are services available, they are not aware of them. A study carried out by the UC Berkeley Human Rights Center reports that the Haitian landscape of shelters for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence changed quickly after the 2010 earthquake.141 The two major safe houses operated by Haitian Women’s Rights organizations were closed to operations.142 In the place, post-earthquake Haiti experienced a proliferation of new temporary shelter efforts supported by international donors, mainly operating in the camps and accessible to the displaced. Poor coordination, communication and engagement between the Haitian Women’s Ministry and other agencies, as well as grassroots Haitian groups led to confusion and misinformation, making inter-sector referrals difficult.

After the earthquake there were, technically speaking, no longer any shelters in Port-au-Prince serving women or girls who had experienced sexual and gender-based violence unrelated to the earthquake or displacement. This was reported to be a result of post-earthquake prioritization of NGO funding and closures of existing shelters.143 NGO funding was restricted to taking earthquake-related cases of sexual and gender based violence, creating a huge gap in the services available and creating divisions between survivors of sexual violence who had access to services and those who did not. It also created the risk that shelter residents would be targeted and harassed. Women and girls are not only victims of violence, but also participate in the baz at all levels. Historically, women experienced an important role in the fight for independence from the French colonizers. Today, while only a minority of women are leaders of armed bases, many women assume important secondary functions associated with the bases, such as informers (or “spies”), cooks and other logistical support, and girlfriends or wives. Those associated with armed groups were described as being under a lot of pressure to consume drugs. Some girls associate with armed groups for protection, and others for material security or to support their partners. As members or associates of gang members, they have influence over the men who may also be their boyfriends or husbands in the armed groups. Female armed group leaders and associates were described as being “more dangerous” because they are not easily suspected or caught by the police.

Informants in Bel Air described a generalized lack of trust between women and girls because of their associations or alliances to armed groups, particularly in times of violence between armed groups. Mistrust was stated to be widespread and required by the conditions of getting involved in violence, peacebuilding and violence reduction work. Few violence reduction programs address the specific needs and issues facing women. Violence against women is viewed as the problem of the victim, rather than a problem that affects and must be addressed by the entire community.

The female respondents from Bel Air expressed that there are very limited opportunities for women and girls in the political process and even when they are included they are often not given responsibilities or leadership. Likewise, managers and directors of NGOs interviewed expressed concern at the weak involvement of women in local associations and violence reduction initiatives. When asked why, responses ranged from too many responsibilities in the community, religious beliefs and women being afraid to express themselves. However, informants pointed out that in Haitian historical tradition women were very influential in social life and held leadership positions in some sectors on equal terms with men. Women were cited as being mediators, voodoo priestesses (called a mambo for female priests) as well as notables, chosen on the basis of their wisdom and respectability in the community. While the dominant patriarchal system has imposed many contradictions there is a historical precedent of women in leadership positions that can serve as a reference to encourage and support women in leadership positions.

143One was the Centre Yvonne Hakim Rimpe, run by the Ministere la la Condition Feminine et aux Droits des Femmes (Women’s Ministy) and funded in part by Eve Ensler’s V-Day. The other was a short-term emergency house run by the women’s rights organization Kay Fann. Ibid.
144Ibid.
145Rachelle Doucet, Local Models of Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management in the South-east and South-west of Haiti, Osa: Peace Research Institute (2012), www.prio.no
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Although poverty was cited as the most common key driving factor of violence, this analysis argues that while entrenched poverty is an important contextual factor in Bel Air, the interplay of inequality and exclusion are more significant driving factors of violence in Bel Air. Poverty, like violence, is a systemic phenomenon and its underlying causes include inequality, weak political institutions and the state, and rapid urban migration, all of which combine to create the circumstances in which conflict becomes violent.

1) Large numbers of unemployed youth, cited by many informants as a source of conflict, are not necessarily a driving force of violence themselves, but the factor of unemployment combined with the circumstances of poverty, humiliation and exclusion are exploited by gang leaders, who are instrumentally linked to the political and economic interests of the elite. Recent studies have found that vocational training and educational programs without increased access to employment raise expectations and increase frustration amongst youth. When employment is not available, there is a higher risk of the youth justifying violence. Trained youths are also more likely to report recognition of discrimination or other class barriers prevent them from accessing economic opportunities, increasing tensions around issues of equity.143

Recommendations on Individual/personal level:
• The “Do No Harm” implications of vocational and educational programs in the absence of increased access to employment opportunities should be assessed and mitigated by NGOs operating in Bel Air. In conjunction, market assessments should be carried out to determine what skills are needed according to the job market and vocational training programs must be tailored to meet these needs.
• NGO vocational and employment creation programs should not only target youth who participate in violence, but should include at-risk youth who refuse to participate in violence, so as not to create incentives for participation in violence.
• Create income-generating activities so youths are less willing to be co-opted into violence.

Relational/community level:
• Linkages should be made with individuals in the private sector who are open to supporting job creation in Bel Air.144 Involve good-willed members of the private sector in the job skills trainings to create relationships. This activity also contributes to strengthening vertical social bonds, equity, and creating a climate of trust to attract investment.

Institutional and Structural levels:
• A key obstacle to economic development and job creation is the monopoly created between Haiti’s interconnected economic elite families and their connections with political elites. Many informants remarked that peace is not in the interests of the economic elite. It is also a challenge to break this monopoly because Haiti has no legal framework to counteract monopolistic trade. A few recommenda-
• tions include the following:
  • Create incentives to demonstrate to business people that peace is in their interests.
  • Expand the number of people from the business community involved in peacebuilding efforts that build bridges across class lines, such as the 3PSM and Lakou Lape programs.
  • Create space for investment and employment through legal reform, access to credit and stabilization programs. See the recent tourism assessment report published by Robert Muggah and Athena Kolbe.145
  • As peacebuilding is a long-term process, it is important to create quick impact projects to generate short-term income and stability while preparing the ground for long-term investment.

2) Levels of frustration are high due to the unmet human identity needs of recognition, self-efficacy, belonging, security and purpose. These factors, mixed with feelings of humiliation and lack of respect, create psychological conditions that are ripe for violence.

Individual level:
• Integrate psycho-social elements or programs into violence-reduction initiatives. See approaches being used by AVSI and AFSC in Cite Soley and Martissant that specifically target psychological factors – such as training of community psycho-social assistants and providing community service opportunities outside of the baz to give a sense of purpose. NGOs should intentionally emphasize aspects of their programs that address identity-based needs and psychological factors.
• Programs that identify and work specifically with “at risk” youth and children should be invested in by NGOs as a violence prevention measure.
• Youth who live in conflict and violence-prone en-
  • vironments often do not learn positive coping and self-control behaviors. Life skills should be incorpo-
  • rated into non-formal and formal education pro-
  • grams.
• Support recreational activities bringing together youth from different neighborhoods to interact and detach from the violence and frustration of their daily lives, such as sports, arts and music.
• The linkage between perceived discrimination and participation in and endorsement of violence amongst youth is strong.146 Interventions should provide youth opportunities to gain respect, such as community service or civic participation activities.

Relational level:
• Attention should be given to aspects of programs that might potentially aggravate unmet identity needs, such as vocational training without job crea-
  • tion, which can reinforce feelings of discrimination and exclusion. Programs that intentionally work to increase a sense of recognition and self-efficacy in community leaders or members of baz should carry out regular stakeholder analyses to ensure that they are not creating further divisions or marginaliza-
  • tion [or worsening existing divisions] by recognizing some leaders and baz and not others.
• Focus on strengthening alternative sources of “belonging” and social bonds [to armed or criminal groups], such as community groups and religious groups. For example, support the development of youth groups that are part of religious institutions.

143It is recognized that many of the recommendations espoused in this report would be very difficult to implement successfully in Haiti and they require the commitment and collaboration of various organizations and actors at multiple levels, not solely Norwegian Church Aid.


CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3] The breakdown of trust in the vertical and horizontal social bonds and the absence of positive means of interacting and resolving conflict also greatly contribute to conflict tipping over into violence. Negative stereotypes on the part of the political and economic elite and the grassroots exacerbates polarization along class lines. Peacebuilding experience in Haiti suggests that the absence of vertical linkages with state structures places limitations on the ability of community level initiatives to extend and deepen their impact, whether in the areas of security, reconciliation, governance or development.

Individual level:

- Identify key individuals who can make linkages between grassroots and national level peacebuilding ("connectors"), to build vertical linkages between influential economic and political actors in Bel Air and at the national level. A few key people were named during the conflict analysis from Bel Air and at the national level, but it seemed that this identification had not been done in a strategic way by conflict resolution NGOs. As these relationships and individuals often shift, it would be advantageous to conduct and update stakeholder mapping of key individuals on a regular basis. (see Jp Lederach’s triangle below)

- Similarly, stakeholder mapping of key actors who are likely to resist change should be conducted to identify those who might push-back on positive changes being introduced through peacebuilding and violence reduction programs.

- Reinforce the role of leaders ("connectors") who can serve as models for leadership at the community level and measures that can restore respect in leaders, particularly elders. Attention should be given by NGOs not to elevate former armed group leaders to "community leaders" unless they display positive values that have developed these kinds of consultation mechanisms and those that have weakened or lost traditional methods in order to support and re-develop local models and traditions of conflict prevention and resolution.

- Create and support multi-track dialogue processes at local, middle and top levels (see Jp Lederach triangle) to increase confidence that vital issues are being addressed. Bring dialogue tracks together to address Haiti’s dramatic history and create a common vision for the future. "Transformative Scenaria Planning" might be a useful tool in creating a more inclusive, action-oriented dialogue process.

- Expand and replicate models of consultation mechanisms established between local authorities and state institutions, such as those identified by the PRIO Institute research.142 This might be a useful mechanism to rebuild trust and repair some of the damage done in the past. These consultation mechanisms represent a synergy between two types of justice (formal and traditional), and capitalize on the experiences of traditional tribunals to preserve unity in the community.142 Exchanges could be done between the leadership of popular neighborhoods that have developed these kinds of consultation mechanisms and those that have weakened or lost traditional methods in order to support and re-develop local models and traditions of conflict prevention and resolution.

- Develop local models and traditions of conflict prevention and resolution.

- Make all violence visible through peacebuilding and reconciliation processes and address violence at all levels of society, as well as the linkages between different forms of violence. By defining urban violence as solely a problem of poor areas, other existing manifestations of violence and linkages with transnational circuits such as the drug trade become invisible. MINUSTAH and other international donors could be key actors with leverage at this level and should address the linkages with violence instigated at upper political levels.

Relational/Social level:

- Support efforts that build vertical and horizontal social cohesion between and within groups. Efforts should be reinforced to engage more members of the private sector and expand to build the political will for political leaders to engage in conflict resolution efforts. These types of programs should be multiplied and harmonized to build synergy. Intentional efforts should be made to create spaces that empower people from Bel Air to interact with political leaders, and to involve local government officials in their activities, community forums, and other activities. Particular attention should be given to the involvement of the Ministry of Interior, mayors and city delegates (delegues de ville).

- Religious leaders can play an important role in strengthening vertical and horizontal social bonds, as well as advocating for change. The national level actions of Religions for Peace should be strengthened and a parallel platform of religious leaders should be formed for Greater Bel Air. Connections and synergy should be made between the local and national level platforms of religious leaders to raise concerns from the grassroots to the notional level and ensure representivity.

4) This conflict analysis suggests that another key driving factor of violence is the way the population of marginalized, popular neighborhoods, particularly young unemployed men, have been included and integrated into the violent political system (rather than their exclusion). Relationships of violence have historically characterized the vertical social bonds between the state and the population of Bel Air, who lack access to more positive ways of participating in governance and the economy of the nation. Violence has become a structurally entrenched mode of interaction between the elite and the masses.

- Provide opportunities for youth and other members of Bel Air to engage in positive civic participation. Peacebuilding initiatives should include a civic education and advocacy component, involving both citizens and local elected officials. The local level provides the most fertile grounds for the development of bonds of responsibility, accountability and transparency between the governed and governors.

- Based on findings on the need for self-efficacy (agency), trainings and other activities that help youth learn and practice nonviolent social action are recommended.143 It would be particularly valuable to use Haitian traditions and experiences of non-violent conflict resolution as a resource. Communities identified that have prevented local conflicts from escalating into violence through their own traditions and mechanisms of conflict management/resolution should be encouraged to establish networks with other local communities and provided the necessary resources to continue their work.142

Relational level:

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5) In relation to actors, one of the current challenges in violence reduction is developing strategies to reach the younger generation of armed groups that differ in their ways of operating from the older generation. The rupture of relationships between the youth and older generation is of particular concern.

142 Wenche Hauge, Alain Gilles and Rachelle Doucet, Conflict Prevention in a DDR Context in Haiti, op cit
143 Ibid., 23.
144 Ibid., 23.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Individual level:
• A better understanding of the psychosocial needs of the youth in ‘new’ armed groups is needed. Several informants pointed out that many of the new armed leaders were abused as children by the older generation of armed group leaders. If this is the case, it might not be easy to bring them into the same peace accords with the older generation. Significant trauma healing and trust-building exercises might be prerequisites to their entry into the peace process. In addition, “at risk” youth should be targeted and brought into NGO programs on violence prevention.

Relational/social level:
• Peace accords in Bel Air are mainly promoted by the older generation of community leaders and the younger generation has not been fully incorporated into the process. New strategies should be developed to reach the “younger generation” of baz members and to bring them into the activities of NGOs and local associations.
• Due to the frequently changing political circumstances and alliances, a conflict analysis should be regularly updated, particularly the actors/stakeholder mapping. It would be advantageous to carry out the ongoing conflict analysis in a participatory way, inclusive of members of the baz, political and economic leaders at the community and national levels, NGOs and donors.
• Identify key individuals who are able and willing to positively influence leaders of younger armed groups.
• Community development projects and cultural events should intentionally bring together youths and older generations to work on common community interest projects. These communal and cultural activities could help in rebuilding relationships across generations by reinforcing common cultural values.

Individual NGO level:
• NGOs working in Great Bel Air should regularly undertake “Do No Harm” analyses in relation to hiring practices, community partners and community leaders with whom they engage. Due to the complexity and fluidity of relationships and alliances, it will be challenging to completely avoid “doing harm”. However, with a clear analysis of the dilemmas, they can better understand the potentially negative consequences of their program choices, are better able to predict these consequences, and can attempt to mitigate them as much as possible. They should likewise be clear and transparent with local communities as to why potentially sensitive programmatic decisions are made in one way and not another.
• Rather than working alone in multiple program areas and in all zones of Greater Bel Air, NGOs should focus their interventions in their specialized program areas, and collaborate with NGOs with other expertise to cover additional program areas.
• In relation to working with armed actors and demobilized youth – there is an ongoing debate on how to best support armed actors in transition without directly rewarding them or buying them off with employment or training opportunities. Lessons learned from the Haiti DDR program demonstrate there is a fine line between creating peace dividends for the general population without creating incentive structures solely for armed actors in linking participation directly with material benefits. Short-term vocational training and cash-for-work employment opportunities must be coupled with longer-term measures to address (and eventually overcome) the opportunity-limiting obstacles for demobilized youth.

Relational/social level:
• Improve communication and transparency through NGO coordination meetings in Bel Air and community forums.
• Work for greater collaboration and synergy amongst NGOs working in Great Bel Air. Dialogue processes between NGOs and local associations could help to harmonize their vision and strategies on violence prevention and conflict resolution. Share and build upon each other’s successes by “scaling up” successful activities.
• NGOs should be intentional about not engendering the divisions that exist within neighborhoods and between baz. Guarding neutrality in mediation is essential to successful mediations. Collaboration between NGOs could render mediation work more effective (for example if one NGO has more influence with a specific baz and the other NGO has more influence with another baz or other key actors).
• Citizen participation should be incorporated into NGO planning as a cross-cutting urban policy theme. NGOs should use their influence to help enlarge and protect the space whereby citizens can influence decision-making. A specific focus on providing space for youth to participate in civic activities should be developed.
• Traditional leaders and traditional conflict resolution methods should be supported and integrated into program activities of NGOs and local associations.
• Increase responsibility and ownership for conflict resolution and violence reduction efforts amongst the local population.

Institutional level:
• Involve youth from Bel Air in advocacy and civic participation activities with youth from other neighborhoods. Through advocacy link youth from Bel Air with decision makers at community and national level, including members of the private sector.
• NGOs have exacerbated existing divisions, contributing to the general frustration of the population. Specific examples are conflicts created around hiring practices, the choice of beneficiaries and lack of communication and transparency with the local population. The selection of stakeholders and beneficiaries engaged by NGOs are often not conflict sensitive. Special attention should be given to working with or through leaders who are not perceived representative of the population, or representative solely of certain groups and who influence through armed activity.
• NGO strategies on how to address stabilization and violence reduction differ, and at times they also adopt approaches that counteract each other, aggravating existing conflicts and divisions. Likewise, while a holistic approach to peacebuilding is encouraged, no single NGO can cover all of Greater Bel Air or work effectively in all program areas. Collaboration and harmonization of approaches is a necessary strategy.
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7) Recommendations related to the gender dimensions of conflict:
• More women should be included in violence reduction and stabilization projects, as well as vocational training programs particularly in leadership positions. As the reasons why there is not greater participation of women in these associations and projects is not clear, it would be useful to carry out a gender barrier analysis to identify barriers to greater participation of women in the associative life. A gender analysis on roles and responsibilities and workloads of women and girls could also be helpful in informing gender sensitive programs and increasing participation of women and girls.
• Vocational training programs should be tailored to address the needs of girls and young women, but also be sensitive to not exacerbate existing gender divisions.
• Male adolescents and adult men may view sexual violence or sex obtained through force, fear or intimidation as “normal”. These attitudes reflect entrenched gender norms and the attitude that victims of sexual violence are at fault. Values and attitudes that perpetuate gender inequalities are instilled in childhood and adolescence may present the last opportunity to promote alternatives. The Guy-to-Guy Project by Instituto Promundo in Brazilian cities could serve as a model of an effective program that

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engages young men as change agents in the prevention of gender based violence and the promotion of sexual health. The change agents (“peer promoters”) are young men from popular neighborhoods of Rio de Janeiro who reach out to other young men with educational materials and activities to reduce violence against women. A similar program called MAVa (Men Against Violence and Abuse) in India targets young men and adolescent boys through mass awareness programs, counseling services, workshops and joint activities between men and women to address specific gender issues. These two programs could be used as models to address male attitudes and behaviors towards gender and sexual-based violence.

- Female attitudes that sustain and reproduce gender norms should simultaneously be addressed. The “Tamar campaign”, used in several countries in Africa is an example of an effective approach to transforming the attitudes of women towards gender norms.

- A functioning legal structure and policing system can help to change attitudes and tolerance levels around child and domestic abuse. Work to increase awareness and accountability of civic and state responsibilities to protect children and women, backed up by a credible police system. Partnerships should be strengthened to make ending violence against women a public health priority of citizen groups and government.

- Work to create safety nets and safe havens (shelters, safe houses, protection mechanisms) for women who report sexual and gender-based violence and who fear for their safety and or livelihood.

- Donors should carry out gender budget audits for partner organizations that are “mainstreaming” gender-sensitive programming and gender-based violence prevention to ensure that rhetoric about addressing gender-based violence is implemented in practice.

- The prevention of violence against women and girls should be an explicit element in urban planning and improving safety in popular neighbors. Spatial mapping should be used as a means of identifying urban configurations that make women more vulnerable to violence. (see “Gender Dimensions” section for example of Spacial Mapping for Bel Air)

8) It is recommended that NGOs, donors and local associations working in Bel Air adopt a “whole of society” peacebuilding approach. A whole of society approach involves stakeholders from all levels of an institution, community, or society. Planning links short-term and long-term focus on systemic change. It is also a multi-sectoral approach, linking different sectors of peacebuilding, including economic development, human rights advocacy, and participatory governance programs, all sensitive to reducing divisions and fostering peaceful and just relations between groups. Ideally, planning includes a balance between stopping conflict drivers and starting or supporting conflict mitigators.

The whole society approach recognizes that enhancing peacebuilding capacity at the local level cannot easily be achieved without strategically engaging with high level political and economic issues and actors. In Haiti, post-earthquake efforts to “build back better” have been impaired by the historic weaknesses of the Haitian state and its inability and unwillingness to form true partnerships with its own citizens. The absence of credible, engaged partners at the national level continues to hamper constructive dialogue and engagement between those who govern and the citizens. The lack of a national-level strategy for the development of marginalized urban communities such as Bel Air and the deep, long-standing gap between state and society on socioeconomic issues raises serious questions about the effectiveness of bottom-up peacebuilding efforts without intentional linkages to peacebuilding at other levels of society.

Relational/social level:
- Strengthen the community policing program and the capacity of the community to denounce abuses by building national and international linkages. Increase involvement of women in community policing. Build linkages with HNP and MINUSTAH’s civil policing division to bring concerns and priorities of the population of Bel Air to the police reform agenda. Create general opportunities for dialogue and accountability for action items (on the part of the MINUSTAH, PNH and community leaders).

- Capacity-building of local peace committees and community associations in providing alternative conflict resolution mechanisms and services in the community.

- Specific attention should be paid to “trigger” events, such as the upcoming electoral period. Coordination of violence prevention efforts amongst international donors, NGOs, local associations.

Institutional level:
- Support trainings for government officials (particularly Parliament) on negotiation, mediation and other conflict resolution techniques, based on current conflictual issues.

- Community-level peacebuilding efforts should strategically engage and accompany their public-sector counterparts to build political will through acts of “bottom-up statebuilding”. For example, peacebuilding activities should offer opportunities for youth to collectively address issues such as weak infrastructure, and the absence of decent public services.

- Dialogue at the community and national levels to discuss security alternatives to the MINUSTAH with follow-up on action items.

- Advocate for formal spaces of mediation and liaison with the government. While the CNDDR was a flawed approach, it at least created an avenue for government engagement with marginalized armed groups.

- Violence reduction strategies should be increasingly mainstreamed into development initiatives. Violence prevention should be the focus, rather than stabilization.

ANNEX 1:
MAPS OF GREATER BEL AIR

Annex 1. Map of Port-au-Prince with Bel Air Outline

ANNEX 2:
GRAPH OF URBANIZATION

Figure 1.1: Changes in Haiti’s urban and rural populations 1950 - 2009

Source: Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d’Informatique and Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, Carte de ouverture d’Haïti, 2004
Grand Black: an influential actor in Bel Air, particularly the Haut Plateau. Officially a foundation/NGO since 2008-9 after Preval became president, but it is run by a baz and has links to criminal groups. They have strong historic ties to Lavalas, but also have political links to many other influential political and economic actors outside Bel Air. Grand Black is comprised of influential community leaders, artists and former armed group leaders who came together to form a social development foundation. Considering themselves the “protectors” of Bel Air, they have kept linkages to armed groups and actors that can be mobilized when necessary. Grand Black fragmented during the recent violent activity of 117 in 2012-2013. They have been a part of Viva Rio’s previous peace agreements and all factions signed the June 2013 agreement.

Van Vire: Baz of Delmas 2, which arms and mobilizes in times of necessity. The main leaders fought in Operation Baghdad and are still aligned to Lavalas. Some of the leaders became involved with Concern’s conflict transformation program and left their involvement with the baz to varying degrees. They consider themselves to be the “community combatants” and “protectors” of Delmas 2. In 2013 they mobilized to carry out operations against 117, with the support of the PNH.

Ligne Dur: armed group loosely linked to Grand Black in Bel Air, called Ligne Dur because they retain a strong loyalty to Lavalas. Leaders are Jean Lucien, Garry and Gregorie. They are part of the internal conflict in Grand Black and split with Ti-Pop and Grand Black foundation. Due to the split, their leaders recently joined in the creation of a new development organization, “Bel Air en Action”.

ANNEX 3: KEY ACTORS IN BEL AIR

117: A loose network of criminal groups, forms very fluid alliances with small neighborhood baz and criminal actors. They allegedly have strong connections with drug dealers, and are well-financed by certain economic and political elites (although no specific individuals were identified). 117 is noted for its strong intelligence system and mobile tactics, such as carrying out attacks on motorcycles. Respondents noted that they are “uncontrollable” and difficult to influence.

Most associates of 117 are young men, between the ages of 13 and 27. Community leaders noted the key leaders of 117 and many of the associated youth are “the children of gangs”. The two main leaders, Philippe Rodelin and Ti-Chinay are said to have grown up with gang leaders, learning their ways of acting and operating. They were beaten and abused by these same leaders as children, and when they became 16-17 years old they formed their own groups and repeating this behavior with younger recruits. Ti-Chinay was arrested during the March interventions of the police and Van Vire and is currently in prison.

Police National Haitian (PNH): The population generally does not have a good perception of the police because of their corruption and past involvement in violence. They often exacerbate situations of conflict and violence, as they will often use one gang to carry out operations against another. Many police agents come from Bel Air and some are involved in incidents of interpersonal violence. Most police have poor training and weak logistical support. They are not paid well and notorious for corruption and human rights abuses. Individual members of the police are known to have strong links to criminal networks, politicians, businessmen and gang leaders whom they might protect or to whom they might provide immunity. The PNH operate in Bel Air with the logistical support of the MINUSTAH.

Viva Rio has a community policing program and “rapprochement” program to improve relations between the local community and the police. They have also involved the police in cultural and sporting activities, community forums, and trainings. (see Viva Rio in chart of organizations operating in Bel Air)

Rara groups: a traditional music group formed by men and women who like music and are sometimes professional musicians. Each rara group is connected to a baz and each baz has a rara group. The rara groups are closely linked to voodoo, ougans and mambos. Occasionally rara groups develop community development projects. They perform in the neighborhoods before, during and after Carnival, and frequently take part in election campaigns. Rara groups, along with political leaders and armed leaders were all seen to form part of the mouvement [movement] from 2004-2007. They are frequently mobilized along with the baz during times of conflict.

Community leaders: the term is used to describe a conglomerate of different figures, sometimes this term is merged with figures like “notable”, “chef”, “boss”, “development professional”, and can include teachers and religious leaders amongst many others. Leaders are linked to different forms of association, including the forms mentioned above. The question of what gives the community leaders their legitimacy is an interesting one. Most respondents stated that a leader must have the trust of the population and work in some way to “bring development” to their community. The majority of community leaders in the study carried out by Viva Rio were also shown to have strong ties with one or more community associations. Some leaders were described by interviewees as being “specialized” in relationships with NGOs. Community leaders also have the capacity to mobilize for violence, and if necessary for the “protection of the population”.

At times leaders were said to retain social control through fear. Historically many leaders in Bel Air had political ties to Lavalas. Interviewees noted a change in the leaders, describing them as “more aggressive” now because the current government is not “their government”. It was also noted that leaders now pursue their individual interests more aggressively. Leadership in Bel Air is contextual and fluid. There is constant movement of leaders coming and going, with new leaders coming up to fill in the gaps. This can make it challenging to carry out sustainable conflict resolution projects with community leaders as key actors.

Local Associations/Associations Populaires (OPs): Originated in the 1970’s in Bel Air as neighborhood associations in opposition to the Duvalier dictatorship. They represented one of the main sources of resistance to the Duvalier regime. They were formalized as “popular organizations” by Aristide and increasingly overlapped with the baz during Aristide’s mobilization of young men from Bel Air into sub-contracted “gangs”. Aristide channeled cash, food items, school materials, and clothing, among other goods, for the local organizations to distribute to their members, in exchange for their political loyalty.

Some informants described them as “mal orientes” (poorly oriented) because of their history of receiving funding directly from the government, which created a mentality of dependence. They still exist today and are often connected with baz, but they vary in their level of activity as many of them lack funding.

NGOs: NGOs in general were described more as an actor in conflict, rather than an actor for peace. A lot of frustration and anger was expressed towards NGOs. Many practices of NGOs were cited as creating divisions within the local community. [See Dividers and Connectors section and the table of organizations active in Bel Air, Annex 4]

Religious Structures: Eglise Catholique de Bel Air played an important role in preaching liberation theology to the disenfranchised masses in the 1980s and 90’s. Interviewees mention that we “don’t feel the presence of the churches” in issues of conflict resolution and violence reduction. Religious leaders who participated in the study noted they don’t have influence over the younger generation of armed groups. Others fear the armed groups and dialogue doesn’t interest them. It was noted that certain ougans might have the ability to influence political actors, but may be engaged in peacebuilding efforts in Bel Air, some of whom are now implicated in Lakou Lape: Philippe Armand, Josseline Fethiere, Nadege Tippenhauer, Yves Beaujolly

MINUSTAH: the UN stabilization mission in Haiti. They are generally not considered by the majority of the population to be agents of conflict prevention and resolution in the communities.

Haitian government: Respondents did not give names of key government officials and their connections to the various armed groups. Most key political actors maintain relationships of patronage with armed baz and at times criminal groups, particularly during electoral periods or times of political turmoil. The relationship between gangs linked to transnational crime (particularly drug trafficking and contraband) and state officials is particularly hazy and difficult to establish.160

Key government officials that have a potential role as actors for peace in Bel Air:
- The Ministry of the Interior is an important government office to implicate in peacebuilding. Their local level delegations include the mayors and “delegates de ville”.
- Georges Racine – Counselor to the President and facilitator for the President in the popular neighborhoods. He is close to President Martelly and the official facilitator of the government with the armed groups.
- Magalie Racine – Minister of Sports and Youth; married to George Racine, avid supporter of Viva Rio’s sporting activities with youth and Tambou Lape.
- Rosanne Augustine: Minister of Human Rights and the Fight Against Poverty

Local government:
- Mayors of the municipalities of Port-au-Prince and Delmas.

Private sector actors:
- Actors for peace – business men and women who became involved with Concern’s program, and continue to be engaged in peacebuilding efforts in Bel Air, some of whom are now implicated in Lakou Lape: Philippe Armand, Josseline Fethiere, Nadege Tippenhauer, Yves Beaujolly


Exploiting Inequalities: Conflict and Power Relations in Bel Air

ANNEX 4:

Baz in Conflict

Baz in conflict in Greater Bel Air by zone:
One of the greatest challenges for NGOs engaged in operational responses to armed violence in Haiti is the fluidity and opaque nature of their alliances, allegiances and rivalries. The following list is an attempt to try to map out the conflicts between baz of Greater Bel Air in July, 2013.161

1) Bel Air and Delmas 2 (also see stakeholder mapping annex) – there is a historic rivalry between Bel Air and Delmas 2 that manifests itself in cycles of conflict and occasional outbreaks of violence. At the beginning of 2013, before Carnival, conflict between the two baz escalated around the activity of 117. Peace during Carnival so the main Rara group, (Patico, from Delmas 2) could parade in Bel Air was the “carrot” in the negotiations carried out by Viva Rio. The free movement of the Rara band across Bel Air was negotiated and became a sign of peace between the two areas.

Conflict within Bel Air: Recent divisions within Grand Black between the foundation, Ti-Pop, and Ligne Dur. This provoked violence between Ti-Pop and Ligne Dur around the issue of harboring 117 in Plateau Bel Air. Historic tensions between Grand Black and Ligne Dur were exacerbated by interventions of 117 in Bel Air. Al Qaeda and Ti-Pop in conflict with Grand Black, provoked over whether to harbor 117 members.

The current situation: All factions of Grand Black signed the June 2013 peace accord brokered by Viva Rio. July 2013 was reported to be a month without any homicides in Greater Bel Air.

2) Van Vire (Delmas 2 and 117 (see conflict described in narrative): Tensions still run high between Van Vire and 117. Both groups are reported to be preparing for renewed fighting. 117 is reportedly reorganizing to return to Delmas 2 through the use of force. Van Vire is trying to uproot 117 from Delmas 2-4.

3) Fortouren and La Saline: Baz are in an ongoing, intermittent conflict over control of the Croix-des-Bouquets market. Control of the market is a contentious issue because of taxes exacted from market sellers, the majority who are women.

4) Warf Jeremie and Pont Rouge – neighborhoods that border Cité Soleil – commonly described as the “Wild West” of Greater Bel Air because the armed actors are considered to be criminal or connected with criminal networks. The armed actors are not territorial, but are closely connected to the baz leaders and have a strong influence over cultural life in the communities. Also involved in struggles over control of the Croix-des-Bouquets market.

5) Soline, Fort National and Corridor Bastia: Baz from neighboring zones of Greater Bel Air who are not enemies, but not allied to one another. As they border Plateau Bel Air, armed groups from Bel Air often take refuge there.

161For a broader list of armed groups operating in Haiti see S. Madigan, op cit. The following list provides a broad summary of armed actors operating in 2004: a corrupt national police force (HNP) politicised first by Aristide and then by its integration of rebel army milita who displaced Aristide in 2004 pre-opposition groups and coup supporters; ex-FADDH (the Haitian army disbanded by Aristide in 1994); SPSGN (Presidential Guard); OPs (popular organisations); baz armed elements of commonly cultural associations; organised criminal gangs including drug traffickers; and zenglendos ( petty criminals). The government militia known as Chimeres were drawn from baz armed, the armed OPs and the USPNG.
### ANNEX 5: SPATIAL MAPPING OF VIOLENCE IN BEL AIR (FOCUS GROUP)

Violence communautaires faite aux femmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ZONE DE MANIFESTATION</th>
<th>TYPE DE VIOLENCES FAITE AUX FEMMES</th>
<th>INTERVENTIONS OU ACCOMPAGNEMENT POUR PRÉVENIR ET/OU RÉDUIRE LA VIOLENCE FAITE AUX FEMMES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Dahomey: Près de la rue Maillard | • Viol collectif pendant la nuit  
• Agression physique  
• Agressions avec armes à feu et/ou armes blanches  
• Vol des effets personnels des femmes chez elles ou au moment des viols  
• Injures | • Dialogue  
• Présence des parents  
• Respect mutuel  
• Emploi  
• Affectivité  
• Assistance aux enfants  
• Responsabilité  
• Travail pour les femmes  
• Engagement partagé  
• Détermination des parents à aider leurs enfants |
| Boniman: situé entre Delmas 2 et Delmas 4 à l’intérieur | | |
| Télécom: Ancien bureau des installations techniques de la compagnie de télécommunication nationale aujourd’hui appelée NATCOM | | |
| CAMPS | | |
| La paix: située à Delmas 2 | • Viol collectif pendant la nuit  
• Agression physique  
• Agressions avec armes à feu et/ou armes blanches  
• Vol des effets personnels des femmes chez elles ou au moment des viols  
• Injures  
• Plagages  
• Meurtres | |
| Seu Pils: zone située derrière l’actuelle Direction Administrative de la PNH, Delmas 2 | | |
| What Jérémy: Près du grand marché public de La Saline | | |
| PLACE | | |
| Église Méthodiste de Rue Saint Martin | Viol sur des femmes lors d’un service spirituel à l’Église pendant la nuit (février 2013) | |
| Corridors (Des petits espaces situés entre les maisons facilitant les déplacements rapides d’un point à un autre) : Alpha, Danika, Senkonm, Gago, Bo lekwa, Dikiz. | • Viol collectif pendant la nuit sur des mineurs  
• Viol collectif sur des femmes en les accusant d’être des femmes des membres du gang 117  
• Agression physique  
• Agressions avec armes à feu  
• Vol des effets personnels des femmes au moment des viols  
• Injures | |
| Station de transport publique: Madame Kole, Crois des bossettes, Gonaïves | • Agression physique  
• Agressions avec armes à feu  
• Vol des effets personnels  
• Viols et prostitution pendant la nuit  
• Injures | |
| Hôtels | • Agression physique (Jalousie, effets de la drogue, infidélité de la femme, infidélité de l’homme)  
• Agressions avec armes à feu et/ou armes blanches  
• Vol sur les passants et inconnus  
• Injures  
• Meurtres  
• Plagages | |
| Blocs (Références indiquant plusieurs Rues) et Rueles (Petites Rues): Mailard, Tamarin club, Barouli, Raboto, Kafo 3, Zzirrit, Seu Iann, Trou et, Charlaitin, Chancerelle | • Viol  
• Vol sur les passants et inconnus  
• Meurtres  
• Plagages  
• Agression physique sur des passants et inconnus de la zone  
• Agressions avec armes à feu et/ou armes blanches  
• Injures  
• Agression physique pour le sexe  
• Agression physique sur les mineurs | |

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**Exploiting Inequalities: Conflict and Power Relations in Bel Air**

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58  EXPLOITING INEQUALITIES: CONFLICT AND POWER RELATIONS IN BEL AIR 59
Les femmes ont insisté sur la montée du niveau de la violence faite aux femmes pendant les cinq (5) dernières années (2008 – 2013) dans les quartiers défavorisés, marginalisés et pauvres. Cette montée de la violence due à plusieurs facteurs (le chômage, la misère, les crises politiques, l’instrumentalisation, etc.) poussent également les hommes à utiliser la violence comme réponse aux questions d’alimentation, de scolarisation et aux besoins quotidiens de la famille.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ZONE</th>
<th>TYPES</th>
<th>CAUSES</th>
<th>CONSÉQUENCES</th>
<th>SERVICES DISPONIBLES</th>
<th>INTERVENTIONS OU ACCOMPAGNEMENT POUR PRÉVENIR ET/OU RÉDUIRE LA VIOLENCE FAITE AUX FEMMES</th>
<th>CHANGEMENT D’ATTITUDE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestique</td>
<td>• Viol</td>
<td>• Le chômage</td>
<td>• Abandon de la maison</td>
<td>• Aucun service de justice dans toute la communauté</td>
<td>• Rapprochement de la PNH et présence des policiers dans les zones rouges de la communauté. Ex : Carrefour Péan, place La paix, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Agression physique</td>
<td>• La misère</td>
<td>• Les femmes battent aussi les enfants</td>
<td>• Les femmes ont peur de déclarer ou de porter plainte à la police</td>
<td>• Éclairage des corridors avec des lampes solaires</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Jalousie, effets de la drogue, infidélité de l’homme, nettoyage de la maison)</td>
<td>• Manque d’éducation professionnelle</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Pas de service de santé approprié dans les quartiers pour les cas de violence (Aggression, viol, injures, etc.)</td>
<td>• Création d’emplois pour les hommes et les femmes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Agressions avec arme à feu et/ou avec armes blanches</td>
<td>• Manque de formation</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Centre de santé de Delmas 4 (Manque d’équipement)</td>
<td>• Développer et promouvoir les business des femmes (Commerces formel ou informel)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Injures</td>
<td>• Consommation de drogues</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Conseil auprès des organisations de femmes comme SOFA et Kay Fann (Elles estiment que les actions des organisations de femmes sont trop lentes et qu’elles préfèrent rester dans le silence pour ne pas se faire tuer)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Agression physique pour le sexe</td>
<td>• Irresponsabilité</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Les garçons de 10 ans commencent à servir les bandits au lieu d’aller à l’école</td>
<td>• Éliminer les camps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Abandon de la maison</td>
<td>• Infidélité</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Prostitution infantile</td>
<td>• Mise en place des structures d’assistance légale pour les femmes victimes ou pas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Agression physique sur les enfants</td>
<td>• Manque de dialogue</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Brutalité</td>
<td>• Création d’infrastructures scolaires</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Manque d’attention</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Absence physique</td>
<td>• Création d’infrastructures d’école professionnelles pour valoriser les compétences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Brutalité</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Vol mineur</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Les femmes ont également estimé que les solutions pour contrer la violence faite aux femmes étaient trop lentes et qu’elles préfèrent rester dans le silence pour ne pas se faire tuer.

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**Zones**

**Types**

- Viol
- Agression physique
- Agressions avec arme à feu et/ou avec armes blanches
- Injures
- Agression physique pour le sexe
- Abandon de la maison
- Agression physique sur les enfants

**Causes**

- Le chômage
- La misère
- Manque d’éducation professionnelle
- Manque de formation
- Consommation de drogues
- Irresponsabilité
- Infidélité
- Manque de dialogue
- Manque d’attention
- Brutalité
- Absence physique

**Conséquences**

- Abandon de la maison
- Les femmes battent aussi les enfants
- Délinquances juvéniles et infantiles
- Déperdition scolaire
- Grossesse prématurée des enfants à partir de 12 ans
- Les garçons de 10 ans commencent à servir les bandits au lieu d’aller à l’école
- Prostitution infantile
- Vol mineur

**Services disponibles**

- Aucun service de justice dans toute la communauté
- Les femmes ont peur de déclarer ou de porter plainte à la police
- Pas de service de santé approprié dans les quartiers pour les cas de violence (Aggression, viol, injures, etc.)
- Centre de santé de Delmas 4 (Manque d’équipement)
- Conseil auprès des organisations de femmes comme SOFA et Kay Fann (Elles estiment que les actions des organisations de femmes sont trop lentes et qu’elles préfèrent rester dans le silence pour ne pas se faire tuer)

**Interventions ou accompagnement pour prévenir et/ou réduire la violence faite aux femmes**

- Rapprochement de la PNH et présence des policiers dans les zones rouges de la communauté. Ex : Carrefour Péan, place La paix, etc.
- Éclairage des corridors avec des lampes solaires
- Création d’emplois pour les hommes et les femmes
- Développer et promouvoir les business des femmes (Commerces formel ou informel)
- Éliminer les camps
- Mise en place des structures d’assistance légale pour les femmes victimes ou pas
- Création d’infrastructures scolaires
- Création d’infrastructures d’école professionnelles pour valoriser les compétences

**Changement d’attitude**

- Dialogue
- Présence des parents
- Respect mutuel
- Emploi
- Affectivité
- Assistance aux enfants
- Responsabilité
- Travail pour les femmes
- Engagement partagé
- Détermination des parents à aider leurs enfants
### Levels of Potential Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual/Personal Factors</th>
<th>Current Problem Conditions</th>
<th>Changes to Promote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Frustration (when frustrated, violence becomes justified)</td>
<td>• Productive coping and self-control behaviors should be taught as part of life skills incorporated into non-formal and formal education systems/NGO programs</td>
<td>• Work on reducing the psychological aspects that make mobilization for violence more likely in the popular neighborhoods; mobilized on AIVS - involve community members (including bad members) in psychosocial interventions which give them a little power, provide opportunities for community service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unmet human identity needs (recognition, meaning, self-efficacy/agency, security, belonging)</td>
<td>• Increase opportunities for positive contact and interaction between people in Bel Air and the economic elite to break down stereotypes and negative patterns of interacting</td>
<td>• Strengthen the way to gain authority and recognition in the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Negative stereotypes of the “elite” and that the economic/political have of the popular neighborhoods and bases</td>
<td>• Belonging: strengthen other community groups, religious groups and civic participation to increase feelings of belonging to a community and nation</td>
<td>• Deep-seated conflict within the Parliament and other state institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of productive coping and self-control behaviors</td>
<td>• Frustration: frustration and interactions across group lines</td>
<td>• Increased collaboration between NGOs working on violence reduction in Bel Air (split up “zones”) and sectors to ensure equal coverage and consistency of approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Vocational training and educational programs without increased opportunities for employment raise expectations and increase frustration amongst youth when employment is not available, putting them at higher risk of seeing violence as justified (trained youth also more likely to report recognition of discrimination or other class barriers prevent them from accessing economic opportunities) - DNN consideration</td>
<td>• Increase responsibility and ownership for conflict prevention/resolution services, but also conflict prevention/resolution mechanisms, give population a mechanism to denounce abuses by the police; other changes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Institutions (formal and informal): How do schools/universities, police, armed forces, justice system, transport, government administration, banks/finance and other institutions function—and how do they influence conflict? What are the informal mechanisms at the community level, such as local dispute resolution processes? How does leadership function within institutions?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Relationships &amp; Social Norms: How different groups in society relate to each other</th>
<th>Current Problem Conditions</th>
<th>Changes to Promote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Violent historic patterns of interaction at the elite and the masses</td>
<td>• Violent historic patterns of interaction at the elite and the masses</td>
<td>• Make all violence visible and address not only violence at the community level (Bel Air), but also the violence instigated by upper/national level actors. Focus should not just be on security at the local level, but public policy responses should focus on the system of violence (not security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of common vision for peace (differences between classes and within classes)</td>
<td>• Lack of common vision for peace (differences between classes and within classes)</td>
<td>• Dialogue processes at both the community and national levels to address Haiti’s traumatic history and to create a common vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NGOs such as Viva Rio and 3PSM provide spaces of interaction for bases and community leaders</td>
<td>• NGO’s such as Viva Rio and 3PSM provide spaces of interaction for bases and community leaders</td>
<td>• Provide space for youth to participate in civic activities, and leadership of community/youth associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Degree of polarization across the class divide and political divide is high, although opportunistic alliances are formed and fluctuate based on context</td>
<td>• Favorable leaderships at the community level, particularly around 117</td>
<td>• Engage religious leaders at the grassroots in efforts to bring together the youth and older community leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Polarization between armed groups, particularly around 117</td>
<td>• Generation gap within communities is played out within and among armed groups</td>
<td>• Increase responsibility and ownership for conflict resolution efforts amongst local population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Weak sense of ownership of community conflict resolution efforts amongst the population</td>
<td>• The way to gain authority and recognition in the community based on involvement in baz or other armed groups</td>
<td>• Increase the recognition of community associations and leaders other than the bases (institutes and religious leaders, youth groups, women’s associations)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Deep Social, Political and Economic Structures and Culture: How does the economy work? Who gains and who loses? What are the social structures of inclusion/exclusion, hierarchy/classism? How does governance work—on paper and in practice? What cultural beliefs and practices aggravate or diminish conflict?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factories at Different Levels</th>
<th>Current Problem Conditions</th>
<th>Changes to Promote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Violence of patterns of interaction across group lines</td>
<td>• Systemic patterns of violence between the elites and the popular neighborhoods</td>
<td>• Focus should not just be on security at the local level, but public policy responses should focus on the system of violence (not security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Use of violence to get recognition or status within bases and between bases</td>
<td>• Enrenched poverty - creates feelings of powerlessness and frustration.</td>
<td>• Violence reduction mainstreamed into development projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Violent patterns of interaction between the upper level actors and grassroots to bridge gaps</td>
<td>• Enrenched poverty - creates feelings of powerlessness and frustration.</td>
<td>• Take a resilience based approach to strengthening factors that promote resilience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Create other forums and non-violent means of interacting across class and political lines</td>
<td>• Create positive modes of citizen participation (particularly for youth)</td>
<td>• “Whole of peacebuilding model”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Create positive modes of citizen participation (particularly for youth)</td>
<td>• Identify key individuals who can make linkages between the upper level actors and grassroots to bridge gaps</td>
<td>• Engage religious leaders at the grassroots in efforts to bring together the youth and older community leaders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**ANNEX 6: LEVELS OF POTENTIAL CHANGE**
Norwegian Church Aid is an ecumenical, diaconal organization for global justice. We work where needs are greatest, with no intention of changing the religious affiliation of our beneficiaries. To ensure the efficiency and quality of our work, Norwegian Church Aid is a member of the ACT Alliance, one of the world’s largest humanitarian alliances. The alliance consists of church-based organizations throughout the world and cooperates with organizations of other religious faiths.

Norwegian Church Aid is committed to the vision: TOGETHER FOR A JUST WORLD